Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Look up keyword or section
Like this
4Activity
P. 1
COIN IN A BOX: Packaging a Wicked Problem, Richard J. Campbell and Conrad C. Crane, Sept. 2012.

COIN IN A BOX: Packaging a Wicked Problem, Richard J. Campbell and Conrad C. Crane, Sept. 2012.

Ratings:

5.0

(1)
|Views: 768|Likes:
Currently, three counterinsurgency (COIN) documents are being revised. The Allied Joint Doctrine AJP – 3.4.4, the United States (U.S.) Joint Publication (JP) 3.24, and U.S. Army / U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5. New insights, observations, and lessons learned, and a desire to enhance synchronization and interoperability generated the revisions. Towards this end, several improvements have already been adopted. The first phase of this project examined the utility of another potential improvement. That is, a standardized instructional framework 1 for insurgency and counterinsurgency based on a social continuum. The suggestion was examined by-way of meta-analysis and the results indicated it is a valid instructional technique. The second phase of the project then looked at the feasibility and efficacy of integrating a social continuum framework and sociocultural information into COIN doctrine and planning. Four confounding problems were discovered that may hamper the integration of any instructional framework into doctrine.

Keywords: instructional framework, social continuum, insurgency, counterinsurgency, logical lines of operations, lines of effort, lines of operations, sociocultural factors, social sciences, intelligence products, freedom of movement, ends, scope, core grievances, root causes, prerequisites, breaking point, end game dynamics, comprehensive COIN, whole of government, systems perspective, population-centric.
Currently, three counterinsurgency (COIN) documents are being revised. The Allied Joint Doctrine AJP – 3.4.4, the United States (U.S.) Joint Publication (JP) 3.24, and U.S. Army / U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5. New insights, observations, and lessons learned, and a desire to enhance synchronization and interoperability generated the revisions. Towards this end, several improvements have already been adopted. The first phase of this project examined the utility of another potential improvement. That is, a standardized instructional framework 1 for insurgency and counterinsurgency based on a social continuum. The suggestion was examined by-way of meta-analysis and the results indicated it is a valid instructional technique. The second phase of the project then looked at the feasibility and efficacy of integrating a social continuum framework and sociocultural information into COIN doctrine and planning. Four confounding problems were discovered that may hamper the integration of any instructional framework into doctrine.

Keywords: instructional framework, social continuum, insurgency, counterinsurgency, logical lines of operations, lines of effort, lines of operations, sociocultural factors, social sciences, intelligence products, freedom of movement, ends, scope, core grievances, root causes, prerequisites, breaking point, end game dynamics, comprehensive COIN, whole of government, systems perspective, population-centric.

More info:

Published by: Richard J. Campbell on Mar 19, 2013
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

03/28/2014

pdf

text

original

 
1
COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM COIN In a Box: Packaging a Wicked Problem Richard J. Campbell and Con
rad C. Crane
 
Author Note Richard J. Campbell CIV, NATO Training Mission
 – 
 Afghanistan (NTM-A), Counterinsurgency Training Center
 – 
 Afghanistan (CTC-A), Kabul. Mr. Campbell was the training developer at CTC-A for 22 months. CTC-A will officially close 12 Oct. 2012.
Conrad C. Crane CIV, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, is the current director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute. He was the lead author for The Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5
Counterinsurgency
 (2006). Acknowledgments: the author would like to thank Paul J. Roberts (COL, SF), Michael G. Murray II (USMC, MAJ), Prayoot Charoenthep (DIA, GS-15), Conrad Crane (CIV, AWC), and Ben Connable (RAND Corp.) for their guidance, insights, and exchange of ideas. Technical assistance was provided by  Nicholas J. L. Butler (CAN, CAPT) and Joseph M. Henson (US, CIV). Comments or questions concerning
 this paper can be addressed to Nicholas J. L. Butler until 12 Oct. 2012. E-mail:
Disclaimer:
The opinions, recommendations, and conclusions in this report are those of the author, unless stated, referenced, or cited otherwise. NATO, NTM-A, ISAF, CTC-A, the U.S. Government, and private companies affiliated with the author, or agencies, offices, or organizations listed above is not responsible for the content. You the reader and end user are responsible for determining the value of the information contained herein and the relationship it has to your environment, position, and assigned tasks, duties, and responsibilities.
 
2
COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM Abstract Currently, three counterinsurgency (COIN) documents are being revised. The Allied Joint Doctrine AJP
 – 
 3.4.4, the United States (U.S.) Joint Publication (JP) 3.24, and U.S. Army / U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5. New insights, observations, and lessons learned, and a desire to enhance synchronization and interoperability generated the revisions. Towards this end, several improvements have already been adopted. The first phase of this project examined the utility of another potential improvement. That is, a standardized
instructional framework
1
 for insurgency and counterinsurgency  based on a
 social continuum.
 The suggestion was examined by-way of meta-analysis and the results indicated it is a valid instructional technique. The second phase of the project then looked at the feasibility and efficacy of integrating a social continuum framework and sociocultural information into COIN doctrine and planning. Four confounding problems were discovered that may hamper the integration of any instructional framework into doctrine.
 Keywords
: instructional framework, social continuum, insurgency, counterinsurgency, logical lines of operations, lines of effort, lines of operations, sociocultural factors, social sciences, intelligence products, freedom of movement, ends, scope, core grievances, root causes, prerequisites, breaking point, end game dynamics, comprehensive COIN, whole of government, systems perspective, population-centric.
1. The term
instructional framework 
 is being used to describe a foundational premise that curricula is based upon. Five things are considered when developing curriculum. They are; the characteristics of the students; the characteristics of the instructors; the context in which the training or instruction takes place; the content and / or material; and the overlap. This includes e-learning.
 
3
COIN IN A BOX: PACKAGING A WICKED PROBLEM COIN In a Box: Packaging a Wicked Problem
―The search for scientific bases for confronting problems of social policy is bound to fail,  because of the nature of these problems. They are ‗wicked‘ problems, whereas science
 has developed to deal with tame
 problems.‖ (Rittel and Webber, 1973, pg. 155)
 The term
wicked problem
 was introduced by Rittel in a seminar in 1967 and then later defined by Rittel and Webber in a journal article
2
 
(1973)
. The article provided 10 ―distinguishing properties‖ that
 separated societal problems or wicked problems apart from scientific and engineering problems. The definition that was set forth described the complex interplay that occurs when people try to solve  problems for other people. For instance, the authors explained that when people are involved in problem solving, there is an abundance of useless information, an absence of important information, a  preponderance of contradictory information, as well as a degree of consistency, inconsistency, and changes along the way. Added to this, there is a lack of consensus about the actual problem and disagreement about the solution, plus resistance to logical arguments, and scientific evidence. There is however lots of support for individual goals and agendas instead of support for pro-social solutions. (Rittel and Webber, pgs. 155-169) If a small group is satisfied or if one individual is happy, then many more are not and the problem is still not solved. If social violence or armed conflict were added to the definition of a wicked problem, an insurgency might even be called a wicked problem. An insurgency is a social phenomenon with the aim of societal change. The desired change is typically linked to politics, corruption, the economy, land, religion, or tribal or ethnic divides. In essence, people want to make plans for other people and use violence to do so.
2. At the time, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber were urban planners and attending the University of Berkley in California. The
article was titled; ―Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning‖ and was published by
 Policy Sciences
. The thesis was that social  public planning problems could not be solved with a linear, analytical, systems, or step-by-step approach.

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->