Commission Sensitive 1
Draft
6/9/2004
Chairman Richard MyersTeam
8
Questions
I.
CINC NORAD,
August
1998-February
2000Air SovereigntyinName Only:
Gen. Meyers, you assumed command of NORAD at a critical time in the historyof
its air
defense/air sovereignty mission.
The
number
of
alert sites
had
beendeclining even prior
to the
collapse
of the
Soviet Union,
and the
Quardrennial
Defense
Review Report of 1997 recommended that the number of alert sites bereduced
to 4. We
understand that there
was
sentiment
in the
regular
Air
Force
to
eliminate
the air
defense mission entirely.
At the
same time, command
of the
First Air Force and CONR was transferred to the Air National Guard
from
theregular
Air
Force.You are reported to have told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs when you assumedcommand that
you
could provide
air
sovereignty
in
name only.
• Was
that your assessment?
If so,
what threats
did you
believeNORAD would
be
unable
to
address?
Did you
share these views with
the
Chairman?
• As
CINC NORAD,
did you
resist
the
reduction
of
NORAD'
s
capabilities to
four
alert sites? How many sites did you
feel
wouldhave been adequate
to
provide
air
sovereignty?
On 9/11
there were
7
alert facilities.Did you
feel
thatwas a
sufficient
number?
Role
andMission ("RAM") Team
Ourunderstandingisthatin 1999NORAD
formed
a"RoleandMission" (RAM)team to study the
efficacy
of the air defense/sovereignty mission.
•
What
was
your
role
in
the
formation
and
work of
the
RAM
team?
Are
you
familiar
with its findings? What was its impact on
NORAD's
airdefensemission and planning?Osama Bin Laden is featured on the cover of the brief developed by the RAMteam,
and he figures
prominently
in the
study.
In
terms
of the
nature
of the
threat,
one
member
of the
team
we
spoke with (Col. Scott
-
CONR
on
9/11)
stated,
"As
we
started
talking
about Osama
Bin
Laden,
the
examples
we
gave
in our
mission
brief were
the first WTC
bombing,
the
Tokyo subway, Oklahoma City bombingandAtlanta Olympics. What we did was connect those dots. The conclusion wedrew was that we had a viable threat."
• Did you
agree with this assessment? What
was the
nature
of the air
threat posed by Osama Bin Laden, as you understood it during yourtenure at NORAD?
Commission
Sensitive
Draft
6/9/2004
•
Every example given
by the RAM
team
—
WTC, Tokyo, Oklahoma
City, the
Atlanta Olympics
--
involved
an
internal attack.
Was
there
any
recognition that the old paradigm of
"looking
out" for threatsoverseas
- or
merely assisting
law
enforcement
in
domestic cases
-
may not be
sufficient
to
combat
the
terrorist threat? What
did you
envision
NORAD's
role to be in responding to such internal attacks?
What
kind
of
force
structure
did you
feel
NORAD needed
to
respond
to the
threat?
•
Did
NORAD's training
and
exercise
regimen reflect
the
emergingthreat identified
by the RAM
team? How?
HijackingsPriorto
9/11
•
How
would
you
describe
the
relationship between NORAD
and the
FAA
prior to
9/11?
Please describe the division of responsibility with
respect
to
hijackings.
•
Prior
to
9/11
did the
leadership
of
NORAD ever consider
the
possibility
of a
suicide
hijackingas a
threat
to ournation?We have heard
from
a
number
of
DoD
officials
-
including
the
Secretary
-
that prior
to
9/11
hijackings were considered
a law
enforcement
issue,andthatDoD wasonlytoplayasupporting roleifcalled upon.
My
question
is how
could
law
enforcement
-
either state
or
federal
-
ever
effectively
respond
to a
suicide hijacking? What assets
are
available
to law
enforcement
to
shoot down
an
aircraft
with
a
suicide
hijacker
in control? Once one acknowledges the possibility of a suicide
hijacking,how can the
tasking
for
that eventuality
be
assigned anywhere
but
to the Air Force?
• To
your knowledge, prior
to
9/11
did
NORAD ever conduct
any
training exercises that involved a suicide hijacking scenario?
Homeland Defense
-
QDR
Debate
During
your confirmation hearing,
on
September
13,
2001,
you
stated that
the
issue of homeland defense was debated in
DoD's
quadrennial defense review(released on September 30,
2001),
and that the September
11
th
tragedy put that
issue
"center
stage."
•
Please describe
the
debate surrounding homeland defense prior
to
9/11.
Was the
role
and
mission
of
NORAD
a
factor
in
that debate?
What
threats were envisioned?
Commission Sensitive
Draft
6/9/2004
II. Day
of
9/11
Command and Control on 9/11Immediate Response:
When did you first arrive in the NMCC? How
did
you learn of the
stakes
in New York? What was your reaction tothe second hit on the World Trade Center? Specifically, whatactions/decisions were made between
the
second strike
in NYC - at
approximately 0903
-
and
the
time
the
Pentagon
washit -
0937?
Coordination with FAA:
It appears that the FAA was not linked into
the
NMCC until approximately 1015
—
after
Flight
93 had
alreadygone down in Pennsylvania. What was the coordination with the FAAfrom the NMCC? Did you speak to anyone from the FAA or DOT onthemorningof9/11? Did youviewthelink betweenNORAD and
FAA
as
critical
to an
effective
air defense operation?
Control
of
Fighters Over
DC:
At one point a question was posedabouttheVice Chairman wantingtoknowwho iscontrolling
aircraft
over DC. The FAA answers Washington
Center.
Was it your understanding that the
FAA
was controlling thefighter
aircraft?
Were you or others in the NMCC incontact with NEADSatthis time?Did theFAA's response triggerconcerns in your mind about the level of coordination andunderstanding between NORAD and the
FAA
that morning?
Shoot Down Order:
Whereandwhendid you firstlearnof theshootdown order? How was it passed down the chain of command at DoD?The first guidance ADD was at approximately ADD; it was
followed
by
similar instruction
at
approximately ADD.Were you monitoring the ATCC when these instructionswere given? What actions were takenat theNMCCinresponse to these requests? A representative from NORADwas on the call at this time, do you know what actions thePEOC requests triggered at NORAD?Secretary
Rumsfeld
stated that by the time he got on the ATCC
and
spoke
to the
Vice
President
- at
approximately 1040
- his
understanding was that the Combatant Commander had alreadybeen authorized by the Vice President to shoot
down
after
the VicePresident talkedto thePresident.
Search History:
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9/11 Commission Draft Questions for General Richard Myers
A set of draft questions prepared by the 9/11 Commission for General Richard Myers. The questions cover NORAD's missions, Myers' perception of the threat posed by Osama bin Laden and hijackings prior to 9/11. There are also questions about the day of 9/11, when he learned about specific events, coordination with the FAA and the shootdown order.
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