2 UNITED STATES
JONESSyllabusanalysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in
, 389U. S. 347, which said that the Fourth Amendment protects a person’s“reasonable expectation of privacy,”
, at 360. Here, the Court neednot address the Government’s contention that Jones had no “reason-able expectation of privacy,” because Jones’s Fourth Amendmentrights do not rise or fall with the
formulation. At bottom, theCourt must “assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy againstgovernment that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”
, 533 U. S. 27, 34.
did not repudiate theunderstanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particularconcern for government trespass upon the areas it enumerates. The
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, butnot substituted for, the common-law trespassory test. See
, 394 U. S. 165, 176;
, 506 U. S.56, 64.
, 460 U. S. 276, and
, 468 U. S. 705—post-
cases rejecting Fourth Amendmentchallenges to “beepers,” electronic tracking devices representing an-other form of electronic monitoring—do not foreclose the conclusionthat a search occurred here.
, 475 U. S. 106, and
, 466 U. S. 170, also do not support the Gov-ernment’s position. Pp. 4–12.(c) The Government’s alternative argument—that if the attach-ment and use of the device was a search, it was a reasonable one—isforfeited because it was not raised below. P. 12.615 F. 3d 544, affirmed.S
, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R
,C. J., and K
, and S
, JJ., joined. S
,J., filed a concurring opinion. A
, J., filed an opinion concurring inthe judgment, in which G
, and K
, JJ., joined.