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Russian–ameRican secuRity Relations ateR GeoRGia1
 
OctOber 2008
The crisis in Georgia brings us ace-to-ace with the reality that the United States andRussia have squandered the opportunity to build a relationship that works or bothparties. Getting the relationship back ontrack will be critical to the uture security o Europe. Relationships among other countriesand regions—not least how China relates toRussia and the United States—are bound tobe aected as well. High-level political atten-tion is clearly warranted in both Moscow and Washington. The question is how to accom-plish it.Tensions in the U.S.–Russia relationshiphave been building or some time. Russianpoliticians, gripped by belligerence and wounded pride, have expressed deep resent-ment that their security concerns are not beingtaken into account. Vladimir Putin has beenarticulating this resentment, beginning withhis speech to the Munich Wehrkunde coner-ence in February 2007 and continuing to thepresent day. In September 2008, Putin asked agroup o international experts why Russia wasnot allowed to deend itsel against Georgia.“… Were we supposed to just wipe away thebloody snot and hang our heads?” he asked.For its part, the United States o late hasnot been in the habit o paying attention toRussia—nor indeed to many other countriesand regions o the world. This phenomenonbegan with the onset o the all-consuming war in Iraq in 2003, but the U.S. presiden-tial election campaign has exacerbated theeect. All political players are justiably wor-ried that the overwhelming orce Russia used
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Whg d mw’ r  dvp  wrkg rhp d d   dgr r—prhpv  r .
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thr   d d  grb  h prrr  h rhp hrgh h
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r,bh  whh rqr rg .
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a w rhr hd w h  brd h rhp, dg h r   w r rr  erp.
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Bh p d  dv  rg  w   h  g h rhp d prv r r.
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a   p prd—u.s. d R—wd hv h hr  r h  k.
Summar
 
F  O R E I  G N  P O L I  C Y  
f o r  t h e  N e x t  P r e s i d e n t 
 
2Policy BRie
against Georgia spells a new phase in Russia’sapproach to its periphery—a willingness tochange borders by orce. The tendency hasbeen, however, or both presidential nomineesand the Bush team to bash Russia while notoering any sense o “what next?”To this bilateral dynamic must be addedmultilateral issues. The European Union, withFrance in the presidency, has been taking thelead on diplomacy to try to resolve the Russia–Georgia crisis. This eort, although muchneeded, has stoked suspicions in the UnitedStates that the Kremlin will try to separateEurope rom the United States, exacerbatingEurope’s energy dependence on Russia.
Closer to home in the Western hemispherehas been the bizarre phenomenon of HugoChávez, the president of Venezuela, who has en-thusiastically declared a “strategic partnership”
  with Russia. Russia has been more circumspect,but the Russian Ministry o Deense has an-nounced it will conduct naval exercises in theCaribbean in November 2008, in cooperation with the Venezuelan navy, and it sent two Tu-160 bombers to land in Venezuela. Althoughthe ministry said the bombers were carrying nonuclear weapons, or some the move conjuredup memories o the Cuban missile crisis.Since the Georgian crisis began, theRussian Federation has been operating as i norules apply to it—whether the hoary MonroeDoctrine or the notion that an agreementsigned by a country’s president must be imple-mented lest his authority and legitimacy come
into doubt. Certainly concerns developed that
 Moscow’s resistance to implementing theSarkozy–Medvedev plan showed a weakenedRussian presidency and perhaps even a gravecrisis in Russian civil-military relations.In sel-justication, the Russians say that it was not they who threw out the rule book, butthe United States. The war in Iraq and recog-nition o Kosovo’s independence are requentexamples o what the Russians call the U.S.“unipolar world” strategy—that as the only remaining superpower, the United States hasbeen disregarding or bending internationallaw to its will. Now, the Russians say, they have recouped rom their post-Soviet weak-ness: Their energy sales have given them newinternational het, and they plan to use it.No holds barred, no rules—the UnitedStates and Russia may be heading to a con-rontation more unpredictable and dangerousthan any we have seen since the Cuban missilecrisis. A conrontation today would be dier-ent—the two countries are in constant and in-tense communication, unlike the situation in1962—but i those exchanges provoke mutualanger and recrimination, they have the poten-tial to spark a dangerous crisis.This eect is especially dangerous becauseboth countries are in presidential transitions.Russia, whose government is riven by corrup-tion, internal competition, and disorder, isattempting an unprecedented tandem lead-ership arrangement. The United States is inthe midst o its quadrennial election season, with both political parties competing to showthat their man is more skilled and tough onnational security issues than his opponent.The unpredictability o these two transitionsstokes the potential or misunderstanding anddescent into crisis. We must avoid such a crisis, because wehave never succeeded in escaping the nuclearexistential threat that we each pose to theother. We never even came close to transorm-ing the U.S.–Russian relationship into onethat is closer to that which the United Stateshas with the United Kingdom or France. What i Russia had reused to conrm or deny that no nuclear weapons were on the bombersit few to Venezuela? Our nuclear weapons arestill aced o to launch on warning o an at-tack, and in a no-holds-barred conrontationbetween us, we could come close to nuclearcatastrophe beore we knew it. What next? Is it possible to outrun con-rontation and return to a pragmatic work-ing relationship in pursuit o mutual inter-ests? Clearly the answer should be “yes,” i the Russian Federation completely withdrawsits troops rom Georgian territory according
rose Gotteoelle
w p-pd Drr  crgmw cr  Jr2006. rr, Grw  r   hcrg edw, whrh hd  j ppwh h R d erPrgr d h Gb P- Prgr. a p d d r  R d h hr rrsv , Gr’rrh  h edwd    rr d b, pr-r, d r r.Br jg hedw  obr 2000,Gr w dpdrrr r dr prr h u.s. Dpr erg. Prr  h ergDpr, Grrvd r hr r dp drr  h ir- i r sr-g sd. i 1993–1994, hw h drr r R,ukr, d er  hn sr c rpb r drz-  ukr, Kzkh,d Br.
 
Russian–ameRican secuRity Relations ateR GeoRGia3
to the Sarkozy–Medvedev plan. But, ollow-ing Russia’s recognition o the independenceo Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that processmay take months and perhaps years. SomeRussian commentators have been arguing thata relevant time rame to consider is how longCyprus has been the site o an unresolved ter-ritorial dispute between Turkey and Greece:nearly thirty years.In the meantime, the United States andRussia have about six months o intense po-litical transition to get through, until the newU.S. president settles into place. This begs ora short-term modus vivendi that would enablethe two countries to avoid a potential crisisand establish an agenda to conront some o the severe problems that have emerged in theirrelationship. Ultimately, the United States andRussia should want to re-create a book o rulesthat both will embrace, corresponding to in-ternational law and in act strengthening it.
Sz h Supsuu
The rst step in this process, and the best way to begin it, is to grab onto the existing super-structure o the U.S.–Russia relationship. Thisis the system o established and well-under-stood treaties, agreements, and arrangementsthat has been built up over time. Beginningin the 1950s, many eorts have been madeto insert predictability and mutual condenceinto the relationship in the orm o both bilat-eral and multilateral arrangements. For thenext six months, both governments need totake advantage o this established and well-understood system. Derided in recent years asa Cold War relic not worthy o the riendshipthe two countries had developed, it couldnow be a lieline.The most important o the treaties is theStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty (
start
), which was brought into orce in 1994 and, un-less extended, will go out o orce in December
FAct File
 
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convnona Ad Fos n euop (cFe) tay
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30  r pr: ar, azrbj, Br, Bg, Bgr, cd, czh Rpb-, Drk, r, Grg, Gr, Gr, Hgr, id, i, Kzkh, lx-brg, mdv, h nhrd, nrw, Pd, Prg, R, R, svk,sp, trk, ukr, ud Kgd, d ud s
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Dr  d, b ce h b dpd  h p–Wrw P vr
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th r bhd q   jr r r
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d h rr WrwP, dg:1) 20,000 b k ( r h 16,500  v )2) 30,000 rrd b vh ( r h 27,300  v )3) 20,000 hv rr p (17,000  v )4) 6,800 b rr5) 2,000 k hpr
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sp   h br  k, rrd b vh, d rr  erp’hr d rhr fk wr dvd  v r h hr d wdh  fkg vr g h hr
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n g   hd r h  hrd  h q   jr r 
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th J cv Grp w bhd 
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pg bd
n
Rgr , p, d d xhg r k bg; R pdd p 
ce
, dg h r,  Dbr 2007
For more detail, see http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/%252Fcfeback2
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