principles to decide among them. We conclude by looking at how to deal in a fair and just manner with conflicts between humans and non-humans and at GaryVarner’s version of moral functionalism. While Taylor’s ethic is largely focusedon individual moral responsibility, there is also a need to consider our roles asmembers of larger communities, a task for the following chapter.4
Community
We turn next to the key issues about holism and communitarianism inenvironmental thought. For some theorists – notably J. B. Callicott – moralindividualism misses the point, and should be replaced by a kind of land-ethicalcommunitarianism, inspired by the thought of Aldo Leopold. We indicate thatthere are metaphysical issues about individualism, subjectivity and objectivitywhich also need to be considered. Although mentioned here, these metaphysicalmatters are dealt with more fully in chapter 8. Focusing on Callicott’s moralsystem, we show why his holism is distinct from his communitarianism, and howhe attacks agent-neutrality and consequentialism. We also assess Callicott’shostility to moral pluralism – an issue that leads us to consider the more generalcase of pluralism in moral theory. By now a further problem is starting to emerge:theorists have discussed different kinds of individuals, and different kinds of communities, all as candidates for having value and deserving respect. So whatare natural things, and which of the various kinds of individual and communityare worthy of respect?5
Natural things
Many theorists have tried to extend the Kantian notions of freedom and self-determination to different ranges of natural things. By diagramming theconceptual space, we show vividly that various of these ‘expanded circles’ fail tocohere. In place of one set of expanding circles, there are several possible, anddifferent, ways of extending value to natural things. What, then, does ‘natural’mean in this context? We review Hume’s, Kant’s and Mill’s understanding of naturalness, and raise the intriguing questions (i) of whether natural things canhave dignity (ii) whether humans themselves are ‘natural’? We consider thearguments of Andrew Brennan, Eric Katz and Robert Elliot on intrinsic functionand their implications for copying and restoration projects, for individuals,species, landscapes and ecosystems. Does restored nature have as much value as pristine nature? To answer this question, we consider the work of Y.S. Lo and thecase of the Yellowstone wolf project. All these discussions, however, pose a prior question – about the source of moral value itself – which is worth separate study. 6
Foundations
What have philosophers regarded as the sources of intrinsic value? We suggestthat answering this question uncovers some surprising and hidden foundations of contemporary thought. We trace the idea that value is an elite quality – asunderstood in older meritocratic ways of thinking – and ask whether there is aspecifically religious element (involving God’s grace) in the notion of absolute,unconditional value. We also inquire whether Kantian foundations for value provide a secular alternative to the religious ones. If so, then can Kant’s ideas beextended in a reasonable way to animals, living things, species and ecosystems?To complete the review of these foundational ideas, we look at subjectivism andobjectivism about value in the work of Callicott, Holmes Rolston and EugeneHargrove (the aesthetics of nature) and consider the extent to which there can be asynthesis between the subjective and objective accounts of value that are common
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