US Supreme Court in US vs. Minker, 350 US 179 at page 187:
"But the subpoena is in form an official command, and even
though improvidently issued it has some coercive tendency,
either because of ignorance of their rights on the part of those
whom it purports to command or their natural respect for what
appears to be an official command, or because of their
reluctance to test the subpoena's validity by litigation."

US v. Tallmadge 829 F2d 767: "... One who relies on a legal
interpretation by a government official assumes the risk that it is
in error... it has also been held or said that `the government
could scarcely function if it were bound by its employees
unauthorized representations'" Goldberg v. Weinberger, 546 F2d

Caterpillar Tractor Company v. US, 589 F2d 1040 (also see
GEHL Co. v. C.I.R. 795 F2d 1324): "Informal publications of
IRS all the way up to revenue rulings are simply guides to
taxpayers and taxpayer relies on them at his peril."

Merril, 332 US 380 (1947): "... Anyone entering into an
arrangement with the government takes the risk of having
accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the
government stays within the bounds of his authority ... and this
is so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been
unaware of the limitations upon his authority."

Fields v. US, 27 App DC 433: Words like "may," "must,"
"shall," etc., are constantly used in statutes without intending
that they be taken literally.

Fort Howard Paper v. Fox River Dist. 26 NW2nd 661: The word "shall" in a statute may be construed to mean "may", particularly in order to avoid a constitutional doubt.

Gow v. Consolidated Copper, 165 Atl. 136: If necessary, to avoid
unconstitutionality of a statute, "shall" will be deemed
equivalent to "may".

George Williams College v. Village of Williams Bay, 7 NW2nd 891: "Shall" in any statute may be construed to mean "may" in order to avoid constitutional doubt.

US Supreme Court, Cairo and Fulton RR Co. v. Hecht, 95 US 170: As against the government, the word "shall" when used in statutes is to be construed as "may," unless a contrary intention is manifest