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February 2009
 As President Barack Obama and his teamdene the contours o a new U.S. oreign pol-icy, one o their many challenges is to reor-mulate U.S. policy on democracy promotion.President George W. Bush elevated the proleo U.S. democracy promotion but then badly tarnished it. By relentlessly associating it withthe Iraq war and regime change, he causedmany in the world to see it as a hypocriticalcover or aggressive interventionism servingU.S. security needs. By casting the war onterrorism as a global “reedom agenda,” yetcultivating close ties with autocratic regimeshelpul on counterterrorism, he provoked justiable charges o double standards. Andby condoning U.S. abuses o the rule o lawand human rights against persons caught in America’s antiterrorism net, he badly dam-aged America’s standing as a global symbol o democracy.Some o President Obama’s initial actionsoer a valuable start in a necessary process o dissociating the United States rom this un-ortunate legacy. Just by being elected, Obamasent a ringing signal to the world o the renewalo American democracy and the power o thedemocratic idea. His immediate order to closethe Guantánamo Bay detention acility withina year and additional subsequent actions toreverse other legally problematic parts o the war on terrorism added momentum to therejuvenation o America’s global democratic
Docc Pootion und O:Finding  W Fowd
ThOmas CarOThers
Vice President or Studies, Carneie Endowment or International Peace
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
POLICY BRIEF
77
C
 ARNEGIE
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The Bush’s administration’s hihly problematic leacy on democracy promotion and eneral pessimismabout the lobal state o democracy create pressure on the Obama administration to pull the United Statessubstantially back rom supportin democracy abroad.
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Althouh dissociatin U.S. democracy support rom the errors o the Bush approach is crucial, a broad realistcorrective o U.S. policy is not necessary.
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The way orward or Obama will be more about chanin
how 
the United States oes about supportindemocracy abroad than about
what emphasis
to place on democracy relative to other interests.
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Cardinal values o Obama’s political philosophy and style—non-conrontational, measured, persistent,bipartisan, cooperative, eective, and empowerin—provide a natural basis or a new ramework to help theUnited States reain its place as a respected, trusted, and inuential ally o democracy around the world.
Summary
 
2POLICY BRIEF
standing. His sober approach to Iraq—talkingabout it as a daunting policy challenge ratherthan as a shining example o U.S. democracy promotion—halts a long, painul delegitimi-zation o the democracy promotion concept.His expressed openness to diplomatic engage-ment with hostile governments has put theregime-change line to rest.Restorative though these steps have been,they are more preparatory to than constitu-tive o a new approach to democracy promo-tion. As Obama and his advisers ormulatesuch an approach in the months ahead, they  will ace signicant pressure to go beyonddissociating the United States rom the Bushlegacy and pull back on the promotion o democracy generally. This pressure has mul-tiple sources. Many observers see Bush’s pushon democracy in the Middle East as havingbeen counterproductive and believe Obamashould embrace the old line o uncritical sup-port or riendly Arab autocrats. Also gainingcurrency is the notion that the United Stateshas been pushing elections too hard in politi-cally shaky developing countries and shouldback away on electoral support and concen-trate instead on oundational elements likebuilding the rule o law and an eective state.Common, too, is the view that, not just inthe Middle East and on elections but muchmore generally, Bush’s enthusiasm or democ-racy promotion has turned U.S. policy away rom core interests, necessitating a broad real-ist corrective. Adding still urther weight tothis cautionary outlook is a growing sense inmany quarters that democracy is doing badly in the world or a whole variety o reasons andthat, in the words o one leading democracy specialist, the world is experiencing “a demo-cratic recession.” Although Obama and his team, their handsmore than ull with urgent issues like the glob-al nancial crisis and the Israeli–Palestinianconfict, have not yet shown their cards, thereare hints they may be inclined toward a gener-al pullback on promoting democracy. Obamararely spoke about the topic while a candidateand has made little mention o it since becom-ing president, including in his inaugural ad-dress. Hillary Clinton touched only glancingly on democracy support in her Senate conrma-tion hearings. The “three
D
’s” policy rame- work that she has articulated—deense, di-plomacy, and development—noticeably leaveout the potential ourth
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o democracy. In January both Obama and Clinton expressedthe concern that the United States has beenoveremphasizing elections in its democracy and development work.Caution and moderation on democracy pol-icy are very much in order, including a careulpost-Bush process o repair and recovery. At thesame time, however, President Obama and hisoreign policy team should not, either explicitly or implicitly, embrace a broad realist corrective.The various pressures cited above that mightpoint to a need or such a shit are a combina-tion o misconceptions and myths. Despite allthe problems o recent years, it remains bothpossible and advisable or the United States tobe an active, infuential supporter o democra-cy abroad. Moreover, key elements o Obamasoverall political philosophy provide a naturalbasis or a new ramework in the domain o democracy support. Realist though some o hiscore instincts may be, Obama has in act all thenecessary attributes to be a natural leader o anew and ruitul period o U.S. prodemocracy policies and programs.
middl et miconcption
The idea that the Obama administrationshould stay clear o any eort to support dem-ocratic change in the Middle East arises romthe reductionistic verdict that U.S. policy ana-lysts and journalists oten render on Bush’s at-tempts at Arab democratization: Bush wanted Arab democracy, the argument goes, and look  what he got—Arab states holding electionsthat empowered troublesome Islamists, suchas Hizbollah, Hamas, Iraqi Islamists, and theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The UnitedStates, it ollows, would be better o not stir-ring that pot again anytime soon.
Thomas Carothers is vice presi-dent or studies at the CarneieEndowment or InternationalPeace. In this capacity, he overseesthe Democracy and Rule o LawProram, Middle East Proram,and Carneie Europe.Carothers is a leadin authorityon democracy promotion anddemocratization worldwide aswell as an expert on U.S. oreinpolicy enerally. He is the ounderand director o the Democracyand Rule o Law Proram, whichanalyzes the state o democracy inthe world and the eorts by theUnited States and other coun-tries to promote democracy. Inaddition, he has broad experiencein matters dealin with humanrihts, international law, oreinaid, rule o law, and civil societydevelopment.He is the author or editor oeiht critically acclaimed bookson democracy promotion as wellas many articles in prominent journals and newspapers. He hasbeen a visitin aculty memberat Oxord University, CentralEuropean University, and theJohns Hopkins School o AdvancedInternational Studies.Prior to joinin the Endowment,Carothers practiced internationaland fnancial law at Arnold &Porter and served as an attorney-adviser in the Ofce o the LealAdviser o the U.S. Department oState.
 
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION UNDER OBAMA: FINDINg A WAY FORWARD3
Two principal misconceptions underlie this view. First, although Bush spoke oten aboutthe value and possibility o Arab democracy and established some aid programs and diplo-matic initiatives to support political and otherreorms, he hardly made a major push or it.Underneath his loty prodemocracy rheto-ric and mild prodding o Arab counterparts,business as usual continued or the most part,that is, close U.S. security and economic ties with autocratic Arab allies like Saudi Arabia,the smaller Gul states, Egypt, Jordan, andMorocco. The Iraqi intervention was, o course,an enormous endeavor but one rooted in secu-rity concerns with democracy added as a goalonly very secondarily. The prodemocratic dip-lomatic pressure on Arab allies, such as it was,lasted only briefy—ater the shock o Hamas’s victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections, theBush administration largely abandoned it.Second, Islamist gains in Egypt, Iraq,Lebanon, and Palestine should not be a show-stopper or U.S. support or Arab democracy.Hizbollah and Hamas are special cases—Islamist political organizations engaged inarmed struggle against Israel, including the useo terrorism. Their electoral successes shouldnot provoke or uel a generalized ear o widerand reer political participation in Arab states.The Islamist movements and parties taking partin elections in most o the Arab world—like Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Morocco’s Party o Justice and Development, and Kuwait’sIslamic Constitutional Movement—are non- violent. Electoral participation by such groupshas not overwhelmed the political system andhas tended to encourage their moderation. Thealternative o completely bottling up Islamistspolitically only osters tensions and radicalismthat spell serious trouble down the road. While Bush’s push on Arab democracy ellar short o the hopes he had invested in it, it was not pointless. President Bush’s declarationson the subject, and the associated proreormaid initiatives, did help stimulate an already existing debate within the Arab world overdemocracy. Due to his extremely low credibil-ity in the Arab world, though, Bush was notan eective messenger. Nevertheless, his ba-sic message—that Arab states should and canovercome their political stagnation and decay and that their doing so would be good both orthem and or the United States—is a valuableone. I President Obama continues to build onhis initial credibility in the region, he couldbecome an eective spokesperson or this ideaand build around it modest but worthwhilesupporting aid and diplomatic initiatives.
Ovpizing elction?
The charge that Washington errs by overem-phasizing elections at the expense o otherbuilding blocks o democratic development,in eect, equating elections with democracy,is not new. In the 1980s, critics assailed theReagan administration or presenting elec-tions in El Salvador as the achievement o democracy in that war-torn country. In the1990s, some scholars accused the UnitedStates o contributing to the spread o illib-eral democracies and civil conficts by push-ing countries to elections prematurely. Theconcern surged again in the Bush years withsome critics aulting Bush or overemphasiz-ing elections, such as in Iraq, Palestine, andthe Arab world generally.It is certainly true that over the past 25years the United States has very oten support-ed elections in countries moving away romauthoritarian rule, through diplomatic en-couragement, technical assistance, and elec-tion monitoring. Yet in the overall domain o U.S. democracy support, elections are hardly dominant. Less than 20 percent o U.S. de-mocracy assistance goes to electoral programs.Most democracy aid already goes to precisely the sorts o putatively oundational areas thatelectoral skeptics call or, such as developing
Ction nd odtion on docc polic v c in od, inclding  cl pot-bpoc o pi nd cov.
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