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 1
S
OMALI
P
EACE
C
ONCERNS AND
A
RTA
O
UTCOME
 
A
BDISALAM
M
 
I
SSA
-S
ALWE
 
1.
 
I
NTRODUCTION
 
Between March 2000 and August 2000 at Arta, a small town in the Republic of Djibouti anotherSomali peace meeting was held. After six months, the peace meeting, known officially as the SomaliNational Peace (SNP) ended up with the formation of a Transitional National Assembly, a TransitionalConstitution and the election of an Interim President. Some saw this as destabiliser and the return of the old clique of the former dictatorial regime (thus Arta Group), whilst others saw it as the 'route’ tothe revival of the central state.The Somali National Peace (
Geeddi Socodka Nabadda
) was the thirteenth Somali peace meeting sincethe disintegration of Somali state in the early 1990s. This peace process was made of three symposiums:the Technical Consultative Symposium, the Business Community Symposium, the Elders ConsultativeMeeting, and the Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC), also known as Arta Conference. It is thelast one which gets the most attention, as it was the major conference which was leid by the threesymposioums.In general, the SNP has been seen as the most serious attempt to solving the Somali crisis. Unfortunately,its resolution, the Arta Outcome, fell short of becoming an answer to the Somali dilemma. This paperattempts to examine the theoretical background of the Somali National Peace, and what let its outcome tocurb a process which was supposed to open new paths towards the reconciliation process.
2.
 
T
HE
P
EACE
I
NITIATIVE
 
In theory, Somali National Peace was expected to define a movement, a peace process. Although thisdefinition may seem mockery for Arta’s opponents and for those who were disappointed with it, theprincipal guidance of the peace proposal included a ‘Convoy of Peace’ (
Geeddi Socodka Nabadda
),which was to involve a process to transform the Somali conflict into peace by sending the traditionalleaders to all Somali regions. This approach was not only searching for a solution but hopefully initiatinga process within the war-thorn society affected, with the aim of empowering actors within the affectedsociety. A 'Convoy of Peace' describes the progression of the process to peace movement.President Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti who proposed the initiative at the 54th General Assemblyof the United Nations on 23 September 1999 triggered the proceedings of the Somali Peace Process.This novel proposal that was meant to open a new dawn to the Somali crisis stimulated two factors.Firstly, the peace talks were to be shifted to the civil society. In other words, the victims of the civilwar were to lead the peace process. The objective was to revive the conflict management of Somalisociety which broke down during the civil strife. All societies possess conflict managementinstitutions. They may be formally established or informal procedures. This method was seen as thepractical way which could lead to a sustainable peace in the country.Secondly, in reaction to the first factor, a popular interest by the Somali society was generated. TheSomali people gave their overwhelming support to the Djibouti peace initiatives, as they felt thespeech had shaken the conscience of the international community over their ‘indifference’ to theSomali tragedy. There are several reasons why Somalis felt the Djibouti proposal as a promisinginternational solution to their dilemma: (a) Somalis share with Djiboutians the same ethnic group
 
 2
(during the colonial period Djibouti was known as French Somaliland), and (b) Somalis felt betrayedby the apathy of the international community towards their problems.The UN Security Council welcomed President Guelleh’s initiative. This initial support followed theeighth Summit of Heads of State and Government of IGAD meeting in Djibouti on 26 November1999. IGAD issued a resolution in support of the Somali peace initiative. Similarly, other internationalorganisation forwarded their support to the initiatives. Some of these organisations were theOrganisation of African Unity (OAU), the Arab League, IGAD Partners Forum, and the Organisationof Islamic Conference.
2.1.
 
B
RIEF
T
HEORETICAL
B
ACKGROUND TO THE
D
JIBOUTI
-S
PONSORED
P
EACE
C
ONFERENCE
 
Looking at the background and development of Somali peace developments in the last decade, no one of them could be expected to have a conceptual foundation. Thinking about this may sound bizarre, as allprevious peace conferences were hastily set without prior preparation and rarely had clear direction. TheSomali peace conferences which had a major impact as well as theoretical background were the AddisAbaba Agreement held in 1993 and the SNP in Arta. While Addis Ababa Agreement was set in a veryshort period and was sponsored by the United Nations, the Djibouti-sponsored Arta Conference took timeto take off. The only peace process which was to take more time was the proposed peace process by thedefunct National Salvation Council (NSC) which was formed on January 3, 1997 in Addis Ababa by 26Somali political factions. Under the NSC, also known as Sodare Group, the reconciliation process wassupposed to culminate in the IGAD-sponsored Bosaso National Reconciliation Conference in early 1998.Theoretically, the UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) inspired theDjibouti-led Somali Peace Process. This had begun in late 1993 in what is generally known as a“Culture of Peace” approach. A similar approach had been previously implemented in countries suchas Germany, Malawi and Cambodia.
1
 The first UNESCO-sponsored Culture of Peace Symposium on Somalia was held in Sana’a, Yemenbetween 17 and 20 April 1995. A follow up meeting in Addis Ababa was held the following year. Inboth meetings, Somali intellectuals, Somali peace organisations such as Somali Peace Line andinternational organisations took part. The objective of the symposium was to “chart a course towardsan eventual and peaceful Somali culture”.
2
The conferences focussed on three themes for debate: thefirst being the restoration of Somali social fabrics; the second, the rehabilitation of the Somali state;and the third, the reintegration of Somalia into the international community of nations.As part of “The Social Integration and Development through Building Culture for Peace”, UNESCOcommissioned a survey to find out the potential of Somali culture and art in dealing with the Somalicivil strife.
3
The survey was curried over by two researchers: Abdullahi Shirwa and Maxamed DaahirAfrax. Shirwa was to look into the socio-political transformations taking place in Somalia following thebreakdown of government institutions.
4
Afrax, on his part, identified cultural means and elements whichcould help change the culture of violence to that of peace. Both of them gave an inside analysis of theSomali situation.Afrax in his report, “Channels of Communication for Peace-building in Somalia”, proposes the use of literature and culture as the medium to solve the communication breakdown among Somalis. The mainconcern or problem is seen here as communication breakdown within the Somali society. Afrax’srecommendations comprised two goals. The first proposed the promotion of a non-formal educationfor peace by the use of the media. The aim here is to use education and mass media in the process of disseminating information pertinent to a Culture of Peace. Here, in the author's view, mass mediausing Somali cultural material is considered as a potential force for mass enlightenment and hence,behavioural change within Somali society. Along these lines, modern media have to teach the younger
 
 3
generation their culture, particularly that part of their culture which has good values. Similarly,Samatar considered that poetic medium in Somali as “an institution which has a cohesive function”.
5
 Departing from this prospect, the purpose of media is to use as instrument to influence and changepeople’s opinions, attitudes, actions and behaviour. On the other hand, however, media can serve torepress as well as to liberate, to unite as well as to fragment society, both to promote and to hold back change.
6
Despite the degree of uncertainty, there can be little doubt that the media, whether mouldersor mirror of society, are the main messengers about society. In the context of behavioural change,communication can be defined as a process of understanding people’s situation and influences,developing messages that respond to the concerns within those situations, and using communicationprocesses and media to persuade people to increase their knowledge and change the behaviours andpractices that place them at risk.The second goal is “to seek appropriate Somali partners who can help to bridge between internationalorganisations and the Somali public at large”.
7
It is in this last approach where the notion of civilsociety appears in the proposal. Afrax reiterates that, “working with the Somali civil society structurescould be a key element in the success of projects carried out by international agencies”
8
. He furtherasserts that,“Underestimating the need for these two approaches in the past has resulted in the failure of many initiatives attempted by the international actors. That is why I felt the need to make them acentral element in these recommendations”.
9
 The Djibouti government who closely followed UNESCO’s Somali Culture of Peace activity took Afrax’s advice seriously and it promised to implement the recommendations that were to culminate in a“Festival of Somali Art and Literature for Peace Symposium” in March 2000 in Djibouti. This wassupposed to be a slow and continuing process which was to evolve at later stage as a political process forthe Somalis to meet and save for what they share first then build on it. The emotion created by thisbeginning process was to lead to a positive understanding of their problems. Indirectly, this strategyproposed an alternative framework to solve the “gridlock” of Somali peace as it advocated the utilisationof cultural communication as means to change the negative attitudes that leads to war. Although this is aninnovative approach, it may have parallel in the example of the Somali cultural nationalism. Nevertheless,Afrax does not elaborate the measures which could facilitate the transition from this ‘culturalmobilisation’ to a ‘political accord’.Things were moving in this direction until suddenly President Ismail Omar Guelleh was elected to theoffice of the president of Djibouti in 1999. With the coming of President Guelleh, Somali peace-orientedevents accelerated by changing the ‘cultural project’ to ‘political conference’. In another word, accordingto the president, his action simply was ‘accelerating the events'. He further maintained that altering theprocess of the project was a worthy ambition, as the Somalis could not afford the luxury of a slowprocess.
2.2.
 
C
IVIL
S
OCIETY AND THE
C
ASE OF
R
EPRESENTATION
 
As mentioned above, what made the difference with President Guelleh’s initiatives from previouspeace conferences, was the new approach to Somali peace talks introducing the issue of civil society.The academic literature reveals a number of conflicting lines of thinking on the definition, role andvalue of civil society. Generally, a common understanding of civil society is between the family andthe state which exists to pursue collective goals. This is usually taken to include civic, professional,trade union and other voluntary organisations. Civil society is often referred to as a 'third sector'alongside the state and the market. According to British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND),this definition perceives civil society as a collective form of organised individuals, which pursues toan end for the good of the community.
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In this case, the civil society should be organised to make a
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