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OctOber 2008
 Ater several decades o disappointing growth,nuclear energy seems poised or a comeback.alk o a “nuclear renaissance” includes perhaps adoubling or tripling o nuclear capacity by 2050,spreading nuclear power to new markets in theMiddle East and Southeast Asia, and develop-ing new kinds o reactors and uel-reprocessingtechniques. During the George W. Bush admin-istration, the United States has promoted nuclearenergy both at home and abroad. Programs likethe 2006 Global Nuclear Energy Partnershipand President Bush’s 2007 joint declaration withthen–Russian president Vladimir Putin to acili-tate and support nuclear energy in developingcountries have helped to promote the notion o amajor worldwide nuclear revival.But the reality o nuclear energy’s uture is morecomplicated. Projections or growth assume thatgovernment support will compensate or nuclearpower’s market liabilities and that perennial issuessuch as waste, saety, and prolieration will not beserious hurdles. However, without major changesin government policies and aggressive nancialsupport, nuclear power is actually likely to accountor a
declining 
percentage o global electricity gen-eration. For example, the International Energy  Agency’s
World Energy Outlook 2007 
projects that without policy changes, nuclear power’s share o  worldwide electricity generation will drop rom 15percent in 2007 to 9 percent in 2030.Given the seriousness o these uncertainties, asound post-Bush oreign—and domestic—policy 
N rnissn:Is I coing? So I?
SharON SquaSSONI
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment or International Peace
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
C
 ARNEGIE
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Expectations or nuclear energy have grown dramatically. More than thirty nations now have plans to build nuclear powerplants or the frst time.
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A nuclear renaissance, however, is not a oregone conclusion. A major expansion would require signifcant policy and fnancialsupport rom governments.
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Key questions need solid answers beorehand: Can nuclear power help reduce dependence on oreign oil or contribute sig-nifcantly to needed reductions in carbon emissions? Is nuclear power economically competitive? Can saety be assured and isan acceptable solution or nuclear waste at hand? Can nuclear power be expanded in such a way as to adequately control theadded risks o prolieration?
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To minimize some o the risks o nuclear expansion—whether related to economics, saety, security, or prolieration—theUnited States should consider several actions: help strengthen the rules o nuclear commerce and transparency, deemphasizethe element o national prestige with respect to nuclear energy, help other countries undertake clear-eyed assessments o allavailable options or generating electricity, and limit the acquisition o sensitive nuclear technologies like uranium enrichmentand spent-uel reprocessing.
Summar
 
F  I  N  I  Y  
   
 
2POLICY BRIEF
on nuclear energy should be based not on hope buton solid answers to six questions:
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Can nuclear power signicantly enhance energy security?
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Can nuclear power contribute signicantly toneeded reductions in carbon emissions?
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Is nuclear power economically competitive?
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Can saety be assured or a greatly expanded num-ber o nuclear reactors and associated acilities?
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Is an acceptable solution or nuclear waste inplace or soon to be available?
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Can nuclear power be expanded in such a way asto adequately control the added risks o pro-lieration?
cn N Powenn eng Si?
Rising prices o oil and natural gas have had a cas-cading eect on countries’ concerns about energy security. Price disputes have resulted in temporary cutos o natural gas supplies in Europe in the pastew years. But most countries will not be able toreduce their dependence on oreign oil by buildingnuclear power plants. Nuclear power—because itcurrently only provides electricity—is inherently limited in its ability to reduce this dependence. Inthe United States, or example, 40 percent o theenergy consumed comes rom oil, yet oil producesonly 1.6 percent o electricity. And even thoughFrance and Japan rely heavily on nuclear energy,they have been unable to reduce their dependenceon oreign oil because o oil’s importance or trans-portation and industry. Worldwide, the picture is similar. Oil accountsor about 7 percent o power generation globally,a share that is expected to decline to 3 percent by 2030. Only in the Middle East, where countriesrely on oil or about 30 percent o their electricity generation, could substitution o nuclear power oroil make a signicant dierence. Until transporta-tion switches to electricity as its uel, nuclear en-ergy largely will not displace oil.Te situation is dierent or natural gas. Although natural gas also has industrial and heat-ing uses, it produces about one-th o electric-ity worldwide. Natural gas is attractive as a way to produce electricity because gas-red generatingplants are very ecient at converting primary en-ergy into electricity and also cheap to build, com-pared with coal- and nuclear-red plants. Nuclearenergy could displace natural gas or electricity production and improve some countries’ stability o energy supply.Ultimately, however, countries may be tradingone orm o energy dependence or another. Giventhe structure o the nuclear industry and uraniumresource distribution, most countries will need toimport uel, technology, and reactor components,as well as uel services. Tis means that ew coun-tries can expect more than
interdependence 
, even when it comes to nuclear power.
cn N Pow coni oconoing ci cng?
Nuclear power is not a near-term solution to thechallenge o climate change. Te need to imme-diately and dramatically reduce carbon emissionscalls or approaches that can be implemented morequickly than building nuclear reactors. It also callsor actions that span all energy applications, not just electricity. Improved eciency in residentialand commercial buildings, industry, and transportis the rst choice among all options in virtually all analyses o the problem. Nuclear energy willremain an option among eorts to control climatechange, but given the maximum rate at which new reactors can be built, much new construction willsimply oset the retirement o nuclear reactorsbuilt decades ago.For nuclear energy to make a larger dierencein meeting the challenge o climate change, theindustry would need to add capacity exceeding re-placement levels. According to a 2007 study by theKeystone Center, this would require “the industry to return immediately to the most rapid period o growth experienced in the past (1981–1990) andsustain this rate o growth or 50 years.” Tis wouldmean completing twenty-one to twenty-ve new,large (1,000 megawatts electric) plants each yearthrough 2050. Yet the global nuclear construction industry hasshrunk. In the past twenty years, there have beenewer than ten new reactor construction starts worldwide in any given year. oday there are al-ready bottlenecks in the global supply chain, in-cluding ultra-heavy orgings, large manuactured
Shon Sqssoni
is a seniorassociate in the Nonprolierationprogram at the Carnegie Endow-ment and has been analyzingnonprolieration, arms control,and national security issues ortwo decades. Her research ocuseson nuclear nonprolieration andnational security. Squassoni cameto Carnegie rom the Congres-sional Research Service (CRS).As a specialist in weapons omass destruction prolieration,she provided expert analyses onprolieration trends and expertadvice on policy and legislationto members o Congress. Prior to joining CRS, she served or nineyears in the executive branch,beginning her government careeras a nuclear saeguards expert inthe Arms Control and Disarma-ment Agency. Her last position atthe State Department was direc-tor o Policy Coordination in theNonprolieration Bureau. Squas-soni has contributed to journals,magazines, and books on nuclearprolieration and deense. Hermost recent publications include:“The Iranian Nuclear Program,” achapter in the orthcoming book,
Combating Weapons of MassDestruction: The Future of Inter-national Nonproliferation Policy 
 (University o Georgia Press,2009) and “Risks and Realities:The ‘New Nuclear Revival,’”
 ArmsControl Today,
May 2007.
 
NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE: IS IT COMING? SHOULD IT?3
components, engineering, crat labor, and skilledconstruction labor. All these constraints have beenexacerbated by the lack o recent experience inbuilding nuclear plants and by aging labor orces.In addition to the major nuclear reactor ven-dors, supporting industries will also either need tobe rebuilt or recertied to nuclear standards. In theUnited States, there has been a signicant declineo supporting industries. In the 1980s, the UnitedStates had 400 nuclear suppliers and 900 holderso N-stamp certicates rom the American Society o Mechanical Engineers. oday, there are just 80suppliers and 200 N-stamp holders. In countriesthat have never had nuclear power plants, qualiedsubcontractors and labor would have to be trainedand certied.
Wi Nw N Pow Pnsb eonoi copii?
Te economic competitiveness o nuclear power is asubject o much debate. Nuclear power plants areexpensive to build but relatively inexpensive tooperate, because their uel costs are low compared with alternatives. For example, the price o naturalgas accounts or 85 percent o the variable cost o akilowatt-hour, whereas nuclear uel accounts or 27percent. Tis means that as the cost o ossil uelsrise, either due to short supply or because carbondioxide emissions may in the uture be regulated,nuclear power will become relatively more competi-tive. Tere is already evidence in the United Statesthat coal plants may become increasingly dicult tobuild because o public awareness o their environ-mental impact. U.S. nuclear industry executiveshave suggested that a carbon-pricing ramework 
 would be necessary to provide incentives for utilities to
 build more than a handul o nuclear power plants. A big uncertainty is the cost o constructingnew nuclear power plants. As a general rule, abouttwo-thirds o a nuclear reactor’s cost stems romconstruction. Factors aecting this cost o con-struction include the creditworthiness o the com-panies involved in building the reactors, the cost o capital (especially debt) over the next decade, therisk o cost escalation due to construction delaysand overruns, the need or additional generatingcapacity in a slowing economy, and the competi-tive advantage o both traditional and emergingpower generation technologies.Because data rom the past unortunately pro-vide little help in assessing uture costs, the realcosts o new nuclear power plants may not beknown or years. In act, Moody’s stated in a spe-cial October 2007 report that “the ultimate costsassociated with building new nuclear generationdo not exist today—and that the current cost es-timates represent best estimates, which are subjectto change.” Figure 1 shows one assessment o how nuclear energy might compare with its alternativesin terms o electricity-generating costs.Te current economic crisis could make nanc-ing nuclear power plants particularly dicult.Financing costs account or between 25 and 80percent o the total cost o construction becausenuclear power plants take much longer to buildthan alternatives (or example, wind plants requireeighteen months to build, combined-cycle gas tur-bines need thirty-six months, and nuclear powerplants take at least sixty months). A global tight-ening o risk management standards in the wakeo the current economic crisis could imperil the
Fig 1
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copi coss o Gning eii
CCGT = combined cycle gas turbineIGCC = integrated gasifcation combined cycle
NOte:
The “nuclear high” case assumes a high construction cost o $2,500 per kilo-watt, while the low case assumes a cost o $2,000 per kilowatt. Parameters or the lowdiscount rate are ound in table 13.10 o
World Energy Outlook 2006,
but the real ater-tax-weighted average cost o capital is 6.7 percent. The high-discount scenario has a 9.6percent rate, and in that scenario, nuclear costs are higher than all others.Reproduced with permission rom the International Energy Agency.©2006 OECD/International Energy Agency,
World Energy Outlook 2006,
fgure13.7.
01234567
NuclearHighNuclearLowCCGTCoalSteamIGCCWindOnshoreCapitalOperation & MaintenanceFuel
28%–32% capacity factor
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