• Embed Doc
  • Copy Link
  • Readcast
  • Collections
  • CommentGo Back
Download
 
December 2008
The brie war in the Caucasus—resulting romMikheil Saakashvili’s assault on South Ossetia, which provoked Moscow’s massive response—has suddenly put Russia back onto the UnitedStates’ radar screen ater a long absence. Thespecter o a renewed Cold War–style conron-tation haunts many minds. But this analogy is wrong, and not just because most people would recoil rom it. Today there is no ideo-logical context, no Iron Curtain, and no central Washington–Moscow relationship or eithercapital, not to speak o the rest o the world.In other words, Georgia is no Germany, andRussia is no Soviet Union. Moreover, the globaleconomy orms a world market, the Internetknows no borders, and people cross bordersin ever-greater numbers. But to repudiate theCold War parallel is not to minimize the prob-lem. Relations between America and Russia areindeed very bad—and potentially dangerous—but in a dierent way.The principal potential danger is the absenceo rules or the relationship. As Russia has risenrom its 1990s state o abject impotence, it hasemulated the United States and its allies in usingorce. Russia has been particularly stung by the
U.S.
reusal to recognize the post-Soviet spaceas Moscow’s backyard. Moscow’s 2008 military campaign against Georgia borrowed a page rom
NATO
’s 1999 operation against Serbia, and an-other rom the 2007–2008 Western recognitiono Kosovo, in the ace o Belgrade’s protests. Todefect
U.S.
criticism o Moscow wanting to e-ect “regime change” in Tbilisi, the Russian am-
Thkg Statgally Aout russa
DmiTri Trenin
Deputy Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
C
 ARNEGIE
n
 
U.S.–Russian relations matter again.
n
 
To succeed where Bush has ailed, Obama needs to approach Russia strategically: enhancing cooperation wherepossible, mitigating confict where necessary.
n
 
To prevent new confict and receive Moscow’s cooperation, Washington needs to deal seriously with Russian concerns.
n
 
Leave Russia’s domestic politics to the Russians.
n
 
To keep Ukraine whole and ree, the EU integration way is
the
way. NATO has reached the sae limits o eastwardexpansion.
n
 
To protect against missile threats, a pan-European TMD system—which includes Russia—is the best option.
n
 
On Iran and Aghanistan, Russia should be treated as an equal partner.
Summar
 
F  O R E I  G N  P O L I  C Y  
f o r  t h e  N e x t  P r e s i d e n t 
 
2POLICY BRIEF
bassador quipped that regime change was not anotion invented by Moscow. And the Kremlinclosely studied the 2003–2005 “color revolu-tions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, which it saw as
U.S.
geopolitical advances intothe post-Soviet space. One day, it hopes to re-turn the compliment.In a speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conerence, Vladimir Putin complained that America respected no borders and sought to im-pose its law and order around the world. A yearlater, Russia took the crucial step o recogniz-ing Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independencerom Georgia. Then Russian warships watched warily as the
U.S.
Navy unloaded humanitariansupplies in Georgian ports. Soon, two Russian Air Force bombers ew to Venezuela or trainingover the Caribbean. The Russian Navy sailed toSouth America in the all.Moscow is sending a message to Washington:Stop your geopolitical harassment, or we will ol-low suit. Now,
U.S.
global hegemony is directly challenged by Russia’s regional great power am-bitions. In the absence o agreed-on rules, eachparty has drawn its own redlines whose cross-ing would trigger direct action; or Russia, theseinclude attacks on its orces and citizens,
U.S.
 military bases in the CIS countries, and
NATO
 enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia.This new situation is inherently unstablebecause o the two players’ disparities. Russia’sgross domestic product is a dozen times smallerthan that o the United States, and the Russiandeense budget is a puny 4 percent o America’s.Moscow has virtually no allies; China would donothing that might impair its steady rise. But Washington has largely repaired relations withEurope and ound a new riend in India. Few inthe United States would see Russia as a worthy opponent rather than a petro-state with an an-tique arsenal. For their part, the Russians see theUnited States as having passed its prime in globaldominance, and they discount the relevance o the United States’ overextended military mightin this age o asymmetrical warare and contin-ued nuclear deterrence. Thus, when both sidessee each other as weak and getting no stronger,they might even take reckless steps. Against that background, the withering away o arms control is a major risk actor. Ater theGeorge W. Bush administration’s pullout romthe Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty, and its deci-sion to deploy ballistic missile deenses in Polandand the Czech Republic, Russia suspended theTreaty on Conventional Armed Forces inEurope, which had served as the basis or thecontinent’s military security since the Cold War.The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, whichbans particular
U.S.
and Russian systems even asthey are prolierating, is acing an uncertain u-ture. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, withits inspection provisions, will expire in 2009.The Strategic Oensive Reduction Treaty, whichruns until 2012, would then be unverifable.Even as the accords o unlimited duration, suchas the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty, are abro-gated, those with a defned lie span are beingallowed to expire without progeny.The general actors leading to a more adver-sarial
U.S.
–Russian relationship are convergingon Ukraine, which is o utmost importance toRussian and European security. Ukraine’s em-battled president, Viktor Yushchenko, is highly suspicious o Russia and a strong proponento 
NATO
accession; his ex-ally turned bitterrival, the very popular prime minister, YuliaTymoshenko, is at best ambivalent on the issueand leaning against; and the ormer adversary o both, the inuential leader o the Regions Party,Viktor Yanukovych, is frmly against. President Yushchenko hopes to raise his low electoral rat-ing by emphasizing the Russian threat. Rightnow, this does not get him too much traction,because only 20 percent o Ukrainians support
NATO
membership and 44 percent have sided with Russia in its war with Georgia.The Ukrainian president, however, has de-creed that the Russian Black Sea Fleet, anchoredat Sevastopol, must notiy Kiev o its movementsin and out o Ukraine’s waters and disclose itsarmaments, personnel, and precise mission. Soar, Moscow has declined to comply, saying it will only be bound by bilateral agreements. But what i Kiev decides to enorce the presiden-tial decree, stressing its sovereign rights? WillMoscow back o, or will it resist this attempt
Dmitri Trenin
is deputydirector o the CarnegieMoscow Center, a seniorassociate o the CarnegieEndowment, and co-chair othe Moscow Center’s Foreignand Security Policy Program.He has been with the Centersince its inception.In 1993–1997, Treninheld the posts o seniorresearch ellow at the NATODeense College in Romeand senior research ellowat the Institute o Europe inMoscow. He served in theSoviet and Russian armedorces rom 1972 to 1993,including experience wor-ing as a liaison ofcer in theExternal Relations Branch othe Group o Soviet Forces(stationed in Potsdam) andas a sta member o thedelegation to the U.S.–Sovietnuclear arms tals in Genevarom 1985 to 1991. He alsotaught at the war studiesdepartment o the MilitaryInstitute rom 1986 to 1993.
 
Thinking STraTegically abouT ruSSia3
to constrain its navy? Will the Ukrainians thentry to use orce to make the Russians behave? I shots are red and a ship sinks, what will hap-pen in the Sevastopol harbor, shared or now by the two navies? What will happen onshore, where Russian separatists are acing Ukrainiannationalists—and Crimean Tartars wait in thebackground? What orders would the
U.S.
SixthFleet receive? Would the Crimean crisis resem-ble the Cuban one? Would Medvedev, or Putin,back o as Khrushchev did in 1962? Or wouldthat be impossible because o Russian publicopinion or Crimea’s proximity? That prospectreduces the recent Georgian war, its tragic lossesnotwithstanding, to sandbox play.
What Does Russia Want?
Seventeen years ater the end o the SovietUnion, Russia’s transormation is not complete.There are ups and downs, but undamentalchanges are continuing—and though seen least where most Russia watchers ocus, in the politi-cal system, even there, Russian authoritarian-ism thrives with the consent o the governed.The changes are most evident in the economy,including agriculture; in social lie; and inthe gradual recovery o urban centers outsideMoscow and Saint Petersburg. This is not toclaim that Russia today is anything but mod-erately authoritarian, that power and property do not go hand in hand, or that Russia’s or-eign policy does not challenge America’s worlddominance. The bitter irony is that Russia isbecoming increasingly Westernized, even as ithas ceased to be pro-Western.There is nothing predetermined aboutRussia’s changes and direction. The relevantdivide is not between the country’s ew pro- Western liberals and its immobile autocraticestablishment but between modernizing andtraditionalist groups, both within and outsidethe establishment. Both groups want Russia tobe powerul, but they disagree on the methods.Sometimes these groups confict; more oten,they compromise; occasionally, they do both.Putin, or example, moves back and orth be-tween the two groups. Conficts with neighbors,conrontation with the United States, and iso-lation rom the West avor the traditionalists.But growing trade and investment, economicdiversication and development, and the needto promote innovation and build institutionsrequire the modernizers. It is striking that the war in the Caucasus was immediately ollowedby a plunge o the Russian stock exchange in-dex, which soon suered even more as part o the global allout rom the crisis on Wall Street.The message to Moscow is clear: War or peace,markets matter, and global interdependence isor real.Those in Russia who want to replace themodernization agenda with mobilization willneed to consider repeating the Soviet Union’strajectory, but at a aster pace and not necessar-ily with a sot landing. Paradoxically, those who want to compete with America need to realizethat only a modernized, Westernized nation canhope to succeed, and that unlike in Tsarist andSoviet times, modernizing the military, adminis-trative, or even industrial structures will not su-ce. Successul innovation requires individualreedom and genuine openness to the world.Those who want a bigger share or Russia in theinternational system will surely notice that nei-ther shrill anti-Americanism nor crude nationalegoism will go a long way. I Russia wants tobe among the agents shaping the uture, it willneed to develop its own powers o attraction andormulate a compelling message larger than itsnational interest.
What Has the United StatesDone Wrong?
 When Putin was asked recently why Russia hadailed to build strong relations with the West, hequipped, “Why has the West not succeeded inbuilding relations with Russia?” He has at leasthal a point. Successive
U.S.
administrationshave oreited the chance, rst, ater commu-nism’s collapse, to integrate Russia into the West;then, in the wake o 9/11, to orge an alliance
The bitter irony is that Russia is becoming increasinglyWesternized, even as it has ceased to be pro-Western.
of 00

Leave a Comment

You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...
You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...