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MEMORANDUMTO: Front
Office
FROM: Team
8
RE:DoDDocument ProductionDATE: October
29,
2003This
memorandum
addresses
our
recent discoveries regarding
DoD's
documentproduction,anddiscussestheimpactof thesituationon ourwork.
1.
Commission
Requests
As you
know,
Team
8 is
charged, among other tasks, with determining
the
factssurrounding
our
nation's
air
defense response
to the
hijackings
of
9/1
1
.
The
bulk
of DoD
requests
related to this issue are contained in DoD Document Request Nos. 1 and 4. DoDRequest
No. 1 was
submitted
to DoD on May 9,
2003, with
a
production date
of May 23,
2003;
RequestNo. 4 wassubmittedto DoD onJune
13,
2003, withaproduction dateofJune
30, 2003.
(See
Tab A).
Outlined below
are
some
of the
specific
items
contained in
these requests
that
should have produced the materials that have recently beendiscovered.
f.n
m
1
.
"All documents relating
to
communications between NORAD
and the FAA
concerningthe tracking
of the
hijacked airplanes
on
9/1 1/01
."
(Request
No.
1
,
Item
1
3).
2."AllDoDafter-action reviews relatingto theeventsof9/11/01,including documentsrelating
to the
graphic depiction
of the
events
of
9/1
1/01
presented
to a
NationalReconnaissance Office Conference
on
June
3,
2002,
by|
|
and
the
review
of
scramble activity
for the
First
Air
Force
and
Continental
Air
Defence Region (CONAR)
,on
9/1
1/01
completed by the Chief of Staff (Colonel
Scott)
or
other/
officials
in
2002."
(Request No. 1, Item 10).
CO
<~2
3. "All transcripts, tapes
and
other documents related
to any
interagency
phoneconference that NORAD (including all of its components)
conducted
or participated in on
9/1
1
relatedto thehijackingsof
9/1
1
and NORAD's
response
thereto."
(RequestNo.
4,
Item
3). /
4."All transcripts, tapesandother documents relatedto anyinternal NORAD phoneconferences
or
communications
on
9/1
1
related
to the
hijackings
of 9/1
1
and
NORAD's
response thereto." (RequestNo. 4,Item4).
/
5.
"Transcripts of all communications and orders conveyed to pilots scrambled in support
of the
North East
Air
Defense Sector's(NEADS)response
to the
hijackings
of
9/1
1."
(Request
No. 4,Item5).
/
9/11 Personal Privacy
 
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
6.
"All transcripts, tapes
and
other documents
of the
parent wings
of
aircraft
scrambled
in
support
of
NEADS' response
on
9/1
1
,
related
to the
response
of
such
aircraft
to the
hijackings
of 9/1
1."
(Request
No. 4,
Item
6).
7.
"All transcripts, tapes
and
other documents
of the Air
Force Bases
from
which
aircraft
were
scrambled
in
support
of
NEADS's
response
on9/11,
related
to the
response
of
such
aircraft
to the
hijackings
of 9/1
1."
(Request
No. 4,
Item
7).
II.
Experience
at
Otis
AFB
On
October
1
4-1 5,
John
Fanner
and
John Azzarello visited Otis
Air
Force Base
andinterviewed
(l)j
{(Command
Post Duty Controller),
(2)
Maj. Daniel Nash (one
of two
pilots
scrambled
out of
Otis),
and
(3)1
IfWine
historian).
In the
course
of
these
interviewswe
uncovered
the
existence
of the
following documents, none
of
which
were produced
to the
Commission prior
to our
visit
to
Otis:
1
.
Audio
and
video interviews
of
personnel
involved
on 9/11:
We
learned that
a
I
Know
stationed
in
Japan), conducted audio
and
video
/
interviews
of the
pilots
and
other personnel involved
on 9/1
1.
The
people
we
spoke with said
that!
jvas
not
"officially" asked
to
conduct
these
interviews.
However,
the
tapes
of the
interviews
are in the
possession
of the
/
.base
and the
people
we
spoke
to
repeatedly referred
to
this project
as the
only"after-action
report''
conducted
by
base personnel
post-9/1
1
.
/
2.
Tapes
from
the
cockpit:
We
learned that
the two
pilots scrambled
from
Otis
-
Duffy
and
Nash
-
recorded their activities
in the
cockpit.
Specifically,
Nashrecorded
all of his
activities
in the
cockpit,
and
Duffy
activated
his
recorder
to
/
memorialize changes
in the
rules
of
engagement.
These
tapes reportedly include
all
commufiications
with controllers
as
well
as
video
and
radar data
from
their
mission.,
3.
Logs from Command
Post,
SOF and
Operations Desk:
We
were informed
that
there
are one or
possibly
two
logs
--
other than
the one log
that
was
produced
.to
.us
that relate
to the
events
of the
day.
/
4.
Historian's
Report:
The
Wing historian wrote
a
piece
on the
events
of
9/1
1
,
.
.
and
kept notes
on his
underlying
interviews.
\Yith
theexcepti
on
of the
latter category
of
documents, which were provided
to the
staff
Interview,
none
of
these materials have
yet
been provided
to the.Commission.
III.
Experience
at
NEADS
This week John Farmer, John Azzarello
and
Miles Kara visited
the
Northeast
Air
Defense
Sector
(NEADS)
and
began
a
series
of
interviews with personnel involved
in
NORAD's
air
defense operation
on 9/1
1
.
The
NEADS trip
is the
first
field
visit
to
NORAD facilities
by
Commission
staff;
similar visits
to
CONR
and
Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center(CMOC) were scheduled
for the
week
of
November
10
th
and
December 1
st
, respectively.9/11
Personal Privacy
 
COMMISSION
SENSITIVE
In
preparation
for
this visit
we
spent
the
last
two
weeks reviewing
the
documentsproduced
to the
Commission
by
NEADS
and
other NORAD facilities. With
the
exceptionof
three logs totaling
eight
pages,
the
only document produced
by
NEADS
was a
"Transcript from Voice Recorder," (See DoD Index #NCT0000049-130). This transcript
was
made within a week of
9/11
and was produced relatively early in response to theCommission's requests - on June 2
nd
.
The
transcript purports to capture the communications of various NEADS personnel,includingthemission crew commander,on themorningof9/11. Becausethetranscript
ends
at
10:15
am, we
asked
in
repeated telephone conversations that
the
tape
be
further
transcribed. This request was memorialized in an email on September 8
th
. (See Tab B).
On
October 20,
after
receiving no
response
to our September 8
th
message, we again wrote
and
stressed
the
importance
of
both continuing
the
NEADS transcript
and of
receiving
all
relevant NEADS documents prior
to
flying
out to
Rome,
New
York. (See
Tab C).Finally,
last Friday
we met in
person with
DoD
officials,
and
once again stressed
the
significance
of
receiving
all
tapes
and
transcripts relevant
to 9/11,
prior
to
flying
to NewYork.
Once
on thegroundatNEADSweuncoveredthefollowing information:
1.
The
transcript NEADS produced
is
fatally incomplete
and
inaccurate:
When
we
arrived
at
NEADS,
we
began
to
listen
to the
tapes
from
which
the
transcript
was
made.
It was
apparent immediately
- and
acknowledged
by
NEADS
officials
-
that
there
are
significant
relevant omissions
in the
transcript.Voices that are clearly audible in the tape were not transcribed. Moreover,
significant
portions of the transcript are simply inaccurate; the words on the paper
do
nottrack whatisclearly heardon thetape.Putsimply,thetranscriptisuseless
as
a
formal
record
of
NEADS conversations
from
9/11
and
will have
to be
doneover.
2.
The
transcript
of the
tapes NEADS produced represents
at
best one-third
of
the
total relevant recorded materials NEADS possesses from
9/11:
We
discovered
further
that the one transcript produced by NEADS - which captures
approximately
five
channels
of
communication
-
constitutes only
a
 fraction
 - at
best one-third
of the
relevant recorded telephone lines
in the
facility.
Specifically,
we
learned that
the
NEADS transcript does
not
reflect conversations
by
personnel assigned to key positions at the SOCC (Sector Operations ControlCenter)on 9/11. As weunderstandit,thereare 46channels thatcan berecorded
from the
SOCC
floor.
Of
these
46
channels, only
five or six
were transcribed
and
produced
to the
Commission prior
to our
visit
to
NEADS.
3.
The
omitted
and
untranscribed statements
and
conversations contained
on
the
tapes
are
critical
to
understanding
the
events
of
9/11.
One example should
suffice.
In
media interviews
and in
testimony
before
this Commission, NORAD
officials
have
claimed
thatfighter
jets
were
scrambled
fromLangleyAirForce
Base
inresponseto thethreat posedtoWashington, D.C.by thehijackingofAmerican Airlines 77. This explanation has caused consternation among thevictims'
families,
who
have wondered
why the fighters did not
travel directly
to
of 00

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