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371
D. C.
McNEELY v. U.S.
Cite as 874 A.2d 371 (D.C. 2005)
Robert L. McNEELY, Appellant, v.UNITED STATES, Appellee.No. 98–CF–924.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Argued June 18, 2001.Decided May 12, 2005.
Background:
Defendant was convicted ina jury trial in the Superior Court, WilliamM. Jackson, J., of violating the Pit Bull andRottweiler Dangerous Dog DesignationEmergency Amendment Act. Defendantappealed.
Holdings:
The Court of Appeals, Ruiz, J.,held that:(1) Act did not deprive defendant of fair warning of the proscribed conduct;(2) defendant was required to know thathe owned pit bulls in order to be con- victed under Act; and(3) prosecutor’s improper comment wasrendered harmless by curative instruc-tions. Affirmed.
1. Constitutional Law
O
38
A facial challenge to a statute allegesthat the law is invalid in toto and thereforeincapable of any valid application.
2. Constitutional Law
O
82(4)
The overbreadth doctrine permits thefacial invalidation of laws that inhibit theexercise of First Amendment rights if theimpermissible applications of the law aresubstantial when judged in relation to thestatute’s plainly legitimate sweep.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
3. Constitutional Law
O
42.2(1), 82(3)
Dog ownership constituted a form of property interest not protected by theFirst Amendment, and thus, defendantlacked standing to claim that statute re-garding pit bull ownership was faciallyoverbroad. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
4. Constitutional Law
O
258(2)
The vagueness doctrine forms a basisfor a facial challenge to a statute where,even if the enactment does not reach asubstantial amount of constitutionally pro-tected conduct, it nonetheless fails to es-tablish standards for the police that aresufficient to guard against the arbitrarydeprivation of liberty interests, or it failsto provide the kind of notice that willenable ordinary people to understand whatconduct it prohibits.
5. Constitutional Law
O
42.2(1)
Whereas the absence of First Amend-ment concerns renders an overbreadthclaim non-justiciable under notions of pru-dential third party standing, a vaguenessclaim not implicating the First Amend-ment remains cognizable, but only as ap-plied to the facts of the case presented.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
6. Constitutional Law
O
258(2)
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifthand Fourteenth Amendments of the Con-stitution have been construed as requiringthat notice be given of the conduct pro-scribed by criminal statutes. U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.
7. Constitutional Law
O
251.6
Notice for purposes of satisfying dueprocess requirements under the Fifth andFourteenth Amendments refers to the ob- jective intelligibility of the law’s content toa reasonable person rather than the claim-ant’s subjective awareness and under-standing.
8. Criminal Law
O
13.1(1)
The ‘‘void-for-vagueness doctrine’’ re-quires that a penal statute define the crim-
372
874 ATLANTIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES
D. C.
inal offense with sufficient definitenessthat ordinary people can understand whatconduct is prohibited.
See publication Words and Phrasesfor other judicial constructions anddefinitions.
9. Constitutional Law
O
258(2)
Where criminal penalties are at stake,the constitutionally tolerable limits of stat-utory imprecision under the Due ProcessClauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments contract and a relativelystrict vagueness test is appropriate.U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
10. Constitutional Law
O
251.4
A statute is not unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendmentseven if it requires that a person’s conductconform to a somewhat amorphous, yetcomprehensible, standard; it is unconstitu-tionally vague only if no standard of con-duct is specified at all. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14.
11. Constitutional Law
O
251.4
A law fails to meet the requirementsof the Due Process Clause of the Fifth andFourteenth Amendments if it is so vagueand standardless that it leaves the publicuncertain as to the conduct it prohibits.U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
12. Animals
O
75Constitutional Law
O
293
The Pit Bull and Rottweiler Danger-ous Dog Designation Emergency Amend-ment Act, which imposed penalties onowners of pit bulls that caused injury tohumans without provocation, did not de-prive defendant of a fair warning of theproscribed conduct so as to violate the dueprocess clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, where the Act criminalized a very narrow range of conduct that waseasily understood by focusing on two par-ticular dog breeds, unprovoked attacks,and injury in fact. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14; D.C. Official Code, 2001Ed. § 8–1906(b).
13. Statutes
O
47
Although the absence of a scienterrequirement may be a factor considered when testing a statute for constitutional vagueness, the absence of a scienter re-quirement is not a sufficient basis to strikea legislative enactment as unconstitutional-ly vague; rather, the absence of a scienterrequirement may be weighed in determin-ing that the express language of a statuteis void for vagueness, while the presence of a scienter requirement may save a statutefrom invalidation despite the apparent vagueness of its wording.
14. Animals
O
4
The temperament of pit bulls, particu-larly their volatile capacity for hostilityand violent behavior, is sufficiently well-known that these dogs are proper subjectsof regulatory measures adopted in the ex-ercise of a state’s police power. D.C. Offi-cial Code, 2001 Ed. § 8–1906(b) .
15. Animals
O
4Constitutional Law
O
293
Although the usual legislative graceperiod for acts to take effect was reducedby half for the Pit Bull and RottweilerDangerous Dog Designation Emergency Amendment Act, defendant had fair warn-ing of the conduct proscribed by the Actfor purposes of the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, where the Act had been in effect for al-most four weeks before its sanctions fell ondefendant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14;D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. § 8–1906(b).
16. Constitutional Law
O
270(1), 303
A statute defining an offense malumprohibitum may impose a fine and/or im-prisonment on a strict liability basis with-
373
D. C.
McNEELY v. U.S.
Cite as 874 A.2d 371 (D.C. 2005)
out offending due process of law.U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.
17. Criminal Law
O
1139
Court of Appeals reviews de novo is-sues of statutory interpretation.
18. Statutes
O
181(2), 190
A cornerstone of statutory interpreta-tion is the rule that a court will not lookbeyond the plain meaning of a statute when the language is unambiguous anddoes not produce an absurd result.
19. Statutes
O
190
It is elementary that the meaning of astatute must, in the first instance, besought in the language in which the act isframed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of thelaw-making body which passed it, the solefunction of the courts is to enforce it ac-cording to its terms.
20. Statutes
O
190
Where the language in a statute isplain and admits of no more than onemeaning, the duty of interpretation doesnot arise.
21. Animals
O
75
Although the Pit Bull and RottweilerDangerous Dog Designation Emergency Amendment Act, which imposed penaltieson pit bull owners whose dogs attackedindividuals, was a strict liability offenseand did not specify a mens rea require-ment, defendant was required to know thathe or she owned a pit bull in order to beconvicted under the Act; conviction underthe Act did not require a finding of culpa-ble intent on the part of defendant. D.C.Official Code, 2001 Ed. § 8–1906(b).
22. Criminal Law
O
713, 730(1)
When reviewing an allegation of im-proper prosecutorial argument, the Courtof Appeals first determines whether any of the challenged comments were, in fact,improper; if so, the court must, viewingthe remarks in context, consider the gravi-ty of the impropriety, its relationship tothe issue of guilt, the effect of any correc-tive action by the trial judge, and thestrength of the government’s case.
23. Criminal Law
O
1171.1(2.1)
Where an objection was lodged at trialto a prosecutor’s comment that was indeedimproper, and where the trial court thuserred in overruling the objection, theCourt of Appeals will reverse the convic-tion unless the defendant was not substan-tially prejudiced by the court’s error.
24. Criminal Law
O
1037.1(1)
Where there was no objection at trialto the prosecutor’s alleged improper com-ments, the Court of Appeals may reverseonly if the trial court’s failure, sua sponte,to intervene and to prevent the misconductso clearly prejudiced the appellant’s sub-stantial rights as to jeopardize the fairnessand integrity of his trial.
25. Criminal Law
O
1037.1(2)
Assuming comment by prosecutor inclosing argument that defendant negligent-ly released his pit bulls was unfounded, thetrial court’s failure to sua sponte strike thecomment did not result in a miscarriage of justice in defendant’s trial for violating thePit Bull and Rottweiler Dangerous DogDesignation Emergency Amendment Act, where the brief reference to defendant’snegligence was not emphasized as a pri-mary argument nor urged as a legal theo-ry of the case. D.C. Official Code, 2001Ed. § 8–1906(b).
26. Criminal Law
O
720(7.1)
Prosecution’s comment in closing ar-gument that defendant intentionally re-leased pit bulls did not prejudice defendantin trial for violation of the Pit Bull andRottweiler Dangerous Dog Designation
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