Sri Lanka's choices: positive accommodation or partition of the

island?

Respecting the history, culture and needs of the Tamils will bring about some healing

Dr. A.R.M. Imtiyaz

Sri Lanka's ethnic civil war involving the two major ethnic groups, or for that matter the two
nations - Tamil and Sinhala, seems to be moving toward an imbalanced politico-military
conclusion, favoring the government led by Mahinda Rajapakse who came to power in 2005 by
effectively employing anti-Tamil and anti-peace slogans.

Some expect this to be the end of the Tamils' quest for justice, and thus the Tamils need to (1)
accept the generosity of the Sinhala south or the Sinhala political leadership for their political
and social survival, in other words, some sort of political surrender to the Sinhala nation, or
(2) radically re-visit its past, in order to form a new Tamil movement. This article gives some
thoughts on these two scenarios to understand the Tamil question.

The first advice about the surrender may not be helpful nor would it not simply serve the
interests of the rebelling Tamils. One key reason is that the ethnic identities are filled with
some powerful symbols such as flag, national anthem, history of group, myth of motherland
and fatherland. These symbols often give group-pride, and thus dangerously motivate
oppressed groups to stand against the oppressive forces. The identities associated with the
Tamils are emotional in nature and they are regularly being employed both by the Tamil
moderates and militant Tamil nationalists in their quest for justice.

Defeat

Sri Lanka's Sinhala forces may defeat the Tamil Tigers who are the by-product of the anti-
Tamil policies of the successive Sinhala political class to win the Sinhalese vote since
independence. But this would not in any way convince the Tamils to seek a generosity from
the ruling Sinhala political class led by Mahinda Rajapakse who conscientiously use the
Sinhalese symbols to execute the war and to consolidate his power among the South
Sinhalese.

It is, therefore, politically nave to expect or demand the Tamil nation to surrender their
struggle for justice and equity, expecting generosity from the Sinhala political leadership, and
to tell the truth, they will not do it.

The Tamil resistance will survive even without the Tamil Tigers for two reasons: First, Sinhala
polity's excessive reliance on ethnic symbols such as a violent Lion flag, national anthem,
history of mythical Vijaya and myth of motherland to influence the Sinhala masses to win and
hold power. These symbols are violent in nature and illiberal in its goals, that is to say the goal
of the Sinhalese symbols is to transform the island in to a highly theocratic state with Sinhala
democracy, otherwise called as Dharmacracy, and second, the Sinhala polity's pure disinterest
to treat the minorities, particularly the Tamils humanely.

Self determination

In other words, in a way the Tamils can exercise internal self determination; if I put it in pure
political science language, power-sharing and group autonomy. Such political mechanism
denotes the participation of representatives of all significant ethnic groups in political decision
making at the center, while allowing ethnic groups to run their own internal affairs in their
traditional homeland.

The advice two recommends stringent reform to accommodate new strategies and to absorb
more politics to weaken the militarised Tamil resistance movement. Ethnic movements
progress when there is willingness to understand a new politico-social reality, and to adopt
progressive ideas and strategies. Therefore, the doors to changes need to be opened widely
and meaningfully to adopt a new thinking and strategies to pursue the major goals.

To make this possible, the Tamil resistance movement needs some gutsy leaders who can
fearlessly demand the Tamil demand. It would not bring any productive changes within the
movement nor would it effectively pressure the Sinhala polity to reform the state structure, in
order to offer an irrevocable political solution to the Tamil ethnic question if it is led by wrong
and weak leaders.

Daunting task

This is, in fact, a daunting task. If reformists who expect mercy from the Sinhala political
leadership, in plain words, some Tamil quislings occupy the leadership of the future Tamil
reform movement, I assume it would be politically disastrous for the oppressed Tamils,
because they would not resist the Sinhala brutality or demand a political solution of power-
sharing democracy, above and beyond; they simply aspire perks and privileges for them and
to their friends and would paint a rosy picture about the Sinhala polity and its ruling class. Will
these acts satisfy the Tamils, particularly the conscious Tamils?

The point is that any new experiments on reforming the Tamil movement would go wrong
when new policies or new leadership points towards a negative political accommodation with
the Sinhala polity, in other words, a sort of political policy to take, without any questions, what
the Sinhala polity offers. Such a Tamil reform movement may not calm the powerful Tamil
symbols nor can it give effective leadership to the Tamil resistance.

The biggest challenge for the Tamil reformists is to win positive political accommodation from
the Sinhala polity. If the Sinhala polity and politicians stand for serious and sincere willingness
to accommodate the needs and aspirations of the Tamil nation, and they translate them into
specific actions through reforming the current unitary state structure, which is one of the key
political symbols of the Sinhalese, in that case, a kind of progressive cohabitation among the
minorities, particularly between the Tamil and Sinhala nations is possible.

This is politically beautiful because polity offers a progressive accommodation. However, this
sort of political accommodation is likely only in societies where political class can formulate
policies beyond the irrational symbols. In other words, Sinhala polity should reflect liberal
values, and its institutions such as defense, justice, parliament, media and police should
support and execute non-racial policies.

Reject
Theoretically speaking, if states are not liberal by their ideology, if they are not economically
secure and politically established democracies, they tend to reject the option of
accommodation to the demands of ethnic groups. Sri Lanka, indeed, cannot be cited as an
example of accommodative democratic societies because its policies and ideologies are
primarily pro-Sinhalese, and thus they are not winning the minorities.

No evidence supports that the Sinhala polity would make the life of the future Tamil reform
movement very easy. The precise prescription for the collapse of the future Tamil reform
movement is the Sinhala hostility against a political solution that aims to go beyond the
unitary state structure. The Tamil leadership, whether it is moderate or extremist, needs to
focus on basic Tamil demands such as genuine political autonomy. They would not win credible
Tamil sympathy either at home or among the Diaspora when they prepare to depend on the
generosity of the Sinhala political leadership.

When the Tamil reformists choose negative accommodation with the Sinhala political
leadership, one consequence may be to witness the re-growth of Tamil radicalism. The one
form of Tamil radicalism, led by the Tamil Tigers, may be defeated, but as long as the Tamil
polity is led by some quislings who behave like the political prisoners of the Sinhala polity, and
there is the Sinhala polity that continues to refuse justice and political equity to the Tamil
nation, it is plainly nave to assume that the future belongs to the quislings.

The Sinhala polity still can effectively deny the reasons for the Tamil militancy, if it embraces
some meaningful interests and genuine commitments to seek political reform aimed at
providing a substantial political autonomy at the regional level and power-sharing at the
center with moderate leaders.

Hostilities

The demand for separation becomes strong when a power-sharing arrangement is not
possible. That is to say, if the Sinhala polity is not interested in power-sharing, partition, as an
alternative, should not be discarded. Some fear that partition will further strengthen the ethnic
hostilities between the two nations, but even if it provokes a period of violence, it would offer
the separated ethnic groups much-needed stability and security in the future.

In other words, partition can reduce the ethnic fear and offers social and political security, as
well as stability, to the different ethnic groups. The separation of Pakistan from India, Eritrea
from Ethiopia, Bangladesh from West Pakistan, and Greeks from Turks on Cyprus all
demonstrate that partition can be helpful, even if it is not completely successful in terminating
violence.

The world recognises that if the people of deeply divided ethnic nations do not want to co-
habit in the same polity, then partition should not be automatically neglected as a solution.
This might be one way to manage the Tamils' demands for political space since 1977 and to
neutralise the pro-Sinhala agendas of the Sinhala political establishment that explicitly risk the
existence of the minorities.