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Published by Janz Serrano
under Prof. dela Cerna 2nd sem AY '11-'12
credits go to the persons cited in the document
under Prof. dela Cerna 2nd sem AY '11-'12
credits go to the persons cited in the document

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Published by: Janz Serrano on Apr 08, 2013
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 Moncupa v. Enrile
Gutierrez, Jr., J.Disclaimer:
Majority of this digest is from our very own CrimPro Sanidad Digests. I opted to add more details, since maikling kaso lang naman pala ito.
Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa and others were arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 pm corner of D. Tuazon St. and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City.
On April 23, 1982, a Presidential Commitment Order was issued against Moncupaand (8) others on the allegations that he was a National Democratic Front staff member.
After two separate investigations conducted the Chief Task Force MakabansaInvestigation Group and Investigating Fiscal, it was determined that the petitionerwas not a member of any subversive organization.
However, both recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegalpossession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents underPresidential Decree No. 33.
Accordingly, 2 separate informations were filed against the petitioner, illegalpossession of firearms before the court the Court of First Instance of Rizal andviolation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon City.
The petitioner was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-subversionLaw.
Significantly, during this petition, his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. In view of that, motions for bail by the petitioner were denied by thelower court.
Petitioner filed the instant petition
Respondents in return of the writ, justified the validity of the petitioner’s
confinement on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as tothe petitioner.
On the contrary, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on August 30, 1983, affirmingthat on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released from detention onorders from the Minister of National Defense with the approval of the President.
Whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in
view of the petitioner’s temporary release?
Yes, in view of the fact that therespondents failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the restraints on
the petitioner’s freedom of movement should not be lifted.
It was noted that attached to the petitioner’s temporary release were the following
His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets theapproval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.2)
His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is alsorequired in case petitioner wants to change his place of residence.
141 SCRA 233 (1986)
His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass mediarepresentatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to theinterest of national security."4)
He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives.
Even though the petitioner concedes that his temporary release is an improvement upon his actual detention,
restrictions that were imposed by respondents,constitutes an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom
The petitioner points out that his temporary release did not render instant petitioner moot and academic but instead, it merely shifted the inquiry from thelegality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by therespondents.
The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporaryrelease of the petitioner constitutes restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa such aslimitation of freedom movement, since it is not physical restraint alone which isinquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
The present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic.
A petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on theliberty of the petitioner is lifted temporarily or permanently
Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al 
: Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpusbecomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners islifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a number of cases. But the instant case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved iswhether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after acourt of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmativeanswer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of thepetitioners being merely 'temporary' it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle.Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he canno longer be detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basicand elementary that it needs no elaboration.
As an effect, a release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot andacademic must be free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to beunlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there ispresent a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has,in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned orthose applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
The petition is granted. The conditions attached to the temporary release of thepetitioner are declared null and void.
Villavicencio v. Lukban
Malcolm, J:
(from http://www.scribd.com/doc/35479363/Villavicencio-vs-Lukban)
Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the deportationof 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the morals of the people of Manila. He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao,purportedly, to work for an haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes wereconfined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at thedead of night, in two boats bound for Davao. The women were under theassumption that they were being transported to another police station while Ynigo,the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent to work for himwere actually prostitutes.
The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban, AntonHohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. Theyprayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the respondents to compelthem to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against theirwill.
During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without theirconsent. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, therewas no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170 prostitutes.
This decision is actually an explanation for the granting of the writ of habeas corpus
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled
these one hundred and seventywomen were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent andwithout any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, wereforcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despitethe feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such wasnot the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and theconstabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose theshades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed soimportant as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.
Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not evento require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the PhilippineIslands, even the President of the United States, who has often been said toexercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary  prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executiveof a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most  praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of thePhilippines have the same privilege.
39 Phil 778 (1919)
If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official cando the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons wouldhave just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against herwishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country, thenofficialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that 
"No freeman shallbe taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs,or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon himnor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. Wewill sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right."
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remediesof the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3)
habeas corpus
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved partymay recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest topursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly tomeet any such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility
if, after due investigation, the properprosecuting officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just asvigorously as they have defended the same official in this action.
Nevertheless,that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings.
To quote the wordsof Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to
"It would be amonstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined,ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty partywas tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure."
The writ of 
habeas corpus
was devised and exists as a speedy and effectualremedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best andonly sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of theparties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principalpurpose is to set the individual at liberty.
RespondentsContentions/Court’s Ruling:
There is a defect in parties petitioners
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitionerswere relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion wasconducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign apetition for
habeas corpus
. It was consequently proper for the writ to besubmitted by persons in their behalf. The law, in its zealous regard for personalliberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of 
if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person isunjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be madetherefor. Petitioners had standing in court.
The Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court.
GENERAL RULE: To avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitionsfor
habeas corpus
should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance.
But this is not a hard and fast rule
. The writ of 
habeas corpus
may be grantedby the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in thePhilippine Islands.
Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court orbefore an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and isdependent on the particular circumstances.
In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davaowas in session, or that the women had any means by which to advancetheir plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that thepetitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents withtheir attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved partiessituated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the womenmight still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shownthat if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizanceof and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of thesuperior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ wouldhave amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.(3)
The person in question is not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It wasfinally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the cityof Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring thewomen from Davao.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet.When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it wasasked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao,and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyondthe city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination,acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of thewrit of 
habeas corpus
 A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquireinto all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and torelieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will  preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
The forcible taking of these women fromManila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who depositedthem in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just aseffectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money orpersonal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when andwhere they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until theaggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and trulywaived his right.We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdictionof the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo thewrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whomthe writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before theapplication for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and thechief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the cityof Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the samemeansto returnthem from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not bepermitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicileand to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost herbirthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus beeasily evaded.
Torres and Araullo’s dissents pertain to the contempt part and not to the habeas
corpus part.

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