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Boghossian, Paul - Sense, Reference and Rule-Following

Boghossian, Paul - Sense, Reference and Rule-Following

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Published by Cleoatwar
Boghossian's review of Jerry Katz's book.
Boghossian's review of Jerry Katz's book.

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Published by: Cleoatwar on Apr 07, 2013
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Sense, Reference and Rule-Following
Paul A. Boghossian
Philosophical Issues
, Vol. 4, Naturalism and Normativity. (1993), pp. 135-141.
Philosophical Issues
is currently published by Ridgeview Publishing Company.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/rpc.html.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. Formore information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.http://www.jstor.orgSat Mar 10 03:17:31 2007
 
12
PHILOSOPHICAL
ISSUES,
4
Naturalism and Normativity, 1993
Sense, Reference and
Rule-Following
Paul
A. Boghossian
In
a series
of
importantand
provocative books,
Jerry
Katz
has artic-ulated
and
defended a 'Platonistic Intensionalism' in
the
theory
of
meaning. As
Jerry
understands it, this is
the
view
that
expressionsof a
natural
language have sense as well as reference,
that
senses are
abstract
entities of some sort
and
that
they
that
are
the
proper
ob-jects of
study
in a theory
of
meaning for
natural
language. As
both
his admirers
and
detractors would admit,
that
is
the
essence
of the
view
that
Frege successfully placed
at
the
center of
the
philosophy
of
language as
we
know it.Much
of
Jerry's
most recent book is devoted to
an
extensive con-frontation with Quine
and
Wittgenstein
-in
Jerry's
eyes, this cen-
tury's
most
trenchant
critics of intensionalism.l
Jerry's
point inconfronting these philosophers, however,
isn't
merely
to stare them
down, arguing
that
their attacks on intensionalism are, for one
or
an-
other
reason, ineffective. His much more interesting goal is to argue
1
Parenthetically,
I
should
say
that
I
think
there
is
some question
about
whether Wittgensteincan
rightly
be
cast in
this
role,
but
I
cannot
argue
this
exegetical
issue here.
 
136
PAUL
A.
BOGHOSSIAN
that,
whereas
the
classic arguments
of
Quine
and
Wittgenstein areeffective against Frege's version
of
intensionalism,
they
are ineffec-tive against his own different brand.
The
overall polemical purpose,
then,
is
not
merely
to
defend intensionalism against extensionalism,
but
to
promote a Katzian new intensionalism over its traditionalFregean rival, by showing
that
it
is
only
the
new intensionalism
that
evades
the
clutches
of
Quine's
and
Wittgenstein's skeptical argu-ments. As
this
description suggests,
it
is a breathtakingly ambitiouseffort, covering a
broad
range of fundamental issues in
the
philosophyof language
and
mind, yet somehow not
at
the
cost of argumenta-tive detail. Even before reading
The
Metaphysics
of
Meaning, I wasin
broad sympathy
with many
of
its central
tenets
-especially
its
Platonism,
commitment
to
senses,
and
anti-naturalism.
Reading
it
has done much to reinforce those convictions. However, I do havesome questions
about the
claimed advantages of
Jerry's
own par-ticular
brand
of intensionalism
and it
is
that
issue
that
I wish toconcentrate
upon
in this piece.
1
Where, precisely, are
we
supposed to locate
the
crucial difference be-tween
the
new intensionalism
and
the
repudiated old intensionalismof Frege?
Jerry
says:The rejection of Frege's conception of the relation between sense andreference
is
the cornerstone of the intensionalism I have developed
...
(p.
126)
And
just
as expected,
it
is this feature of Fregean intensionalism
that
is held responsible for generating all
the
nasty problems:The
(new
intensionalism] does not
define
sense derivatively
in
terms ofreference or think of sense
as
containing rules of
use.
As
a consequence,the theory does not lead to
[an]
approach
on
which
sense determinesreference or makes sense responsible
for
rules that specify
usein
advance.
As
we
shall
see.
. . thinking of meaning
as
something
in which
"all thesteps are already taken"
is
one of the things that makes an intensionalismvulnerable to Wittgenstein's paradox about
following
rules.
(p.
129)
The
key,
then,
to
the
new intensionalism is
the
rejection
of the
claim
that
sense determines reference.
But
how exactly is this to be un-derstood?In denying
that
sense determines reference, one thing
that
Jerry
has in
mind
is
the
claim
that,
owing to contextual pragmatic reasons,

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