• Embed Doc
  • Copy Link
  • Readcast
  • Collections
  • 2
    CommentGo Back
Download
 
Egypt—Don’t Give Up onDemocracy Promotion
   J   u   n   e   2   0   0   7
T
he United States took up the issue o political reorm in Egypt as part o adramatic reorientation o policy towardthe Middle East ater the September 2001terrorist attacks. No longer would the UnitedStates rely on authoritarian Arab govern-ments to secure its interests; it would insteadchampion the cause o liberty in Arab coun-tries. Ater pushing airly assertively (and with some success) or reorm in Egypt in2003–2005, the United States dropped theissue just as suddenly in 2006 because its pri-orities shited rom transormational back totraditional diplomacy to contain regional cri-ses. Islamist electoral gains, especially in Pal-estine but also in the Egyptian parliament,also gave the United States pause. But re-newed U.S. support or political reorm inEgypt is not only compatible with U.S. secu-rity interests in the short term but vital to astable, productive bilateral relationship inthe long term. With Egypt’s strong institutions, array o domestic actors coalescing around a reormagenda, and admittedly thin but still real his-tory o liberal constitutionalism, political re-orm is a ar less quixotic quest in Cairo thanit ever was in Baghdad. Now is a particularly propitious moment or pursuing reorm, asEgypt is in a leadership transition rom thecircle surrounding 79-year-old PresidentHosni Mubarak, in power since 1981, to anew generation more amenable to change.But recently the Egyptian regime has reex-erted control, ater a promising politicalopening began in 2003, through a crack-down on opposition and a series o sel-serv-ing reorms that circumscribe more than ex-pand political and civil liberties.The next ew years—which will likely seea leadership transition in Egypt—will be acritical time. I the United States supportsindigenous demands or gradual and respon-sible political change, it can help Egypt break out o years o political and economic stagna-tion and human rights abuses. I it missesthis opportunity, prospects or a stable, pros-perous Egypt will diminish, with negativeconsequences or Egypt and the UnitedStates. Governments and citizens o other Arab countries will watch closely, mindul o Egypt’s historically inuential role in the re-gion and o the billions in U.S. assistance ithas received over the past thirty years. A ail-ure to pursue reorm in Egypt will also deal adecisive blow to U.S. democracy promotion
Smma
Even as the United States ispreoccupied with how tostabilize and withdraw romIraq, it risks missing anotherimportant opportunity topromote democracy in theMiddle East. Among Arabcountries Egypt is uniquelypositioned to make a transitionrom authoritarian rule to amore liberal system andeventually to democracy. Alooming presidential succes-sion in Egypt makes suchchanges more easible. Butater several years o modestreorms, the Egyptian govern-ment is now backtracking andenshrining illiberal measures inits revised constitution. TheUnited States aces a criticaldecision about whether topursue reorm seriously withEgypt or to abandon theproject o promoting Arabdemocracy, at least or now.
B Mh D, Am Hamzaw, ad natha J. Bw
Senior Associates, Carnegie Endowment or International Peace
EndowmEnt FoR IntERnatIonal PEaCE
CaRnEGIE
PolicyBrief
 
Michele Dunne
is a seniorassociate at the CarnegieEndowment and editor o the
 Arab Reform Bulletin
, a monthlyonline journal. A ormer specialiston Middle East aairs at theDepartment o State and theNational Security Council,Dunne’s research ocuses on Arabpolitics and U.S. policy in theMiddle East. 
Amr Hamzawy
is a seniorassociate at the CarnegieEndowment. He is a notedEgyptian political scientist whopreviously taught at CairoUniversity and the Free Universityo Berlin. His research interestsinclude the changing dynamics opolitical participation in the Arabworld and the role o Islamistopposition movements in Arabpolitics. 
in the Arab world, already threatened by cyni-cism and despair because o the sectarian vio-lence in Iraq and Lebanon and the esteringIsraeli-Palestinian conict.
A Reform Push
Political openings have typically come imme-diately ater a succession in leadership. But in2003, the pendulum seemed to swing in thedirection o political reorm in anticipation o succession rather than ollowing one. The re-alization that President Mubarak might leavethe scene in the not-too-distant uture openedfssures in the regime, motivating a actionaround presidential son Gamal Mubarak togarner support by positioning themselves asreormers.Three developments inside Egypt, in addi-tion to increased pressure rom the UnitedStates, helped push the political opening inmodest ways. First, the political oppositionshowed renewed vitality. Although older legalopposition parties had largely atrophied, anew umbrella coalition o opposition actorscoalesced around Kiaya, a group opposingPresident Mubarak’s quest or reelection. TheMuslim Brotherhood added its voice to thecalls or political reorm. Intellectuals and civ-il society activists lent gravitas i not numbersto the reorm movement. This opposition her-alded not a mass movement or the prospect o revolutionary change but only wider discus-sion, more imaginative strategies, and tenta-tive steps toward opposition coordination.Second, elements o the Egyptian state itsel began to escape some o the stultiying domi-nation o the executive. The judiciary showedpromising pockets o independent judgmentand willingness to move into politically sensi-tive areas. A series o court decisions in the1990s, or instance, had led to signifcantchanges in the electoral system that oppositionelements could use to advantage—and thatslightly loosened the National DemocraticParty’s grip on the parliament by allowing inlarge numbers o independents (many o themrom the Muslim Brotherhood). And, third, the government, caught be-tween Egyptian and international calls or re-orms, was unclear about its intentions, leav-ing room or political erment. One day government ofcials frmly rejected talk o constitutional reorm; the next day they em-braced it in orm i not content. PresidentMubarak made a surprise call in February 2005 to amend the constitution to allow ordirect popular election o the president (here-toore chosen by the parliament and merely approved by popular reerendum). The gov-ernment allowed the Muslim Brotherhood tocontest seats in parliamentary elections and tocampaign reely, only to later arrest many o its leaders when the movement showed itselectoral strength.The reorm wave seemed to crest with the2005 presidential and parliamentary elections.Various parties, including the president’s own,competed or the reorm mantle, and the pub-lic openly discussed subjects such as constitu-tional amendments that had previously beenkept o the agenda by presidential fat. Judi-cial supervision and monitoring by civil soci-ety groups brought airer balloting, especially in the frst o the three rounds o voting. Butas the magnitude o the Brotherhood’s elec-toral strength became clear, the security orcesstepped in to sway the results, sometimes by orcibly preventing large numbers o Egyp-tians rom voting. Despite such interventions,the Brotherhood still walked away with 88 o 444 elected seats in the People’s Assembly, winning roughly 60 percent o the races itcontested.Even at its best, the limited opening o the2003–2005 period never oered unetteredpolitical competition, much less unctioningdemocracy. But it did augur or more open de-bate and contestation o political power. Sincethe elections, however, the country has begunmoving sharply in the opposite direction.
Backsliding
The Egyptian authorities seem to have con-cluded rom the parliamentary elections that
2
POLICY BRIEF
 
the opening had gone too ar. In the frstmonths o 2006, the regime postponed localelections, extended the state o emergency ortwo years, cracked down on popular protests,and worked to undermine eorts by the coun-try’s judges to expand judicial independence.By the end o 2006, the government movedbeyond mere reaction to a more systematic re-sponse, launching a severe clampdown on theMuslim Brotherhood and targeting severalhigh-ranking leaders and fnancial heads o the organization. Yet the most serious—and potentially ar-reaching—blow to Egypt’s political openingcame in March 2007. Egypt’s ruling NationalDemocratic Party used its majority in the par-liament to amend thirty-our articles o theconstitution, whose largely authoritarian con-tent is discouraging or the hopes o meaning-ul political reorms. The amendments weresubsequently approved on March 26 in a pop-ular reerendum marked by low voter turnoutand an opposition boycott. The amendmentshave some positive aspects; or example, they expand parliamentary oversight o the budgetand give the parliament easier procedures orvoting no confdence in the prime ministerand cabinet. On balance, however, they hurtmore than help political and civil liberties.The Egyptian regime had several motivesin introducing the amendments. First, it wasintent on politically restraining the MuslimBrotherhood, earing that an emboldened Is-lamist opposition could complicate presiden-tial succession. The constitutional amend-ments were just short o explicit in targetingthe Brotherhood, or example, banning any political activity or the establishment o any party drawing on a religious reerence point. Another amendment paved the way or achange in the electoral system rom a candi-date-centered system to a mixed one that de-pends mostly on party lists, leaving only asmall unspecifed margin or independentseats. The Brotherhood, barred rom orminga party, had been running candidates as inde-pendents or years. Such a change in the elec-toral system also served to drive a wedge be-tween the Brotherhood and the legal oppositionparties, which could not secure more than acombined 5 percent o the seats in the 2005race. A second motive o the regime was to re-vamp its tools to control the electoral process.The amended electoral procedures diluted theprevious requirement that judges oversee elec-tions with the stipulation that an electoralcommission be established (whose member-ship includes but is not limited to current andormer members o judicial bodies). Judicialsupervision did not remove all raud and re-pression, but it did result in a more transpar-ent electoral process.Third, the amendments answered a long-standing opposition and international demandto prepare or liting the state o emergency but did so by enshrining in the amended con-stitution vast powers rom the emergency law.For instance, under the banner o combatingterrorism, the president was given the right toreer any suspect to exceptional (primarily military) courts, and protections against arbi-trary arrest, search, and violation o privacy  were set aside. With these steps, the Egyptianregime made a set o legal and extralegal au-thoritarian tools a seemingly permanent parto the political order.Opposition groups so ar have oundered inresponding to the regime’s backsliding on po-litical and civil liberties. Conronted with theMuslim Brotherhood’s ideological strength andsuperior organization, legal secular oppositionparties have a vested interest in allying them-selves with the regime to marginalize the Broth-erhood and expand their own legal space as op-position parties. Despite its recent electoralsuccess, the Brotherhood is also restricted in itsability to respond; leadership arrests and con-fscation o fnancial assets crippled its ability tomobilize. And the new protest movements suchas Kiaya and various networks o human rightsactivists have ailed to mobilize signifcant pop-ular support or their pro-democracy plat-orms. Some o them also have shown signs o 
egpt—D’t Gv up  Dma Pmt
 
Nathan J. Brwn
is a seniorassociate at the CarnegieEndowment and is also proessoro political science and interna-tional aairs and director o theMiddle East Studies Program atthe George WashingtonUniversity. He is the author oour books on Arab Politics,including
Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming ArabPalestine
(Caliornia, 2003). Hispast work has ocused onPalestinian politics and on therule o law and constitutionalismin the Arab world.
of 00

Leave a Comment

You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...
The Trashy Novel Corp

Too bad this is all a big lie. Anyone read the Wikileaks docs? Champion the Cause of Liberty in Egypt by selling an Autocracy 1.5 Billion in crowd control weapons? F#$K you Carnegie, get the facts straight.

reply01 / 28 / 2011
You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...