318
Allan
M.
Winkler
ahead. Secretary of War Henry
L.
Stimson, overall director of the project,became increasingly aware of the bomb's potential impact on interna-tional diplomatic affairs. In 1947 he reflected that "with the release ofatomic energy, man's ability to destroy himself is very nearly complete."As hydrogen weapons replaced atomic bombs in the 1950s and kilotonsgave way to megatons in the decades that followed, such fear grew evenmore pronounced and speculation about a dismal or non-existent futurebecame more common. Scientists in the 1970s and 1980s predicteddeadly epidemics of radiation-related illness, devastating climatic adjust-ments, and the death of life as we know it2Fear, of course, has always been muted by hope. With the advent ofnuclear energy, a new age beckoned, and for years the possibilities appearedboundless. Atomic energy could "usher in a new day of peace and plenty,"according to University of Chicago Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins in 1945.This wonderful new force, Walt Disney proclaimed a decade later in thepopular children's book
Our Friend the
Atom,
could
"be
put to use for cre-ation, for the welfare of mankind." Despite the near-catastrophic accidentsaround the world, the administration of George Bush began at the end of the1980s to dream of the advantages of nuclear power again3In the effort to reconcile hopes and fears, scientists played a majorpart. They spoke out first as the experts who had unleashed the awesomenew force and best understood how to deal with it. Though many haddoubts from the start about the monster they might create, they set asidetheir anxieties in the interests of defeating Adolf Hitler and his Axisallies. "How Well We Meant," Nobel Prizewinner I. I. Rabi titled hisspeech to Los Alamos colleagues at a reunion several decades after theirfirst success. Meanwhile, literary and artistic commentators began toexplore the dramatic possibilities of atomic holocaust. "When the bombwas dropped," author Isaac Asimov noted, "atomic-doom science-fictionstories grew to be so numerous that editors began refusing them onsight." Novels, stories, comics, films, songs-all served as something ofa safety valve, allowing fears to find expression as artists indulged theircreative vision. But it was government officials, rather than scientists orcultural critics, who seized the initiative in shaping the public agenda.The scientists and intellectuals, policy makers felt, failed to understandpolitical demands. As strategic and military planning came to dominatenational discourse, they argued that they alone had the expertise toprotect the nation from nuclear threat. Their reach extended in all direc-tions. They helped promote public dreams about nuclear planes andships, about the medical benefits of atomic isotopes, about the extrava-gant possibilities of nuclear power. And they made the final decisionsabout how development shouldpr~ceed.~
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