• Embed Doc
  • Copy Link
  • Readcast
  • Collections
  • CommentGo Back
Download
 
OctOber 2008
Nuclear disarmament is higher on the U.S.and international agenda than it has beensince the beginning o the nuclear age.George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, WilliamPerry, and Sam Nunn have urged “turningthe goal o a world without nuclear weaponsinto a practical enterprise among nations.”Barack Obama has pledged to “renew thegoal o a world without nuclear weapons.” John McCain has said “the time has come totake urther measures to reduce dramatically the number o nuclear weapons in the world’sarsenals.” British Prime Minister GordonBrown has expressed the need “to acceler-ate disarmament amongst possessor states,to prevent prolieration to new states, and toultimately achieve a world that is ree romnuclear weapons.” Indian Prime MinisterManmohan Singh has said that “India is ully committed to nuclear disarmament that isglobal, universal, and nondiscriminatory innature.”These are leaders o states that have nuclear weapons. People in the vast majority o coun-tries that don’t have them say, “It’s about time,but is this talk o nuclear disarmament merely public relations?”O course, not all American leaders agreethat a world without nuclear weapons is de-sirable. Former Democratic cabinet secretariesHarold Brown and John Deutch argue that“the goal, even the aspirational goal, o elimi-nating all nuclear weapons is counterproduc-tive.” Republican Senator John Kyl insists
Aolsng Nula Wapons:Wy  Und Sas Sould Lad
GeOrGe PerkOvich
Vice President or Studies, Carneie Endowment or International Peace
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
C
 ARNEGIE
n
 
The next American president should emphasize the oal o a world without nuclear weapons and really mean it.
 
n
 
The verifcation and enorcement mechanisms that would be required to achieve this would aument U.S. andlobal security at a time when the nuclear industry will likely expand lobally.
 
n
 
Without a clearer commitment to the elimination o all nuclear arsenals, non–nuclear-weapon states will not sup-port strenthened nonprolieration rules, inspections, and controls over fssile materials.
n
 
The accountin and control over nuclear materials that would be necessary to enable nuclear disarmament wouldreatly reduce risks that terrorists could acquire these materials.
n
 
I nuclear deterrence would work everywhere and always, we would not worry about prolieration. I nucleardeterrence is not ail-sae, the lon-term answer must be to reduce the number and salience o nuclear weaponsto zero.
Summary
 
F  O R E I  G N  P O L I  C Y  
f o r  t h e  N e x t  P r e s i d e n t 
 
POLICY BRIEF
that “U.S. national security—and that o ourriends and allies—will not permit a nuclear- weapons-ree world in the oreseeable uture.”Thirty-ve senators are sucient to block theUnited States rom ratiying a comprehensivetest ban treaty or treaties or urther reduc-tions o nuclear arsenals, necessary steps on aroad to zero. Thereore, the case needs to bemade or seriously seeking the global aboli-tion o nuclear arsenals.The next American president must decide whether to emphasize the goal o a world without nuclear weapons and, importantly, whether to really mean it. (False promiseso eort will only weaken U.S. standing andpower.) This Policy Brie makes the case orboth. It does so rom the perspective o U.S.national interests. Russia, China, France,Pakistan, and Israel have less condence thanthe United States that their security and po-litical interests could be preserved withoutnuclear weapons. Their considerations are ex-plored in a September 2008 Adelphi Paper,
 Abolishing Nuclear Weapons 
, by the authorand Carnegie Associate, James Acton.This Brie summarizes our security inter-ests that would be served by making the long-term project o abolishing nuclear weaponsa central purpose o U.S. policy: preventingprolieration; preventing nuclear terrorism;reducing toward zero the unique threat o nuclear annihilation; and ostering optimismregarding U.S. global leadership.Each o these objectives can be (and hasbeen) pursued without the larger purpose o eliminating nuclear weapons. However, thechances o success will steadily diminish i theew nuclear-armed states try to perpetuate adiscriminatory order based on haves andhave-nots and i they enorce it rmly againstsome states and hollowly against others. Suchinequity breeds noncooperation and resistance when what is needed now is cooperationto prevent prolieration, nuclear terrorism,and the ailure o deterrence. Why shouldeveryone cooperate in enorcing a system thatlooks like it was designed to avor just a ew?
Nonpolaon n a WoldW Mo Nula indusy
The challenge o strengthening protectionagainst prolieration is growing just as pros-pects are rising or a major global expansiono nuclear industry. These two objectives—nonprolieration and the secure expansion o nuclear industry—are shared by the UnitedStates and many other countries, but there istension between these objectives. I the num-ber o nuclear power reactors and states thathost them grows dramatically, so too will thenumber o acilities or enriching uraniumand, perhaps, or separating plutonium romspent reactor uel. The same technologiesand people that produce ssile materials orcivilian purposes can be employed to produce weapons. More broadly, as nuclear know-how, equipment, and materiel spread aroundthe world, so too does the wherewithal todevelop nuclear weapons. The diculty o detecting weapons prolieration rises as theoverall density o nuclear commerce, train-ing, and cooperation increases.The United States and other states andentities that care greatly about nonproliera-tion, such as the International Atomic Energy  Agency (IAEA), have identied three majorpolicy innovations that could reduce proli-eration risks.The IAEA is charged with ensuring thatnuclear materials and related activities are usedor exclusively peaceul purposes. The discov-ery o Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons e-orts in the early 1990s compelled the 40-plusstates on the IAEA’s board o governors to ac-knowledge that its saeguards system neededto be strengthened. Years o negotiations re-sulted in a new model or saeguards in 1997,called the Additional Protocol. It requiresstates to notiy the IAEA o plans to buildnew nuclear acilities, to provide blueprints in
Geoge Pekovich
is vice presi-dent or studies and director othe Nonprolieration Proramat the Carneie Endowmentor International Peace.His research ocuses onnuclear stratey and nonproli-eration, with a ocus on SouthAsia, and he has authored andco-authored many articles andbooks, includin
India’s Nuclear Bomb
, and the September 008Adelphi Paper,
 AbolishingNuclear Weapons
, with JamesActon.He is a member o the Advi-sory Board o the InternationalCommission on Nuclear Non-Prolieration and Disarmament,ormed by the overnments oJapan and Australia.He was the lead authoro
Universal Compliance: AStrategy for Nuclear Security 
 (Carneie 005). In 1989–1990he served as a speech writerand orein policy adviser toSenator Joseph Biden.His work has appeared in
Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, Atlantic Monthly 
, the
Weekly Standard,
the
Wall Street  Journal,
the
Washington Post,
 the
Washington Times,
andthe
New York Times.
 
advance, to declare nuclear uel-cycle-relatedresearch and development activities, and torequire reports on all trade in sensitive nu-clear technology and materiel. The AdditionalProtocol also grants IAEA inspectors greateraccess to nuclear acilities on short notice andallows them to take environmental samples tobetter detect possible violations. While the Additional Protocol is not asrobust as most nonprolieration experts wish,it is a major advance, which is why it wouldbe an important innovation. Unortunately,104 (o 194) states still have not implementedthis protocol. Among them are Argentina,Belarus, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel,Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, theUnited States, Venezuela, and Vietnam. Thesestates, as all others, are entitled to nuclear coop-eration as long as they remain compliant withtheir saeguards and general nonprolierationobligations. They should not be presumed toharbor ill intent. Yet, their reusal to imple-ment the Additional Protocol weakens overallcondence that prolieration threats can be de-tected in time to mobilize responses to protectinternational peace and security. The UnitedStates, the European Union, Turkey, Australia,South Korea, and other states have proposedthat the providers o nuclear technology andmateriel in the 45-member Nuclear SuppliersGroup should establish a rule requiring thatany state receiving their cooperation mustimplement the Additional Protocol. The U.S.capacity to lead this important campaign ishampered by the Senate’s reusal to place theUnited States under the protocol. The next ad-ministration should work with the Senate tocorrect this untoward situation.
 A second innovation needed is the clari-fcation o terms under which a state may  withdraw rom the Nuclear Non-ProlierationTreaty (NPT). Article X o the treaty permitsa state to withdraw “i it decides that extraor-dinary events, related to the subject mattero this Treaty, have jeopardized the supremeinterest o its country.” Negotiating in 1968,the authors o the treaty did not speciy whatsort o events and interests would justiy  withdrawal or how the treaty’s ultimate en-orcement body, the United Nations Security Council, should treat a bid to withdraw. In
ABOLISHINg NUCLEAR WEAPONS
bOX 1
n
rung  Agumns Agans  vson
The desirability and easibility o achievin the secure, verifable eliminationo all nuclear weapons deserves wide and serious debate. However, several othe most common neative reactions to the idea do not withstand analysis.
“Nula wapons anno  ‘dsnnd.’”
True, but beside the point. Nohuman creation can be “disinvented.” Civilization has nevertheless prohibitedand dismantled artiacts deemed too danerous, damain, or morallyobjectionable to live with. Mass-scale as chambers such as those used by Nazigermany have not been “disinvented,” but they are not tolerated. The issueis whether the means could exist to veriy that a rejected weapon o massdestruction had been dismantled in all cases, to minimize the risk o cheatin,and to build confdence in enorcement measures aainst cheaters. These chal-lenes, not “disinvention,” should be the ocus o debate.
“t Und Sas sould no dsam unlaally.”
True, but that is not whatShultz, Kissiner, Perry, Nunn, and others advocate; nor is it what the NPTand other commitments require. The ermane issue is whether and how
all 
 nuclear-armed states could mutually, reciprocally reduce their nuclear arsenalsto zero, and whether and how they and other states could implement theverifcation and enorcement measures necessary to prevent cheatin aainst aban on nuclear weapons. I the United States and other states do not have thenecessary confdence, they will not eliminate their last weapons.
“i  Und Sas mos  nula dn umlla  xnds os NAtO alls (Japan, Sou koa, and os), s sas wll dlop own nula wapons.”
 
Probably not. The United States (and other pow-ers) will always insist on retainin deterrent capabilities. But these capabilitiesneed not include nuclear weapons i all others who possess these weaponsimplemented verifable and enorceable commitments to eliminate them. IRussia, China, Pakistan, et al. eliminated or reatly reduced their nuclear arse-nals and Iran and North Korea no loner posed acute nuclear threats, it wouldbe politically and strateically unrealistic or Japan, South Korea, germany,and Turkey to counter such a trend and acquire nuclear weapons on their own.Indeed, these key non–nuclear-weapon states have lonstandin traditions a-vorin the lobal elimination o nuclear weapons. They would welcome beinenlisted in the deliberations over how to proceed incrementally toward thisobjective in ways that buttress their security ties with the United States. Enlist-in them is somethin the next administration should do in any case.
of 00

Leave a Comment

You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...
You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...