Stroschein Making or Breaking Kosovo

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Making or Breaking Kosovo: Applications of Dispersed State Control

Sherrill Stroschein
In this article, I make a case for a dispersed state control model as an alternative to the territorial and hierarchical principles of the Weberian state. Rather than allocating governance powers in terms of territory, dispersed state controls are based on a functional principle, in which governance is allocated to various subunits by issue area or function. This examination is informed by recent debates in international relations theory on contractual and imperial network models of control, as well as work on non-territorial autonomy in the elds of nationalism and ethnic conict. I examine the practical application of a dispersed control model in the context of the governance structure proposed for Kosovo, which declared independence from Serbia in February 2008. I conclude with an overview of the advantages of creative designs for states that move beyond territory and hierarchy, to deal with complex demographic and governing realities in regions such as the Balkans.
osovos declaration of independence from Serbia in February 2008 split the international community. As of this writing, approximately 40 states 1 have recognized or intend to formally recognize Kosovo as an independent statea tally codied on a website called kosovothanksyou.com. Serbia has consistently opposed Kosovos formal separation from Serbia, and continues to enforce ties to Serbs living in Kosovoapproximately 7 percent of Kosovos population.2 Given the Serbian governments stance in opposition to Kosovos independence, it was to be expected that states with close ties to Serbia, such as Russia, might withhold formal recognition of the entity. However, other states with their own potential separatist movements have also demonstrated reluctance regarding Kosovos recognition. Countries such as Slovakia and Spain have cited Kosovos independence as setting a dangerous precedent of redrawing borders in the international system, via unilateral decree.3
Sherrill Stroschein is Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Politics at University College London and Director of the Masters Program in Democracy and Democratization (s.stroschein@ucl.ac.uk). She wishes to thank Stephen Deets, Matthew Nelson, Stefan Wolff, and three anonymous reviewers for comments on previous drafts; Fotini Christia, Stacie Goddard, Daniel Nexon, Katia Papagianni, and Roger Petersen for conversations related to this piece; and to the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) for research support in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2001 and to the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies for support in 200305.
doi:10.1017/S153759270808184X
This diverse range of opinions on the Kosovo issue poses an inconvenience to the United States and a number of EU countries that have been articulating plans for the regions independence. Long negotiations within the EU have failed to bring all member states to full agreement in support of independence. Moreover, the independence issue has faced an embarrassing division within the UN Security Council that makes Kosovos recognition from that body unlikely for some time. The unilateral nature of Kosovos independence has included some rather stark rhetoric by its supporters, in an effort to obscure dissent on the matter. But this rhetoric also obscures some of the complexities of Kosovos intended governance structure, needlessly ratcheting up the debate. U.S. President George Bush has stated categorically that Kosovos borders have been clearly dened. 4 Certainly, Kosovos borders can be clearly drawn on a map. However, in de facto terms, the governance structures outlined for Kosovo will be much more complex than the typical Weberian state model. The ideal of a state as outlined by Max Weber is that of a sovereign administrative apparatus governing the use of force within a clearly dened territory. But the Ahtisaari plan on which Kosovos governance is to be based establishes an asymmetric decentralization model, granting particular powers to Serb-majority municipalities to govern their own affairs.5 Similar to governance structures in Belgium, Northern Ireland/UK, and Bosnia, it devolves substantial powers to substate units and even allows these units some powers of cross-border linkages with other states in the realm of specied issue-areas or functions. The strong devolution and weak central authority in these functional governance models dees a traditional
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Making or Breaking Kosovo

the undeniable repression of the Milos evic regime, the agitation of political rivals to Rugova, and a government collapse in Albania in 1996which produced chaos on Kosovos doorstep and facilitated access to armaments. With the growth of Albanian extremist activity, repression by Milos evic increased, drawing the attention of the international community.7 Following the NATO intervention in 1999, the United Nations held de facto control over Kosovo, granted by UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The Resolution denoted Kosovo as ofcially remaining under the control of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which prevented the province from ofcially conducting its own affairs or establishing its own defense structures. Kosovo thus remained a de jure part of Serbia, while Serbia held no de facto control in its Albanian-majority areas after the June 1999 settlement.8 The real authority was instead the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). It not only provided security, but also proposed legislation for parliament, nullied parliamentary decisions on security issues (over Albanian protests) and regulated foreign visitors to Kosovo (over protests from Belgrade).9 The international communitys drive to resolve Kosovos status accelerated in the fall of 2005. Although policy briefs soon after the 1999 intervention were open to a variety of possibilities for Kosovo, independence slowly came to dominate all other optionspartly due to the vehemence of the international actors supporting this position.10 Most of these policy discussions took the line that independence, by establishing clear ownership over Kosovo, would solve the complex problem of ethnic mixing by simply forcing Serbs to accept Albanian control of Kosovos territory.11 The Serb position was that Kosovo should be granted extensive autonomy within the boundaries of Serbia, but this proposal was generally unsuccessful in garnering Western support. In Kosovos rst parliamentary elections in November 2001, the Serb coalition Povratak (Return) was able to mobilize enough of the vote to obtain 22 seats in the 120-member parliament, far above their guaranteed 10 seatsin spite of initial threats of a Serb boycott.12 However, as Serbs began to perceive UN support for the Albanian position on independence, they slowly began to withdraw further from participation in political institutions. Less than one percent of eligible Serbs voted in the October 2004 parliamentary elections, a boycott endorsed by leaders in Belgrade.13 A Serb boycott of the 2007 parliamentary elections had a similar effect, as only 3 percent of registered Serb voters went to the polls.14 Serb representation after both elections thus became limited to their quota of 10 parliamentary seats. The remaining Serb representatives have occasionally withdrawn their participation as a form of boycott as well. Following the February 2008 independence declaration, protests were held by Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia.
view of state control as structured hierarchically around a powerful center. Rather, Kosovo is an example of a growing number of states with complex governance structures to govern diverse ethnic or religious populations. First, in contrast to the hierarchical model, such states have a dispersed control structure, in which the central government is weak and substate units have substantial powers. Second, in contrast to a territorial premise for governance and control, they operate on the basis of a functional premise of controlmeaning that substate units need not be territorial. As an example, Belgiums linguistic communities regulate educational affairs on a functional principle, meaning that both the Francophone and Flemish communities govern particular schools within the territory of Brussels. These communities may also sign treaties on educational policy with other states. Such an ability for substate units to conduct foreign policy without direction from the center is a serious departure from the typical model of a territorial state. While these complex state structures hold promise for the governance of divided societies, they remain poorly understood in the everyday world of policy discourse. The rhetoric surrounding Kosovos independence by all sides has tended to reect a zero-sum understanding of the meaning of statehoodone that makes Albanians overly joyful and Serbs overly mournful in relation to the complex institutions that comprise Kosovos governance structure. This article attempts to correct these misunderstandings. In the sections that follow, I rst sketch the conditions in Kosovo that warrant a complex governing structure. I then consider the Weberian state model and the territorial and hierarchical solutions that it implies, noting why they are likely to be inadequate for this case. I then outline the conceptual bases for functional governance, which provides an alternative to the Weberian model in terms of both territory and hierarchy, and analyze the new Kosovo structures along these lines. Finally, I conclude with an overview of the advantages of creative designs for states that move beyond territory and hierarchy, to deal with complex demographic realities in regions such as the Balkans.
Background: Intractable Positions?

During most of the 1990s, Kosovo was a civil disobedience success story. After the removal of the provinces autonomy by Slobodan Milos evic in 1989, the majority Albanian population adopted a strategy of passive resistance to Belgrade, under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. The Albanians maintained a shadow state government that functioned at a number of levels, including the collection of taxes and the development of some infrastructure.6 The stirrings of violence among Albanian extremists of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1998 were caused by the convergence of a number of events. These included
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Serbia has vehemently declared that it will not recognize Kosovo as a state. Controversy has raged within Serbia regarding how to treat those states and international bodies recognizing Kosovo. A dispute within the Serbian state government regarding its stance toward the EUgiven most EU countries support of Kosovos independencecaused the government to collapse a few weeks later, followed by May elections.15 Kosovos independence declaration is a claim for de jure control to be ofcially allocated to Kosovo, although the international community will retain a strong de facto governing role for the next several years. The independence plan outlines quite complex governance structures, a means to acknowledge that a simple Albanian domination of the Serbs in government would be problematic. In order to extend powers to the Serbs, the plan outlines a detailed proposal for decentralization, represented by Article 124 in the Constitution. It outlines enhanced governance powers that are allocated to local level municipalities, which also have the power to collect and allocate their own revenues. They also have the ability to engage in cross-border cooperation with Serbia and to form associations of municipalities.16 As I outline below, these arrangements reect a dispersed state control model that differs greatly from the Weberian ideal type of a territorial, hierarchical state.
Options for Divided Societies in the Weberian State Model

The current international system is founded on the norm of territorial states, an order that is preserved through the practice of mutual recognition.17 Max Webers inuential writings on the state describe it as a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. 18 These territorial lines may be granted to the state and recognized by the international community. But it is left to that state itself, as the sovereign, to assert its own de facto control within them, in the form of physical force, throughout that territory. According to these norms, the state is considered the sole source of the right to use violence for the purpose of control. However, the complex realities of governing diverse populations can produce a divergence from this ideal typeand a wide gap between recognized state borders and actual control on the ground.19 Given the predominance of the norm of territorial state control in international discourse and legal structures, actual deviations from this model tend to be treated by the international community as temporary and unstable arrangements. Appellations such as failed states or state death reect this understanding. Moreover, international policy often approaches such places with a focus on the creation of institutions to reect the ideal Weberian state model, or state-building. 20 One of the difculties of applying this ideal is that the act of drawing and enforcing bound-
aries cannot erase the ethnic, linguistic, religious, and family networks that may cross recognized state boundaries. The Balkan region contains particularly strong examples of such networks, though they certainly appear elsewhere throughout the globe.21 Under such circumstances, attempts to draw and enforce such boundaries require a steady commitment of resources to prop up the territorial state edice. Kosovos independence declaration reects some of these territorial border norms. Soon after the independence declaration, the international community immediately moved to fortify its new state bordersan act that Serbs responded to by vandalizing border posts.22 After the declaration, Serbs in the North, in cooperation with Serbia, began strengthening local institutions in preparation for a potential partition of the Serbian-dominated North from the remainder of Kosovo.23 Even with the establishment of border controls, these borders will remain inevitably porous, and surround diverse populations that are connected by networks. Such networks often pose control problems for a centralized and hierarchical government structure.24 There is an inherent incongruence between these on-theground realities and the attempt to endorse an international system of idealized nation-states. A number of strategies have been attempted in the pursuit of increased state control. One historical solution to potential minority challenges to central authority has been the repression or removal of minority groups via ethnic cleansing or forced assimilation.25 Normative shifts in the international system towards human and minority rights and towards democratization have problematized these approaches as policy options. More recently, scholars and policymakers are focusing on attempts to design state institutional structures in a way that can more successfully regulate potential group conicts.26 In the sections below, I rst outline three categories of state structure options that remain founded on the Weberian ideals of territory and hierarchy in state control. I then discuss alternative options founded on a non-territorial foundation and with dispersed control structures. Independence and Partition as Conict Resolution Conicts within a state can either be resolved by brute force and military victory or by negotiated settlement. Military victory may be more likely to produce a lasting end to conict, but at a sizeable cost to life and human rights.27 If a negotiated settlement is to be successful, each side must believe that the other is adhering to its terms and will not resume hostilitieswhat scholars refer to as a potential commitment problem.28 Negotiated settlements thus often require third-party enforcement to provide enforcement, or credible commitments, that the other side will be unlikely to cheat on the agreement.29 Moreover, negotiated settlements should also redene conicts
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and are thus limited as a means to alleviate minority concerns. Territorial Autonomy, Federalism, and Decentralization Socialism left a legacy of very centralized governments. For the past two decades, most Central and Eastern European states have embarked on decentralizing reforms the territorial devolution of governmental powers from the central to a more local level. Devolution efforts are founded on the normative principle of subsidiarity: the notion that responsibilities should be assigned to the lowest level government that can adequately perform them, as noted by Ronald Watts.39 Naturally, the act of choosing what unit this lowest level should be is often fraught with controversy. Contention over types of decentralization was indeed one of the primary initial causes of the initial unravelling of Yugoslavia in 1990 and 1991.40 This devolution process continues, but is now being implemented at far more local levels. While devolution is a broad term that implies the transfer of power, terms such as decentralization and federalism usually denote a symmetric dispersion of powers among units. The United States is an example of a symmetric allocation of powers among the 50 states of the union. Autonomy, on the other hand, consists of an asymmetric devolution of powers to a specic minority within a state.41 It codies the recognition that a particular minority group or historical territory might have unique governance concerns beyond those of other groupsas in the case of Native American reservations in the United States, Quebec in Canada, Catalonia in Spain, Crimea in Ukraine, or South Tyrol in Italy. Autonomous units tend to have powers beyond those of other units.42 In addition, autonomous units may take territorial or non-territorial forms; territorial forms are addressed here, while non-territorial forms are addressed in the following sections on functional governance principles.43 Autonomy may be assigned to a unit as part of a useful post-conict strategy. In essence, it gives concessions to each sideit can satisfy a minority enclaves demand for a degree of self-government without conceding state sovereignty. Autonomous structures thus allow for the possibility that groups on different sides may both perceive governing institutions as advantageous; in academic terms, they are multivocal, allowing for different interpretations.44 The ambiguity of autonomy is a source of its strength, as it allows each side to claim some victory in a battle for control over a specic territory. Up until the February independence declaration, Belgrade had been proposing autonomy for Kosovo, in a form that would have allowed signicant governing authority to the Albanians within the territory of Kosovo, while at the same time keeping Serbias state borders around Kosovo intact.45
in a way that convinces each side that it has a stake in a lasting peace.30 Negotiated settlements may be difcult to implement and costly for third parties to maintain, as heavy troop presence may be required to prevent a recurrence of hostilities. Some theorists have argued that conicts between identity groups are inevitable when individuals of different groups remain mixed, because the commitment problem implies that each side will have an incentive to attack the otheran ethnic security dilemma.31 Following this logic, they propose that the only means to achieve a permanent end to hostilities is through partition and population transfer: partition or independence to draw a boundary, and population transfer to remove the element of mixing.32 Population transfer tends to be unpopular among policymakers, given the obvious human rights abuses involved in such a policy. However, the logic of divide and quit 33 inherent in partition does imply that minorities left within a new state or province would continue to face a serious security dilemmaone potentially greater than before partition.34 Indeed, such circumstances have often led to a military or militia removal of these minorities post-partition, as an effort by majorities to homogenize the newly-partitioned unit. The Serbs in Kosovo have repeatedly expressed fears of such potential homogenizing actions, and there has indeed been sporadic violence against them over the past several years.35 Reecting a Serb unwillingness to participate in the security apparatus of a new Kosovar state, soon after the independence declaration a number of Serb police ofcers in Kosovo refused to adhere to Kosovar Albanian commandersbut rather attempted to pledge loyalty to UN forces.36 The recognition of Kosovos independence currently applies a double standard regarding the partition issue. Kosovo has been effectively partitioned from Serbia, but Serb proposals for a territorial partition of Kosovo itself, namely to separate the Serb-majority north from Pristina, have been ofcially rejected by the same bodies, ironically on the grounds that it would negate multiethnicity and facilitate population transfer.37 But independence is simply partition by another nameboth partition and the creation of new states are based on a territorial principle of allocating control. Minority groups who nd themselves within these new territories have understandable concerns about their status. Such problems are not unique to the Balkans, as a similar dynamic persists between religious communities in Iraq.38 The act of drawing borders in partitions and independence declarations will inevitably make minorities worry about their status in a new entity. For this reason, territorial autonomy and decentralization, outlined below, tend to be viewed as more palatable optionsas minorities remain within the protection of a larger state. However, these options are also based in Weberian state principles,
But many international policymakers viewed the proposal with suspicion, preferring instead a clear solution in Kosovo. A disadvantage of territorial autonomy is that once territorial units are created, they can also provide a basis for secession from the state. The propensity of territorial autonomy to encourage secession has occupied the attention of several analysts in comparative politics and international relations.46 Autonomous units established on a territorial principle tend to legitimize and institutionalize local control within particular borders, and thus can be perceived or used by local leaders as a stepping-stone to statehood. The alternative of functional autonomy, discussed further below, can mitigate these effects by only giving groups power over certain competencies or functions, rather than over a territory. In this way, it does not create mini-states potentially ready for secession. The most commonly-used forms of devolution in the international system take territorial forms that are very much in line with the Weberian state model. In addition, these systems preserve hierarchical structures, provided that the central government retains powers to restrict or negate powers exercised at the substate unit levelalso the case in most devolved systems.47 These territorial models tend to reserve powers over foreign policy and security for the central government. But systems of functional competencies may allocate these powers to substate units (as in Belgium and Bosnia), moving away from the typical Weberian centralized hierarchy. Current plans for Kosovos governance structures include a mixture of all of these elements, discussed in more detail towards the end of the article. One more territorial menu option rst remains to be discussed: innovations in elections, representation, and the allocation of governing powers. Elections, Representation, and Consociationalism The above sections illustrate how, under the premise of territorial governance, minorities will tend to perceive that they are at a power disadvantage in relation to majorities.48 Because democracy codies the principle of majority rule, translating demographics into political power, its implementation can augment these minority fears. These effects are compounded where ethnic or religious groups are mobilized as ethnic or religious political parties, a strong feature of the Balkans.49 The majoritarian electoral systems of the United States and Great Britain discourage the formation of small parties, such as ethnic parties. Majoritarian systems thus tend to hide ethnic or religious political divisions. In doing so they may prevent political fragmentation, but also fail to give voice to minorities in the political process. Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, used in both Kosovo and Serbia, grant minorities this voice because in PR systems seats in parliament more closely
reect group proportions.50 PR systems can also encourage ethnic parties. Serbia contains ethnic minority parties for Albanians (Pres evo Valley), Muslims (Sandz ak), Hungarians (Vojvodina), and Roma while Kosovo contains ethnic minority parties for Serbs and Roma. Quotas are also applied to guarantee representation and voice for minorities. Of the 120 seats in Kosovos parliament, 10 are reserved for Serbs and 10 for other minorities. Given continued Serb boycotts of Kosovos elections, their quota has served as a useful avenue for continued representation. Minorities may view electoral representation as a small allowance, because even quotas in parliament cannot change the fact of minority status in the decision-making process. For this reason, consociational structures in many divided societies provide a more direct means to integrate minorities in policy discussions. In consociational structures, each group is given veto powers. In Belgium, Bosnia, and Northern Ireland, for example, decisions on important matters cannot be made by one group without the potential for veto by other groups.51 Kosovos new governing structure includes some consociational features, but they do not involve a strict minority veto partly due to the demographic imbalance in favor of the Albanian majority. Rather, the decentralized structure provides the mechanism to alleviate minority concerns. One disadvantage of consociationalism is that it includes groups in representation at the cost of government efciency.52 Groups often disagree, producing frequent stalemates. Belgium thus maintains a modied form of consociational government. In Belgium, decisions on particular functional matters are relegated to each group separately, in a process discussed below. This functional innovation provides a means out of obvious stalemates in advanceand in this way steps away from the territorial and hierarchical limitations of the Weberian state model.
An Alternative: Functional Rather Than Territorial Governance

A territorial principle for control assumes sovereignty on the basis of territory. A functional principle is instead concerned with control over particular issues. Rather than allocating sovereignty over a particular territory, functional governance species sovereignty over specied competencies: Sovereignty over what? Sovereignty to do what? Functional units of government that are designated these controls can coexist and cooperate with territorial units. The Belgian federation, for example, consists of three territorial and three non-territorial units. The non-territorial linguistic councils adjudicate matters of language, education, and health care, while the territorial regions adjudicate matters that are more closely linked to territory, such as environment and economy. In a system of exclusive competencies, policy decisions on language and education thus come under the jurisdiction of the three
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trol structures, such as the mutually recognized powers of embassies on foreign territory, a form of neomedievalism that counters the hegemony of territoriality in world affairs.60 In addition, globalization processes are increasingly chipping away at the edice of territorial governance, requiring new assumptions about the assessment of political control.61 In addition, the establishment of shared competencies across the states of the European Union has produced a hybrid system of territorial and functional governance structures.62 Another cross-border innovation is Northern Ireland. Although Northern Ireland is ofcially part of the United Kingdom, a NorthSouth council with Ireland allows for strong direct consultation with this other state, and citizenship can be shared between the UK and Ireland.63 The territorial model of the Weberian state is hardly appropriate here. International relations scholarship has devoted some attention to functional governance structures, in order to better conceptualize these deviations from the system of territorial statesas in recent approaches to the study of empires. Although the study of empires and the study of states tend to be analyzed within the different elds of international relations and comparative politics, their governance structures are isomorphic, with similar forms regardless of the level of aggregation at which they are applied. Dynamics of imperial control and dynamics of domestic control can both be understood through an analysis of potentially similar control structures.64 These control structures can be approached from sociological or neoliberal viewpoints. Viewed through a sociological lens, functional control is exerted through networks as ties and relationships form non-territorial conduits through which power may be exercised. Such networks as a basis for control have been examined across a variety of settings (from Renaissance Florence to old and new empires) as a strategy used by leaders to consolidate power over diverse populations.65 Viewed through a neoliberal lens, which emphasizes individual choices in politics, functional control can take the form of contracting between self-interested parties.66 In both versions of analysis, control structures have the capacity to exercise power independently of territorial sovereignty, and independently of territory. Functional structures of control thus differ from the Weberian state model in terms of their non-territorial exercise of power. They also differ from the model in terms of its emphasis on centralized hierarchy, as the structure of control may be more dispersed throughout a network or set of contracts. As outlined by Alexander Cooley in his application of rm theory to power structures, power relations in a governance structure or relationship may take unitary (U) forms or multi-divisional (M) forms. While U forms are more hierarchical and centralized, in M forms the center is weaker and there is more autonomy allotted to the subunitsa dispersed control model.67 The degree
non-territorial linguistic communities. This innovation removes divisive issues from the realm of general state debate and adjudicates them separatelya means to avoid unnecessary conicts between groups.53 The central government in Belgium does maintain decision-making powers over budgetary allocations to these units, which can be and has been a source of a stalemate at the center. But because so many functions of the Belgian government are devolved to these substate units, a potential crisis is not perceived as such. In fact, during a long governmental stalemate in 2007 and early 2008, interviewees in Brussels quipped that the business of governance simply continued on without an effective center, due to the fact that devolution to the federation units is so strong.54 How can it do this? As noted above, the Belgian government is consociational, such that each group may veto proposals by the othera source of recent crises. Consociationalism requires that elites cooperate in order to create policy. However, Belgiums consociationalism is supplemented with the complex federal structure outlined above. In this structure, territorial and non-territorial units with specic functional competencies take specic policy matters outside of the realm of general debate. Belgium thus takes two steps away from consociationalism as it is usually applied. First, the division of competencies among the different units means that elite cooperation is not necessary for several decisions to be made. Second, the non-territorial units of the federation invoke aspects of collective rights for communities in governance, regardless of the actions of elites at the central level.55 Some of these innovations appear in the new governmental structure for Kosovo.56 After a sketch of the conceptual foundations of functional governance, I will outline the Kosovo structures in more detail. Basics of Functional Control Structures Territory may currently serve as the dominant principle of governance in an international system based on states, but it has not always held this role.57 Various non-territorial and functional control structures conducted the tasks of governance long before states became dominant units in the international system.58 In the Ottoman Empire, for example, non-territorial units called millets allowed Orthodox and Jewish groups to administer family law on the basis of their own religious traditions, rather than on the basis of Islamic law. Membership in millets was based on a personal rather than a territorial principle; thus individuals within the same millet might be dispersed throughout a territory.59 Nor does territory hold exclusive reign in the contemporary era, as the modern international system includes highly visible exceptions to territorial governing rules. John Ruggie calls these non-territorial or functional con660 Perspectives on Politics
to which a governance structure reects hierarchy versus dispersed controls varies according to the strength of the entities and the networks isomorphic pattern.68 As one example of a hierarchical arrangement, Cooley examines Russias contracts with Central Asian republics for purposes of resource extraction. Both parties may be willing participants in such transactions, even though their interactions often reect a hierarchical structure of power.69 Another fruitful area for the application of these dynamics lies in the study of imperial management. As outlined by Daniel Nexon and Thomas Wright, a hub-and-spoke network pattern with little connection between subunits is a more effective control structure than other forms for an empire, because it forces all communication through the center.70 This hub-and-spoke pattern with little subunit communication denotes a hierarchical focus on the center that is not unlike that of the Weberian state. A strong empire may exercise less direct inuence than does a central government in a Weberian hierarchical state, but the two structures reect the same governance pattern. In contrast, a more dispersed control structure could allow for direct links between the units, or for direct links between the units and external actors. In these dispersed forms, controls are allocated to the subunits for potential interactions that do not involve the center. These deviations from the territorial and hierarchical aspects of Weberian state structures show promise for addressing governance problems in divided societies. Non-Territorial Autonomy and Functional Governance The primacy of territorial states over other types of recognized political organization inevitably produces conicts between groups vying for the same territory. As noted by Gidon Gottlieb, the premise that each nation should have a state of its own is a good idea only in the abstract.71 Given these problems, scholars of nationalism, ethnic conict, and group accommodation have been engaged in the project of designing various institutional solutions for governing complex societies. First, if territory poses a source of dispute between groups, the nature of territory can be reframed.72 Northern Irelands exible citizenship policy and North-South councils take precisely these steps. Second, if a states governance hierarchy poses a source of dispute between groups, the state structure can be redesigned away from hierarchical structures. Belgiums non-territorial federal structure allows French and Flemish speakers to administer their own schools without fear of involvement by the other group in educational matters. The fact that educational matters lie under the jurisdiction of the non-territorial federal units, the linguistic communities, effectively takes them out of the realm of general debate. This is how the system of divided competencies can reduce ethnic tensions, by min-
imizing debates on issues that are most likely to cause controversy between groups. In this way, many potential disputes are simply redirected via institutional design before they can become truly divisive.73 Normative theorists attempting to address these problems have noted that democratic decisions in particular issue-areas need not require territorial units.74 This line of thought was initially put forth a century ago by Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, in their attempt to address dilemmas of minority governance brought about by the demise of the Austrian Empire. In their view, the non-territorial premises of the Ottoman millet system could be applied to address this matter directly.75 While their instrumental works on this subject were not put in practice at the time, in the last few decades a literature has emerged on nonterritorial autonomy as a means to address governance problems for minorities. Due to a diverse range of scholarship on this issue, these non-territorial structures are also referred to as personal or cultural autonomy, as well as nationalcultural autonomy (NCA). These examinations of functional governance have been pursued separately from the international relations work on functional governance, but the two literatures have much in common. In the development of the concept of non-territorial autonomy, non-territorial units hold jurisdiction over individuals according to a personal principle, and in relation to specic governance functions. Groups may thus administer themselves with regard to competencies that can be separated from territory.76 Such functions generally include the cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or religious matters of a minority group. However, they might also include foreign policy, criminal justice, and economic policy. These foreign policy powers are evident in Belgium, where the linguistic subunits have the capacity to sign treaties with other states on matters relating to education. Consistent with the logics outlined in the international relations literature, non-territorial autonomy includes two important components: 1) decision-making bodies that are not territorialsuch as councils elected according to linguistic afliation, and 2) specic functional competencies that are assigned to those bodies. In specifying particular functions for particular councils, these structures reserve matters such as language and education for internal group debate, rather than allowing them to become a bone of contention between different groups. Belgium is not the only example of this type of nonterritorial governance. In Hungary, non-territorial councils for minority groups were established in 1993, primarily to administer matters of culture. Similar to the Belgian units, the Hungarian bodies consist of representatives chosen by their ethnic constituents in non-territorial elections.77 The Russian Federation passed a law on National Cultural Autonomies in 1996, as a means to address the problem of recognized national minorities living outside of territorial republics assigned to their ethnic kin. These
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regard to references to Serb interests. As stated explicitly in the Ahtisaari plans executive summary (2007):
The Settlement provides a wide-ranging decentralization proposal, which is extensive in scope and intended to promote good governance, transparency and effectiveness in public service. The proposal focuses in particular on the specic needs and concerns of the Kosovo Serb community, which will have a high degree of control over its own affairs.86
entities ofcially serve functions of linguistic, cultural, and religious administration.78 In addition, courts to adjudicate matters using Sharia law (usually with regard to family law) appear in a number of diverse states, including Nigeria, India, and Greece.79 Closer to Kosovo, Serbias 2002 Minorities Law included provisions for minority councils funded by the state budget and designed to protect language, education, media, and culture for minorities.80 Such pro-minority structures, a vast deviation from past Serbian policies, are comparable to the non-territorial structures in Hungary, Russia and Belgium. Moreover, the Minorities Law provides for towns with high concentrations of a particular minority group to work together, allowing for a loose organization of Hungarian-strong or Albanian-strong towns and regions. The Hungarian minority in Serbia, which was particularly involved in designing this portion of the legislation, has already established some of these structures. The law was partially designed with Kosovo in mind. Indeed, as early as 2003, Serb communities in Kosovo began following this model in the form of a Union of Serb Municipalities, a loose organization headed by a president and executive board.81 Kosovos New Structures Kosovos current constitution emerged from the Ahtisaari plan from 2007,82 and includes structures quite similar to those outlined above to address minority concerns especially for the Serbs. Minorities in Kosovo are granted particular concessions in the areas of representation and decentralization, discussed here. The constitution, which took effect on June 15 2008, utilizes more vague wording to outline decentralization provisions than the previous constitutional draft and the Ahtisaari plan. However, their basic logic remains, with some of the differences between versions noted in the coming discussion.83 With regard to representation, both the previous proposals and current constitution codify the 10-seat quota for Serbs in the Kosovar parliament (Article 64) that has been ongoing practice in recent years. Other minorities are also granted seats. In addition, there is a permanent Committee to represent the interests of minorities in parliament, particularly on issues of vital interest to those communities (Articles 78 and 81). Finally, at the municipal level, minorities are guaranteed a representative voice where they comprise over 10 percent (Article 62).84 At rst glance, these representation structures might appear somewhat consociational. However, the constitution does not give minorities a veto on decisions, thus stopping short of a consociational model.85 Rather, the operative powers for minorities appear in the highly devolved state structure. With regard to decentralization, the initial provisions for Kosovos devolved structure were quite specic with
In the 2008 nal constitution, the decentralization language is more vague, but is represented in the discussion of the high degree of local self-governance and extended and delegated competencies outlined for municipalities in Article 124.87 The Ahtisaari plan of 2007 is more explicit in outlining specic competencies for municipalities in areas of higher education and health care, similar to the Belgian model. The 2007 plan also proposes extensive nancial autonomy for municipalities in the form of block grants, including the ability to accept transparent funding from Serbia for a broad range of municipal activities and purposes. The nal 2008 Constitution omits explicit references to Serbia, likely due to Albanian sensitivities, but retains these provisions in the form of municipal powers for crossborder cooperation, (Article 124) and in the rights of ethnic and national communities to establish and maintain their own schools (Article 59).88 In addition, following a pattern established by the 2002 Serbian minorities law, Serb-majority municipalities are able to establish partnerships with other municipalities most likely to be other Serb-majority entities (Article 124). Taken in conjunction with their powers of cross-border cooperation with other states, Serbian municipalities can thus establish a range of agreements and nancial connections with other municipalities and Serbia, on particular maters of governance that remain of interest to the Serbian community.89 These decentralization plans are particularly intriguing in relation to the demographic dispersion of the ethnic populations in Kosovo. While the plan ofcially avoids outlining territorial autonomy, a concentration of Serbian communities in the north, combined with the municipal structures, gives a wide degree of de facto territorial autonomy to this area. In the aftermath of independence, Serbia has been using this fact as the basis for an alternative plan for the potential territorial partition of Kosovo. However, Serbias attempts at partition are problematized by the existence of several Serb municipalities outside of this region, to the east. The Ahtisaari plan outlined extensive autonomy to these Serb-majority municipalities as well, which are points dispersed throughout Albanian-majority areas. In addition, the divided city of Mitrovica, with a Serb majority in the North and an Albanian majority in the South, may be governed by two ethnic municipal entities.90
At rst glance, one might say that these municipal entities could be units with territorial autonomy. But this conguration is a combination of territorial and nonterritorial controls. Serb-majority municipalities in the East can work closely with the Serb-majority area in the North, and both can form close links to Serbia. Moreover, the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo explicitly outlined the potential for Serbian state institutions to contribute funding towards the governance of these Serb-majority areas in Kosovo, to supplement their own revenues, formally recognizing an ongoing practice. The linked network structure of Serb communities creates a de facto non-territorial network of governance over certain issue areas, particularly language, culture, education, and health care in cooperation with the Serbian state. While both the 2007 plan and the constitution ofcially omit the establishment of a meso-level Serb representative body, the system of links implies a whole that is greater than the sum of its partsa network structure not unlike the medieval Hanseatic League with competencies over particular areas.91 Even the police force, the representative of state control in the Weberian model, is to be quite decentralized in Kosovo.92 Both groups are aware that this strong decentralization reduces the potential for territorial and hierarchical control in Kosovo, taking it several steps from the Weberian state model. Albanians, as the majority, would prefer a more hierarchical model, while the Serb minority prefers a more dispersed control model. Thus, the strong levels of decentralization for municipalities were opposed by the Albanian majority, which can explain the shift to vague language on these provisions between the initial plans and the nal Constitution. But the Serbian community in Kosovo ueses these decentralized structures to their full potential, and will very likely continue to do so. The strong cross-border links that can be established between Serbmajority municipalities and Serbia, including the receipt of Serbian state funding for their activities, contravenes the norm of a territorial state with the ability to regulate its own affairs. The proposal appears to be at least as powerful as Northern Irelands North-South councils in this respect. The dispersion of strong competencies to these municipalities also represents a quite dispersed control structure, rather than a hierarchical model for governance. In addition, the network links that municipalities can form with each other and with Serbia add an element of non-territorial autonomy to the structure, as a de facto governing network entity is created independent of territory to regulate matters of ethnic Serbian interest. Kosovo is thus in essence pushing the boundary of what it means to be a stateunless one is willing to move away from the standard Weberian denition of states.93 Indeed, it may be time to re-think this standard understanding of how states should be congured, as democratization throughout the globe fosters increased involvement of minority groups in politicsrather than simply their
repression. Governance dilemmas are unfolding in a vast range of places, from Europe to Africa and the Middle East. As a result, more analysts are turning their attention to the need to think creatively about the design of institutions to manage them.94
The Precedent Issue and Kosovos Neighbors

What will happen next? Several state governments have expressed fears that Kosovos independence will encourage other separatist movements throughout the globe movements that may view it as establishing an international precedent for others to follow.95 But proponents of Kosovos independence argue that it is a unique case that will not set an example elsewhere.96 How might we conceptualize potential ripple effects in the immediate region, and how might potential effects be contained? The impact of Kosovo on separatist movements will likely depend on the ability for extremist wings of separatist groups to successfully employ it as evidence or support for their own claims. As outlined by Rogers Brubaker in his triadic nexus model, this potential is contingent on the set of interactive relationships between minorities, host states, and kin statesand the extremist and moderate elements within these entities.97 Romania and Slovakia, for example, contain signicant Hungarian minorities. In the few years before Kosovos independence, articles in both the ethnic Hungarian and titular press in Romania and Slovakia invoked Kosovo as a potential model for ethnic Hungarian minorities. The minority Hungarian press has viewed Kosovo independence in quite positive terms, while the Romanian and Slovak press have opposed it.98 It should thus come as no surprise that Hungary has recognized Kosovo, while Romania and Slovakia have been reluctant to do so.99 The recognition issue also poses serious problems for states such as Bosnia and Macedonia, where different ethnic groups may espouse different views on whether to recognize Kosovo. This section outlines how Kosovos independence might play out in light of the on-the-ground complexities of some of its neighbors. As much policy rhetoric on the Balkans appears to overlook some of the complexity of this region, the potential implications for these countries and regions merit some attention. Bosnia The 1995 Dayton agreement that ended the brutal civil war between groups established a state divided into two main parts: the Republika Srpska (RS), inhabited primarily by Serbs, and the Croat-Muslim Federation. As Montenegro held a successful referendum on independence from Serbia in May of 2006, Bosnian Serbs began to call for a similar independence referendum for the RS. In spite of an immediate EU rejection of the referendum request,
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both provinces simultaneously in 1989, but Vojvodinas territorial autonomy was reinstated in 2002.105 Although Vojvodina has fewer autonomous powers than it did before 1989, the 2002 Minorities Law provides for the establishment of non-territorial minority councils.106 Many of the provinces residents of a variety of ethnicities argue that any independence for Kosovo implies a parallel consideration of Vojvodinas potential independence. Pro-Vojvodina parties, the leaders of which are Serbs, are a strong political presenceand the provinces own blue, yellow, and green ag is ubiquitous. Multiethnic support for Vojvodinas increased governing powers is based on the provinces wealth in relation to the rest of Serbia, as well as its separate historical identity.107 Vojvodina contains a population that is 17 percent Hungarian, along with a mixture of other groups. Ethnic Serbs constitute approximately 57 percent of the population.108 In addition to the pro-Vojvodina parties, ethnic Hungarian and radical Serb parties are the most visible. Among the provinces groups, the Hungarians have been the most active in establishing the non-territorial councils endorsed by the Minorities Law.109 Increased autonomy for Vojvodina has not deterred the actions of local Serb extremists, who categorically oppose any further separation from Belgrade. Unfortunately, Vojvodina is rarely mentioned in reports on Kosovo, and the legal relationship between the two is often dismissed without much consideration of events on the ground.110 In fact, in July 1999, when U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Hungarys Prime Minister Viktor Orbn to thank him for his assistance on Kosovo, he was surprised when Orbn proposed autonomy for Vojvodina as a proper thank you. Cohen described the Hungarian plan as the last thing he wished to discuss in the wake of the Kosovo conict.111 But the notion of even further governing powers for the province has not gone away,112 and the pro-Vojvodina parties there remain vocal. Serbias Pres evo Valley and the Sandz ak Large concentrations of Albanians live in Serbias Pres evo Valley, bordering Kosovos east. A sizeable community of Slavic Muslims inhabits the nearby Sandz ak region, which borders Kosovos northwest.113 These regions have not been immune to violenceevents in Kosovo have had undeniable spillover effects in these areas of Serbia. In the most recent demonstration of how events in Kosovo and Serbia are entwined, mosques in several cities around Serbia were set on re following some violence against Serbs in Kosovo in 2004.114 These incidents were not the rst time that events in Kosovo ignited tensions in Serbia. In February of 2001, clashes between Albanian militants and Serbian police took place in the Pres evo Valley. After the Kosovo conict in
these Serbian demands became louder as the push for Kosovos independence accelerated. As of this writing, Serbs continue to threaten to declare independence for the Republika Srpska from Bosnia.100 Macedonia Until the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was an oft-cited example of ethnic coexistence. Albanian parties have been a rather constant presence in the countrys coalition government since its rst free elections in 1994. Macedonians, who are Slavs, constitute the majority of the population. Ofcial census gures denote the Albanians at 23 percent, though Albanian leaders there have argued that they instead comprise close to 40 percent. Other population groups, including Turks, Serbs, and Roma, are estimated at roughly 10 percent.101 In 1999, the ethnic balance was changed somewhat with the arrival of a vast number of Albanian refugees eeing Milos evic s military drive and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. But in 2001, violence erupted in Macedonia as well. Some violence between Albanians and Serbs within Serbia brought both extremists and refugees across the border into Macedonia. Initial gunre on the Kosovo-Macedonian border grew into clashes between Albanian militants and Macedonian police, and arms were regularly transported from Kosovo into Macedonia.102 As the conict grew, civilians inevitably became caught in the fray. By June, more than 33,000 refugees had left Macedonia for Kosovo, reversing the path walked by Kosovar refugees in 1999.103 Intervention from the international community quickly brought an end to the violence and produced the Ohrid agreement between groups. However, scars of fear and suspicion remain. Recent disruptions in the implementation of the Ohrid agreement demonstrate that in spite of Macedonias successes, peaceful ethnic relations there could be easily disrupted. Strong Albanian networks in the region make it possible that Albanian extremists, emboldened by Kosovos independence, could renew an attempt to annex towns in Macedonia to Kosovo, similar to efforts by some Albanian extremists in Serbia. Moreover, because Macedonia borders Kosovo to the south, it would be a likely destination for Serbian refugees from Kosovo if they might be forced to leavefurther disrupting the countrys ethnic balance. In addition, the issue of Macedonian recognition for Kosovo remains internally divisive, and could become a source of political contention between groups.104 Vojvodina in Serbia Vojvodina is located in the north of Serbia. Unlike the southern portion, it was part of Hungary before 1920. For decades, it has been Kosovos sister province, as the two regions have historically held the same autonomous legal status within Serbia. Milos evic revoked the autonomy of
1999, NATO had established a 5-kilometer buffer zone between Serbia and Kosovo. It was in this army-free buffer zone that Albanian militants, calling themselves the Lib and Bujanovac, were eration Army of Pres evo, Medveda, able to gather their forces. These 500800 militants modelled themselves on the KLA and were equipped with weapons from Kosovo. With a stated goal of attaching three Albanian-majority towns in Serbia to Kosovo, they attacked local Serb police and a bus convoy, as well as moderate Albanian politicians. By May of 2001, NATO began to allow Serb army units into the zone in an effort to rout the Albanian extremiststhough many remain at large.115 Kosovos independence could breathe more life into this goal of annexing Albanian municipalities to Kosovo.116 Moreover, both the Pres evo Valley and the Sandz ak border Kosovo. In the event of a potential departure of Serbs from Kosovo, these already tense areas could be among their primary destinations. An inux of individuals escaping violent conditions would be highly likely to disrupt regions that already feature a delicate balance between ethnicitiesas shown by the 2001 Macedonia violence. Overview As these examples make clear, the territory of the Balkans is not composed of a set of atomized unit states rmly separated by clear lines on a map. Even without the formal cross-border institutional provisions inherent in the new Kosovo, the fates of the various regions within the Balkans are thickly intertwined with networksethnic, religious, trade (legal and illegal), and family networks. The presence of these networks might facilitate two mechanisms that could increase the likelihood of regional instability following Kosovos independence: emulation and spillover effects. Such network dynamics are quite common across the borders of diverse states, and can work against the logics of state controlKurds in Turkey and Iraq, borders of Palestine/Israel, and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi are just a few such examples. The Balkans display similar complexities. Rather than establishing forms of government that ignore these realities, it is important that institutions embrace them. The Ahtisaari model, used as a foundation for Kosovos new government, is a good step in this direction. However, the international community actors in Kosovo must implement these provisions as they were intended, rather than falling back on the rhetoric of atomized and hierarchical state units.
function. The examination here is informed by recent debates in international relations theory on contractual and imperial network models of control, as well as work on non-territorial autonomy in the elds of nationalism and ethnic conict. Like Northern Irelands North-South councils, Kosovos new structures allow substate units to create formal links, including nancial links, with Serbia. With this component, as well as its non-territorial structures, Kosovo moves away from the typical hierarchical premises of the Weberian state. Like Belgiums model of divided competencies for territorial and non-territorial units within the federation, the structures planned for Kosovo aim to remove some of the most controversial matters of governance from the realm of public contestation. In doing so, they reduce the potential for group conict by moving away from a hierarchical state model to dispersed controls. The dispersed state control model offers much promise in a world of diversely-populated states. Rather than forcing ethnic or religious minorities to conform to the will of the majority because they nd themselves within a particular territory, dispersed state control models establish nonterritorial institutions by which minorities might control specic functions of concern to them. The deciders of Kosovos fate have done well to establish a dispersed state model for control within its new structure. It can only be hoped that the policy rhetoric of the international community will catch up to these realities. Complex societies require complex governance solutions.
Notes
1 The United Nations contains 192 members. 2 Kosovo contains an Albanian majority that is approximately 90 percent of the population, and Serbs are approximately 7 percent, and likely decreasing. Other ethnicities include Roma, Bosniaks, and Turks. Ethnic Albanians have consistently supported full independence, while Serbs have categorically opposed it. 3 BBC News Online 2008b. Arguments that Kosovo is a unique case (International Crisis Group 2007) seem to be based on wishful thinking rather than an understanding of ethnic dynamics. As one example, this author was contacted by a Kurdish newspaper in Iraq to comment on the implications of Kosovo for Iraqi Kurdistan. Each country has more extreme elements among ethnic minorities who are certainly invoking the Kosovo case as support for their owndiscourse in Hungarian circles in Romania has reected these aspects as well; International Herald Tribune 2008. 4 RFE/RL Newsline, February 25 2008. 5 Austin 2007. As he argues, anyone who suggests that Kosovo is set to become simply another Albanian state in the Balkans has not read the ne print. 6 Schmidt 1993, Juviler and Stroschein 1999.
Conclusion
This article has outlined a case for dispersed state control models as an alternative to the territorial and hierarchical principles of the Weberian state. Rather than allocating governance powers in terms of territory, these innovative structures are based on a functional principle, in which governance is allocated to various subunits by issue area or
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26 An excellent, concise overview of these options appears in Sisk 1996. 27 Licklider 1995. 28 Fearon 1998. 29 Walter 2002. 30 Goddard 2006. 31 Posen 1993. 32 Kaufmann, 1996 and 1998, and Downes 2001. 33 Kumar 1997; emphases original. 34 Kaufmann 1996 and 1998. 35 Most notably in 2004, when many Serbs were forced out of certain areas and their homes were burned: BBC News Online, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, Hayton 2004, Thorpe 2004, Bardos 2005 and 2006. There are also ongoing sporadic attacks; International Crisis Group 2007. 36 Associated Press/New York Times 2008, BBC News Online 2008d. In addition, ethnic Serbian railroad ofcials facilitated Serbias brief takeover of a rail line in northern Kosovo, later regained by the UN; Kristic 2008, BBC News Online 2008e. 37 Sletzinger and Gelazis 2005, Bilefsky 2008a, BBC News Online 2008a and 2008c. 38 See Diamond 2005, Cordesman 2006, and the Roundtable published in Foreign Affairs by Diamond et al., 2006. 39 Watts 1998. 40 For a theoretical treatment, see Cooley 2005; 12636. 41 Watts 1998 and Hale 2004. In practice, however, these terms are not always used consistently. Devolution in the UK refers to an asymmetric allocation of powers, and the Belgian federation has an asymmetric structure that will be examined later in this article. 42 Hannum 1996; Heintze 1998, 7, and 2002, Thornberry 1998. See also Baubock 2001. The term federacy might be used to express a loosely-connected autonomy, as in Puerto Ricos relationship to the United States; see Rezvani 2007a and 2007b, and McGarry 2007a and 2007b. As dened by Rezvani, a federacy is a territory within the international legal boundaries of a state that has been allocated some entrenched [. . .] nal decision-making powers without being a member unit of a federation; 2007a, 117. 43 A good overview of these principles can be found in Ansell 2004 and in Caporaso and Jupille 2004. 44 Padgett and Ansell 1993, Tilly 2002; Nexon and Wright 2007. 45 Judah 2005. 46 Roeder 1991, Lapidoth 1997, Bunce 1999, Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999, Rothchild and Hartzell 1999, Sambanis 2000, Hale 2000 and 2004, Stewart 2001, Hughes and Sasse 2001, Sasse 2002, Cornell 2002,
7 Greenhill 2003. 8 United Nations Security Council, 1999. A good discussion of the differences between de jure and de facto controls appears in Jackson and Rosberg 1982. 9 Alexandris 2004. For an overview of powers, see United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 2001/2002. 10 International Crisis Group 2002a and 2002b contain more subdued language than the 2005a and 2006 reports; see also Kupchan 2005. 11 International Crisis Group 2005a and 2006, Kupchan 2005, and Moore 2006a and 2006b. 12 RFE/R Newsline, November 15 and 26, 2001. 13 BBC News Online, 2004e, National Democratic Institute 2004. 14 RFE/RL Newsline, November 19 2007. 15 RFE/RL Newsline, March 10 2008, Beaumont 2008. 16 The initial Ahtisaari plan included provisions for block grants to municipalities, while the nal version leaves these provisions more vague: United Nations Ofce for the Special Envoy of Kosovo (UNOSEK) 2007a and 2007b; Constitutional Commission, Government of Kosovo, 2008a and 2008b. 17 Weber 1946, Spruyt 1994, Ansell 2004, Thomas 2004. 18 Weber 1946, p. 78. 19 Jackson and Rosberg 1982, Spruyt 1994. 20 Another proposal would make such units ofcial protectorates of more powerful states, along the lines of shared sovereigny; Krasner 2004. This notion bears more resemblance to colonial rule than the non-territorial governance structures outlined in this article. Not only would ongoing resource commitments make Krasners shared sovereignty impractical over time, but a stated commitment to democracy by the worlds leaders makes such relationships inherently problematic. A sincere attempt to stabilize states from the inside requires some serious thought regarding institutions of functional, rather than just territorial, governance. 21 Examples abound in Africa and the Middle East, but are certainly not conned there. 22 RFE/RL Newsline, February 20, 2008. 23 Meanwhile, other states openly opposed independence for fear that it might give rise to further separatist movements elsewhere. While realist views of international relations continue to analyze the state system as if it consisted of autonomous units, in fact the international order is better understood as an ecosystem of relations, where changes reverberate throughout network ties and globalized discourse: Bull 1977, Goddard and Nexon 2005. 24 Jackson and Rosberg 1982, Herbst 1996/1997. 25 Licklider 1995.
47
48 49 50 51
52 53
54
55 56 57 58
59 60 61 62 63 64 65
Gorenburg 2003, Laitin 2001, Jenne 2004, Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson 2004. This view differs from that of Cooley 2005, 27, who does not view federations as hierarchies. Here I argue that it is the functional content of powers that determines this question. As military power and foreign policy tend to be regarded as crucial powers for a central government to exercise in order to appear as a state in the Weberian sense, devolving these to a substate unit would remove this element of hierarchial authority. A good discussion of these issues appears in Haydens 1999 discussion of the Dayton structure established for Bosnia. Unless it is the minorities who hold the means of coercion, as was the case in colonial Rwanda and in South Africa until 1994. See Horowitz 1985 on census voting. A broad treatment of these electoral systems appears in Sartori 1994, Sisk 1996, and Reilly 2001. Lijphart 1968 and 1977, Lustick 1979, Andeweg 2000, Wolff 2004. Consociationalism could be understood as a form of corporatism because it includes columns of strong representationbut it is for ethnic, rather than economic groups. On corporatism, see Schmitter 1974. On this tradeoff, see Diamond 1993. Hooghe 1993, Van Parijs 2000, Jacobs 2000, Lauvaux 2001, Leton 2001, Jacobs and Swyngedouw 2003, Stroschein, 2003 and 2006, Farrell and Van Langenhove 2005, Nimni 2005, and Lidstrm 2007. Some theoretical foundations appear in Ruggie 1993 and Ansell 2004. Rumors of Belgiums imminent collapse fail to address the issue of how the sticky point of Brussels governance might be resolved if the state dissolves into two parts. Nimni 2005, especially 810. See especially Pettifer 2006. Weber 1946, Ansell 2004, Thomas 2004. These works are numerous. Some more recent examples include Tilly 1992, Padgett and Ansell 1993, Ruggie 1993, Spruyt 1994, Sassen 2006, and Nexon and Wright 2007, and Nexon forthcoming. Ra-anan 1991, Nimni 2005. Ruggie 1993. Friedrichs 2001, Ansell 2004, Deets 2008, Agnew 2005, Adamson 2006, Etzioni 2006, Sassen 2006. Jacobson 1997, Brenner 1998, Aalberts 2004, Ansell 2004, Di Palma 2004, Caporaso and Jupille 2004, Stone Sweet 2004. OLeary 2002. Tilly 1998, Nexon and Wright 2007, Nexon 2009. Some of this work leans toward a constructivist vein as well. Padgett and Ansell 1993, Ruggie 1993,
66 67 68
69
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79
80 81 82
83 84
Wendt and Friedheim 1995, Jackson and Nexon 1999, Tilly 2004, Hobson and Sharman 2005, Goddard and Nexon 2005, Nexon and Wright 2007, and Nexon 2009. Lake 1996, and Cooley 2000/01 and 2005. See also Baumgartner, Buckley, and Burns 1975. Cooley 2005, esp. pp. 46. The content of the relations may also affect this power dynamic, but this issue is beyond the scope of the present analysis. See among others Mannheim 1955, Foucault 1980, and Shotter 1993. While notions of contracting vs. hierarchy may appear to be contradictory, this dilemma tends to reect the nature of principal-agent problems in such interactions. On this point, see Cooley 2005. Nexon and Wright 2007, Nexon 2009. Gottlieb 1994, 101; Heintze 2002; Brooks 2005; Nootens 2006. For an excellent treatment of reframing disputes, see Goddard 2006. Van Parijs 2000. Walzer 1992, Gould 2006, Gould and Macleod 2006. See Renner in Nimni 1899/2005. Coakley 1994, Eide, Greni, and Lundberg 1998, Bowring 2002, Nimni 2005, introduction and conclusion, Baubock in Nimni 2005. Eide, Greni and Lundberg 1998, Deets 2002, Deets and Stroschein 2005. Bowring 2002. However, similar to the Hungarian bodies, they sometimes lack appropriate funds to carry out their dutues. I am grateful to Katerina Mantouvalou, Fatima Kazim Olubodun, and Stefan Wolff for these points. It should also be noted that Sharia law has even been proposed for some Muslim communities in the United Kingdom; Burns 2008, Liptak 2008. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2002; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2002. RFE/RL Newsline, February 11, 18, and 25, 2003; Naegele 2003. Mustafa 2008, Foniq-Kabashi, 2008, as well as RFE/RL Newsline articles on the Kosovar parliaments approval of these plans for a constitution in April, 2008. Bilefsky 2008b, Moore 2008b. Constitutional Commission, Government of Kosovo, 2008a and 2008b; in 2008a (Draft) especially Chapter X, article 12, and articles 62 and 64. It is notable that the European standard for minority concessions at the local level is 20 percent. Initial versions of the plan proposed electoral solutions, such as a double majority requirement for pariamentary legislation on issues pertaining to minorities, as mentioned in the Ahtisaari plan, United Nations
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International Crisis Group 2005b; Pettifer 2006; and Lobiakas 2008. Associated Press/New York Times 2001a; Radio Free Europe Daily Report 2001 (later changed name to RFE/RL Newsline ); Moore 2001a and 2001b; Glenny 2001. Associated Press/New York Times 2001a and 2001b, Gall 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d. Whitmore 2008. RFE/RL Newsline, October 23 and December 18, 2001, and January 24 and 29, 2002, Vec ernje Novosti 2002. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2002; Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSz) 1999 and 2002. Puzigac a and Molnar 2001, Social Democratic League of Vojvodina (LSV) 2001, and interviews conducted by author, Novi Sad, July 2001. Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 1998. The foundations for the Hungarian councils were established even before the passage of the Law. Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMSz) 1999, Npszabadsg 2003, and interviews conducted by author, Novi Sad, July 2001. Teleki 2002. Npszabadsg 1999a and 1999b. In interviews with local elites supporting Vojvodinas independence in the summer of 2001, they continually invoked their legal similarity with Kosovo. International Crisis Group 2005c is a good source on this area. BBC News Online 2004a. Anderson 2001, Partos 2001. Joseph 2005, Bardos 2005, 35.
85
86
87 88 89 90 91
92
93 94 95 96 97 98
99 100 101
Ofce for the Special Envoy of Kosovo (UNOSEK) 2007b, under constitutional provisions. In fact, article 149 explicitly removes the possibility for a minority veto (Constitutional Commission, Government of Kosovo, 2008b). Indeed, this article could cause trouble between communities if it is used by the majority to hinder municipal powers over the affairs outlined here. United Nations Ofce for the Special Envoy of Kosovo (UNOSEK): Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement: Section 2, 2007. Emphasis original. United Nations Ofce for the Special Envoy of Kosovo (UNOSEK) 2007b; Constitutional Commission, Government of Kosovo, 2008b. Ibid. The Ahtisaari plan, United Nations Ofce for the Special Envoy of Kosovo (UNOSEK), 2007a and 2007b, especially sections on decentralization. International Crisis Group 2007, which includes useful maps. As of June 2008, Serbs in Mitrovica began to take some actions toward establishing a meso-level of government, in the form of a parliament for Serbs (Moore 2008a, Kristic 2008). This development could in fact t within the provisions of the plan, depending on the approaches of the various actors. United Nations Ofce for the Special Envoy of Kosovo (UNOSEK): Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, and International Crisis Group 2007. It is notable that health care is also administered non-territorially in Belgium. The Serb municipalities represent a form of collective rights for Serbs that crosses borders: Pettifer 2007; see also Austin 2007. On the Hanseatic League, see Spruyt 1994. See Laughland 2008, who employs phrases such as polyvalent sovereignty and postnational statehood to describe Kosovo. Herbst 1996/1997, Ben-Porat 2005, Schwartz and Jtersonke 2005. See also Bowring 2002. Petrov 2006, BBC News Online 2008b, International Herald Tribune 2008. International Crisis Group 2007. Brubaker 1996. Articles especially in the summer of 2007. On Kosovos independence and its implications for an enthusiastic Hungarian enclave in Romania, see International Herald Tribune 2008. Kosovothanksyou.com, and BBC News Online 2008b. Wood 2006, RFE/RL Newsline, August 25 and 28, and September 1, 5, 14, and 15, 2006. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1998; Freedom House 1997 and 19992000;
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103 104 105 106 107 108 109
110 111 112
113 114 115 116
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ARTICLES

Making or Breaking Kosovo: Applications of Dispersed State Control

Making or Breaking Kosovo

Background: Intractable Positions?

Options for Divided Societies in the Weberian State Model

Making or Breaking Kosovo

An Alternative: Functional Rather Than Territorial Governance

Making or Breaking Kosovo

Making or Breaking Kosovo

The Precedent Issue and Kosovos Neighbors

Making or Breaking Kosovo

Making or Breaking Kosovo

Making or Breaking Kosovo

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668 Perspectives on Politics

Making or Breaking Kosovo

Making or Breaking Kosovo

Making or Breaking Kosovo

674 Perspectives on Politics

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