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preliminary version
Briefing Paper
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation inDeveloping Countries: Meeting the main challenges ahead
As consensus on methodological issues related to Re-ducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degra-dation in Developing Countries (REDD) is growing,UNFCCC talks can now move forward on policy ap-proaches. The most important topics here are how tofinance REDD and how to design a REDD transfer sys-tem. In both cases, policy design is of enormous rele-vance not only for REDD but for the integrity of the post-2012 climate agreement as a whole.A full integration of REDD into the future InternationalEmission Trading Scheme (IETS) would require indus-trialised countries to commit to emission reductionssubstantially higher than 25–40 % by 2020, comparedto 1990, in order to achieve significant reductions fromthe two chief emission sources (fossil fuels and tropicaldeforestation). As long as high overall reduction tar-gets are unlikely and unclear, full integration bears therisk of leading into dangerous climate change.Market-linked approaches are more adequate. Mostpromising are the proposals by the Climate Action Net-work International and Norway to use proceeds fromsales of emission allowances from global or regionalcarbon markets.REDD transfer systems should be designed so as to ad-dress the underlying causes of deforestation; otherwisemitigation effects will not be permanent. This requiresa broad range of country-specific policy reforms whichcannot be dealt with at the level of the convention.Instead, the UNFCCC should provide a guiding frame-work for the design of national transfer systems anddelegate operation to a subsidiary body. Developingcountries should submit REDD strategies and shouldbe compensated on the basis of a set of individualperformance indicators.
Why reducing emissions from deforestation matters
Accounting for approx. 20 % of global annual anthro-pogenic greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation is amajor contributor to anthropogenic climate change. Itis now widely acknowledged that if dangerous climatechange is to be avoided, reduction of emissions fromdeforestation must be a core component of the post-2012 climate agreement. With a view to achieving thisend, the concept of “Reducing Emissions from Defor-estation and Forest Degradation in Developing Coun-tries” (REDD) is currently being developed under theauspices of the UNFCCC. The basic idea of REDD is sim-ple: Developing countries willing and able to reducetheir deforestation rate keyed to a reference time periodwill receive financial compensation. Transfers will bebased either on foregone opportunity costs or on thevalue of carbon emissions saved. Estimates of what isneeded to significantly slow or stop deforestation rangefrom 12 to 30+ bn US$ a year. This provides an un-precedented (pessimists say, the last) opportunity tosave the world’s tropical forests at scale.What has originally been developed to reduce carbonemissions could also deliver enormous co-benefits interms of biodiversity conservation, poverty alleviationthrough sustainable rural development, improvednatural resource management and adaptation to cli-mate change. To deliver as many of these benefits aspossible, REDD must be designed in an integrated man-ner. Here, the upcoming climate change talks in Accra inAugust 2008 are an important milestone, as they willdeal with the main policy issue of REDD. Most promi-nent on the agenda is the question of how to financeREDD. Developing countries expect developed coun-tries to provide several billion US$ a year and manyparties have suggested using the International EmissionTrading Scheme (IETS) for funding. The integration of REDD into the IETS, however, creates a number of seri-ous problems, which has sparked a controversial debateon this issue. In response, alternative solutions to pro-viding sufficient funding for REDD have been devel-oped, but so far they have received little attention inparty submissions to the UNFCCC on REDD.In the first section, this paper will thus elaborate onapproaches to finance REDD from an integrated pointof view as an input to the upcoming REDD workshop inAccra and beyond. The lead questions are:
 
How to raise sufficient funds for REDD without jeopardizing the reduction of fossil fuel emis-sions in Annex–1 countries and sectoral reduc-tions by major emerging economies?
 
How to design a funding solution that is ac-ceptable to most parties and simple enough tobe negotiated by Copenhagen 2009?The second section deals with the design of a REDDtransfer system. This topic has received little attentionin negotiations, and few concrete proposals have been
 
 
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik
 
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made by observer organizations. Spending REDD trans-fers is a delicate issue, and doing this effectively couldwell prove to be more difficult than the actual raising of funds. The guiding questions here are:
 
Will transfer payments for carbon alone reducedeforestation, and what is the time horizon weshould aim for?
 
How to respect country sovereignty over land-usedecisions and at the same time prevent misuse of transfer payments?
 
How to design a global agreement that sufficientlyconsiders the specific needs and circumstances of developing countries?
Raising sufficient funds for REDD: market-based vs.market-linked approaches
The integration of REDD into the IETS (full fungibility,i.e. market-based approach) is problematic for severalreasons. The value of the majority of REDD credits (=1 tCO
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e) is expected to be below 10 US$ each. Value iscalculated on the basis of opportunity costs, which aregenerally low compared to the value based on theglobal carbon price. This would no doubt create a hugeoffset mechanism, delaying fossil emission reductionsin Annex–1 countries and crowding out credits from asectoral CDM. In addition, a high carbon price is abso-lutely necessary to prevent the construction of as manynew coal power plants as possible, both in the devel-oped and developing world. Otherwise, without cer-tainty on the operability of Carbon Capture and Storagetechnology (CCS), lasting energy structures will be putin place, that will make it impossible to limit averageglobal warming to 2°C.To prevent such a scenario, developing countries de-mand higher reduction targets by Annex–1 countries(more than 25–40 % until 2020, as recommended bythe IPCC). From a political perspective, this seemsunlikely. So far, the EU has promised to reduce its emis-sions by 20 to 30 % by 2020, depending on other An-nex–1 commitments. Future US commitments are un-certain. Taking into account the looming US recession,ambitious reduction targets seem rather unlikely, re-gardless of who succeeds the present US administra-tion. Other options to prevent a flooding of the carbonmarket include caps and banking. All three options are,however, subject to negotiation, i.e. no one can guar-antee that these safety catches will be adopted.As a result, full fungibility of REDD with the IETS shouldbe ruled out for precautionary reasons. Nor are thepotential financial gains that can be achieved by othermeans worth the risk they entail of leading into dan-gerous climate change.An alternative option is market-linked rather than mar-ket-based approaches. These include the “Dual-MarketsApproach” proposed by the Center for Clean Air Policy(CCAP) and the “Tropical Deforestation Emission Re-duction Mechanism” (TDERM) promoted by Green-peace. Additionally, the Climate Action Network Inter-national (CAN) and Norway have separately proposedto sell or auction emission allowances at the interna-tional or national level to leverage funds for REDD (butalso for adaptation and technology transfer). All threeapproaches could raise sufficient funds without the riskof flooding the carbon market. They use the dynamicsof the carbon market with partial or no fungibility withthe IETS. The CCAP Dual-Markets Approach suggestscreating a separate REDD trading scheme. Demand forREDD credits is generated by transferring a share of Annex–1 commitments to the new market. Theamount will depend on the overall target of Annex–1countries, in order to ensure significant reductions infossil fuel emissions. To guarantee developing countriesa certain amount of revenue, and thus provide an in-centive to reduce deforestation, Annex–1 countrieswould commit themselves to buy REDD credits from aspecific country (or several countries). The GreenpeaceTDERM introduces a new trading unit (Tropical Defor-estation Emission Reduction Unit) which would be usedby Annex–1 countries to fulfil part of their reductiontargets. To guarantee a continuous, predictable flow of revenues, a minimum purchase level of TDERUs wouldbe set. Equally, an upper limit of TDERUs would be set,again depending on the overall reduction target of Annex–1 countries, to prevent large-scale offsets.Greenpeace does not propose any particular limit, butannual revenues would range from 7–34 bn US$, givena price of 29 US$ per ton of CO
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e and an upper limit onTDERUs of 5 %.The proposal advanced by CAN International and Nor-way is different. No REDD credit unit or market wouldbe created, and thus Annex–1 commitments wouldhave to be met by domestic emission reductions andwith the help of the flexible mechanisms (CDM, JI,IETS). Instead, either the allocation of emission allow-ances at the international level (AAUs) or regional ornational carbon trading schemes would be used togenerate sufficient funds for REDD. While emissionallowances in the EU carbon market are already auc-tioned in part, allocation of AAUs to the countries un-der the Kyoto Protocol is free of charge. According toCAN International, selling AAUs at a price of 30–40 US$apiece would raise 3.75 bn US$ for every percent of AAUs sold. Selling a fraction of AAUs, e.g. 20–30 %,would result in a total of 75–112.5 bn US$ a year avail-able for adaptation, REDD and technology transfer.These revenues could go into respective UNFCCC-administered funds.As we can see, all three approaches are a viable alterna-tive to funding REDD. While it is tempting to use theDual-Markets approach or TDERM to directly includeforest carbon into a market system and thus internalizethis specific ecosystem service, we argue that the pro-posal by CAN and Norway is the best solution to serveclimate, biodiversity and poverty reduction.With no fungibility, additionality of emission reductionsfrom deforestation would be ensured.
 
REDD funding would be decoupled from the overallreduction target. A 20 % reduction target by Annex-1countries (until 2020) would have to exclude any REDDoffsets (target too low) and could not generate anymoney. Selling a fraction of AAUs or emission allow-ances from domestic carbon markets, however, wouldstill provide funding, though of course to a lesser extent(fewer AAUs, lower proceeds).Systems with partial fungibility must address account-ing and permanence more stringently to avoid hot air.This does not imply that a non-fungible system shouldbe lax on these issues. However, non-permanence inthe case of a non-fungible approach would meanwasted money and fewer additional emission reduc-tions. In the case of a partly fungible system, it wouldalso impact on the overall reduction effort.High accounting and compliance standards could, how-ever, delay the participation of many countries, whichcould result in little political support as well as in inter-national displacement of emissions. This issue has beenaddressed by CCAP and Greenpeace. Discount factorskeyed to the quality of accounting and countries’ ca-pacities as well as the portfolio-performance approachwould provide solutions for this. However, they wouldalso create additional issues to be negotiated within avery short timeframe.Finally, using carbon credit units (TDERM, Dual Markets)means paying for a carbon service, which makes itharder to incorporate issues such as biodiversity andpoverty considerations. By contrast, the CAN/Norwayproposal would make it possible to better address otherrelevant issues related to deforestation and providefunding for adaptation and technology transfer as well.To summarize, negotiations on financing REDD shouldstrongly bear in mind the following points:
 
Financing REDD directly via the IETS would putstabilization of greenhouse gases in the atmos-phere at 450 ppm at risk, which could thus lead todangerous climate change. This must be avoided,also since forests are anything but immune to theadverse impacts of climate change.
 
Market-linked approaches represent a viable alter-native to providing several billion US$ per year. Thecriteria for selection should be simplicity in design(few subjects to be negotiated), implications formethodological issues, and impact and depend-ency on the overall reduction target.
 
Even though the Dual Markets approach andTDERM are very comprehensive, the proposal madeby CAN and Norway is most promising. The Euro-pean Commission’s proposal to raise funds fortropical forest preservation from EU ETS auctionproceeds goes in the same direction. Several re-gional funding efforts may provide a realistic fall-back option in case a global solution should not bepossible, although the latter would be more desir-able.
Can REDD turn the tide without addressing the under-lying causes of deforestation?
Human development is the root cause of deforestationand forest degradation. Conversion of forest land toother land-use systems is induced by underlying causesrelated to structural changes, namely demographic,technological and economic development as well ascultural variables and political decisions. Deforestationhas often followed an inverse U-shape trajectory. It haspeaked when wood has been substituted as a primaryenergy source and/or policies for sustainable forestmanagement and forest protection have been intro-duced. While it is highly questionable whether this clas-sic trajectory would occur in developing countries undertoday’s global economic pressures, we can simply notafford to let it happen. Apart from their role in stabiliz-ing the global climate system, tropical forests providemanifold other ecosystem services, such as local provi-sion of forest products to millions of people or mainte-nance of regional hydrological cycles for agriculture andhydropower. In essence, tropical forests are a funda-mental part of the global life support system uponwhich all human societies depend, regardless of theirtechnological development stage.Therefore, it is evident that first, for reasons beyondclimate change mitigation, tropical forests must bepreserved in the long-term. And second, human devel-opment in both North and South must be decoupledfrom land-intensive consumption patterns. Suchchanges will not come about by offering carbon pay-ments alone, they require policy reforms in developingand developed countries. These reforms must addressthe underlying causes of deforestation, which include:
 
at the international level, commodity prices forfossil and mineral resources, palm oil, soy, beef andtimber which are linked to foreign countries’ con-sumption patterns, currency fluctuations and poli-cies (e. g. agro-fuel quotas),
 
at the national level, national development plans,including infrastructure and subsidies for agricul-ture, deficient forest laws and lack of enforcement,no or insufficient land tenure systems, demo-graphic development,
 
at the national and sub-national level, unemploy-ment and poverty, lack of social security systems,and corruption.This broad range of underlying causes illustrates a cou-ple of points. First, deforestation may well be beyondthe control of national governments, thus requiringconcerted international action beyond the UNFCCC.This should include revision of international trade poli-cies, introduction of socio-ecological import standardsand reforms of agro-fuel quotas and other relevantpolicies in the EU, the US and elsewhere. Second, com-bating deforestation requires an integrated approach,i.e. cross-sectoral action on different administrativelevels, as most of the underlying causes lie outside theforestry sector. As a result, efforts to reduce or stop
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