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February2008
01_
T’s ys  b mt sm.— Jm Cm, TStt.cm
For most o the past twenty-ve years the West generally, and the United States particularly,experienced a surprisingly apolitical interlude. The great perturbers o world war, coldwar, sweeping social reorm, and crippling resource constraints went largely absent. Onlyrom the cramped viewpoint o the present could tussles over the NEA, Supreme Court justices, and spotted owls seem momentous. Politics receded. For investors, this meantthat politics became a much less important variable in the grand calculus o interest rates,innovation, global integration, and so on.The recent past can thereore be conceived o as a sort o political bear market, one wherethe degree to which ordinary lie — including economic activity — was mostly unaectedby politics. There have been many such bear markets, during which the economy and thelives o most citizens chug along rather nicely, or at very least, without substantial overtintererence rom the state. By contrast, during a bull market, political inuence — over nancial matters, public policy, decisions o war and peace — takes on great importance.Ater a placid quarter-century, many cannot bring themselves to believe that the utureholds anything more than a continuation o the recent bear market in US politics. Buttremendous structural changes to the world’s economy render impossible any suchcontinuation: or the US, global integration and competition have reached a point wherea signicant political response is inevitable. The bear market is giving way to a powerulnew bull market and or the rst time in many years, US domestic politics will become acentral concern or investors around the world. The background assumptions o the pastthree decades — that there will be no major changes in trade, immigration, and tax policy — have become unreliable. Portolios that underweight the possibility o major policyshits thereore risk signicant underperormance as the US moves into an increasinglypoliticized uture. 
Bull and Bear MarkeTS in PoliTiCSitt B  B Mts  Ptcs
World history is littered with bull and bear markets in politics. The consequences or thepolities and economies involved have been varied, though an historical review reveals thatperiods o heightened political erment, while undoubtedly more interesting, prove lesssalubrious than more serene times.Recent bull markets in politics illustrate the general pattern. Perhaps the most importantbull market o the past century was post-Tsarist Russia, which produced the rst moderntotalitarian state. From the rebellions ollowing the Tsar’s deeat in the Russo-JapaneseWar to the Bolsheviks’ New Economic Policy in 1921, politics became central to the lieo all Russians. To paraphrase Trotsky in another context, the average Russian might nothave been interested in politics, but politics was interested in him. Equally catastrophicwere the ascist bull markets in Europe o the 1920s-1940s, and the somewhat less dismalgyrations in the Middle East, Latin America, and Southeast Asia o the late 1940s-1960s.
T B Mt Ptcs
© 2008
 This document is confidential and not for further circulation. This is not a solicitation or recommendation to buy, sell or holdsecurities. Certain statements contained herein may be forward-looking. Information contained herein is believed to be accurateand/or derived from sources that Clarium Capital Management LLC believes to be reliable; however, Clarium disclaims any andall liability as to the completeness or accuracy of the information contained herein and for any omissions of material facts. This document has not been filed with the Commodities Futures Trading Commission or any other regulatory body. Graphicscontained herein are purely representational and do not reflect any hypothetical return from an investment in the depictedinstruments.
 
02_
As a general matter, bull markets in politics coincide with major wars, the expansiono government, and the politicization o large parts o the economy, oten to society’sdetriment.
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As Robert Higgs documents in
Crisis and Leviathan
, advocates o statistintervention take advantage o economic downturns, wars, and other catastrophes tointroduce reorms that may have little to do with the situation at hand, typically outlivethe crises that provoked them, and produce correspondingly dismal results.But the case should not be overstated: not every bull market ends in disaster. The Putin era,in which the state reasserted itsel over an economy looted during a period o instabilityand transition, is certainly a political bull market. For all his aults and singular dependenceon an oil windall, Putin moderated the chaos o the early post-Soviet era, to the generalacclaim o the people. The jury is still largely out on Putin, but Medici Italy, Louis XIV’sFrance, and the Gladstone-Disraeli era are other examples o bull markets in politics thatproduced some, and occasionally signicant, benets or the populace and investing classes.And, as we shall see, Europe’s vigor over the past 40 years has been, in part, the product o a narrow bull market in economic policy (though one which has ironically produced 27smaller bear markets as Brussels squashed economic nationalism).By contrast, bear markets in politics and the politicians who create them tend to be under-studied, under-analyzed, and underrated; these markets are viewed as unimportant tonational well-being. But while they may be less interesting odder or the historian, theygenerally produce more congenial results. The outstanding recent example is Adenauer-era Germany. Adenauer took politics out o the central place in German lie — or instance, by removing the suocating price controls that the Allies had carried over romNazi government, and establishing a sound, apolitical currency. The resultant German
Wirkschatswunder 
(economic miracle) was in act the predictable result o providing anindustrious populace in an historically viable nation-state with a stable government andrule o law, and removing the suocating hand o regulation. Adenauer’s amous 1957election slogan,
Keine Experimente 
(No Experiments), could serve as a motto or bear market politicians everywhere.Adenauer’s dedication to establishing a bear market in German politics should not beconused with inaction or lack o vision; the Chancellor was vigorous and brilliant inpursuit o his goal, at an age when most men would have long since been retired. But thebias o political scientists and historians is against political bear market politicians. Their programs seem dull and bourgeois, their slogans are rarely sexy, and their achievementslack grandiosity o vision — principally because, as these statesmen themselves admit, thesuccesses they rack up
have little to do with politics
, except insoar as the politicians havebeen shoved out o the way. This is one reason that Mao Zedong’s grand experimentsabsorb more historical ink than Deng Xiaoping’s less colorul eorts. But it was Deng’sbear market that has made China a real competitor with the West, not Mao’s paroxysmso violence and dogma.
amc B  B Mts  Ptcs
American politics has also produced bull and bear markets to roughly similar eects,though the American bull markets tend to produce somewhat less cataclysmic results thantheir recent European counterparts, while being somewhat longer-lived. As the US isabout to enter its rst bull market in a quarter century, an historical survey is instructive,with a ocus on the under-studied bear markets.
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So far, only one major war, the Korean War, is associated with a bear market in politics, thoughit remains to be seen whether the present war in Iraq will add to that short list.
 
03_
Bull markets in politics orm the standard narrative o what we might call American courthistory: the Revolution and Federal period, the run-up to and ghting o the Civil War,the Progressive era and World War I, the Great Depression and entry into World War II,and the Sixties and Seventies. Bull market presidents tend to get the highest rankingsrom historians. Yet America’s prosperity has arguably been built during political bear markets.The entire Colonial period rom the ounding o British North America at Jamestown in1607 to the Stamp Act o 1765, with a ew sharp local exceptions, can be viewed as onelong and generally successul bear market in politics, the legacy o brilliant compromisesby Elizabeth I.
2
The Colonial period may lack the drama o revolution, but it made theRevolution possible. Jumping ahead 150 years, the 1920s witnessed another bear market in politics, and onelargely characterized by great national accomplishment. The engineer o this bear marketwas Warren Harding. I you want to know what a political bear market politician soundslike, consider Harding’s well-known call or a return to normalcy:
America’s present need is not heroics, but healing; not nostrums, but normalcy;not revolution, but restoration; not agitation, but adjustment; not surgery, butserenity; not the dramatic, but the dispassionate; not experiment, but equipoise;not submergence in internationality, but sustainment in triumphant nationality.
Substitute “China’s” or “America’s” and Deng Xiaoping in 1978 would have agreed withevery word o it.Though Harding is commonly viewed as a disaster, his accomplishments belie the commonconception. During his brie administration, Harding released political prisoners,
3
 negotiated the world’s rst arms reduction treaty, cut taxes rom their high wartime rates(the top rate ell rom 73% to 43.5%, with capital gains at 12.5%), reduced unemploymentand ination drastically, cut spending dramatically, and established the Bureau o theBudget (now the Oce o Management and Budget). The economy surged — real GNProse 9% annualy in the two years ater Harding took oce — and when Harding died,he was among the most popular presidents in American history. Eventually, Harding wasbesmirched by those who took issue with his dismantling o Progressive reorms, and heis now better remembered or his philandering and the cupidity o his Cabinet than or his considerable accomplishments.
4
 
2
 
Despite or perhaps because of the politically correct attention she gets for being a woman,Elizabeth I is still underrated as an important politician because she created a bear market inpolitics (at least by the colorful standards of her day). Elizabeth took over a society in whichpolitical murder was common and left a society in which it was much rarer.
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Most notably, socialist labor leader Eugene V. Debs, imprisoned for protesting World War I.
4
 
Close students of history will remember that Harding also engaged in some seemingly bullmarket tactics on the immigration and taxation fronts. However, Harding’s efforts were merely areturn to the status quo ante after an exceedingly turbulent period. On immigration, Harding’sreforms — passed with trivial opposition — built on earlier reforms designed to moderate thestupendous flow of immigrants from Europe. Following the Harding quota, formerly war-stokedimmigration fell from a brief high of 1.2 million to 425,000 annually, but the latter level wasroughly the same as that prevailing in the relatively peaceful period from 1880-1900. In thecase of tariffs, the picture is more mixed. There is no question that the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922, taken alone, seems like the act of a bull market politician. But in conjunctionwith the tariff, Harding reduced the recently innovated income tax, restoring traditional US taxpolicy and reducing taxes overall. In context, then, the net effect of Harding’s policies wasto reduce the intrusion of politics into private life, which, of course, is the definition of a bearmarket politician.
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