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Boghossian, Paul - Reply to Schiffer

Boghossian, Paul - Reply to Schiffer

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Boghossian's reply to Schiffer.
Boghossian's reply to Schiffer.

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Reply to Schiffer
Paul A. Boghossian
Philosophical Issues
, Vol. 2, Rationality in Epistemology. (1992), pp. 39-42.
Philosophical Issues
is currently published by Ridgeview Publishing Company.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/rpc.html.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. Formore information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.http://www.jstor.orgSat Mar 10 03:17:17 2007
 
3
PHILOSOPHICAL
ISSUES,
2
Rationality in Epistemology,
1992
Reply
to
Schiffer
Paul
A.
Boghossian
In "Externalism
and
Inference", I sought
to
describe a kind
of
case whose possibilty has,
it
seems
to
me, been widelyoverlooked:
that
of a thinker
in
whom
Earthly
and
Twin
Earthly
contents
cohabit,
without, however, there being any
'internal'
indication
of
this. I further claimed
that
such athinker would, as a result, be
temptedto
think logically validinferences which are, on
an
externalist
interpretation,
invalid,
and
that
this would
be
a mistake from which he would
not
be able
to
recover
a priori.
Part
of
the
significance of such acase may
be
described as follows.
The
case of Pierre shows
that
externalism may well lead
to
a situation
in
which certaininferences
are
valid,
but
don't
a priori
look
to
be so.
The
caseof Peter,
if
it
worked, would show something perhaps moresurprising:
that
externalism may well lead
to
a situation
in
which certain inferences
look
valid,
but
aren't.
Now, Stephen appears
to
agree with me on
the
first centralclaim
-namely,
that
I have described a case
in
which
Earthly
and Twin
Earthly
contents cohabit. I quote from p. 31.
 
40
PAUL
A.
BOGHOSSIAN
Paul
is
surely right
that
after a while, Peter would havebeliefs about Twin Pavarotti which he would express using'Pavarotti'; at some point on Twin Earth, for example, hemight say 'Pavarotti
is
in good
voice
tonight' and be express-ing a belief about Twin Pavarotti, the tenor within sight.Paul
is
also surely right
that
Peter would have retained
on
Twin Earth his memory belief
that
Pavarotti swam in LakeTaupo, and this
is
a belief he might express using 'Pavarottiswam in Lake Taupo'.
So
far
so
good.
But
he
wishes
to
resist a
further
claim:But Paul next claims
that
these intuitive considerations al-
low
us to conclude
that
Peter would have in his belief box'Pavarotti swam in Lake Taupo' and 'Pavarotti
is
in good
voice
tonight' and
that
the
two
tokens of 'Pavarotti' woulddiffer in reference: the first would refer unambiguously toLuciano, the second to Twin Luciano. And he further claims
that
these same intuitive considerations would show
that
rea-soning which Peter can't be faulted for thinking
is
valid isn'tvalid.
(ibid.)
One
of
the
things
that
Stephen
is worried
about
is
that,
whereas
it
may
be
perfectly
legitimate
to
suppose
that
Peter
says
in
his public
language
"Pavarotti
swam
in
Lake
Taupo"
it
doesn't
follow
that
he
is giving voice
to
a belief
that
in-volves a
name
in
thought.
He
thus
questions
my
right
to
claim
that
I have described a case
in
which
the
following inferenceoccurs
in
Peter's
belief-box:
Pavarotti
once swam
in
Lake
Taupo
The
singer I
heard
yesterday is
Pavarotti
Therefore:
The
singer I
heard
yesterday once swam
in
Lake
Taupo
I
think
that
Stephen
is absolutely right
that
there are
plenty
of
examples
of
beliefs which,
although
expressed
by
public
languagenames,
don't
essentially involve
them.
And
I also
think
he
is right
to
say
that
the
example would have
to
be
described
at
much
greater
length
if
every conceivable
doubt
that
Peter's 'Pavarotti'
beliefs
areof
this
kind is
to
be
laid
to
rest;
and
that
was certainly
not
attempted in
thepaper
presented
at
the
conference.

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