rary of Compan Catsaging in Puen Data eiegaey ete ita) 2 rate ney sroseasoed sais enti new Yon SuReeRD SORE comma ot CoWMBA Uveny ass Raven THE UNTED STATES OF AUENEA CONTENTS: PREFACE PART . CHAPTER |: DESCRIPTION THEORIES OF PROPER NAMES im M's View 112 Reasons for Rejecting Mil's View 12 The Ain Problem 14 Ambipity: Types and Tokens 11S The Refutationof Description Theories 16 Ckeslaity ‘CHAPTER 2:_A CAUSAL THEORY OF DESIGNATION (1) 21 The Problem 22 ist Uses ofa Proper Name 23 Later Uses ofa Proper Name 24 Ambiguous Names 25 Donselan’s Distinction 25 Demoestratives 417 The Semantic Significance of Doanelian’s Dinineion 28° Multiple Groundings 29 Other Ways of Naming 210 Criterion of Kent PART IL CHAPTER 3: A SEMANTIC PROGRAM aM aa a3 ‘Maia Outline ofthe Program ‘The Language of Speaker Meaning and Conventional Messing 2s s BuKs SSEER suesomen os CHAPTER. DEFENSEOF THE PROGRAM = 14 Kaolin ws 1 Sanat Cora Ami 5 i Setoatee % 42 SEROUS Ser es x Hohe i {3 SERS a ingue Cotetece 2 , 4.4 Linguistic Competence and Knowledge-That os bees 43 LSS eoteams ot CHAPTERS: MODAL CONTENTS » rec ti Sibu ad Eset » i Cees ts By Bacio fon » Co Bits anya Ratoniy ts 1 Resales a 83 BioMed ecco ote ! Uo Hi Conon it PART I CHAPTERS: CONTEXTS OF PROPOSITIONAL CHAPTER S:_A CAUSAL THEORY OF ‘ATTITUDES (ty a BESIaHATioN » 31 Bega Fa SIONATION = Seta knowing he : LL Dsnnt 2 33 uncepitlng Re 3 ite bonovia a 34 Pandan Cs 2 5.4 Partial Designation and Designation Change Be eae = $5 Mcty Sars a 35 Teihcondtions Fiat Approxmaoas iS fete ae 518 Truth Conditions: Reinzments and Adcitons 248 31 The Puninell Noon ta CHAPTER 10; CONTEXTS OF PROPOSITIONAL Sh ta Ve Coutton ta mmTUDES 2), a CHAPTER & EMPTY TERMS ro WL Neve Atod Satan 2» 1 The Tou” ad be ene ie Se een rgt to Oban : tna Sueiyin Coren vee % 83 toy Nene ude Be ft 104 Srey nC 2 $1 Bevo eran eGo Tery 183 ana ety ‘ 65 The Distinction between Desgnatinal and oe 7 Attributive Empty Terms mm (yaldthlemeeaee os frame ooh fa uossany oF SPECIAL SEMANTIC $3 Prato SEROLOGY » $2 SM Race tenes ae . CaAEten Creme Rea BIBLIOGRAPHY ws A "Oberon Nal Xin Terms : ‘7.2. Mistakes and Reference Change INDEX a eSPREFACE This book ita etsy in he seman of natural language. My timisto give w theory of prtiularsemaati relationship, which Teal designation, and to big out the bearing of hs relationship fn the meatings of various simple and complex expressions ‘evgnation usualy holds between proper names andthe objects they refer to; it olen olds between demonstrates, pronouns, ‘nd definate description, and the objects they refer to, Toffler "a causa theory” of designation, “This book contin, therefore, “e causl theory of proper ares." Such theories have enjoyed plenty of attention but cot 2 grt del of populry. There are to main sources of resist- tice fit, caus theories have not been worked oun suliient ‘deta frit to seem plausible to many tha they can bandle the Atfcuk case; second, several popular programs in semantics ‘em to leave no place for eausel theories of reference, A major ‘oacer of this book iso overcome this resistance arts and IL are focued onthe deta of «causal theory of ames and 40 ae directed atthe frst source of ressance. Some ey ideas in bandit dficies areas flows: the idemifeation of 8 nare's "meanig" with ts underlying causal actor; the ‘lain hat a name is usually muily “grounded” in ts object: 11 Gricean dstncton between speaker meaning and conventional Inetsing: a distinction, like Keltn Donsela's for descriptions, betwee designtonal and atsbusve names; the application of otlons of pert reference to names.x Preface Part takes up very general questions about the nature of semantics and the place of causal theories of reference in se- martes and 10 in directed tthe second source of resistance, The semanteproprams of sch nfuential writers as Donald Duv- ‘dson, Paul Grice, and Michael Dummett seem o have no pace for cnutal theories of reference. Drawing onthe seas of Hat, eld in “Tarah's Theory of Truth” (197), 1 deveribe a progam that gives central fle fo cautl theories of reference. T eate this program to the wellknown ones. {rejct the popular view that tie the man atk of semantics to deste or explain what the apenher known, and ana the view that what he de knot te semante proposition fr example, "Tsenences"), I eect the "Principle of Charity” and give "Convention "no signit- cant roe. wl help the prospective reader i! bring out now the rela Wonship between my views and thove of the two best-known causal theorists of mames, Saul Kripke and Keith Donel. "There are two steps in my causal theory of proper names & eausal theory of reference borrowing and a exval theory of _rounding. The theory of reference borrowing explains how those ‘of us wha have never grounded s name ints bearer can get the ‘benefit ofthe groundings of others. The theory of grounding ex Plains how, ultimately, names are linked to their object. In 1967 Tatended a series of lectures by Kripke a! Harvard, pars of which Inter became the paper "Naming and Necenit" (1972). From those lectures I ook the den of canal theory ofrfeence ‘borrowing, Domnellan has ase idea (972, 1978). Farther, in ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions” (196), Donnelan e- serbes refereatal” ones end "ones. Tis dsticton and rips idea suggested ome atwofold development. Firs, draw need by such writes as Michael Dummett and Donald Davidson in semanise, and Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend in the philosophy of science. Dumas leans expiiy toward at alla a3 result of his ientictin of the metaphysiaisue fof realsm about the exteral Word with an issue about th, ‘Ths identitiaion seems to me qute mistaken. However Ido think, 8 many do, thatthe issues frat nd reals are eae. ‘Sol think thatthe rejection of uth by Kuhn and Feyerebend ‘makes their realism 2n "ager kind, These important mato ‘Could not be argued ina book of ths mature (have used ese theories of reference aginst the "incommensurbity thesis" of Kun and Feyerabend in Devi (199).} Davidso’s views are ‘scussed here in some detail. In my view, hs zjecton of els. reference, and hence of eausl theories of reference, makes his Fealsm "anemic" also If we donot view reference 9 an oj: tive relationship between words and the world, we cannot View {ruth as a property a sentence has is virtue of an objective oor spondence fo that word, A proper defense of "Ylrbioded" realism must be left fo another time Preface ii ‘My debs to Kripke and Donellan are obvious by now. In that respect shoul also mention Chari Matin. Iwas ist deawn toa distinction ike Donzelian’s when Mari urged iin leeaures and disussions in Sydney in 1966, Nt obvious trom the above ‘8 my debt to Harvy Field His influence begin when we both sitende Kripke’ lectures in 1967. The discussions that preceded ‘is paper of 1972 were important in forming my general views about semantics. Over the yeas since then L have benefited ‘Beaty from diacusions and corespendence wth him. am aso indebted to David Armszong, Jha Bigelow, Bill Lycan, Graham: ‘ele, Mary Putnam, J.J-C. Smart, Ki Steveay, and Bary ‘Taylor for writen comments on pars of eae defs. Other carlir debts re too numerous ost. Sue it to say that Lam ‘rtf o the many people with whom I have discussed this bjt, Finally, my tanks go to Anthea Banko for her coop tration acd efcency typing the fsa drafts, ‘Although my main eas on designation have ot changed over several years of thinking about it, my views of the details change onsanly. Tha good reason 10 suppose, therefore that shall fom come to recognize eros inthe present work. Michael Devi. Sydoey, Australis 1980Chapter One DESCRIPTION THEORIES OF PROPER NAMES “Dont sand chatoring to yours Ika that.” Hurray umpy sar looking a her or he fist me, “bale ime Your rams ana your bus "My name is Alice, but __" “ifs stupid name enough!” Humpty Dumpty in ‘erupted mpatienty. “What Soest mean?” ‘Wust & name mean something?” Alice asked tout, ‘OF course it must” Mumpty Dumety said with @ shor ugh my rare means he shape |am—and ‘good handsome shepe Wie f00 With a name ihe {yours you might be any shape. almost ‘Laws Care Through the Locking Giass 4 Mis View It vas Mi’ view that "proper names ate not connotative: they eaote the individuals who are caled by them; but they do not indicate or imply anyatribvtes as belonging thos individual (1857-20), We can vary the language a litle: proper name dese ‘anaes an object but has no other meaning it oes not deserve that objec: it says nothing about the objet ‘This view doesnot take us fr but i 4 promising star! i Accords with our first intuions abou ames Ite snk, then, a4. Description Tacories of Proper Names thatthe view has ben elected by near ll subsequent shears Fer one reason or another, twas thought necessary 0 conclude that names have “sensee™ oF ae oerwise lopally associated ‘with descriptions “The first sim of ts Book isto reject thse "description the coves. replaing them with theory that is iin in spit. 1.2 Reatons for Rejecting Mit's Viow lesibe though Mil’s view is, various reasons have been ad Ahved for teeing it in fvor of deseinon theories, “Gh We aoed to explain the fact that “Socrates is wie fers in meaning for Aristotle is wie. This seems esy enough for 1 Millan, The meaning of nei ipl its role f designating f eertain object! or more extemely, its meaning is that objet (Russell 1956; 186, Socrates” and “Anstotle’ designate diferent objects and so ifr in meaning. "A consideradon of identity statements suggests tht this ex: planation is inadequate, Frege indicated the dicly ‘Now if me were orga eqult a areation betwee at wich he homes and b dena, woud str tht 'a = cold ot ier fom ‘oe es proved tht “e618 Wael, A renbon would herby be exoreved ofa hing oe, sdindeed on wih (angen to foc ba ono ther he. (198236, Hane 19:20), How cana Milian expain the diferng “cognitive vaes” of ‘a's band a = a”? Each name here concers the one object. ‘The probe posed by entity statement acs al theories of umes, Awareness of the problem hss pushed some philosophers ‘vay fom the view that entity what it seems tobe— areation beeen the objects designated by the names—twvard the view that itis a elation between the names themselves, This Rad been Frege's view.” Objections to that view led Frege to his theory of tames. (They bave led others to sore éesperte expedient” Frege sow thatthe solution 1 the problem of ett sate- ments st be found by focusing nether exclsively onthe signs Description Theories of Proper Nemes. 5 or exclusively onthe objects designated; we must focus on what ‘meats between sgn and objec, Frege caled tis the “mode of presentation." Frege's theory, the casa dseripion theory of eames, it that each name has "sente” wherein the mode of presetton is centsined (195257). The sease is something " prsped by everybody whois suiciemly familiar with the lane guage" to which the name belongs (though there maybe diferent ‘opinions about among those who ase the language). I isthe ‘ste atthe sense of some dfirite description. It supplies & r+ tenon of identification the object the name designate is the one tnd only one that isthe description. The dering “comiive ‘values of'a =a and “a = b are to be explained bythe a {erag senses of ‘c! and “0” (Frege 1950:37H88; see also Frege ws (i) The next reason for rejecting MIN’ view (the long ncto- ous problem of singular existence statements, If the role of name's merely to designate, then it Seems "analogous to ‘ay ‘a ens’ Ihe name is meaning tal, then there must ls somthing ic designates; i “sity nonsense” t talk of the existence of actual things in the world (Russell 1986:233, 24), More seriousy, it seems impossible to make any ease ofa does sot exis seems "contasiccory." Russell distinguished ordinary proper names from “logically proper ames." Ordinary ones ae abbreviated dserptions ame: ‘ube to teatment by the teary of descriptions, Logically proper ‘ames ae the only gesine ones, They stand ina celaioship of ‘he utmost intimacy to thee bearers, The relationship is este rmologialy fundamen; a name immediately and directly fo- cise attation onan objet, and that's olf it does. Only this’. ‘seems, qualifies asa logiclly proper name. It cannot mean: {nghly appear ina singlar existence statment, Oa the other Ind, an orinary prope atme can: the statement aims that ‘here exits or doesnot exist exaetly one object ting the as sociated description * (GA closely related dificaty for Mil's view arises from the& Deserption Theories of Proper Nomes fact that some names Hike ‘Pegasus’ and ‘Santa Claus’ are empty.” Mil says that “al names aze names of something eal ‘or imaginary” (186716), So there exists something which “Pe fasue names, But no sich entity exit. $0 ‘Pepan’ does aot ‘ame anything. Soitemearingcanco be simply its role of naming somethin, His temgtig say that it must havea sent which ‘can be expressed by deft description (Romsl 1956:50, And ite allow this fr empty names, why not allow it also forthe others? (Go) Finally, there is he problem of opaque context. The pe- collar fetore of wach a context tht the rule of substitu ‘of ident does aot hold fort: we replace a mame by acode- tignatinal name, there is no guarantee that we will preserve {rut The tole ofa name fa such context cannot, it would seem, be merely 10 designate, However, suppove that a name bas « sense. A way out of the difficulty then suggest sel. these ‘peculiar contexts & mame sits is eferent to what is normally Fs sense; the name stl designates, bu it dsigaates someting eeat, Such a slution was Frege's ("On Sense and Refer ence," 1982, "Any theory of proper names must take account ofthese four ‘problems. [consider entity statement ia setion 5.5. Singular thittence statements and erpy eames are the whole concer of chapter 6. Opnaue context are the concer of chapters Bt 10, 113 Tha Maln Problem “The main semaniial problem for proper names is that of ex- pling the nature ofthe link between name and object ove fof whic the former designates the Inter. Description theovies seem to supply the fire step i a solution: the name designates the object in virtue ofthe object being the oe end oaly one to ‘which the nascited description applies. Tis eves the problem ‘fexlaning he nature of the ink between dereripon and object Description Theories of Proper Names. 7 in virtue of which the former apples to the ler. However, we have that problem anyway: two problems seem to have been e- duced to one. "A very obvious concer with ths main problem has led many recent theists to emphasize tht the ute of & name mus, Some way, be able to iden an object.” Usually the form of ‘dentifeation required has been the production of an identifying esripton of an abject. To this pont, such recent hecies emai love to those of Frege and Russe. However, che idetfeation requirement has usually been pat of more complex desertion theories than the classical ones. A name is rotted tightly to one ‘eseription but Icotely to many: a name has logically associated witht luster, or "presupposion-et,” of descriptions * These Complications bave been prompted by the implausibly of the elas heres Tn deceribing the main problem, Ihave used the term dese tae’ to refer to certhin relationship between name and objet. ‘Wee might ordinarily ute tat term for this purpose: or we might say that the name "refers to the object ofthat "denotes the ‘bec: or thal the objec site bearer.” “Designate” seems the ‘mos pt ordinary semantic erm forthe relationship, bat nothing hinges ot ite choice. More must be said about this, fort leaves the precise natre of the problem unclear. And 0 long a the ‘problem emtins unclear, the methodological question of how we ‘hal testa proffered solution oi remains unclear. ‘Our problem isto investgne the semantically important re- lnionship that olds between a same and a certain object, what ‘ever that relationship i called. The relationship i question is picked out by its crucial Bering on the tratk conltons of sen {ences containing he name. Consider any simple predation con- taining a name. For the prediction tobe tue, a certain object Imus ave a cettin property. Which obec? In my usge itis the ‘Sbjct the name "‘esignates.” And we could give examples of fame-bjet pairings to teach this usage” That sal I can and8. Descrintion Theanes of Proper Names could say italy to explain my usage. Beyond this the term i ‘Shinied an we develop a theory, [shall ave ocason 0 modify Sar Ragen the one hand T shal widen the extension of des: [ute because a relationship existe between certain otter sn ‘Eine terme and thir objects tht is simar to that between & fame adits obest. On the other hand I bal narrow the exten Sion because a lationship exists between some names aad ther Siject that is diferent Grom the pareigm. shall ot tempt an nals or definition of ‘designate’ in the seae offering as ‘ony Todo 30 would be poatless,for our skis to explain and ‘Geerbe the nature of the celetonship that any such tem refers fo, The overall aim in seaantis is ‘Ships lke designation in nonsemuanic terms. Perhaps we can ex. pest a physlealst reduction (9 the end; Lam at sure." In any ase my explanation falls far shot of i, "These remarks rise a number of questions about the nate and cope of sementis which are discussed in more detain Par. TH We most wat until then to say much onthe methodological ‘guston (ee section 4.1 particulary). Meanie shal sy oly that we canot rely uncically on "what we would soy" inhi ‘or that circumstance 10 tei # theory of designation; fr “whit Ste would say" is lagen with undeveloped fk semantic theory. ‘Clearly enough, nevertheless, we mus ook o our odin i+ futons for tests because thee is nowhere el to fok ti imporast to distinguish our main problem fom aot. ‘our protien i to explain the nature ofthe ik hat ceri hinds ‘of words have tothe worl. The other problem iso explain how Svords come to be 0 liked tothe world: what i the historical ‘or eaual eplenation? Causa theories of reference are sometimes sen simply as solutions to this oer problem. As soch hey may ‘Rem uu enough but tia, However, they are offered primary fb soltons fo the main problem: they cla tat te matte of the lin ist Be found by looking to the historia explanation “two further pats on usage 1 flow Quine in using ‘refer as Description Theories of Proper Names 9 ‘a penerc term: proper names, predicates, variables, and so on, may all refer 1 use ‘apply to express the speci relationship etwoen predicates ane te word; 0 raven’ applies teach and ‘every raven and fo nothing le. 14 Ambiguity: Type and Tokens Prope names typily have more than one bearer. shall stretch fina usage tle snd say they are typically “ambiguous This convenient to bring out the contrast between description theories of aes andthe theory tbe offered hereby considering the way they banlethe problem tis ambiguity gives ris to, The irobiem is thet of determining which oe of the many objects bearing certain mame is designated by a particular token of hat tum, What i it aout a particular token of “Joba that makes ‘designate this Toha and not anyother ofthe milions of Sohns? Ws common to distinguish per and fokens, When We st, ‘Jo’ is among the words uted In a.cerain book,” what we are talking about i type. John is used 107 ines in he book, The result ofeach ute a token. The iden of « word token is clear ‘hough: tokens ar insertions om tbe page or sounds in he ait; they are dtable laceable parts ofthe physical world; hey have asa histories, But ore needs to be sad about word types. ‘What is hat is ambiguose? What, for example, are We fe- fering to by the express ‘proper names’ in the opening se0- fence ofthis seedon? We are referring to torts af sounds or in- erotons, each sor teing identified by the over physical Charterites ofthe sounds or insertions that make t up. When ‘ne say tht Toba ea proper name in ths sense, we are saving ‘hat ceran sort of snd or inscription is wed Gimp, i English) withthe semantic properties of proper name. AnG is ambiguous bestase iti $0 used in more than one way. 5 ‘tha ist proper name inthis sense, and Whats ambiguous is & ound ype or an izcistion ype defined only by overt physical characteris10. Deserpton Theorie of Proper Names ‘his fot ipa le obscured in languages ike Eaglsh where ambiguities in sound types and insenpion types tnd 4910 ‘ether, Thus the statement, "John isambiguous,” canbe aken to be refering iter fo a sound type or an inscription type, In Japanese, however thigs are aut ferent. The spoken la ‘ge Is fll of ambiguous tound types for which there are 20 oresponding ambiguous inscription types; dnd there ae aso ‘umbipous ntrigtion types fr which there are no coresponding ‘ambiguous sound types ‘Call ound types and inscription typs"physial types." Words ‘ike word and propet name’ are often used to refer to physical types. They ae sometimes used to refer fo tokens. The ae aso sted to refer to types of mdifferen sort which T sal call "se runic types." ‘Supe that nthe above book she physical name type ‘ohn’ is used Jo designate three erent people. So the 107 tokens exemplify three meanings ofthe physical type. We may wish 0 talk about ove of those three vet or measings: "Soha ames wellknown fgurein the Sydney underworld; that mame makes 1 tru sentence if fined “ie rich" The reference ere i ct to any particular token andi eanot be tothe physica type it {sto semsatic type. Or, considera common semantic remare like the following: "Pegasus isan empty name.” Thief not 8 remark about the sound or inscription type Pegasus, for such types are uted to refer suecessuly t9 many things: i is about a temantc type, (When we ute the expression ‘he English Lan- frags’, we are mostly refering to something to be defined semanicaly-) Two tokens that aren different meda-—fr example, in speech din wetng cannot be ofthe same physical ype ba hey can be of the same semantic type. Semantic types ae defied only by semantic characteristics. ‘The problem of ambiguity that concerns us here can now be ‘putas follows, What sles which semantic name type a piven token ofan ambiguous physical aame type belongs 0? Deseripton Theories of Proper Nemes 11 Does our min problem, outined in the revios section, con- cam physical types, semantic types, or tokens? Uerances are ‘he primary vehiles of trith (Quine 1950:x). Utteranes are to ent. Srl it ame tokens tha ar the peimatyvebicles of esigntion, (Recase ofthis 1 shal fe eet alk of the person responsible fora token, as well asthe Loken, designating some- thing) Indeed, my talk of types nem sothing but & convenient fogan de paler. To say tha a token is of a certain physica type ‘ajut to say thar ts F, where "Fis a certain physical predicate ‘To aay that i is of «certain semantic type is just to sy that i iG, where 'G" is cenain semantic predicate Having made these distinctions, I shall not be pedantic about ther, I shall use words like "werd! and ‘proper mame’. without more ado, to refer to takens and to types af both sors unless there is danger of confusion. A word token surrounded by single quotation marks may refer to a certain physical type, or to 2 Certain semantic type, orto a certain token: it will never refer to ie, ‘Which cbjet di »patcuar name token designate? It isnt ral to ay hat it designated the oben he speaker had in mind cor meant, This was aa insight of some description theorists ‘eulay, Stawson 1985182). The ordinary action ofhavingi- ‘nin ea Nery nagesive one in the semantis of singular ters, 1s we shal see (sections 2422.7, 9.3-9.). However, sti too ‘ueleat tobe helpful without some sort of explanation. Uwe had ‘ote, &tlution 1 cur problem of ambiguity would be in sigh: 2 spedier designated oe object and not another by “Joba! Because he had itn mind What sor of explanation might description theorists oer of ‘his notion? The fist step clear enough. The speaker associates with the name an "identifying description.” He has in oid the ‘object pleked out by that description. So he has one and not an ‘other objet in mind by "John In what does this association of identifying description with ‘mame cosa? It consis seems, inthe speaker's readiness 1012. Description Theories of Proper Names proce thet description if asked what he has mint consis In something he could or woald do." How are eto understand this lai? One way that is some: times suggested by the writings of description theorist is what Wwe might calla "Behaviors iterpretation." Iisa lows: A person has wllered a sentence ncn the use of name. Ihe ‘were asked soon afterward what he ad in mind by the name, Ne ‘Would offer a certain idemifieg description, The atest picked out by this description waste object he had in mind This view is unsatisfactory ort makes a certain sort of ror Inyposit, It prevents speaker from being wrong sot what he had in mind. Suppose he uses the name ‘John. Whee asked ‘whom he ad in mind, be produces a description which denis, iin objet with that name. Could the object picked out be the ‘wrong Joha? With this view, it seems nt. The description de- Tevmines what he had in mind, Ye leary be could be mistaken about his mental stats 80 that he would offer the wrong deterip- tion; he doe aot have “incorigible knowledge.” He might. fo trample, have become confsed about, of fogote, what he ‘meant Pethap he diet notice wht he was ding ‘A more pauable way of understanding the cnimis given by The association of ientving d- terion sith name consis in he holding of abel which the User would express using the nme andthe deseription. Whenever ‘speaker uses the name, sucha bel has w causal ol. Which ‘object the speaker bad in mind, and hence designates, depends ‘on whic such belie had the causal roe: the objet iste one Picked out bythe description “involved inthe bei: Know! fdge of his own mental states woul, in normal circumstance, Tead the epee to offer that description on request to expan tis use of the name, However, ecumstances may be abnormal ‘What matters ie mot the description he offers, but he description that was infact involved in the above way inthe production of the mame. Detcrotion Thecrles of Proper Names 1% This censalistierpreiation contains more than a grain of ‘out, shal return to it in developing my own theory (see tons 124 and 51-53}, However, dseiption theories under thi itr pretation, as under all thers, ae open to Kripke’s objections. In my view these ejection are decisive. 1.8 The Reltation of Description Theories Kripte’s lng atic, “Naming and Necessity" (Kripke 1972,” weaves together many strands of thought inclang several on proper nares. My purpose inthis sections to outine what I see [tthe srongret Kripkean argument agaist deerpion theories ‘Deseption theoles are mostly offered ws theories ofthe mean ing of» ware. Ax such they have, certain modal statements as ‘consequences for example, the consequence that necessarily, if “Asal exited, he was such and buch. * Much of Kripke'sar- till akenup with cussing the nature and truth value of uch modal coosequences, He argues that names are “rigid designs tors” and ence tat these consequences are fuse, Therefore, description theories ofthis type are fle. His discussion of ne- ‘erty has been the foe of much subsequent commen. I is ‘important to tice thatthe aniclecomtaies another argument tqaintdeecripioe theories. This argument is independent of the modal argument, has & mote powerful conclusion, and is it ny view a better argument. ‘Kripke points ot that description theories may be offered not es theories of meaning but as theories of reference, As such they ‘lh simply thatthe reference of @ name is determined by the designate then, ‘Een ideatiiaion by means of demonstratves can be mit18 Description Theorles of Proper Names lakes. Ii possible indeed is itl, that our memories of aay op Would bes dm that we would point ou the wrong peson ina crond for many nares we use The object we Men for name may thus be ute relevant to the tah eondkions of Stoereats containing the mime This scusson revels urher hazards to reference borowing asa ay fr te ignorant to gt by, The ference lender may be ‘iskenifieg, Or may be mistaken: someone whorl thks that Einstein discovered the Theory of Rlavity may. when pressed to identify the designatun of ‘Listen’ pac hs ost na close (eal emiablefend who wronal thinks Eston invented the atomic bomb. ‘To sum up, we have eal seen that we may fall 10 associate ny appropriste definite dexerition witha mame We see 0% ‘hat we may associate one that emis the Wrong objet id Consider Witgenstee’s example of Moses (193:89). Sap ose we were to discover that there Was noone man who sat [or most of even any) ofthe descriptions normally associat beh “Moss's for example, “the man who le she sacs out af Fgypt the pan whe a8 child was taken ot ofthe Nie by Pharaoh's dager Inte face of hs we woul ay, and peo: bly say igh, that Moses dil nt exist and that Moses" was ‘an empty name designating nothing. But there i an alternative fmallermative which may be overlooked, This ca be Brought out by considering the ease of Jonah. His waikely that the biblical story Jonah os whole is true ofan seal man or even that substan parts af paral ‘he pasts abou th big a ae true of anyone, Des tthe allow that Jonah isan empty name? I does aot because Jonek may ave bcen areal pero about ohom alpen has grown. Imagine lw discover hat the ues were as fallows: There was a ordinary ‘man called ‘Jonah who lived out his fen an oriry way. The ‘only unusual hing about Mat was that he wa egarded in 4 Perstious may by his associates; they tended a tell ecu w- ee Description Theories of Proper Names 19 sk abut him. Aris deh ies some ato wba {Eso now a the ory aha the rts oa sa ‘cept ions ie ings an were gu fre ‘Ths istheatomatie tay be ovens Inte stoaton mogned, ou ees oon designe the man destibed: eater resto ong ema sash shoe the Bal, are mos fe cms tht ma cs te seared opeleson theater hans, present pred, eetng is scary, rte reuse te mon as he outed popes Drscinteones cat sscommaate tse dab Ree erese borrowing ofp hee, forme ail ere wg ea Jonah. A'deserpton tent mnt cone Wath bapa dssoery shows at Jona in ere we at ea at 001 ie: one hie estos. ren hea one ‘el ink ur, can beta. We fare wn reset theory abot a ein man, Jonsh, witha ie teary sot hn wl be soe" web hey cou a Nee et itis nt posible, ecoting 1 dscrsion tery fo a Sater holo ea, ro dei as wer 4 ceri odin rant he the Schl, hes tasked dows, ht Jonah was the bef iertiow trad so ah Sch esas an vec anno abon ash eco thy dey ie desertion on whch out ne oft ue eros Ths snot aoe cam The eases in (ol Seon sages ta: descipton thos are ong ot mes in als und te le “sesh progam” scm mistaken‘ eran: de lane lathe. ile “been is Te evidence oth erie cn sms be dete (The enor do ot deste Ent" soto Bau, ates ean te mie 0 acm te evidence {Ksph consider some) bt hee have the ea of degece aug prem sits." tal comer a suetigy nce ‘emp inthe nex ection However, What we Me eed20 Description Theories of Proper Names complete he reection a this program it ne program for heer tang shout desigstion. How can we scseed in desigating an object witha pare when we are unable fo enify the ebject? We designate the object im vitae ofa causel network stretching ‘back rom our uses ofthe name tothe First wes oft designete the object. Tae important hie fo consider deciding whether and what a name designates isthe hstoriclexplanation of 13 ‘we. This isthe central da of “caus theories of prope aes, ‘With Kripke’ discovery of this new program, he objections fo Assertion theories become, ia my view, decisive. Deseriovon theorists hive been inpeos by era fc a person's ably to use a ames accompanied by varius belts touts bearer. Ther enor has been oti that some of these belies, suclent number to idem he esrer, rust he trae in onde forthe peme o designate the obec, Te dtcovery that ‘most of our Beliefs about the bearer ofa mame ar false iy of ‘course, large one. However, we have no need tse his i covery 25 changing the "meaning or any other semante prop ety, ofthe name. I simply changes curbs about the bearer as Tsai Desenption theoves ate not without any tach, nevertheless. They are haf tue for some names (2.5.56) And the) contain number of insights which canbe included in eas theory. Tes natural and core) to think thal for he most pat, we iknow what we mean™ by the words we use, However, this xpresion shuld not mislead us ito exaggerating, as desrpion ‘theories do, the depres to which we are experts onthe semaies ‘of our language, and in particuler. the depee to which we are expers on what our terms refer fo: shere i @ tense in which we Gio ot, for thy most part, know what we meen. Questions of meaning and reference ate theoretical questions resin em pirical investigation. We can alk without knowing the answer to these questions jst as we ean en! without Being eet explain Aigestion and ride a bicycle without knowing any phe. hal reli to these mates i later seeuons (64-48). Descrpton Theorie of Proper Nemes 23 16 Crevary Kripke placed the following condition ona deseription theory of (©) For any sascesi tory, the ascot mat aot be cece The Sropertc nc we sed a oe fo tein he names alee) fut ut hemsees ave he soa fetece a3) a ie {An obvious volition of condition (C) would be provided by 2 theory that offered asthe identifying desertion associated with fname ‘a by «speakers the abject fam deviating by "aA tore nleresting lation could occur withthe eserition theory reference borrowing explained brie eair (1.5). Te speaker fers the description ‘the person befered 10 by a sch and ‘ach circumstances”. New suppose that b Borrow from ¢ in a Similar way and borrows from the orga speaker, We have ‘oe fl ite we have nol explained what determines the re {erento any ofthese uses ofA saistactory description theory that allows reference borrowing of this sort must require that Some lender ean manage reference on his on “Tis might sem too obvious to be Worth more than 2 passing mention were st for ie Tact that philosophers who are pre fumably aware of condition (C) and of Kipke’s detailed discus: sion of (Xiph 1972583-86, 297, 165-6) ar sl urging he ois that take very le account of. * ‘What these theories do inclute i the descriptions a person associates vith the name it elle aoe Was named a, ‘of ie commoaly refered toby 2, ete. The appeal ofthis move [sthat itis plait lai tat these are descriptions that wsers tktbe name do correctly believe tue of the object, 14 esi then fo Bulle an identifying description around one ofthese which it seems plausible to say ts associated withthe name i ficult tases, Kripkean arguments from ignoraree and error like those in il apply bs they do not seem so persuasive ‘Our task eto exp the nature of she elatioship between22 Description Theories of Proper Names ‘name and its bearer, have cll he relationship dese tion; others may refer naming,” reference," oF whatever. ‘The term is not ipertat (1.3). What il these desertion the ces doin effect, explain the fat tata perio designated ‘by a patly interme of conmanin's present practice of des nating © by “sa practice that may he dependent on 2 pet ‘Consider fist present practice tha! is ot dependent oma past ‘ove. Suppose that the description the speaker adds to "it desig- sated by "2" in community K" to get an ientfyng description it - What these theres tll us is hat he speaker of ‘o' dsi- sated x becau thatthe member of K, a community ‘he ean identify are inthe practice of designating by ‘a, In vie ‘of what iit x that they are inthe practice of thus desgratig? ‘We are old the same story foreach one of them. Each on det- ignates x only beeaute everyone does. We hve no independent toute tox. Tht sort of community reference borrowing is no beter than the individual borrowing we considered ear. It lates (C) and is erelr ‘The situation isnot sgnifeaty eter i the speaker's bor owing takes back toa past price of designating x by {Un one respect itis wore: the speaker or one of his ellos wil have to be able to identify the eelevant past commarity » ask that eUkely to prove harder than that of eating the present fone) We donot have immediate cieclanty inthis case becante the present community is dependent onthe pest one bu not vce versa. For this teat Kripke sems to regard it a8 pot violation of condition (C) (1972766), Nevertheless itis as objectionable nies we are given some way of eliminating the notion ofthe ast communiy’s reference” We need tobe old in virtue of Svat it mas + tat the pau community refered toby ‘a, These ‘theories tell ut only that each member oft refered to x Becae all he others di. The circularity has reappeared bt in this case ‘Risin the pat, Tie ie what we sould expect af course, because ‘here was Atie when the past community was a preset one ike Description Theories of Proper Names. 23 ‘he community above, enitely dependent on is vn retources Reference borrowing from the past simply cransfers the problem, ‘A salifctory desertion theory of reference cannot simply rest with idetiyingdesritions lke ‘the F called ‘aby Kt trun say more. However, a8 400m 8 mare esd the theory is ‘open to the usual arguments fom ignorance and error. ‘The fist move to avid circularity seems clear enough: some embers of the community on which we al ultimately depend ust be able to designate x by ‘c' without relying on the com munity. How is that requirement tobe filed? ‘An eagy wy would be Yo 2a) that he commun see om ol! those who donot rely on reference borowing: onal those who ‘ave an Kenting coneept which dees not inchde beng called ‘2 But thi cary way ead a dsaser, Among those courageous enough, or cclhardy enough, t9 "go it alone” will be many who ae simply wrone about #;n0 single answer wil emerge et aone ‘The theory must somehow speciy the experts. Mow is that to be done? The theory ean, on pain of circuanty, say tha they se the people who are expert about what’ devpnates.I'seem (ba he tery most require thatthe members ofthe community ‘enfy the experts. But then we can forget about the commamiy hogeher. Weare back to reference borrowing from individuals (abe exper). The theory must, of cours, avoid violating con- Aiton (C) (thinks & isthe expert, thinks es, and thinks in) Sil there i the problem that a member of the commu ‘may not know the experts or he may know one but not have an Metfying individual concept of him except one that involves is called and 20 raze the same problems; or he may musideniy the exper; or he may identify the expert bu the expert may be ‘rong about tbe referent, Problems of ignorance ané error loom agin conclude tht description theories are aot to be saved by snaking ute of reference borrowing from he community We must ‘ek an alleratve theory aChapter Two [ACCAUSAL THEORY OF DESIGNATION (1) ‘This chapter outlines a caus! theory of nonempty proper names fader her singular tems which resemble thes semant> aly. The filing of he theory must walt unl chapter , after ‘we have placed the theory (in Part I) within a general program for semantics Tar with names (2.1-24. I then consider deflate descrip ons arguing that aistnction ran by Donnelan sto be party ‘explained in terms of caual inks to objects similar to those for ames (25). I draw 4 similar ditinedion for demonsraives and pronouns (2.6) and consider the significance ofthese dsinetons for semantics (2.7), Making ute ofthese distinctions, I eturn to the discussion of names (2.8-2.10, 21 The Problem! ‘The cet dea ofa caus! theory of names is thet our present tases of amame, say ‘Aristotle designate the famous Grek phi Tovapher Aristotle, no invitwe ofthe various things we (MBAy) televe tue of him, but in viwe of causal network sechise ck from our ures to the first utes of the name to designate ‘Aol. eisinths way that ou presentuses ofa name "borrow ‘heir reference fom ear uss ts this socal mechanism that emables us all to desigaate the same thing bya name, ‘This cent idea makes oar present uses of name causally Aepencent on eae uses of i. These causal inks do no, how- 2s28 Causal Theory of Desi ion) ver, take us tothe objec. In Vetus of wha do theft wet of ‘name designate a certtin object? We cn ee, perhaps, hom we are dependent on our ancestor, Ut how did they manage? ‘Other questions occur tout, What ete nature ofthis causal aetwork? How did it begin and how didi gow? What has my ‘causa connection to Aristotle got to do wih my pretent act of Aesgnating him? Coulda uae of ase be usally linkedin the appropiate way 1 more than one object? ‘Our main problem was to exp in nonsemanic tems the ature of the link between name and obec in virtue of which the former designates the later (13). hove sane 9 far that at of tha ink iw cnsal network. So, if we explain te nate of that network by answering the question in the at paragraph, Wwe have partly explained designation, What would ren to be explained would be the inal link 1 the objet, the abject of the previous peragraph. It would be uncalti, of course, 0 ‘expect that we could come near to completing iter expantion ft This time and inthis place 22, Fira Uses of a Proper Neme ‘A paradigm situation fr naming is one in which a name ie given {0 4 previously unnamed object by a “amin setene" fc 8 faceoface confrontation ata “saming Fenny.” The sr of ‘ceremony tat leaps to mind here in a erisening ceremony of ‘the Inching ofa ship. Mostly. however, such formal and elab- ‘orate procedures merely give relsous and publi expresion to ‘what has already been extablishedinformaly and privately ‘The object in the paradigm is likely 1 bem humble oe, and so we shall ake such an obec toute a aig ceremony. (Thinking about names has nt been helped by linting attention tothe famous andthe grand.) Consider the case of our Ite cat. ‘We acquired her at akilen, My wife si, "Le' cll er Nana after Zoa's courtesan.” | agreed. Thus Nana was named. Causa! Theory of Designation it) 27 ‘This isthe typical way for & name tobe bestowed, but there ac others. I shal discus thee in section 23, ‘What happened to those present atthe naming of Nana? They 7 perceived the ceremony, using a leat their eves tnd earn. To perceive something isto be cautlly affected by ie AS a rest Of the effect it had on them, they Were in 8 postion to use the fame ‘Nan’ later to designate the cat. What they gained a he Eeremony, we might $3 ‘Na ‘Letus expand this story itl, conskderng my situation atthe ‘msn gles that aby to designate fom perciving the coms ‘ex even hat consivted the naming ceremony. 1 saw Nana saw my wife. 1 beard the naming sentence. { was aware of Agreeing, Uhnew which object my wife was suggesting name for. Ax rel ofthe causal interaction a tht ceremony Amen any wife, Nana, and mye, an interaction in which Nana oc. ‘wped a ungue place (cat ofthe object being named), gained iy ably which is thus "grounded in” Nana, order to gain ths ability Imus already have several bites ‘To ui the bility touse his name, I mst already have te ably {o use names in general. And I must realize thal a name can be bestowed on an object bya ceremony ofthe sort witnessed. This ‘eauies. iter ala, that T understand my wife's use of ‘het. In eed twas because that use designated Nana that he name was bestowed on her a this ceremony. I dscus the role of persona Pronouns in 26. Foreshadowing tat ditcustion, we can say now that ner’ designated the cat Because of he place the had nthe ‘causal explanation of my wife's se ofthe tem. And had my wile sed ‘our cat’ stead because Nana was absent, we can sa. foreshadowing a discussion in 2.5, thatthe term would have des. ‘gnated the cat because of her rae inthe causal explanation of the se, The ame would be true if there had been another name for Nana avaiable, and if my wife had sed that. ‘few minutes Inter I exercised my new ability I said “Nana28 Causet Theory of Designation (2) Is hungry. That rat ute of the same designated Nang, How? Tt flevgnuted het becouse twas infact produced by an ability that ‘Sone our ofthe above ceremony in which she had x certain plas the ay is grounded in Nana. In other words it was because ‘Nan had that specie place i the caval explanation of my ut Terance tat the name designated her, “The central Gea of caseab theory was that present uses of ame ae eusally inked 10 first uses claim now tha rat uses tre causally lnkaa tothe object (bt see 25 and 36)? ‘Designation fara network pus intial causal ink, Theres ood ground already for our ear pessimiam about the extent ‘Srexplanation possible here. My description of the iil link, the grounding, ests on a notion of perception and it presupposes Srasous lngultc sk in those present at the ceremony, Fur. {ermore tlk of “alii to dsiaat object by ame" These ‘bier constitete an important ar ofthe designtionl ink, bt iba are they? Such an ably a enc sate which is brought “bout in a language user by perception of a naming ceremony {and in ether ways fo be descnibed} and which i apt to produce tin part) certain sorts of erances—ulerances using the me In question. In $1 1say more about these alii and in 2 more [uot groundings. However, even i te Gal analysis we baNe fe tlk of mental sales Whicr renal arly unexpaied "How concered should we be about bess explanatory falas? Given our present lack of knowledge of te mind of ange, Sov ofthe relation ofthe one ote the, it seems to me thatthe answer is, "Not very.” Takei that our attribution ofa language oan ogais—out assumption thatthe sounds, et, ha it emits ave meaning and feference is pe. of ou atization toi of « human mind. We ‘tribute (eit complicated beefs, hopes, desires, et, which We think its words expres, a5 part of our theory to explin the Complicated vay behaves (31), Notion like designation ae ‘ut ofthis explanation: Co see person's expression as desgr Causal Theory of Designation (1) 29 sn sy hs ou Tey gn dept, Shere, we woud aed ti pyhnlogeltd ‘nl theory ta feed Ingle bhai to tr ener tod ocd ta exaaton of a, We ne et) ng et obi sah eon * ‘Nevers, at We Ae aemping bre shoul be on utan oth thay. Wea epg xs dn tao ia sonserat eras y reling #t pryilogl ‘nonpsychological reality. ae Ca we eo forward bvig, say mover eho ‘upeat tang ory a ponpyenclp snare lpg’ cs weloeoreuaton eso pg tare thepayain ean bt am mccain! weap, So hn aay seat). Cea Tt ey tle jes even nd aes physe What een tome mush tle hes fi fr Sap, poy for teasonn gen by Jr der ad sy Puc 1d a tank Ghat soma cao ke sigan trp se ‘ho. eke chp ens, &antonl aon ‘ich canbe ea y veut py tos atl thunder” anon“ chai sccenbleto" the pron who pode te oes, Ta ch, Ie he sy tat prt conse ye pounded he dete ne ceva Tes edriig yf ‘Nan beg wit Nene ber any een ns ees E” my perception of ta ceremony from then ont i my ability thus Bloc 'Nao fo eupate osl el ch cu ‘chain a ‘‘d-chain," short for “designating-chain,"* . | 23 Later Usee ofa Proper Name wo of us uined ou abilities to designate Nana by her same at he naming ceremony. Al others, deeetly or idlrecly, sow" their aference fom these two (but $002.8)80 Causal Theory of Deviation (!) Many gin the ability diel from one of the (90. { might intoduce them tothe ct: ("Shes ale Nana’, of) "This is Nana." This etemony plays the roe fr them that he ealer taming ceremony payed forme, Thr perception of Nana i that {ntrodction wl mean that undetying thei ater wses of "Nena! ‘ill be d-chains grounded in ber. T might pass onthe ability in Nana's ebence (i) “Our et it called Nana,” rv) "Nanas our cat." An aii thus gine ‘would also be easly grounded in Nana, although this is nto [ppateat boone Nanas sent Ln sing of meatonng the nae ‘Rane’ T have exercned my abity whch is caualy grounded fm Nena. The person adreted hears my remark. Ths causally {inks im through my ability to Nana. The question arises wheter te alo linked to Naae through the rol fur cat So far we ave barely mentioned the role ofthe other siular fern used to designate Nana at the ie when bites are guined, There ‘was for example, my wife's ue of he inthe naming ceremony, iy use of she in (the in GD, and now ‘our a (i) and Gv). We must set side consideration of the role of such terms in grounding ables with names ul we have dcusted the terms @.5-2.0. ‘There is one inportat way 1 might past onthe abity: Lmight use the mame in an ordinary predicaon. For example, 1 might ‘ay, () "Nanas hing.” Someose who hear this and caret ‘asin ‘Nana a 8 sound withthe oe of name can boro bis reference fom me, If he does, be gine an abity that causally grounded in Nana via the ably 1 exercised in making the remark. Undertyng his future eof ‘Nena willbe a chan sounded inthe ext. {Conra this view with that ofdesesption theories They re quire extensive knowledge of an objet for a person to succeed A denigrating Uhave Mendy rejected this requirement am tow’ going further; it is nol ecessary that a person fave any Srbwantal st of Beef involving the same (whether true or tals. Causal Theory of Designation (1) 31 in ay amigo “We wo mt yh ee to come ona Mann ily tren of rere tear rane eas ay ramet Feet Dot bat whe wl ny Spend on ete wb oe ‘hie Thine aveagy red at ntbodsogcalgueton 13 tod wil cum ot io 4 and 431 eal tate poson who turks) sina posion gi the ably to deine Nora whe name. He ble to a etn aout er Who Nia!" ndr conceringher (Show Nana tome") and ‘aera or fie tenet her ("Narang bec ‘hele gcd can seo rez, devant ‘Re deer theo, fr eng th We have sen ho thote peta ing cernny in pats onthe aby fo eagate an objet by ane. Terese Thny aur ane who mre nt att aningcetmeny a fave a come yhoo anyone wp was We we {Sis spon wih Cea Cone ante ie of Nw The wi ued he ae fete wot ws pert a the ang ctnay etch ‘ponds oon pase on we wer An hy pase S Snr aye Pepe ae, "Tae Devt ex called ‘Rane oe Na an uly ptered ea” and ery panto oyopt ay Theta ef be sae desig on eee the cheering tc tokens, chan st i heough evel peopl abie, tenet rade et Aad so ean coniue: people necure nd ued the mane gar Nana wa hu dene che semantic name ype (0 esa hin her inted oper orn he cena nto fo ane ire. So far we have considered only those uses of a name which Wop I fat, mon uses of a mame are to an audience that ready bast, Each of these uses reifoees Ina member ofthe382 Causal Theory of Designation 1) audience the ability he has with the name. It establishes farther ‘ous inkages betveen hi andthe objet. Therefore thre may ‘bemmany d-chaine grounded in the object undeing a person's ‘ve of name: there may be a cous network underying his olen. The overall netvork forthe ae isthe union ofall uch Individual networks, ‘is a commonplace that person in a positon to pick up a ame may fll odo so: he may fl to pay attention ata into- ction; the required ability to designate the object i not a ‘quire, Fuser, a person wo has tbe ability may lose it fades through ack ofexercite* Tis oss of ability is failure of mex ‘ory, For description theorist, whet are forgcen are the de ‘eriptons required to identify the objec, My explana is some- hat diferent ste $1), 24 Ambiguous Names So far I have ignored, as writes on prope names are prone to, {he fact that mos proper eames are ambiguous. The amiga ofthe physical type "Nan was clear trom the sar, frit wa Zola's ust of it that led to its being bestowed on our ct. And there are many names ich more ambiguous than "Nana Ta 14 I mentioned an insight of description theorists which seems hepfl ere: a name token designates this object and not that because the speaker had itn mind, Te problem was then {o give a sistatory explanation ofthis clear notion MY best ‘efor (odo to following description theories, the “ceatais in- {erprtatio,” fell wet vo Kripke'srefuation, ‘Tis insight of desrption theorists isan important one. The condiary notin of having tn mind points the way to the solution ‘of several problems in semantics involving singular eras. I 0n- erties Donnellan's distinction (5). Most important ofa and ‘elated to chs, its Bearing onthe role of singular tems ia tbe ‘contents of propositional aides @,3-9.6). Our present interest, Coase! Theory of Designation (1) 39 ‘in itis that, when embod inthe above insight it supplies an- ter route toa eausl they of nares. Whatisitio fave en objectin mind? Asa rst step in answering this, suguet tat here is an obiect which a person has in mind (Fandoniy if there ia certain sort of causal connecion Berreen is stare of mind end the object so what you bave In mingle sot etemined by what isin your head, Weare ierestedin amore speci nation, having on obec in mind i ating ne for ‘meaning an object by a name)” This requires a apecal tort of ‘tus connetion, I sugest he following rough explanation: For ay x, end, had yin mind in tering nae token a meant yin ring name token 2) fan ony ifthere was 2 G-chain accesible to x undryingz which was grounded iny. ‘Apoly this tothe above insight and we havea ceva theory of ‘ames: a mame token designates the object in which the d-hain undervng its rounded What bearing des this have onthe problem ofthe ambiguity sf names? Take a physic] type “oh Iti probably the ase ‘hat most of us cas designate about 30 diferent people with this ‘tune. Most of us, therefore, have about 30 distinct abies int ‘volving the name, each oe caualy based on a datiet person ‘When we ule the ame having a cetain perso in mind, there ‘8 (aormally) one and ony one ofthese sites exercised inthe ‘roduction ofthe token. Which objet a person designates de: ads on which ability he in fac exercises Or puting this an ‘other way, which object a person designates depends on which <é-hain in fact underls his utterance and on which object tat {chains infor greunded in, My concer ere his not been produce a precisely accurate planation of having on obec in mind in using a name. Inf, What Ihave sai is aot sricy correct, asthe easex considered in $4 sow. My alm hasbeen to give a rough account of the94 Causal Theory of Designation (1) notion and to show that those who have sezn it at an importa ‘Sloe tothe explanation of designation were comet, However it ison ea for sds ab much i eed of explana esrption ‘etre ofr tenis tat of ingiing which anon th many stains been oken nd bes ies pene one skig or explore ta ne Sines eet ee a Se aun extn of an ter even uh ony ne pace neue Copier my eacrneroed eee San inhuny ch soo sakes fen abs ae Iwetaly Zon cowteanfort nome wee) athe tray ou her wh nema elo on Ge ‘ene ou a, Preor oth y eper tel ‘vote token ton arly este Lar others bd ies to tugaue te counen whe san ht he st te tune, Never 1 ead re he en Neca as by tt ocr er a we nec, Ec hie wit an anians nae Sn Te sy cox ering the twat xed ree wus te oe yd ‘beret causal a proicing eke, Te tenes tel hecarbecuse sien ny she ped promi fee 2 cea 23; only se played he govedig al, The “puna of wht coed ts parr grounding ok Sie mong et os cere nd obec etree to desation The waiving can beg chime her uate ed emo aden ssc han ity fle te rn yom he reg of spon fo wrong and ee oi ‘tend he remu erandgr te come he un rane nes Ts cover be cones fheminer (0, Ava ret of many err wing eae ie “Jn we cg many bee conuing vate people a ob dity Couto! Theory of Decimation (1) 98 ‘are. The beliefs concerning different people ar, in some sense “stored separately with thee respective abies, How iit that we do not more often misunderstand the use of ‘an ambiguous name? According tothe causal they, the vig ‘atu ofthe mare i sted by something to which the audience ‘sno acces, Cleary we rely primarily onthe (external) context for clus. I is unalyw reliable guid to what the speaker has ‘nmind. Some have though that the context bs more than merely ‘istic signfcance here: it determines which jet the ame Atesigntes Ihave crticied this view elsewher tis important o note that what lues we get from the contest depends very much on what we already believe, particle about the speaker; understanding person's words is part ofthe tsk af understanding him. We know that people who viter sentences ae usually aiming 1 communicate something and so they wil {ty nt to mislead, Taking account of this, we consider wha (his conte is tke tobe the designatum. We are guided by what we tink the speaker can designate with hat name, an als by at we balieve be thinks we can designate by it and he his we know about his designating ables. By and lwrze, «speaker ters names can use, names he thinks his audience can se tad understand, and names he thinks his audience expects him to use. Sometimes, however, he will use a name that fe mew to hie audience; te intoduces the auience to a semantic type further iporaat clue to the interpretation of name token isthe predicate used with: "Whom the key tobe saying vat about?" Our answer to that wil be guide by what we thik the ‘eaker might know about various objects, by what we think he ‘would be kel o think worth saying tous, and s0 om Were the contet leaves us in doubt, we can usually ask the ‘speaker about his intentions. The descriptions he wil offer soppy further eae, Mostly the content, together with a well-chosen question or ‘vo, enables ut ete on an interpretation. And mostly we wil96. Causal Theor of Designation (1) be right, However, we may be wong, Misunersandings are possible: the content may mislead; our relevant beliefs about he peak nay be erronegus. Futber his answers to our questions may be incorrect he may be Wrong in one way or anaes about what be refered 10 (1.3). ‘We shall return tothe discussion of proper names in 2. 25 Donnellan's Distinction have caied chat names rele to their objects because hey are ural nk to them. Can we ny tything rar about de inte cesriptons? Atti sit it seems nota definite deseripion refers tothe one and only object thal ts description apis to, However, investigation ofa dtaction made by Keith Doanelian gusts that this 8 f0 hasty (1566, 1968. ‘Donoclan distinguishes two nse of defiitedeseptions—an stibuive” se and “referential” use: (spake wo wate a defi descripion atively aan atrion Sates someting abot weve er wbtever esata. A speaker ‘who ver eine descrip frets ax were onthe othe Thc. ass the Ssriptn to cable hs axdieacew pick ot whom o ‘thot be talking about and tts someting about pron og, (a345) onselian brags out his distinedon by giving 2 number of ex- ‘amples, particularly of situations where he claims & person i Speaking about” (166:288),“ooringto™ (1566285) or ying Something "of" (1968:301) someone in using a description, even though the description dock not correct) describe that person. ‘Those ae feferemial uses of the description, Atuibuve uses die inthis espect, We would naturally mak the istntion by ‘saying that in a referent ue he speaker har ceran object In nd in uting the description, whereas in an atibatve use he oes no.” (Causal Theory of Designation (1) 37 Consider two of Doanelan's examples. Suppose ston wi fr ad yn ha Ge eee pbs nme oh apts ee icra n ate rcomernre. "Goa oa en Sugpose tbe jadgmen was bused onan assessment of overt trends win the ary. Te deena tat uterunce ed ssrbutvely the pater doet not have uy para ejecta ‘lads he sean bout whoever bape fo Become le ca ‘int in 196 Icon, suport oe er saan with i's ade ss bea piven tang orca Sen amar os et Ei We mat op peso st arya. ‘Seas dor se 0 The detrinion here ed fee The speaker bus ae tin bet nid ony, Joes. Now fake at wi beng extn tia of “ovo use of eerie tht hea to deat com ina! se of deseo. at 5, fat of eonaerble ‘ani siieance. In my view Donselan bas aot etblshed thal there are hee two covenos, the has mae i sce inutvlplasbl hat here ae. Tala ter hat there ze the two conenion (27, Meanie shal sinless {hs Donnetan sig (On tis asumptn, heres convention owe description “refer. How col thre be? Suppose, the ae tt esele, tat ones ot murder mh, According to Bowe nel thes everest" ta og ob pk uty te ‘diese (19630 nam, lones, andthe eer “fered {otha ig wih 'Smi'serdere How oud operon manage oferta objet niga esepon tht does ot even ani Lo elm aay ni How ol hare it cb a88 Causal Theory of Designation (1) 1 have eater given causal explanation of having an objet in mind in ing uname (2), This point fo what we need #89 het, It was because of ou experiences of Jones during hs ial and our belles about him that we used Sit's murderer in that bterance, Similarly, i was because of my experiences of Nana tnd my beifs about Ber that I sed ‘our eatin those eer remarks aimed at pasing on ber name, (i) and) In sense, the object del leads us to use the definite description in such cases. {shall mark thee similares Between descriptions used in this way and aames by extending my terminology to them. 1 hall ny that such a ten description designates te objet 10 ‘which seal inked inthe appropriate way, and that wr deriving it ina dchain grounded inthe object. ‘There canbe a causal ink of he required kind even though © speaker has had no dieect experience ofthe object it will be 8 (Echain runing though overs back to speakers who Gi expe Fience the object, Ths, someone who has beard about our cat from me, but Bas never met he, cam have here in mind and des- ignate ber by ‘the Devt cat, And we can al designate Aistoie ‘bythe philosopher who taught Alexander the Great, One can borrow the ability to designate in using a description just as one can in using name, ‘So far [have said next to noting about the nature ofthe d- chain which makes the referential use ofa description possible. Rather, have relied on the very abvius ference between the causal explanations of referential and atibulive ues ia potc- ‘lar-on the vey obvious ference inthe cnsa role fhe cet ‘deactbed. Jones clearly had role in bringing about the use of “Smith's murderer’ which Goldwater didnot have i tings boul the une of ‘The Republican candidal or president in 1964 nthe Inter case there wat no causal ink between the speaker tnd Goldwater in vir of which th peak tered what be i Refinements in this account wilson be elle fr. Cause! Theory of Designation (1) 98 Donnallan emphasizes that the description in a sentence can jonone occasion be used atributivelyand on another referently Uhaveiutraeda referential us in'Seth's murderers insane [Now consider the following situation ‘ee come upon por St fly murdered. Fram the brutal manner of Che tig and the fc that Sout wat the mont lovable peron fn he ‘ov, we might excl, "Shy murderer ieane" aunt ha. ed ntknow who murdered Sih (Dornea 196829, ‘The use ofthe detripton i ttibutive. We donot have, nos in ‘he cieumstances could we have, anyone particular ia mid. Yet lest there i causal link between the murderer ands (ia the coms eof whch weed he desertion St ‘What itnguohes te casa linkin this ase from the ener links is that it doesnot involve experience of he object. Before, ‘wehad actually seen Jones athis til: andit wat my acquaintance ‘wit Nana that edt my use oor cat" Now, however we may sever have seen the murderer. Or, fe have seeing him could ot Tend sto use that description: we do nt associate the person we sa withthe nudes 1s fr these reason tha the causal link tothe murderer in his ease i nt a chin, ‘The chain tht enable 2 speaker to have an object in mind in using description stats with the perception ofthe object. (he speaker need not have perceived the object himself of ‘ours. Those who have perceived it can pass on the ability to ‘others Its indeed appropriate enough that having am objet i mind soald be based on perception ot ‘There are elements of vagueness about perceiving an obec. ‘The clear-cut cases are those of “face to-face™ perception ofthe ‘objet These ace alo the cases which yield paradigms of having the object in mind. Consider a cae at the other extreme. Suppose ‘that, a the tine we come upon Smith fully murdered, we barely40 Cause Theor of Designation (1) notice movement inthe distance which we rely tke o be the ‘murderer fleeing. Do we perceive the murderer? 1 shall et at- tempt to answer tis question. However, shall sy that we could ‘ot, on the srength ofthis perception, have the murderer in mind ‘in using “Smiths murderer something close to “acesoace” ‘perception i required for a grounding, (See aso 21D and 5.7 on ‘Bounding perceptions.) T shall fay more about chains fr descriptions, lating ther to dchais for sames (and oter tems Soon 0 be eiscussed), in Tater sections, particularly in 5.1033, ‘Donoellan seems to bave detected, athe level of native se: smantes, a diffrence in meaning or function. We mark the re- ferential use with an ortinary expression like “having an objet in mind” and the atribuive with an ordcary expresion lke “whatever ite. Assuming (forthe moment) thatthe distinction {a good one, Lam claiming hat the referential use of eseriptions ia made possible by d-chains. 1 i ia viue of adc linking ‘person to an object that be can use it having tht object in ming ‘Thus, the causal theory goes Long way toward expaning Dow elias estinetion Forme, unlike Donnellan, ‘refs is a geet tron (1.3). Dom selan’s distinction i best captured in my terminology by te- pei his term referent” by “designation. have poined out earier that definite description may be used at naming ceremony to pick out the object tobe named. (2.2), Sothe connection between a name token ands object may be mediated bya desertion, Clely if that connection ist be ‘dshain that description must te adesigational one; oly such 8 description can be grounded in the objet. And what we find ina normal naming ceremony is that any mediating desripion is desigaatonal ‘Abnormal naming ceremonies are possible, however. An ex- ample would be the introduction of the nace “ack the Ripper for whoever commited that famous series of London murders, Causal Theory of Designation (1) 44 Wecaninecamreeten tmp, “Lats cl hehe [itis sr omar inuse ernest te of ctve cpt lel ceases Bete to dataport Saeste ton! oes Giemsa estonia tiny Shaner tat cfg toe oy Abe baa tly pound nh seca ie des nhl st Oy ae Drs teas tes rd del fat he tte uz eros ter Sch nse re ech in eng eens wich min er aces Horr des gto a ener rom in wong fi oy an. pan Ste i tec anes ht to pao ‘ete dalton, We hve weno a talk no aay asl nut een een he tanned wy ane aes ne Peon pro ees dopey nes Tesh Isutrblvenunesaswuasedvinan deus uote isms many fon ho no ty ae thst ned, ul haueh wt hyo teodyao ig etna etn eee aa, Grate nasi Tine beet Del inna dtcton be twtr te sr of ane However dae oh {tern in hn Docs i ea ape, rors carn Brin’ tone Parlay at sacs eps ems he ti ne gut, he atte sae Rene tv my te dnp! noe nue Domes dnn btn of te eps iit diction tween sm pes Le ey inden wpe al a an ak of pen42, Ceusl Theory of Designation (1) svg pen i rae gt tai ed ao aa ae par ed Sao A rican ae Sime iA re i nr do Jn wif eae Se rere Fea A gee da ae ts I cr a i trace art Sate Sn ontad late ie e a Step tac rie ee alah et Done ce er act nme Sn mao Ba Hoe tnt ey cere ean ene a ont ote poe sae St rcs waa ttl ats cp an ro nee ce cc a a ce estan em anni ce 28 Damonsvatves We sex onside sin sing donne an ons Rasen demensratver orem, Ea Seat : a ae arava raed xt ihe Nn” ee ro arabjec, when ae x "eei,” itches that here some Causal Theory of Designation (1) 4% ‘aut ink between the speaker andthe abject in vinwe of which the uses the demonstrative. He is perceing the object spacing iia the ease of) or has recently perceived it ‘aus ation of he objec on im tha le hie in pat) ‘he did, Because ofthis we can truly sy that he had that object ‘in mind in using the demonstrative. Ths, at our earer naming ‘eeremany 2.2), ny wife had Nana in mind in usag "he hat itwas the caval action of Na on my wife ha (partly) ed her to-ue the pronoun. Onze agua I extend my terminlogy to mark similarities, sal ay tat sucka demonstrative token designaes fs object Decaue it causally Baked (othe abject Dy a ach ‘rounded init In derigrational demonstrative token. Commonly the deictic demonstrative wil be acompanied by a pointing gesture of hand or eye tovard the object. On its ov {his gesture would often be isuficient to identify the referent ‘What determines that one aspect and not another ofthe vaguely indicated environment is refered tis thatthe speaker bad tht. ‘sapect in mind. We lok to what played certaln ausal role in the bekavior in order to remove ambigutes. Sometimes no ge tare is elle for—it fe not with ‘T'—and other times, none is ‘ven, Again we look to the case ofthe wterace (o determine the reference. ‘When a demonstrative it not used “out of the blue.” the speaker may not hive a paricular object im mind, And dem nsrtve is ften not used deicically:t "may depend fri referecce upon determinants in antecedent verbiage” (Quine 1960.13) itis a way 0 crovsefer, it may be “anaphoric.” In fc tte the demonstrative borrows charctristis fom the fing erm on Which depends. 1 tat singular tem is inked tan object by a d-chain eo tha the speaker had that obec is snd and designate then so als isthe demonsrative, In, then the demonstrative is not, Ifthe tem is dependent on an er deignaonal demonsrave, ora designational ae, or Vanaionl description, then it wil bes inked (unless they‘44. Cousal Theory of Designation () are empty), It wil bea designeional demonstrative. Ion the ter hand, itis dependent ona tirbutive name or desertion, then it wil not be linked wil be an aributve demonstrative For example, both the defite description and the pronoun dex ignute an object the rt ofthe folowing sentences and denote one in the second (Our catis hungry becaute she has’ eaten for several hou ‘The henviest ih nthe te snot a shark cris it whale. Note that the desimationalatinbutve distinction does not cover pronouns that depend for their reference on indefinite it~ {lr ferme; these are ike variable bat wil ot be cussed bere ‘except briefly im 104 and 105, ‘have extended my distinction atten level. based on Doo- relian's type level, to simple demonstraivs. However, Dor teln's distinction irl eannot be ao extended. Note that the Shaptorie or erose referential uses of «demonstrative may yield ther desinational or stributive tokens ignoring thos ike var lables. Further, the dectic ones yield only devigmational tokens. ‘Our move to the level of tokens has pido in greater generality for Doenllan’s insight. This becomes more srking when We 86 that his distinction al fype level does at eves apply to al uses of descriptions. 1 wl help to bring this out if we fst extend our trentment to conplex deminsiratives, Consider that book’ It canbe sed to Alexignate a book in font ofthe speaker, I can be used ross: referential, borrowing is referential properties from en eater Gesignatione of atibutve tern. The designationaletrbuive distinction applies to the suing tokens. Definite deveriplons, like demonstrative, can be usedto cress refer, Thus the book’, ike "that book’, might be used to reer toa book described in more deal by an attibuive or designe tional description in the antecedent verbiage. What I uid sbove for erosereerential demonstatives applies as wel to erste Causal Theory of Designation (1) 45 ferential descriptions. Donnelon’s dtnctin covers only the eicic ues of éeserrion. Croseeference is a familar enovgh example of the way in Which one token can depend forts reference om another. What 1am urging in my theory of referee borrowing it that an anal ‘ogous typeof dependency isthe fot of most singulatterm tokens Indeed, the only ference between reference borowig and the fanaa crosereterence is relatively trivial one terms typically cxossrefer to ones of diferent type that “convey more for. ‘ation terms typiealy borrow ther reference frm one of the same type “conveying just the same ifermation.” Where there is crosereerence there is a eavsal network, though usualy & short one In sum, my sand on Donoelan’s distinction and related di ‘ction is as Fiows (stil ignoring ll terms like variable). Don rellans distinction is between two dectic uses of deveiptins, one yielngdesgational tokens and the ocher rbutve ones, ‘There is also an anaphoric use of descriptions, Demonstrates, ‘ave an anaphoric use but only one deieic ur, yielding deig- ‘ational tokens; 10 Docnellan's distinction cannot be extended to demonstrates. Antphoric wes of descriptions and demon fratves may yiel ether desigrational or attrbutive tokens, ‘Names are basically anaphoric reference borrowing is ofthe e35- ence of their role. We distinguish name typet according to ‘whether they are linked ultimately to ther objects by desizna ‘ional or atribuive means. The tvo sorts of ame types yield {vo sorts af tokens, designationl and atibutive, So mp atne- tion at token level, bated on Donnelon’s at ype level, applies erate bord al fear term tole (rep ‘aribles) ‘My aim inthis book isto describe che relationship berween @ token and an object in virtue of which the tolen designates that ‘object, and to argue forthe temantie significance of tha ele Monch. hal set aide matters that are ielevan otha al,a 48. Cousel Theory of Designation (1) ‘Tous, whereas the dinlaction between atsbutive and designs ‘onl token is important forme, the nature ofthe ink between stibtive tokens nd the world is nt ‘Finally, as preparation for the argument about semantic ss rifeance in the next section, consider the following question How would we give the meaning, tbe conventional mening, of the vemandc type "that book"? I will simplify our discussion tithout cost we lore azaphoric uses. Making use of ours Tnunce terminology, 1 ses. as answer alog the nes of "a ‘exigaated book.” “WE ould tret simple demonstrative in asia way, The core of thei conventional meaning isa desiontd object." Tait tases the suances of meaning that distinguish the simple dem naelives from euch oter. For my popones we can mostly ig+ tore these, However, it wil help to tice the diflerence between the soup ‘ths, "the and "i and the group ‘he and ‘se "A designated obeet” near enough exhmusts the meaning of the ‘members of the fist group bat we capare the members of tbe teond group beter wth" desiaated male” and “a designated fenele,” eapectively, So the ater havea descriptive content” that book bas, albeit a more general one. And it would ela accord with our wage to ey fr example, that" apelier in this ection and the preceding one Ihave adopted Donne: s ditinction and developed it in two ways. Fist, 1 fave de Tired from i «dtineton for tokens and then applied tat di Tieton across the board to all singular terms. Second TBa¥E ‘ered a causal theory to explain the designations! sie ofthese inintons.” [shall now argue fr she distinctions and cheit signcance. £27 The Semantie Signifeance of Donnaitn's Distinction We have already found some semantic tgniance inthe tuncton have derived from Donnelan’s, We ned to expla bow Cousal Theory of Designation (1) &7 emonsrasive tokens ar liked to their objects. In some cases they are linked via definte description to objects denoted (he tect s denoted by the demonsative because the description ton which he damonsraive depends apis to that object ony) Ta ome other eases, the dice ones, they are ot so linked. 1 ave explained the diferens lnk in the latter cases in tems of éehnins, The distinction between atiebutive and designationst fokens is significant fora least these two groups of demonsira- tiver i distinguishes demonsintves according to the way ‘which theireferens are determined. This significance mus ary ‘overto some ne tokens, for aames ca belinked other objects Invnmue of dete demonrrauves designating those object et in vine of descriptions denctieg them ‘What as notteenenalished ithe sgiiance of Donnellan's istinton for deserptions a ype level and hence mine for de: ferptons (2d dependent demonsatives and names) at token level" The isue is whether of not there are two conventions ses of desriptont. A renton for doubting tbat there aze two is that one aces to be enough. It sems that 2 description ‘pplily applies to one and only one objet, thereby denoting it. ‘Wecan rely on denoation to identify the object we wish to sty something about Why suppote tat there is another use relying ‘on designation? ‘so far, we have two reasons for supposing that there is this cher conventional oe. First, Donnllan'sdiscasion of various tases of eonfision and mistake makes it plausible o think that, ‘her a. Homever, perhaps the phenomena be points to can be tbervise explained.” Perhaps he has discovered some sort of ‘dtinton Buti sot one between two conventional uses of Aescripions, Second, I have shown how another use of a e+ ‘expo is posible. Is possible because it can depend on des: igzation, a elatoneip that Hinks descriptions to objets by &- | Ghane Tiss fa from conelusve as reason, ofcourse, because ‘oes not show tha thre i an actual convention relying on his teltonsip of desigation in using descriptions. It doesnt show48. Causel Theory of Designation (1) ‘that this telationsip bas any bearing onthe tith condions of sentences containing descriptions. (Q) Donnellan often seoms™ 1 eake claims which, if re, would got lng way toward establishing that he bas dicovered Trother use of deterpions and hence a disinction of semantic enileanee, These chims concern te rok of dxinational de- Serptions and, rented to tis and more import), the ith ‘condons of sentences containing one ording to Donnell, 2 dsigstional description “refers” tothe object he speaker ad in mind even when it doe not dente thar object Pure, the sentence confining the description is trucor fase sccordng to whether the prediat int does or does fot apply to that objet which the speaker had in mind (6.8 Donnellan 1966298)" In all Donoellan’s examples the desig- ‘atonal detription does not denote anything; 9 he choice is ‘etween reference to wha the speaker had in mind aed reference failure, Donelian plumps for te former. He doesnot dieass ny example where the speaker has one object i mind ut cho ‘eacrpion be uses denotes another, However, the implication ‘fis discussion is clea: in auch case the description refers to the rt objest ad he rah value ofthe sentence depends cits ‘raters (1956501 prtculrly the sentence “It doesnot ‘rater here whether o othe Wowaa bs a usband or whether, iF she docs, Jone is her asband” (oy ena. Doonelan’s claims ae oo tong. FUs, ny of his remarks using the term refer’ seem to presuppose tha there exis, pret toretially, a clout notion picked ou by thi term which is ‘ur wsk in seman to investigate 4, 966299." Thi i ot So (et .3 and 4). This term in plospy i gly trm of tr, gaining is reanings fom is use in semantic theories, This tede of Donellan's use, sities of mine, The pretheoreticl (ordinay") oe ofthe ter i 0 lose that seas adaptable toa varety of uch meanings. Donaelan’s claims about “rel ‘rence become substantia rather than merely verbal, only tnhen we se thelr bearing on his laims about rth [Causal Theory of Designation (1) 49 ‘Suppose that Iwas under the misapprehension that Nana wat ‘ur neighbor's cat which we were looking after for a while; my Wife hd told me tis tory inorder to get Nona into the Bouse ‘The day after her arial, she disappears. Talking abou this ater in the day, I say, “Our neighbors cat has disappeared.” Now, infact, our seighbor has at, Jena, whom have never a ‘nor heard of ac who is safely at home.-Did our neighbor's eat refer to Nana or Jemima? My cla shat, taken on its own his isa purely vera question. Cleary, my description i inked to both cats, though the inks ae of a different kind, Ihave marked this diference by saying that I “designated” Nana but "de- ‘noted Jemima, Others might choose diferent terms. What we hee sof no itrest uml we see what follows within the seman theory from saying it. ‘This brings us to the second point, Donnelian wou! say (it seems) that [refered to Nana and, hence, that what I sid was true. We are here faced witha substantial question waich Don- lln gives a spe swe, 1 think that the correct answer is {arfrom single. When we atend to thelink to Nana we ae indeed incined to say thatthe sentence is rue, bu when we atend to the diferent Unk to Jemima we are inctined to say it is false. Considering the whole picture, we don't know what say. So ‘uch for our pretheoretcal intuitions about “rue To advance further we ned a semantic eo; we ned to bring out he place of designation und enotation in explaining descriptions in par- ticular and language in genera Tf Domelian's discussion established his claims about truth ‘values, then it would be fay decisive evidence that he had ds- covered a distntion of semante sigiicance. But he discussion oes no, This is nto say at the discussion does not give some support for the hypothesis that there are two coxvenonal ues of deseapions. We need to explain ou ination that Nan bas somethig todo with he uth valve of “Our neighbor's eat has lxappeared," with tx result thatthe sentence does not s2em simply fale (ough we have found no basis for Doasela’s View