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Briefing Paper
Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Principles, Power, and Perceptions
Afghanistan: Humanitarianism under Threat
By Antonio Donini
 
M 2009
Introduction
S
ince our case study on local perceptions o humanitarian action in Aghanistan wasissued in June 2006,
2
the situation in Aghanistan has deteriorated considerably, bothor ordinary Aghans and or aid agencies attempting to bring assistance and protectionto those aected by crisis and conict.
Senior Researcher, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Please sendcomments to antonio.donini@tufts.edu.
Antonio Donini, “Humanitarian Agenda 05: Principles, Power, and Perceptions.Afghanistan Case Study,” Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, available at
http://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/conuence/display/FIC/Humanitarian+Agenda+2015
 
--Afghanistan+Country+Study.
The Feinstein International Center
 develops and promotes operationaland policy responses to protect andstrengthen the lives and livelihoodsof people living in crisis-affected and-marginalized communities. The Centerworks globally in partnership withnational and international organizationsto bring about institutional changesthat enhance effective policy reform andpromote best practice.This report is available online at
c.tufts.ed
u.
Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in crisis through knowledge and practice
Darulaman palace, Kabul, January 2009. Photo by A. Donini.
 
“Afghanistan: Humanitarianism Under Threat” by A. Donini, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University
Tis brieng paper provides an update on the humanitarianchallenges and opportunities in Aghanistan. It is based on some60 interviews with Aghan and international aid workers, as wellas with senior Aghan government ocials, bilateral donors,and observers and analysts unrelated to the aid enterprise. Teseinterviews were conducted in Kabul in August 2008 and January 2009. In order to gain a wider perspective on perceptions o the evolving situation, ve ocus groups were also held in theShomali plain (north o Kabul) and in Jalalabad with a selectiono local beneciaries o assistance projects, returnees, andconict-aected displaced persons. Te purpose o this paperis to highlight, working rom the data collected on the ground,critical issues aecting the provision o humanitarian action andto suggest how they could, partially at least, be redressed.Humanitarianism is under deep threat in Aghanistan.Humanitarian actors and the principles they proess are underattack. Te ability o humanitarian agencies to address urgentneed is compromised by internal and external actors, i.e., bothby the organization and modus operandi o aid agencies on theground, and by an extremely volatile and dangerous operatingenvironment.Te UN is, and is seen as, aligned with the US-led coalition in-tervention. Its humanitarian capacity is weak and urther dimin-ished by its incorporation, until very recently, into an essentially political, integrated mission. Te separate OCHA (Oce or theCoordination o Humanitarian Aairs) oce that had existedsince 1988 was disbanded when the integrated mission waslaunched in 2002. A humanitarian unit was only re-establishedwithin the United Nations Mission in Aghanistan (UNAMA) in2007.
Tis arrangement was seen as unsatisactory, especially by international NGOs who, as the crisis deepened, advocated re-peatedly or the creation o a separate OCHA oce,
a move thatthe Special Representative o the UN Secretary-General (SRSG)and the UN headquarters political departments opposed, butthat OCHA headquarters and the Emergency Relie Coordinator(ERC) supported. While it has recently been decided (December2008) to separate the humanitarian coordination unction outo the mission through the establishment o a separate OCHAoce, the problem o perception o alignment and inadequateUN humanitarian capacity remains. Te lack o humanitariancapacity and resources is broader than just OCHA’s coordina-tion unctions: there is no common inormation collection andanalysis system, nor an adequate humanitarian logistics capacity,common services or customs and tax agreements, joint convoys,coordinated air services, and the like.Te majority o NGOs do not are much better. Many work asimplementing partners or government programs or, even i they do not, are seen as part o the international enterprise that supports
Thanks to a contribution from Norway, one of the few donors torecognize the need for a humanitarian capacity within UNAMA.
Through a formal letter to the DRSG/RC/HC in March 008 and
subsequently in various demarches, both at UN HQ and in the eld.
the government. Unlike other conict situations, there are ewNGOs in Aghanistan with humanitarian track records or speci-cally humanitarian mandates. Most, i not all, NGOs are multi-mandate organizations ocused principally on reconstruction,development, and advocacy or solidarity issues. Some engage inhumanitarian activities as part o their varied portolios. A ew o these have dedicated humanitarian sta that ably engage on issueso principle or humanitarian advocacy. Nevertheless, the absenceo a critical mass o principled “Dunantist” humanitarian playersaects the quality o the debate around humanitarian issues andthe ability to address these issues on the ground. Te deense andpromotion o humanitarian principles is lef to the InternationalCommittee o the Red Cross (ICRC), the only international or-ganization able to work neutrally, impartially, and independently on both sides o the conict, although its ability to interact andnegotiate access with the aliban and other insurgent groups isimpaired by the volatility o the situation and uncertainties aboutthe representativeness o local interlocutors on the ground.Donors, all o whom are also belligerents, with the exceptiono Switzerland, are either unwilling or unable to recognize theneed or a humanitarian response and to mobilize the necessary resources. ECHO (the European Commission HumanitarianAid Department) and Norway stand out as donors supportiveo principled humanitarian approaches. Te programs o mostother donors are driven by political and security agendas andbased, in the main, on the increasingly erroneous assumptionthat Aghanistan is a post-conict country. Te pressure romdonors on “their” NGOs to work with and around their country’sProvincial Reconstruction eams (PRs) is particularly troubling.Te pursuit o “joined-up” or “comprehensive” approaches, inwhich assistance, including humanitarian assistance, is unc-tionally linked to political and military agendas, is seen by many observers as a dangerous blurring o lines, in addition to clashingwith the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles to whichdonors have subscribed.Tere is no humanitarian consensus in Aghanistan and very little humanitarian space. Both have been trampled by politicalexpediency and by the disregard by all parties to the conict orthe plight o civilians. Civilians are dying because o conict andinsecurity. According to UNAMA, there has been a 0% increaseo civilian casualties in 2008. Te human security o ordinary Aghans is rapidly deteriorating because o the combination o conict, appalling levels o poverty, ood shortages, dicultieso access, and the accumulated consequences o three decades o war. Conict-related displacement is a seriously under-addressedissue. Estimates o the numbers o displaced vary, but there isagreement among aid workers that they are on the rise and thatthe international community is not doing enough, even in placeslike Kabul, where access is possible.Aid agency sta are being increasingly targeted by the alibanand other insurgents or their perceived instrumentalization by,and support o, alien political agendas. Access and operationalspace are almost nonexistent in the south, south-east, and partso the west o the country. Large swathes o the country are no-
 
“Afghanistan: Humanitarianism Under Threat” by A. Donini, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University
go areas to the extent that it is now impossible even to have aclear picture o the humanitarian situation on the ground. Tecombined eects o conict, drought, increased ood prices, anda long history o recurring disasters are thought to be severe inparts o the country, but the actual depth and breadth o the crisisare as yet unknown.Tus, the aid community in Aghanistan aces severe challengesthat need to be urgently addressed so that civilians in need can beprotected and assisted and the credibility o the humanitarian en-terprise restored. Failure to do so will have dire consequencesor Aghans and or the uture o humanitarianism worldwide.Tese challenges arise rom a complex mix o causes relating tothe nature o the war, the set-up o the international community and its objectives in Aghanistan, the ailure o the externally-directed state-building project, and the conditions o structuralunderdevelopment pertaining in Aghanistan, which has beenmade worse by thirty years o unending war and oreign occupa-tion and manipulation.Te environment in which aid actors operate is largely theresult o decisions taken by the international community in theafermath o 9/11 and the subsequent collapse o the alibanregime. Among the actors that contributed to the re-emergenceo the aliban and other insurgent groups, three stand out, in the view o many local and international observers:Te act that the Bonn agreement was not a peace accord butan agreement among victors;Te return o rapacious and despised warlords as instrumentso the US-led intervention;Te ailure to address the issues o impunity and account-ability or the massive human rights violations o the past.From a humanitarian perspective, perhaps the single mostserious “sin” is to be ound in the way in which donors and the aidcommunity dened the Aghan situation in the afermath o 9/11.All players willingly accepted the notion that Aghanistan was ina post-conict situation, and that thereore the role o externalactors, including NGOs, was to support the government. As aresult, the existing capacity or addressing humanitarian needthat had been built up since the late 1980s and had successully weathered the aliban years (1996-2001), when it represented theonly visible orm o the international community’s engagementin Aghanistan, was dismantled under the allacious assumptionthat it was no longer needed.While much denial still prevails in the ortied compoundso Kabul’s “green zone,” where donor and UN bureaucracies livein a kind o virtual Aghanistan, the seriousness o the situationis plain to see or anyone who ventures outside the wire or theblast walls and interacts with ordinary Aghans. Hopelessnessand disenchantment, i not rising anger, are everywhere. Tegovernment and its police, in particular, are universally seen•••as corrupt; both are increasingly reviled. Te tide is turningagainst the oreign militaries, largely because o poorly targetedbombing raids and heavy-handed searches o civilian houses that violate custom and culture, as well as or their support or powerholders with inamous human rights track records. Tere is asense that the regime itsel is becoming more authoritarian, withrequent crackdowns on the independent media and civil society organizations. Abuse o power is seen to be rie. Te judiciary isin shambles. Te death penalty is being used as a tool to appeasepublic opinion and more conservative elements in society.Criminality is on the rise and sometimes linked to organs o the state. Middle-class Aghans, and their children, seem to beparticularly at risk o kidnappings or ransom. As a result, many businesses are shutting down and those who can are moving toDubai.
“I have to lock my children inside the house when I leave. It is too dangerous or them to go out to play.” - Senior Aghan NGO proessional 
Te remit o the insurgency has rapidly expanded in 2008, withorms o aliban counter-power emerging in areas where they hold sway. Tey provide rudimentary justice and police services.Tere are reports that criminality has all but disappeared in someo the areas controlled by the insurgents. Tis does not meanthat the aliban are welcome—ew Aghans are keen to see thereturn o their brutish regime. Rather, it is an indictment o theexternally-supported state-building project which has ailed toprovide physical and human security on the ground.Te current situation in many ways resembles that o theSoviet occupation. Te government and its allies control themain towns and parts o the north and center o the country,but are unable to maintain a stable presence in much o the rest.Te strategically crucial Kabul to Herat ring road is unsae. Kabulitsel has a nervous and edgy eel: it has come under rocket attack and anti-government elements are only a ew miles away andhave shown that they can strike with deadly suicide bombingswithin the city itsel. Te dierences, o course, are that, unlikeSoviet times, aid agencies—with the partial exception o theICRC—are unable to work on both sides o the conict and thatdonors are supporting the outside military intervention, ratherthan the insurgents, as was the case when the mujahedin werethe West’s “reedom ghters.” Moreover, the levels o corrup-tion, ineectiveness o the state machinery, and perceived lack o legitimacy o the government around the country seem to behigher than in Soviet times.Despite successes in some sectors since 2001—education,health and the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) aremost ofen mentioned though even these appear now to bein jeopardy 
—the disproportion between the international
Millions of girls have gone/returned to school since 00 andhealth indicators have improved dramatically; however, since 006,
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