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COIN Revision FM 3-24 Richard J. Campbell

COIN Revision FM 3-24 Richard J. Campbell

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Recently staff at the Combined Arms Center (CAC) Ft. Leavenworth announced the revision of FM 3-24 /MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (COIN).http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/FM3-24Revision.asp The stated goals of the revision were; less theory and more application, globally applicable, capture enduring tactics, and the scope will be from platoon to division level. Two of these goals, applicability and scope, can be improved by providing definitions and expanded explanations for several specific, but related topics. The topics are, information, information collection, the relationship between information and intelligence, and the importance of partnering and how partnerships help command and control, and intelligence. These deficiencies were noted during a pre-analysis of COIN references. Correcting these shortfalls would improve application, adaptability, C2, situational awareness (SA), and the commander’s Common Operating Picture (COP).
Recently staff at the Combined Arms Center (CAC) Ft. Leavenworth announced the revision of FM 3-24 /MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (COIN).http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/FM3-24Revision.asp The stated goals of the revision were; less theory and more application, globally applicable, capture enduring tactics, and the scope will be from platoon to division level. Two of these goals, applicability and scope, can be improved by providing definitions and expanded explanations for several specific, but related topics. The topics are, information, information collection, the relationship between information and intelligence, and the importance of partnering and how partnerships help command and control, and intelligence. These deficiencies were noted during a pre-analysis of COIN references. Correcting these shortfalls would improve application, adaptability, C2, situational awareness (SA), and the commander’s Common Operating Picture (COP).

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Published by: Richard J. Campbell on Mar 19, 2013
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03/28/2014

 
[1]
FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 COUNTERINSURGENCY REVISION PREANALYSIS
MAJ Michael G. Murray II (USMC) Editor Richard J. Campbell Author
PREFACE
 
“This is another type of war new in its intensity, ancient in its origins —
 war by guerrillas, subversives insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him...it requires in those situations where we must counter it. ..a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore
a new and wholly different kind of military training.”
 John F. Kennedy (FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, Preface, 1962, pg. iv) The legal and military features of each small war present distinctive characteristics which make the segregation of all of them into fixed classifications an extremely difficult problem. There are so many combinations of conditions that a simple classification of small wars is possible only when one is limited to specific features in his study, i. e ., according to their legal aspects, their military or naval features, whether active combat was engaged in or not, and many other considerations. (Small Wars Manual USMC, 1940, pg. 2) The two quotes above represent a 72 year time span. They support the idea that the United States has had an interest in Irregular Warfare and Insurgencies, and Counterinsurgency doctrine, training, and operations for quite some time now. In a world that is continuing to be more complex, unpredictable, and dynamic, and in some cases more chaotic, antisocial and deadly one would think the countries in NATO will continue to have an interest in Irregular Warfare and Insurgencies. This project is based on this assumption.
 
[2]
FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 COUNTERINSURGENCY REVISION PREANALYSIS
ABSTRACT
Recently staff at the Combined Arms Center (CAC) Ft. Leavenworth announced the revision of FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency (COIN). http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/FM3-24Revision.asp The stated goals of the revision were; less theory and more application, globally applicable, capture enduring tactics, and the scope will be from platoon to division level. Two of these goals, applicability and scope, can be improved by providing definitions and expanded explanations for several specific, but related topics. The topics are,
information
”, “
information collection
 the relationship between information and
intelligence
, and the importance of
partnering
 and how
partner
ships” help command and
control, and intelligence. These deficiencies were noted during a pre-analysis of COIN references. Correcting these shortfalls would improve application, adaptability, C2, situational awareness (SA), and the
commander’s
Common Operating Picture (COP).
KEYWORDS
COIN, counterinsurgency, insurgency, command and control (C2), information, information collection, intelligence, intelligence synchronization, partnering, and partnerships.
 
Disclaimer:
The following observations, insights, opinions, recommendations, suggestions, and conclusions are that of the author and the author alone. They are not the observations, insights, opinions, recommendations, suggestions, and conclusions of any element or component of NATO, NTM-A, ISAF, CTC-A, the U.S. Government and
it’s agencies, organizations, or representatives.
Additionally, the following analysis does not express the observations, insights, opinions, recommendations, suggestions, and conclusions of any private contracting company affiliated with any of the above mentioned elements, components, agencies, offices, or organizations. You the reader and end user are responsible for determining the value and / or worth of the information and the relationship the written content has to your specific environment, position,  job, and assigned tasks, duties, and responsibilities.
 
[3]
INTRODUCTION
FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 was released in late 2006. It was the modernized version of FMI 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations (Oct. 2004) which was an updated version of FM 90-8, Counterguerilla Operations (Aug. 1986). Since FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 was published, FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency (Apr. 2009), the Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations (Oct. 2009), and the Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) AJP-3.4.4 were published (Feb. 2011). Since U.S. involvement in COIN operations will continue to be a joint / combined effort there are a number of other associated irregular warfare documents that must be considered. This includes;
 
JP 3-07 Stability Operations Sep. 2011
 
JP 3-0 Joint Operations Aug. 2011
 
JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning Aug. 2011
 
JP 3-08 Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations Jun. 2011
 
JP 3-05 Special Operations Apr. 2011
 
JP 3-22 Foreign Internal Defense Jul. 2010
 
TC 2-50.5 Intelligence Office
r’s Handbook Jan
. 2010
 
JP 3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Mar. 2009
 
JP 3-26 Counterterrorism Nov. 2009
 
JP 3-06 Joint Urban Operations Nov. 2009
 
JP 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Jun. 2009 The references above demonstrate that the U.S. Government, particularly Department of Defense (DoD), has learned a lot about hybrid threats, insurgencies, and COIN since the release of FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 in 2006. US allies have also endeavored to learn about insurgencies as evidenced by the degree to which allied government officials, politicians, and educated civilians talk publicly about current insurgencies with a degree of accuracy. This of course is due to the total number of recent insurgencies, the impact those insurgencies have had on the global economy, education and training of NATO armies, and international news and media outlets interest in the topic. The majority of senior NATO and U.S. military personnel agree that training for COIN operations is relevant since COIN will remain a predominate mission set in the foreseeable future. The emphasis on COIN in doctrine is clear and is derived from an expectation of more insurgencies to come. For example, the NATO Allied Joint Publication views
COIN as a “predominate campaign theme”
 (AJP-3.4.4, pg. xiii). The U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Special Operations Command are the DoD leads for Irregular Warfare. These commands agreed with the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO v. 3.0, Jan. 2009) which states,
U.S. Forces require the same level of expertise in irregular warfare that they
developed for conventional warfare.” (
IW JOC v. 2.0, May 2010, pg. C-1) Mathematically this equates to a 50 / 50 mix of COIN and combined arms training. Half of all current and future training should be intended for conventional warfare and the other half should be geared towards irregular warfare. A recent notice from the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff stated that the DoD envisioned

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