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QUESTIONS EOR
MAY
22-23 HEARINGS
ON
AVIATION SECURITY Page
1 of 7
QUESTIONS
FOR MAY
22-23
HEARINGS
ON
AVIATION SECURITY
PANEL
ONE:
WHERE WEREWE AS OF 9/11/01?
1.
In the
three months leading
up to
September
11,
2001,
how
would
you
characterize
the
relationship between
the
U.S. intelligence community
on the one
hand
and the
aviation securitysystem
on the
other?
How
responsive
was the
intelligence community
to
information requests
and
needs
from
the
aviation security system? What were
the
major
obstacles
to the
flow
of
security-related intelligence information
from
the
intelligence community
to the
various components
of the
aviation security system?
(What
about
after
September
11:
what
is the
situation now?
What
still
needs
to be done to
improve this relationship?)
2.
DOT
Assistant Under Secretary
for
Intelligence Claudio
Manno
testified before
the
JointIntelligence Inquiry
in
October
of
2002 "Until
the
passage
of the
Aviation
and
TransportationSecurity
Act
(ATSA),
DOT
distribution
of
threat information
was
severely limited because some
of the
information
had to be
disseminated without being protected
from
release into
the
publicdomain. Only
the FAA had
sufficient
authority
to
share
"sensitive
security information"
(SSI)."
How
did
this limitation impact
the
aviation security system's ability
to
learn
of
terrorist threats
to
civil
aviation
up to
September
11,
2001?
(What
about
after
September
11:
what
is the
situation
now?
What
still
needs
to be
done
to
improve this situation?)
3.
What information lead
to the
issuance
of the FAA
security circular
of
June
22, 2001?
Describe
specifically
the
response
of the
aviation security system
to the
circular.
In
particular, whatsecurity-related actions were taken
at
Dulles, Logan
and
Newark airports? What,
if
any, changesoccurred
in
these security procedures between
the
time
of
their employment
and
September
11?4.
Between June
22,
2001
and
September
11, 2001,
what
did DOT and the FAA
know about general
and
specific
terrorist threats
to
civil aviation? About general
and
specific
threats
from
al
Qaeda?
About
potential threats
from
the
individual
9/11
hijackers?
MR.
MAY: What
did the
airlines know
about
such threats?
5.
In
your
view, what were
the
most significant threats
to
civil aviation
as of
September
10,
2001
?How
did the
system
of
aviation security governance
affect
the
system's response
to
those threats?
(What
about
after
September
11:
what
is the
situation now?)
6. On
September
10,
2001,
how
confident were
you
that
the
terrorist threat
to
U.S. civil aviation
could
be
effectively
countered?
How
likely
did you
believe
it to be:
that terrorists would targetU.S. civil aviation
for
attack? That
the
U.S. intelligence
and law
enforcement communities would
successfully identify,
apprehend
or
otherwise prevent such terrorists
from
gaining entrance into
the
U.S.
or the
U.S. civil aviation system? That profiling
and
other intelligence assets within
the
aviation
security system itself would successfully
identify,
apprehend
or
otherwise prevent suchterrorists
from
gaining entrance onto commercial
aircraft?
That
the
baggage
and
passengerscreening system would prevent such terrorists
from
bringing
on
board explosives
or
weaponsnecessary
to
hijack
a
commercial
aircraft?
That
the
personnel
and
security procedures
on
boardcommercial
aircraft
would
defeat
terrorist
hijacking
attempts?
(How would
you
change
any ofthese
assessments based
on the
current situation?)
1.
As of
September
11,
2001, what
was the
status
of
each
of the
following,
first
for the
U.S. civil
aviation
system
as a
whole,
and
second,
at
Dulles, Logan
and
Newark airports:
a.
FAA
security guidelines
and
security-related communications
on
civil aviation (includingSecurity Directives, Emergency Amendments
and
Information Circulars)
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y^STIONS
FOR MAY
22-23 HEARINGS
ON
AVIATION SECURITY Page
2 of 7
/
b.
Airport
and air
carrier security plans
c.
Computer-assisted passenger prescreening (CAPPS) system
d.
Checked baggage screening
e.
Passenger
and
carry-on baggage screening?
(What
about
after
September 11:
what
is the
situation now?
What
still
needs to be
done
toimprove
these measures?)
8.
As of
September
11,
2001,
what performance indicators were employed
to
measure
the
effectiveness
of
computer-assisted passenger prescreening,
and the
passenger, carry-on
and
checked baggage screening systems? What
was the
measured performance
of
these
systems
in the
civil aviation security system
as a
whole,
and
specifically
at
Dulles, Logan
and
Newark airports,
and at
American
and
United airlines? What sanctions,
if
any, were imposed
for any
failures
to
meet performance requirements? What
was the
enforcement record
on any
such sanctions?
(What
about
after
September
11:
what
is the
situation now?
What
still
needs to be
done
to
improve these
systems?)
9.
What procedures were
in
place
on
September
11,
2001
to
insure compliance
by
airports, airlines
and
contractors with
FAA
security policies
and
procedures?
How
well were these proceduresimplemented,
and how was
compliance measured?
(What
about
after
September
11:
what
is the
situation now?
What
still
needs
to be
done
to
improve system compliance?)
10.
With regard
to the
operation
of the
computer-assisted passenger prescreening system
by
American
and
United airlines between August (when
the
hijackers
began purchasing their tickets)
and
September
11,
2001,
was
this system applied
to:
a.
Passengers proceeding through airport screening
b.
Carry-on baggage
of
passengers proceeding through airport screening
c.
Checked baggage?
(What
about
after
September
11:
what
is the
situation now?)
11.
Very specifically,
as ofSeptember11,2001
what
was thestatusof boxcuttersandshort
kniveswithin:
a.
FAA
security guidelines
b.
Airport security plans
for
Dulles, Logan
and
Newark airports
c.
Primary
air
carrier security plans
for
Dulles, Logan
and
Newark airports?
12.
What FAA, airport, airline, pilot
and/or
flight
attendant regulations, guidelines,
and/or
trainingprocedures were
in
place
on
September
11,
2001
for
dealing with hijackers
in
general
and
suicide
hijackers in
particular?
(What
about
after
September
11:
what
is the
situation now?
What
still
needs
to be
done
to
improve these measures?)
13.
It has
been reported that
the
hijacker pilots
may
have undertaken
a
series
of
surveillance
flights
on
U.S.
air
carriers
between
May and
August
of
2001. What
do we
know about
these
flights?
In
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5/12/2003
 
STIONS
FOR MAY
22-23 HEARINGS
ON
AVIATION SECURITY Page
3 of 7
hindsightisthere anything about their actions with respecttothese flights that should havetriggered closer scrutiny of these individuals?MR. MEAD: In testimony you gave to the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs
on
September 25,
2001,
youstated
that,
"Under
the
current
system,
those charged
with
aviation
security oversight
(FAA) and
those charged with providing
the
security (the airlines
and
airports)are themselves facing other priorities, missions, and,
in
some
cases,
competing economic
pressures."
Would
you
elaborate
on the
impact
of the old
system itself upon
the
system's security
performance?
Do you
believe that
the
aviation system's governance problems were well knownprior
to
September
11,
2001? If so, why
were changes
not
made
to
correct
the
problems?
(What
about
after
September
11:
what
is the
situation now?)
15.
How did economic factors, including the de-regulation of civil aviation in the late1970s,
affect
the
performance
of the
aviation security system?
(What
about
after
September
11:
what
is the
situation now?
What
effect
are
economic factors having
today?)
16.
What was the status of security clearances for airport security personnel at Dulles, Logan andNewark airports
on
September11,
2001?
(What
about
after
September
11:
what
is the
situationnow?
What
still needs
to be
done
to
improve this situation?)
17.
What was the status of the federal air marshal program on September
11, 2001?
(What
about
after
September 11:
what
is the
situation now?
What
still needs
to be
done
to
improve
this
program?)
18.
The General Accounting
Office,
the DOT Inspector General and others
identified
the performanceof the airport security passenger and baggage screening system as a significant problem for manyyears
prior to September 11,
2001.
Why
were
these warnings evidently not acted
upon?
In
otherwords, why was low screener performance tolerated for many years?
19.
MR.
MAY: From
the
airline perspective,
how
would
you
characterize
the
pre-September
11,
2001
performance
of thefederal aviation security systemineachof thefollowing respects:
a.
Sharing of threat informationb.Issuance
and
enforcement
of
security guidelinesc.
Measurement
of
system
performance?
(What
about
after
September
11:
what
is the
situation now?
What
still needs
to be
done
toimprove
this
performance?)
PANEL
TWO:
WHAT
HAPPENED?
1.
Published reports indicate that nine
of the
nineteen hijackers
were selected
for
special security
scrutiny prior to boarding the hijacked
flights:
six by the
computer-assisted
prescreening
(CAPPS)
system,
two
because
of
identification document irregularities,
and one
because
he was
travelingwith
one of the
latter two.
Are
these reports accurate? Specifically, what triggered each selection?In each case, what
was
done
as a
result
of the
selection? Were
the
individuals detained,questioned, subjected to special screening, or subjected to any other special treatment? What weretheresultsof anysuch actions?2.What weapons did the
9/11
hijackers use, and how did the weapons get on board the
aircraft?
Inthe
aftermath
of the
9/11
hijackings there were published accounts of box cutters being
found
onboardanother commercial
aircraft.
Are those accounts accurate? Have you been able to rule outthe introduction of the weapons used in the September 11, 2001 hijackings prior to the boarding of
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83&id...
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