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(9
QUESTIONS
FOR
5/22-23 HEARINGS
Draft
MAY
18,2003
V
Panelon
"State of the System: Civil Aviation Security on September 11
th
"
2PM, Thursday, May 22, 2003
Primary
Questions
for
Panel:
Prior
to September
11,
2001,what did the U.S. aviation security system know about
terrorist
threats
to
civil aviation?
How did the
different
elements
of the
system respond
to
any
such information
in
their possession?
What
aviation security policies
and
procedures were
in
effect
as of
September
11,
2001?
How did
these measures comply with relevant laws
and
regulations? What
was
known
of
/._
the
effectivenessof
this
system,
andhow
was this measured? </
"^
TESTIMONY
GOALS
FOR
PANEL
WITNESSES
ty^i^D^
'
.
JANE
GARVEY
(FAA
ADMINSTRATOR FROM (1997-2002)
1.
Have
the
witness acknowledge
the
continuous cycle
of
warnings
from
experts about persistent weaknessin theaviation security system,andobtainanexplanation of how the witness/the system responded to these warnings andeaknesses.Have the witness explain the agency's approach/philosophy to prioritysetting/management of aviation security vis-a-vis competing FAA missions andpriorities.
3.
Have
the
witness explain what intelligence information
she had
aboutthreats to the aviation security system prior to 9/11 and what actions she took inresponse.
KENNETH
MEAD (Then and Current Inspector General of DOT)
1.
Have the witness explain the
specific
weaknesses in the aviation securitysystem leading up to
9/11.
2. Have
the
witnessexplain
why
weakness
in the
aviation security
systemwas and is such a persistent problem.
3.
Receive the
witness'
critique of management methods and mindset withrespect to aviation security.
 
JAMES
MAY
(Current Executive Director
of the
Airlines' lobbying wing:
Air
Transport Authority—Was not in the job on 9/11/2001)
1.
Have
the
witness describe
the
airlines'
view
of the
industry's
role
in
aviation security policy
setting
and
implementation.
2.
Havethewitness explaintheairlines' philosophy about aviationsecurity'spriority
in the
industry's
mix of
missions
and by
what standards
the
industrydetermines what security measures
are and are not
appropriate (i.e.
cost/benefit
and
bottom line considerations).
3.
Have the witness explain what the airlines knew with respect to theperformance
of
their security
systems on
9/11?
BOGDAN DZAKOVIC (FAA/DHS "Red Team" Member and whistleblower)
1.Obtain the
witness'
views about the culture of
indifference
toward securityproblems
in the
FAA.2. Have the witness explain why he
felt
he had to be a whistleblower ratherthan go through the customary channels.
3.
Have
the
witness share
field
personnel's
perspective
on the
quality
of the
aviation security system and leadership.
Jane
Garvey,
former
FAA
Administrator
1.
When you came to the FAA as administrator what was your assessment of
the
Aviation Security System
and its
effectiveness?
By
what means
and
whatcriteria
did the
agency measure effectiveness? What
did you see as the
securitysystem's biggest strengths and weaknesses?2. When you received audit reports citing weakness in the security system orrecommendations
for
corrective action
from
the
Inspector
General,
the GAO or
other sources, what
was the
process
for
responding
to the
warnings
and
considering
the
recommendations? What criteria were used
in
determiningwhether to implement
specific
suggestions?
3.How
specifically
did the FAA
weigh security
in
relation
to
competingagendas relative to its mission, including cost containment? What was theorganizational attitude in the FAA with respect to security vis-a-vis otherpriorities when you arrived? What was your philosophy on this point and how
was
that implemented?
 
4. What was the process by which you received aviation security threatassessments and alerts? From what agencies and internal personnel did youreceive this information
and how did you
receive
it?
5.
What exactly did you know about the nature and timing of terrorist threats,
both
general
and
specific,
prior
to
September11, 2001?About threats
from
al
Qaeda? Threats from the individual
hijackers?
What actions did you take inresponse to
this
information?6. Where were you when the
hijacking
took place on September
11,
when
and
how were you notified, and what did you do? Were your actions andresponses following the incident guided by any prepared protocol, or were your
required to
respond spontaneously?
7.
After
September
11,
what steps
did the FAA
take
to
ascertain
the
facts
about
howpreciselytheaviation security system
functioned
with respectto the
hijackings?
What analytical, corrective and disciplinary actions were taken inresponse?
8.
In a hijack situation, please explain your understanding of the division ofresponsibilities between FAA and NORAD. What protocols or procedures govern
FAA's
responsetohijackings? Were those followedonSeptemberl
1,
2001?
9.
There are reports that an executive summary exists describing activity in
the
FAA Command Center on September
11,
and containing an indication that a
gun
was used in one of the hijackings. What can you tell us about these reports,
and
specifically about the FAA's information about the use of a gun in one or
more
of the hijackings?
10.
Becauseoftime constraints, please supplytheCommission withawrittenresponse to the
following
question. The White House Commission on Aviation
Safety
and Security, which was created in August 1996 in the
aftermath
of the
destruction
of TWA Flight 800 and made its report to the President in February1997. Please comment on the
following
items contained in the report that would
appear
to be relevant to the events of September
11,
2001.Please indicate what
impact
each
finding
or recommendation had on the civil aviation security system
before
and
after
September
11,
2001:
a.
Improvements
in aviation
security
have
been complicated
becausegovernment
and
industry
often
found
themselves
at
odds, unable
to
resolve disputes over financing, effectiveness, technology
and
potentialimpacts on operations and passengers. Americans should not have tochoose between enhanced securities
and
efficient
and
affordable
air
travel.
of 00

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