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House of CommonsTreasury Committee
Banking Crisis
Written Evidence – Part 3
This is a volume of submissions, relevant to the inquiry Banking Crisis, which have not yet been approved for publication in final form. Any public use of, or reference to, the contents should make clear that it is not yet an approved final record of the written evidence received by the Committee.Only those submissions written specifically for the Committee have been included.
 
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List of written evidence
Page 
 
70 Odey Asset Management (second submission) 371 Linda Kaucher, London School of Economics 1072 Dr Damian Tambini, POLIS/London School of Economics 1573 Sir Michael Rake, Guidelines Monitoring Group 1974 Richard Pereira 20, 2675 Standard and Poor’s 3476 Lord Stevenson and Andy Hornby 3877 Lloyds Banking Group 4278 Paul Moore, Ex-head of Group Regulatory Risk, HBOS Plc 4679 Professor Prem Sikka (supplementary memo) 5380 Investor Voice 5681 Mick McQuade 6182 FSF ICAEW 7083 Ian Johnstone 7384 Philip Slaymaker 7585 Findlay Turner 7786 Kais Uddin 7987 Financial Services Authority 8388 Greg Pytel 9489 Guernsey Financial Services Commission (supplementary memo) 10290 Gavin Fryer 10391 KSFIOM (supplementary memo) 10592 Tony Shearer (supplementary memo) 10993 Which? (supplementary memo) 11394 Charities Aid Foundation (supplementary memo) 11595 Financial Reporting Council (supplementary memo) 12096 Clive Menzies 13997 Chris Wilson 14098 ACCA 14199 Peter Hamilton 147100 HM Treasury 148101 Financial Services Compensation Scheme 149102 Tony Shearer (supplementary memo) 154103 AIMA (supplementary memo) 157104 Ron Parr 161105 Citizens Advice Scotland 163106 Common Good Party 187107 Carmel Butler 192108 Philip Murphy 214109 Manifest 216110 Phil Bale 251
 
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Further memorandum from Odey Asset ManagementAction on Troubled Debts and how to Kick-start Corporate Lending 
We judge there is a significant opportunity for government to restart the credit flows throughthe financial and real economy of the UK, to make that happen fast, to ensure fair value fortax payers, and to do this with an exit strategy in mind.We recommend
a two-stage package of UK government intervention
:
 
a national bank for troubled debts or government guarantee scheme
 
active intervention to kick-start corporate debt markets
… other interventions will be necessary as the crisis progresses and should be coordinatedwith this package. Without this scheme as a foundation, existing and future measures look likely to fail.
We also offer a comment and proposals on HM Treasury’s latest guidance on theproposed asset protection scheme to deal with bad debts (page 3).Key arguments:
- a recent IMF working paper* showed that 60% of all global banking crises in the last30yrs (42 crises in total) were ended by a bad bank or troubled debt guarantee structure. Thisstructure is missing from the policy response in the UK today.- the buyer of last resort approach for company debt is analogous to the US TALFintervention scheme. The TALF provides evidence that this approach delivers significantpositive effects for the wider economy and population.- international experience provides elements of successful road-maps for implementingthe proposals.- these measures would not hand UK banks a ‘free lunch’. It will ensure that solventUK banks remain in private sector control.- the two building block measures will work best when accompanied by other sensiblepolicy measures including credit guarantee schemes, and the much needed flexing orsuspension of those Basle 2 rules which have a pro-cyclical impact.- there is no reason for government to make a loss over the life of the project.
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