Leg Prof

DAROY VS. LEGASPI Facts: Fermina Daroy, Lydia Legaspi and Agripino Legaspi hired the Ramon Legaspi in May, 1962 to represent them in the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the spouses Aquilino Gonzaga and Paz VelezGonzaga. The complainants, together with their brother, Vivencio, who was abroad, were adjudged as one of the six groups of heirs of the late Gonzaga spouses, their deceased mother, Consuelo Gonzaga-Legaspi, being a daughter of the spouses. April 11, 1969 in a joint petition dated which Atty. Legaspi signed as counsel for the complainants, agreed that the coconut land left by the decedents would be divided into six equal parts, that the administrator be authorized to sell the land, and that, after payment of the obligations of the estate, the net proceeds would be distributed among the six groups of heirs. The land was sold. Fermina Daroy came to know of the sale only when the Atty. Legaspi wrote a note dated November 28, 1969 to her father, Teofilo Legaspi, wherein he stated "that the money we have deposited may be withdrawn on December 8, 1969 at 9:00 o'clock". Atty. Legaspi advised Teofilo Legaspito see him on that date so that the money could be withdrawn. Complainants were not able to withdraw the money. December 9, 1969 Mrs. Daroy received a note wherein Atty. Legaspi informed them that he used their money to solve his problems and that he would pay the, as soon as he receives the proceeds of his jeep. Complainants made several demands for payment buy Atty. Legaspi repeatedly broke his promise and as such a complaint for his disbarment was filed. Version of Legaspi: o Teofilo Legaspi supposedly went to see him on October 21, 1969 and at their conference they supposedly agreed that the sum of P700 would be deducted from the P4,000 to cover the expenses which he described as "expenses involved from the parties litigants, expenses seeking evidence and other expenses relevant to the case" and "major expenses" in the case and that his attorney's fees would be equivalent "to a share of the petitioners", and that the balance of P3,300 would be divided into six equal parts (six because of the four Legaspi children, the father Teofilo Legaspi and the lawyer Ramon C. Legaspi); that under such division each participant would receive P412 each (P3,300 divided by six gives a quotient of P550 not P412), and that he gave Teofilo the sum of P412. No receipt was presented. o First week of November 1969 Teofilo got from him the share of Vivencio. Money left with him amounted to P2,476. o According to Atty. Legaspi the complainants "refused consistently to receive" the said balance from him because they wanted the full amount of P4,000. He said that he had already paid to them the sum of P2,000 and that only the sum of P476 was left in his custody. He did

not present any receipt to prove the alleged payment of P2,000. He said that he could deliver that amount of P476 to the complainants. Mrs. Daroy stated that there was no agreement that Atty. Legaspi would participate like an heir in the partition.

WON Atty. Legaspi paid the money to Teofilo Legaspi? NO Note of Atty. Legaspi to Mrs. Daroy dated December 9, 1969, overwhelmingly belie his fabricated theory that he conferred with Teofilo Legaspi at the end of October or in the first week of November, 1969. He was tempted to concoct a story as to his alleged payments to Teofilo Legaspi because the latter is dead and could not refute him. However, complainants' documentary evidence refutes his prevarications, distortions and fabrications. WON Atty. Legaspi is guilty of malpractice? YES Carbon copy of a supposed extrajudicial partition executed in 1968 by the four children of Consuelo Gonzaga, by her surviving husband, Teofilo Legaspi and by the respondent, Atty. Legaspi, all the six being described in the document as "the legitimate children and sole heirs of Consuelo Gonzaga, who died on March 12. 1941". Atty. Legaspi is not a legitimate heir and he did not explain why he is referred to as one. The document casts a reflection on his competency and integrity as a lawyer and on the competency and integrity of the notary before whom it was acknowledged. It was made to appear herein that respondent Legaspi was an heir of Consuelo Gonzaga when, obviously, he did not possess that status. A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his clients that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without his client's consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust. Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and must be immediately turned over to them Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that when an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions and he is liable to a criminal prosecution. A member of the bar who converts the money of his client to his own benefit through false pretenses is guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in his office of lawyer. The attorney, who violates his oath of office, betrays the confidence reposed in him by a client and practices deceit cannot be permitted to continue as a law practitioner. Not alone has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession Sturr vs. State Bar of California: The conversion of funds entrusted to an attorney is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional

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ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession, "It deserves severe punishment" Holding: Atty. Legaspi is disbarred. TANHUECO vs. DE DUMO [1989] Hilaria Tanhueco filed a disbarment case against Justiniano de Dumo for violationg CPE in failing to remit the collected money from Hilarias debtors and refusing to return the documents entrusted to him. Dumo denied all these in a rejoinder and answer to counterpetition. The court in a resolution referred this case to solgen for investigation, report, and recommendation. A year after the resolution, Jose Florencio Tanhueco, nephew of Hilaria, pursued the case by writing to Imelda Marcos. The complaint was referred to the PIA staff, and Dept of Public Info for proper action. An administrative case was filed. Dumo filed his answer. The court in a resolution again referred it to Acting Judicial Consultant Ricardo Puno for study, report and investigation. So since there were already two admin cases filed, the solgen moved for a consolidation. The Office of the Solgen held two hearings, but with a 12-year interregnum,Dec 1976 and April 1988, Hilaria already died. In the 1st hearing, Dumo was absent, the next hearing Tanhueco (jose) didnt appear. Solgen was able to get these from the evidence presented by both parties: Petitioner: the agreed fees was 15% of the collection. There were documents he didnt return to her. Dumo borrowed money from her: 2k, 1.3k and 3k.The collected debt of Manosca worth 12,500 wasnt remitted to her. Respondent: the agreed fees was 50% of the collection. He was to collect from Tipace, Manosca, Morena and others. All the initial payment were remitted to her, except that of Manosca because, he was able to obtain a money judgment for 19k although debt was 12k. Manosca paid 12k, and seeing that Tanhueco owed him 17k of attys fees, he kept the 12k. he denies the documents and the borrowed money alleged. Findings of solgen: atty-client relationship exists, the 12,000 from Manosca was really taken, that there was no proper accounting given to Tanhueco of this. No conclusive evidence on borrowed money and documents. De dumo committed an unprofessional conduct subject but mitigated because it is also in jurisprudence that the atty is entitled to his lien on his services. He then is admonished and reprimanded. Repetition will be dealt with more severely. WON the recommendation of the SOLGen is proper. NO and WON the agreed fees were proper. NO Canon 11 dealing with trust property says that an atty must not abuse of the confidence reposed in him, that money of client or other trust property he receives should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be co-mingled with his own or used by him.

Even in Sec. 37 of Rule 138 of RoC, he has a right to enforce his lien on judgments and funds or documents coming into his possession lawfully, by retaining the funds, documents, but only after reporting the liens to the courts and giving written notice to the client and adverse parties. Therefore, the lawyer having a lien on the clients money doesnt relieve him from his duty to give prompt account, otherwise it is a professional misconduct. And the court said he wasnt even supposed to get the lien yet because he must deduct only upon the actual amount collected, here, not all the cases were finished. So he wasnt entitled to his lien, on the entire 12k, until all his fees for all the other cases have been paid and received. Knowing that the atty-client relationship is one of special trust and confidence, an atty. Must exercise good faith and fairness, respondent fell far short of this standard. He placed his private and personal interest above his clients. A reprimand is not enough. Contingent fees are not prohibited by law but if it was obtained by undue influence exercised by the atty upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or the compensation be excessive, the court will protect the aggrieved party. He actually collected 60% of 31, 390= 18,840 pesos from a 76yo penniless (old and sickly)woman.(breakdown in page 769) Their agreed contingent fees he said, were the 50% of the collected(both principal and interest) and the legal attys fees charged to the other party. Knowing the circumstances of the woman, she probably agreed only because she wanted the debts paid before she died. In Mambulao v PNB, the court said that even if there was an agreement as to the attys fees, does not insulate such agreement from review and modification by the court if found to be unreasonable for being excessive, unconscionable, or unreasonable. The lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with the duty of assisting the court in admistering justice between parties, hence the fees should be subject to judicial control. Public policy demands that courts disregard stipulations on attys fees whenever they appear to be for speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or mortgagor. The courts then has the power to fix the fees between atty and client. The court must guard the client, especially an aged and necessitous one. On a quantum meruit basis, no special difficulty was had of the case, fees reduced to 15% of the total amount( including attys fees stipulated as chargeable to the debtors) collected by him. The solgend findings on the documents and borrowed money is upheld to be still inconclusive. Decision: 1. respondent guilty of violation of the attys oath and of serious professional misconduct, suspended for 6 months and WARNED against repetition. 2. only 15% is the entitlement of the total amount collected. 3. he must return 10,200(12,000 minus 15%) to the estate of Hilaria 4. he shall also return any document or collection received from client and debtors, accounting it before subtracting the 15%.

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FERNANDO & AMELIA CRUZ, complainants, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO JACINTO, respondent [2000] June 1990: Jacinto, lawyer of Cruz sps, requested latter for a loan in behalf of Concepcion Padilla, who he claimed was an old friend in need of money. Loan was for P285k, payable after 100 days for P360k to be secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land in QC. Sps, believing & trusting their lawyer, authorized him to prepare documents relative to the registration of the mortgage. July 4, 1990: Jacinto presented Real Estate Mortgage Contract & a Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) in the name of Padilla. Sps then gave him P270k in cash & P15k in PBCom check. Oct. 15, 1990: maturity of loan. Sps demanded payment from Padilla. However, they discovered that no person by that name lived in the address given by Jacinto. They also learned that the TCT was fake & spurious. They failed to locate Padilla. Complaint was filed before the NBI: 1. Sps claim that they relied on Jacintos reassurances and that their trust & confidence in Jacnito made them decide not to meet Padilla. 2. Estrella Palipada, Jacintos secretary, testified that she prepared the mortgage contract & receipt of the loan, however she never saw Padilla. She was also instructed by Jacinto to notarize the contract by signing the name of Atty. Ricardo Neri. 3. Avegail Payos, Jacintos housemaid, testified that she simulated the signature of Emmanuel Gimarino, Deputy Register of Deeds of QC upon Jacintos instruction. This was done to make it appear that contract was registered & annotated in the TCT. Sps filed a case for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents under RPC Art. 315 against Jacinto. Counsel was arrested & detained by the NBI. Jacintos defense: 1. Information filed vs him had already been dismissed because of sps voluntary desistance. 2. He had no idea that Padilla will give a falsified TCT. He was a victim as well. 3. He had not been negligent in collecting the proceeds of the loan. He even advanced the full payment of the loan from his savings even if Padilla had not yet paid. IBP Recommendation: Suspension from the practice of law for 6mos. 1. Dismissal of the case was because of sps voluntary desistance & not a finding of Jacintos innocence. 2. Disciplinary proceedings are sui generis (unique?). Its primary objective is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to safeguard the admin of justice by protecting the court & the public from the misconduct of lawyers and remove lawyers who are unfit. It may proceed despite the dismissal of civil and/or criminal cases vs a lawyer. 3. Advancing the payment will not exonerate him. It can only mitigate his liability. A lawyer guilty of unlawful fraudulent or dishonest act may & should be held administratively liable.

Issues & Ratio: 1. WON administrative proceedings vs Jacinto may proceed despite the dismissal of the criminal case filed vs him. YES. The practice of law, being intimately affected w/public interest, is subject to the control & regulation of the State in order to promote public welfare. Consti vests this power on the SC. SC cannot be divested of its power by a voluntary desistance & quitclaim. A lawyer may be disciplined/suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional/private capacity, w/c renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Real party in interest in this case is the public/all good citizens who are after the proper administration of justice. 2. WON Jacinto is guilty of misconduct. YES. Jacinto acted both as a lawyer & an agent. As a lawyer, he was tasked to execute the mortgage contract, register & annotate the TCT & he even received a share in the interest earnings. A business transaction between a lawyer & his client is disfavored & discouraged. If such is necessary, it must be characterized w/utmost honesty & good faith. A higher standard must be observed. A lawyer must not take advantage of his clients credulity & ignorance. No presumption of innocence/improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor. Jacinto failed to perform his duties & responsibilities faithfully as well as to proctect the rts & interests of his clients, thereby he is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Disciplinary measures are imposed for his own good & the good of the entire membership of the Bar. Holding: Jacinto suspended from the practice of law for 6 months w/warning that a repetition of the same/similar offense will be dealt w/more severely.

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RUBIAS vs. BATILLER [1973] Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Iloilo Domingo D. Rubias, a lawyer, filed a suit to recover the ownership and possession of certain portions of lot located in Barrio General Luna, Iloilo w/c he bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante in 1956 against its present occupant, Isaias Batiller, who allegedly entered said portions of the lot on 2 occasions (1945&1959). He also prayed for damages & attorney's fees. Batiller, in his answer with counter-claim, claims the complaint does not state a cause of action, as he & his predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open & continuous possession since time immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question. He also claimed he suffered damages TC ordered a pre-trial conference where the parties agreed as to the following facts: o Francisco Militante claimed ownership of the subject parcel of land and before the war with Japan, he filed with the Iloilo CFI an application for the registration of title of the land. But during the war with Japan, the record of the case was lost before it was heard, so after the war he petitioned SC to reconstitute the record of the case. Record was reconstituted and the CFI heard the land registration case & after trial SC dismissed the application. Francisco appealed to the CA. o Pending the disposal of the appeal, Francisco sold subject land to Rubias and the sale was duly recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds o CA dismissed the application for Registration filed by Francisco o Rubias declared the land described for taxation purposes for 1957, 1961, and 1964. o Militante, immediate predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, has also declared the land for taxation purposes for 1945 and 1948 and paid the land taxes for 1940, for 1945-46, for 1947, for 1947 & 1948, for 1948, and for 1948 and 1949 o Tax Declaration in the name of Liberato Demontao for the land described therein was cancelled by Franciscos Tax Dec. Demontao paid the land tax for the yrs 1938 (50%) & 1959 o Batiller had declared for taxation purposes the lots under certain Tax Decs. and the land taxes for the years 1945 and 1946, for the year 1950, and for the year 1960. o The land claimed by the defendant as his own was surveyed & a plan approved by Director of Lands was issued o Then, plaintiff filed a forcible Entry and Detainer case against Batiller to which Batiller filed his answer o Municipal Court decided the case in favor of the defendant finding that plaintilffs complaint is unjustified, intended to harass the defendant and that Batiller, has a better right to possess the land in question having been in the actual physical possession thereof under a claim of title

many years before Francisco Militante sold the land to the plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed. And SC decided the case in favor of the Batiller. o During the trial of this case on the merit, the plaintiff & defendants will each prove by competent evidence certain information. The appellate court further related the developments of the case. Apparently, defendant's counsel manifested in open court that before any trial on the merit of the case could proceed he would file a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint which he did, alleging that plaintiff does not have a cause of action against him because the property in dispute which he (plaintiff) allegedly bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante was the subject matter of a case filed in the CFI of Iloilo, w/c case was brought on appeal to this Court and in w/c aforesaid case plaintiff was the counsel on record of his father-in-law. Invoking Arts. 1409 & 1491 of the CC, defendant claims that plaintiff could not have acquired any interest in the property in dispute as the contract plaintiff had with Francisco was inexistent and void. Plaintiff strongly opposed defendant's motion to dismiss claiming that defendant can not invoke aforesaid articles as Art. 1422, CC provides that 'The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected' Lower court dismissed plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff filed MFR w/c was denied by the lower court, hence this appeal

WON complaint was validly dismissed outright YES. The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established plaintiff's lack of cause of action and justified the outright dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the land in question was predicated on the sale made by his father-in-law, Francisco, in his favor, at a time when Militante's application for registration thereof had already been dismissed by the Iloilo land registration court and was pending appeal in the CA. With the Court of Appeals' 1958 final judgment affirming the dismissal of Militante's application for registration, the lack of any rightful claim or title of Militante to the land was conclusively and decisively judicially determined. Hence, there was no right or title to the land that could be transferred or sold by Militante's purported sale in 1956 in favor of plaintiff. WON contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law over the subject property was void as it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in dispute YES. Purchase by a lawyer of the property in litigation from his client is categorically prohibited by Art. 1491(5), CC, and that consequently, plaintiff"s purchase of the property in litigation from his client (assuming that his client could sell the same, since as already shown above, his client's claim to the property was defeated & rejected) was void & could produce no legal effect, by virtue of Art. 1409(7), CC w/c provides that contracts "expressly prohibited or declared void by law" are "inexistent & void from

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the beginning" & that "(T)hese contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived." Wolfson vs. Estate of Martinez relied upon by plaintiff was superseded by Director of Lands v. Abagat w/c held that the deed was invalid by virtue of the provisions of Art. 1459, CC, which prohibits lawyers and solicitors from purchasing property rights involved in any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. Art. 1491, CC prohibits in its 6 pars certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public officers and employees; (5) judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, & lawyers; & (6) others specially disqualified by law. Fundamental considerations of public policy render void and inexistent such expressly prohibited purchases. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and administrators (Art. 1491, CC), as to whose transactions, it has been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new contract, in which case its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the time of execution of such new contract. As applied to the case at bar, the lower court therefore properly acted upon defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of nullity of plaintiff's alleged purchase of the land, since its Juridical effects and plaintiffs alleged cause of action founded thereon were being asserted against defendantappellant.

Holding: Order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed

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LAIG vs. CA [1978] FACTS:

Register cancelled Laigs title in favor of Verzo Rosario inquired with the Register if it was true that her title was cancelled in favor of another person, after being informed that it was, she called the Director of Lands attention to the existence of the 2 deeds of sale Director requested Galero to explain; Galero denied the sale to Atty. Laig Bureau reported to the Director that it is recommended that the heirs of Atty. Laig to seek redress in court because the status of the property was no longer within the jurisdiction of the Bureau Galero was charged and convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents He died while serving sentence Rosario filed the present civil suit praying for the annulment of the sale in favor of Verzo and the cancellation of the second owners duplicate title or, in the alternative, ordering Verzo to reconvey the land to the Laigs plus P5000 by way of damages a. b. c.

Peter Galero was the grantee of a homestead patent for a parcel of land located at Labo, Camarines Norte He sold it to Mario Escuta for P300; Escuta, in turn, sold it to Florencio Caramoan Later, however, Galero sought to recover the land alleging that it violated Section 118 of the Public Land Act1 He was represented by Atty. Benito Laig After winning the suit, Galero sold the same land to Atty. Laig for P1500 plus attorneys fees due Atty. Laig for his legal services However, Laig faied to solicit the approval of the Sec. of Agriculture It was only after his death that his widow, Rosario, noticed the deficiency Rosario wrote the Register of Deeds, Baldomero Lapak giving notice of her claim over the property and requesting that she be informed of any claim of ownership by other parties so that she could take the necessary steps After the Register took note of her letter and informed her that the title was intact, she filed with the Bureau of Lands an affidavit that she wanted ownership over land to be transferred to her husbands name Bureau forwarded the letter to the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources with the recommendation that the deed of sale be approved for it violated no provisions of the Public Land Act Undersecretary Camus approved the deed of sales Meanwhile, Galero, assisted by Atty, Lapak (son of the Register of Deeds) sought in court the issuance of a second owners duplicate copy of title (Original Certificate of Title) alleging that he had lost his copy during WWII After a record-breaking 4 days, the Register issued the title sought On the same day, Galero sold the land to Carmen Verzo for P600 Verzo addressed a letter through the Director of Lands to the Secretary seeking his approval of the sale Director recommended that the sale be approved since it did not violate pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act Undersecretary Camus approved the sale in favor of Verzo Verzo registered and declared the land in her name for taxation purposes and has been paying realty taxes since then

Trial court declared: that Verzo is the rightful owner Lapak the Register guilty of negligence but exempted him from liability Director and Secretary also guilty of negligence but exempted them from liability on the theory that they are not responsible for the acts of their subordinates d. That Atty. Laig and his heirs slept on their rights in not having the first deed of sale registered CA affirmed ISSUES: I. WON VDA. DE LAIG IS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION. YES. Since Verzo was not acting in good faith and there is no valid inscription, the widow has, in good faith, the oldest title.

Article 1544 of the New Civil Code (paragraphs 2 and 3): Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who, in good faith, recorded it in the Register of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who, in good faith, was first in possession; and in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith

No alienation after 5 years and before 25 year after issuance of title shall be valid without approval of the Secretary of Agriculture

Records show that Verzo did not act in good faith:

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a.

At the time of the first sale, Atty. Laig was Carmen Verzos boarder, and Verzo even received his clients, including Galero. Laig must have mentioned the sale to Verzo considering the peculiarly intimate relationship of landlady and boarder in a small town b. One of the witnesses in the first sale was Verzos own sister, who was living with her c. There is proof of conspiracy between Verzo, Galero and father and son Lapak: Procurement of second copy of the duplicate of OCT was done without the required notice and hearing Issued only after a record 4 days, which would not have happened if Atty. Lapak were not the son of the Register of Deeds Register of Deeds Baldomero Lapak should have informed his son and Galero about the previous inquiry by the widow The second sale was done immediately after the death of Atty. Laig, during the time when his wife was still in Manila and was seeking all legal means to have the title transferred to her name Atty. Lapak was the same notary public before whom the second deed of sale was executed; he was also the same lawyer who assisted Verzo in writing to the Director and Secretary d. Verzo was aware of the earlier legal battle over the property, where Atty. Laig was counsel for Galero. She could not pretend to believe that the owners duplicate copy was lost during the war since that litigation was instituted only AFTER the war and the title was still intact then e. She knew that the property belonged to Atty. Laig because, whenever he was in Manila, Verzo communicates with him about his share of the harvest from the land II. WON THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE. NO. No malice can be gleaned. It should be borne in mind that both officials daily attend to thousands upon thousands of papers. WON REGISTER OF DEEDS BALDOMERO LAPAK SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE. YES. They violated the Land Registration act by assisting in fraudulently procuring or is privy to the fraudulent procurement of the certificate of title in favor of Verzo (Sec. 117, Act No. 496) (Only the Register) Article 27 of the CC, as a public servant or employee who caused material or moral loss by refusing or neglecting, without just cause, to perform his official duty They are also liable under Art. 19 of the CC (civil liability for failure to observe honesty and good faith in the performance of their duties as public officer and as member of the Bar), Art. 20 (for willfully or negligently causing damage to another), Art. 21 (in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and/or public policy

HOLDING: Cancel the OCT in favor of Verzo Issue a new one in favor of the heirs of Atty. Laig All respondents, except Director and Secretary, ordered to jointly and severally pay petitioner P10T in moral damages, P5T as attorneys fees, and costs.

III.

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DAROY vs. ABECIA [1998] Facts: Abecia was the counsel of the complainant (Daroy) in a case for forcible entry before the MTC. To satisfy the judgment in the case a parcel of land was sold in a public auction and this land was bought by Daroy. Daroy claimed that Abecia forged his signature in a deed of absolute sale, dated March 31, 1971, transferring the land to Jose Gangay. Gangay in turn conveyed the land to Nena Abecia, wife of Atty. Abecia. Daroy claimed that he discovered the fraud only in 1984. Daroy submitted in evidence a report of the NBI which shows that Daroys signature was written by a different hand. Abecia maintained that on March 31, 1971 Daroy sold the land to Gangay and the latter in turn sold the land to Nena Abecia on April 17, 1971. July 15, 1993 0 Commissioner Plaridel Jose rendered a report finding Abecia guilty of Malpractice and recommending his disbarment. The Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report but reduced the penalty to indefinite suspension. Abecia contends that Daroy very well knew of the execution of the deed of sale dated August 6, 1973 where he declared that he was accompanied by the complainant and his assignee, Nena Abecia, in implementing the deed of conveyance and possession on August 4, 1973 Issue: WON Abecia is guilty of Malpractice? NO Ratio: As early as August 4, 1973 Daroy already knew that the title of the land had already been transferred in the name of Abecias wife. Nor does it appear that the transfer was made without the knowledge of the Daroy. o Certain documents pertain to Mrs. Abecia as the assignee of Daroy o Erasmo Damasing, notary pubic who notarized the deed, affirmed that Daroy and his wife appeared before him on March 31, 1971 and, in his presence signed the document, It seems that the parties thought that Abecia cannot acquire the land because it was acquired by Daroy in a public sale held in order to satisfy the judgment in his favor in a case in which Abecia was the counsel. Article 1491 of the CC provides that: o Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another: o (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to

the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. Guevara v. Calalang: the prohibition in Art. 1491 does not apply to the sale of a parcel of land, acquired by a client to satisfy a judgment in his favor, to his attorney as long as the property was not the subject of the litigation. Abecia and Daroy thought that the transfer of the land to Abecia was prohibited and so they contrived a way whereby the land would be sold to Gangay and then Gangay would sell the land to Mrs. Abecia. Daroy never denied the claims of the notary public and a witness to the execution of the deed of sale. NBI writing was never called to testify in his finding.

Holding: Resolution dated March 26, 1994 of the IBP Board of Governors is Reconsidered and the complaint against Abecia is Dismissed.

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CANTILLER vs. POTENCIANO [1989]

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RAMONA VDA. DE ALISBO & NORBERTO ALISBO, petitioners, vs. ATTY. BENITO JALANDOON, SR., respondent [1991] March 16, 1970: Ramon Alisbo (Ramon), then insane, engaged the services of Jalandoon to commence an action to recover his share of the estate of the deceased sps Catalina Sales & Restituto Gozuma, decided on April 29, 1961 (action related to this will prescribe in 10 yrs. or April 29, 1971. Thus, Ramon had roughly a year more to go before cause of action prescribes). Ramon failed to file a motion for execution of the judgment w/in the 5-yr period. They agreed that Jalandoon will: 1. decide WON to file suit for the recovery of the share/claim 2. shoulder all expenses of litigation 3. be paid 50% of the value of the property recovered Jalandoon prepared a complaint for revival of the 1961 judgment on April 18, 1970 but such was only filed on Sept. 12, 1970 (5mos later). Plaintiff included Ramon & his brothers but was signed by Jalandoon alone. Defendant: Carlito Sales, judicial administrator.

5.

Mistakes were not deliberate or made w/malice there being no proof of collusion/conspiracy. He even stood to gain substantially.

First complaint was w/drawn by respondent who filed a 2nd complaint w/Ramon as the lone plaintiff. His brothers were impleaded as defendants. Signed by Atty. Bernardo Pablo & Jalandoon. Dec. 8, 1971: an amended complaint was filed w/8 other plaintiffs joining Ramon. Signed by Atty. Pablo alone as plaintiffs counsel. Carlitos defense: action for revival had already prescribed. CFI Negros Occ: dismissed complaint on ground of prescription. Although 1st complaint was w/in the 10-yr prescriptive period, such was null & void for Ramon was insane & w/o legal capacity to sue when he instituted the action. Amended complaint was filed beyond the prescriptive period. Jan. 2, 1974: petitioners charged Jalandoon w/: 1. having deliberately caused the dismissal of the complaint 2. having concealed from them the material fact that he was the former legal counsel of Carlito, their adversary in the probate proceedings. Jalandoons defense: he only discovered his previous professional relationship w/Carlito on Oct. 6, 1972, when the 1970 case was called for pre-trial. Period for revival of the judgment had already expired & so he asked for Ramons permission to allow him to w/draw from the case. He likewise informed the court. Request was granted. Sol Gen observations: Respondent erred in not verifying the status (capacity) of Ramon before filing the case. Respondent wasted precious time in postponing the motion to revive judgment & giving way to a motion to resolve pending incidents in the 1961 case. Respondent erred in dropping Ramons co-plaintiffs. The complaint would have been defective only in part had he not done so. (Wholly defective complaint could not stop the running of the prescriptive period unlike a complaint defective only in part.) Mistakes led to cases dismissal on ground of prescription.

Issue: WON Jalandoon is liable for the dismissal of the case. YES. Ratio: 1. His errors are so gross & glaring. They could not have resulted from mere negligence/lack of due care. 2. Defense that he was not aware that defendant in the 1970 case was his former client is unbelievable: a. He had several interviews w/ Ramon & his brother Norberto before he filed the complaint. b. He must have done some research on the court records of the case. c. To prepare the complaint, he needed to inform himself about the personal circumstances of the defendants. 3. In view of his former association w/Carlito, he should have declined Ramons offer on the ground of conflicting interest. He should have done so at the soonest possible time to give Ramon enough time to find a new lawyer. Canon No. 6, Paragraphs 1 & 2 of the Canons of Professional Ethics requires a lawyer to disclose to his client any conflicting interest w/c might influence the clients selection of counsel. He cannot represent conflicting interests w/o express consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. 4. Jalandoon used his position as Ramons counsel to favor his former client, Carlito by delaying Ramons action & thereby depriving latter of the fruits of his judgment w/c Jalandoon, as Carlitos counsel had vigorously opposed. Proof: errors noted by Sol Gen. Although Jalandoon learned about Ramons insanity on July 7, 1971, he only amended the complaint 5 months later (Dec. 1971 complaint) to implead Ramons legal guardian as plaintiff. However, by then, prescriptive period had run out. 5. Jalandoon betrayed his clients (Ramon) trust & did not champion his cause w/the whole-hearted fidelity, care & devotion hes obligated to give. This is more than simple negligence. Theres a hint of duplicity & lack of candor. Holding: Guilty of serious misconduct & infidelity. Suspended for 2 yrs. Feliciano, concurring & dissenting: Suspend him for 5 yrs. 1. Penalty is not commensurate w/the very serious character of the misconduct & infidelity. 2. Jalandoon utilized lawyers craft & profession to defeat & dissolve the rts of one client for the benefit of the other client. This is infidelity to the clients cause. 3. Those dealing w/members of the legal profession have the rt to expect not just a reasonable amount of professional learning & competence but also whole-hearted loyalty to clients cause. 4. Client must be free from the intolerable apprehension that his counsel may at some other time turn around to betray his confidence & to deliberately destroy the very rts that he went to him to defend & prosecute.

1. 2. 3.

4.

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NGAYAN vs. TUGADE [1991] Admin. Case in SC. Violation of subpar (e) & (f), Sec. 20, Rule 138 Atty. Faustino F. Tugade was formerly a counsel for complainants (Fulgencio, Tomasa & Bella Ngayan) either as defense counsel or private prosecutor in 5 Criminal Cases for light threat, for unjust vexation, for grave threats, for trespass & for threats, for grave threats & trespass & for grave defamation Complainants alleged that they asked respondent to prepare an affidavit to be used as basis for a complaint to be filed against Rowena Soriano & Robert Leonido as a consequence of the latter's unauthorized entry into complainants' dwelling. W/o thoroughly reading the same, Tomasa allegedly signed it as she was rushed to do the same. After signing, Tomasa noted a par. w/c didnt mention that Leonido was w/ Soriano when both suddenly barged into complainants' residence. Tomasa allegedly told Tugade about the omission. He crossed out the part Tomasa complained of in front of her & promised to make another affidavit. Complainants filed motions to discharge Tugade as their counsel Complainants allegedly made a follow up after the discharge and found that the name of Leonido was not included in the charge. Since the omission was remedied by their new counsel and the case was subsequently filed in court, the adverse parties filed a motion for reinvestigation & attached thereto the 1st affidavit of complainants w/c was crossed out. Complainants averred that: o the motion was filed by Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, a former classmate of Tugade. o that he was also Leonidos brothers lawyer in an insurance co. o that he himself executed & submitted an affidavit for Leonido & Soriano controverting complainants affidavit despite having prepared complainants affidavit when he was still their counsel o that before he executed & submitted his affidavit, Tugade sent a personal letter to Fiscal Beza denouncing complainants and stating that he is filing criminal and civil cases against them. Complainants charged Tugade for violation of par. (e) and (f) of Sec. 20, Rule 138, ROC: "(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval; "(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witnesses, unless required by the justice of the cause with w/c he is charged;" Par. (e) was violated when the Ngayans edited affidavit was submitted as evidence against the Ngayans in the motion for reinvestigation while par. (f) was violated it when he sent a letter to the fiscal. Tugade was required to answer but failed to file one. Sol. Gen. set a complaint for hearing but Tugade never appeared on any date.

Sol. Gen made findings of facts and said: The inaction of respondent to the resolutions of this Honorable Courtindicate that respondent has not obeyed the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities and he has not conducted himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients (Sec. 3, Rule 138, ROC). Further, lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processesThis lack of concern shown by respondent regarding the matter that involved the very foundation of his right to engage in the practice of law would show how much less he would regard the interest of his clients. He thus recommended that Tugade be disbarred & his name dropped from attorney's roll.

WON Tugades conduct was unprofessional and violated Sec. 3 and pars. (e) & (f) of Sec. 20, Rule 138, ROC YES. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, & for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, case against Tugade must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Tugade furnished the adverse parties in a certain crim. case w/ a copy of their discarded affidavit, thus enabling them to use it as evidence against complainants. This actuation constitutes betrayal of trust & confidence of his former clients in violation of par. (e), Sec. 20, Rule 138, ROC. Inasmuch as Tugade failed to answer the complaint filed against him and despite due notice on four occasions, he consistently didnt appear on the scheduled hearing set by the Office of the Sol.Gen., this claim is still uncontroverted This partiality could be explained by the fact that respondent is the former classmate of Atty. Gaminda, the adverse parties' counsel & the fact that respondent is the lawyer of the Leonidos brother Executing & submitting an affidavit as exhibit for Leonido & Soriano demonstrates clearly an act of offensive personality against complainants, violative of the 1st part of par. (f). Likewise, respondent's act of joining the adverse parties in celebrating their victory over the dismissal of the case against them shows not only his bias against the complainants but also constitutes a degrading act on the part of a lawyer. Tugade's failure to answer the complaint against him & his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful order, of the court & illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Sec. 3, Rule 138, ROC But the Court held that disbarment is too harsh & thus penalized him with suspension from the practice of law for a period of 1 year.

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LEGARDA vs. CA [1992] FACTS:

Victoria Legarda was defendant in a civil suit filed by New Cathay House (NCH) seeking to compel Legarda to sign a lease contract over property that the petitioner intended to use as a restaurant Atty. Antonio Coronel (former law school dean) entered his appearance as counself for Legarda, and asked for an extension of 10 days in which to file an answer Despite the fact that the extension was granted, Legarda failed to file an answer within the extended period She was declared in default and the decision was rendered in favor of NCH and ordering Legarda to execute the contract and to pay damages and fees amounting to almost P389T Atty. Coronel received a copy of the decision but failed to appeal within the reglementary period; thus, the decision became final Upon motion of NCH, a writ of execution was granted where the property in question was levied by the sheriff and sold to NCH, who was the highest bidder After the one-year redemption period expired, the sheriff issued a final deed of sale Legarda, represented by her attorney-in-fact Ligaya Gomez, filed a petition with the CA for annulment of the judgment against her on the grounds that it was obtained through fraud and not supported by the allegations and evidence submitted in court (she alleges that a representative of NCH assured her that he was agreeable to the terms of the lease she imposed and that NCH would withdraw the complaint, which prompted her to tell her lawyer not to file an answer anymore) NCH filed a consolidated comment, after which Atty. Coronel filed a reply The CA found the allegation too improbable because: 1. if it was true that there was an agreement between Legarda and the representative, her lawyer would have asked NCH to file the proper motion to dismiss or withdraw compaint with the court 2. if NCH had refused to do so, the lawyer would have filed Legardas answer anyway to prevent her from being declared in default 3. or the lawyer would have prepared a compromise agreement It dismissed the petition, saying that: 1. any conscientious lawyer, and more so a former law dean, would normally have done these in order to protect the interests of his client, instead of leaving it to the initiative of the plaintiff to withdraw its complaint 2. This is simply a case of negligence on the part of defendants counsel, which is not a grounds for reopening a case because, if it were allowed, there would never be an end to a suit for as long as a new

3.

counsel could be employed who could allege that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned Thus, Legarda is bound by the acts of her counsel and could not complain

Again, Atty. Coronel did not lift a finger to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the CA decision to the SC NCH sent Legarda, through the Coronel Law Office, a notice to vacate the property 3 days from receipt thereof. Atty. Coronel did not inform his client of the demand Legarda only learned of the demand from Atty. Coronels secretary after she (Legarda) persistently phoned. Legarda, now represented by new counsel, filed a petition contending that the decisions of the courts below are null and void as she was deprived of her day in court and divested of her property without due process of law through the gross, pervasive and malicious negligence of previous counsel, Atty. Coronel. SC granted the petition: 1. nullified prior decisions of the lower courts 2. nullified sheriffs certificate of sale 3. directed NCH to reconvey the property to Legarda 4. directed the Register of Deeds to cancel NCHs registration and to issue one in favor of Legarda 5. required Atty. Coronel to show cause within 10 days from notice why he should not be held administratively liable for his acts and omissions which resulted in grave injustice to the petitioner On the 10th day, he asked for a 30 day extension, alleging as reason pressure of work consisting of daily hearings as well as the more than 80 civil and criminal cases against the Marcoses The extension was granted, but it expired without answer A day after the expiration, he asked for another 30 day extension because he was, at that time, confined at the St. Lukes Hospital for various ailments

ISSUES: I. WON THE EXTENSION SHOULD BE GRANTED. NO. Although the reason seems to warrant another extension, it was not granted because it was filed one day late. Motions for extension of time is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court in view of attaining substantial justice. The show-cause resolution was addressed to him not in his capacity as a lawyer of a litigant, but to him in his personal capacity as a lawyer subject to the disciplinary power of the Court

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II.

That he failed to heed the directive reflects an unbecoming disrespect towards the SCs orders As a lawyer, he is expected to recognize the authority of the SC and obey its lawful processes and orders. His failure to show cause is considered a waiver of his rights to heard and to due process. WON ATTY. CORONEL SHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE. YES. He violated Canon 18, which mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence; and particularly Rule 18.03, which requires that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Legarda would not have gone through the travails attending the disposition of the case against her and the devastating consequence on her property rights had Dean Coronel exercised even the ordinary diligence of a member of the Bar A well-know practicing lawyer and deal of a law school is expected to extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to his client. Unfortunately, he appears to have abandoned the cause of his client and did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the answer Moreover, this is not the only case where Atty. Coronel appears to exhibit a pattern of negligence, inattention to his obligations as counsel, sloppiness and superciliousness (e.g. In Imelda Marcos v. PCGG, it was only in the last day of the period granted to him that he showed initial efforts to comply with the Resolution by filing a motion for a 20-day exension) He was both unfair and disrespectful to the SC and has unduly delayed the disposition of the case The moment a clients cause is taken, the lawyer covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his clients cause makes him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter. Moreover, he owes fealty, not only to his client, but also to the Court of which he is an officer. Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice; strict compliance with ones oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is imperative. The profession is a matter of public interest.

For failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the interest of his client and causing material prejudice to the latter: 1. Motion for extension is denied 2. Found guilty 3. sentenced to 6 months suspension from practice of law with a warning that a repetition shall be dealt with more severely

HOLDING:

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WACK-WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB vs. CA [1959] GR No. 15910 Petronilo Arcangel, a former employee of the Wack Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc., filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a money claim for overtime services rendered to said employer, for unenjoyed vacation leave, moral damages and attorney's fees. The employer having filed its answer to the complaint, the case was accordingly set for trial. At the hearing of May 6, 1955, however, neither the defendant (employer) nor its counsel, Balcoff, Poblador and Angel Cruz appeared notwithstanding the fact that they were duly notified of the hearing since March 22, 1955; hence, the plaintiff was allowed to continue presenting his evidence without the presence of defendant. May 5, 1955 Wack Wack manifested its desire to replace their counsel Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador in this case with Law Office Juan Chuidian. Atty. Jesus Sayoc of the Law Office Juan Chuidian conferred with Atty. Angel Cruz of Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador for the purpose of securing the court file in this case and effect the substitution of attorney. Unfortunately, Mr. Balcoff was not in the office at the moment and attorney Angel Cruz declared he had no authority to turn over to Law office of Juan T. Chuidian the court papers and file in this case; besides, there were unpaid bill due Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador. It was agreed that inasmuch as Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador were still the attorneys of record in the case, Atty. Balcoff would sent a representative of his law office to appear at the hearing of the case of the following day, May 6, 1955 in order to ask for postponement of the case. Consequently, nobody in Law Office Juan Chuidian appeared in behalf of defendant-appellant on May 6, 1955 before the Trial Court. The records of the case were turned over to Law Office Juan T. Chuidian only on May 13, 1955 after Law Office Juan T. Chuidian had received on May 12, 1955 through Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador a copy of the decision dated May 10, 1955 of the Trial Court. On the other hand, Atty. Angel Cruz or any associate lawyer of Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador did not appear for defendant-appellant on May 6, 1955. May 10, 1955 Lower court rendered a judgment awarding Arcangel 7,702.78 May 14, 1955 - law firm of Juan Chuidian, on behalf of the defendant employer, filed a petition to set aside the judgment on the ground of misunderstanding, mistake and excusable neglect, which petition was denied by the lower court in its order of May 31. GR No. 15902 R February 18, 1953 Antonino Bernardo filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a claim against the Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. for overtime pay, unenjoyed vacation and sick leaves from 1946 to 1951 and attorney's fees. As the employer denied the claim, the case was set for trial. May 12, 1955 after about 8 previous postponements, nobody appeared for the employer although said defendant was represented from the

commencement of the proceeding by Atty. Angel Cruz and was duly notified of the hearing since March 26, 1955. May 14, 1955 the lower court adjudged the plaintiff entitled to the claim, and sentenced defendant-employer to pay the total sum of P26,422.78. Wack Wack represented by the law office of Juan Chuidian, filed a petition for relief from the order authorizing the Deputy Clerk of Court to receive plaintiff's evidence and for the re-opening of the case. This petition was denied. Arguments of Wack Wack: o It was only in the afternoon of May 11, 1955, that the records of this case were sent to the Law Office, and that Atty. Juan T. Chuidian was then out of town and, consequently, nobody knew what action to take in this case o May 12, 1955, Atty. Juan T. Chuidian telephoned the law office and requested that one of the assistant attorneys appear at the sala in connection with the scheduled hearing of the above-entitled case, and to move for the postponement thereof on the obvious reason that the undersigned law firm was not prepared right then and there to proceed with the trial of the case inasmuch as the facts of the case were not then sufficiently known to any of the associate attorneys. Efforts to postpone the trial was fruitless. Wack Wack assailed the decision of the Trial Court on the following grounds: o that counsel's tardiness or delay as well as his unpreparedness to go to trial are accidental or may be considered as excusable negligence o that the trial court should have allowed the motion for postponement Issue: WON the trial court abused its discretion in denying its petition for relief from the order authorizing the reception of plaintiff's evidence in the absence of the defendant and the judgment rendered in the case? NO Ratio: GR No. 15910 As of May 6, 1955, the law firm of Balcoff and Poblador and Angel Cruz were still the employer's counsel of record, the law office of Juan Chuidian having entered its appearance in the case only on May 14, 1955. As such counsel of record, said law firm must have known that, its impending relief as counsel for the defendant notwithstanding, it is under obligation to protect the client's interest (which includes appearance at the hearing) until its final release from the professional relationship with such client. The court could recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected. Thus, any agreement or arrangement such counsel of record and its client may reach regarding the presentation of the client' case in the court is purely their private concern. Proceedings in the court cannot be made to depend on them. The lack of coordination or understanding between the two law firms in the instant case cannot be considered as a legal excuse or falling within the ambit of excusable negligence to justify the

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granting of relief from the order declaring the client in default, or as in the case, from a decision entered after presentation of evidence in his absence. GR No. 15910 and GR No. 15902 The lack of coordination or understanding of counsel cannot be considered as a legal excuse or falling within the ambit of excusable negligence to justify the granting of relief from the order declaring to justify the granting of relief from the order declaring the client in default or from a decision rendered after presentation of evidence in his absence. Held: No error in the decision of the CA.

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BLAZA vs. ARCANGEL [1967] Canon 18.04, a lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for info. Blanza and Pasion complain that way back in April, 1955, Arcangel volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims to their husbands deaths as PC soldiers. They gave Arcangel documents and affixed their signatures in blank papers. But, subsequently respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims. 6 years later, they asked for the documents back and resp refused to return them. Arcangel answered to Fiscal Rana, to whom this case was referred for investigation, report and recommendation by the SolGen. He admits receiving the documents, but only for photostating purposes. He didnt return them because of the complainants refusal to hand him the photostating costs, preventing him from getting the documents from the Photostat service. HE had advanced payment and turned over everything, documents and Photostat and all to the court. Fiscal Rana recommended resps exoneration after finding out that the latter didnt charge for his services. At most he be reprimanded only. But Solgen feels that resp deserves at least a severe reprimand considering his failure to attend to nthe claims for 6 yrs., failure to return immediately the documents despite repeated demands, and to Pasion for allegedly failing to return all her documents. Only resp thru counsel appeared at the hearing, resp submitted his memorandum, annexing an affidavit executed by Blanza asking for dismissal. Resp submits tht he wasnt obliged to follow up the claims since there was no agreement for his compensation as t6heir counsel. HE FORGETS that he volunteered his services, and was not legally entitled to fees, but having established the atty-client relationship voluntarily, he was bound to attend to the claims with due diligence. Issue: WON Arcangel is guilty of violating professional ethics. NO and WON he should be reprimanded. YES he deserves to be reminded of the nature of being a lawyer. The evidence adduced is insufficient to warrant the taking of disciplinary action against resp. There is no clear preponderance of evidence substantiating the accusations against him. Resps explanation as to the delay infilling the claims and returning the documents has not been controverted by complainants. On the contrary they said that they were asked to shoulder the photostating costs, but they didnt give any money for it. Moreover the

documents and their Photostats were actually returned by respondent during the fiscals investigation with him paying for it. The condition of the Photostats themselves, support resp allegations that they remained in possession of Photostat service for the failure of the owners to withdraw upon payment. Complainants are partly to b lame for the delay in filing their clqaims. As for the allegations of the documents of Pasion, resp denies it. Fiscal Rana made no findings on the matter. The affidavit of Blanza cannot prejudice Pasion because res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Still there is equiponderance of evidence which must necessarily redound to resps benefit. Complainant Pasion had another opportunity to substantiate her charges in the hearing set for Oct. 21, 1963 but she let it go. Neither she or her counsel appeared. Court is constrained to dismiss the charges against resp for being legally insufficient, yet, the court must counsel against his acts as a member of the bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of law her is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. RESP HERE HAS NOT LIVED UP TO THAT IDEAL STANDARD. IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO HAVE COMPLAINANTS WAIT AND HOPE FOR 6 LONG YEARS. UPON THEIR REFUSAL TO CO-OPERATE, RESP SHOULD HAVE TERMINATED THE PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP, INSTEAD OF KEEPING THEM HANGING. Voted not be reprimanded but in a legal sense let this be a reminder to Arcangel of what the high standards of his chosen profession require of him. Dismissed.

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ANGEL ALBANO, complainant, vs. ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA, respondent [1967] Disbarment case filed by Albano vs. Atty. Coloma Albanos version: 1. During the Japanese occupation, Delfina Aquino, Albanos mom, & Albano engaged the services of Coloma. 2. Albano alleged that after liberation & reorganization of the courts, Coloma failed to expedite hearing & termination of the case. 3. They then hired another lawyer. However, Coloma intervened to collect her attys fees. 4. Coloma presented a document stipulating that Albano & his mom promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33 1/3% of whatever could be recovered in land/damages. 5. Albano alleged that his signature & the writing after his mothers name were forged. NBI studied the document along w/the sample signature of Albano & it concluded that the signature in the document was not Albanos. 6. He further alleged that hes a poor man who could hardly pay for the services of a lawyer in this disbarment case and that Coloma is a very influential woman in their province who was a member of the Provinical Board. Colomas defense: specific denial 1. There was an agreement between her & complainants that she will receive 1/3 of whatever land & damages could be obtained for the plaintiffs. 2. She filed more than 20 papers & pleadings, went to trial for several days and she finally obtained a favorable judgment for the petitioners in the CFI & CA. CA took note of the fact that she has been petitioners counsel for 7 yrs rendering valuable service. Favorable decisions were almost wholly result of her efforts. Shes been a member of the Bar since 1940 & thus, shes entitled to have reasonable compensation for her services. Shes entitled to 1/3 of the land & damages recoverable by plaintiffs. 3. She served her clients faithfully, efficiently, continuously, & to the best of her knowledge & capacity. Thus, her dismissal was w/o cause & w/o her consent. After the case was won, plaintiffs stopped seeing her & even disowned their own contract. 4. Plaintiffs really signed the contract in the presence of attesting witnesses who confirmed such. She denies NBIs findings & further invoking the trial court & CAs findings that the contract is genuine. Albano & his sister attest to such fact too. Determination of WON a document is genuine lies w/in the knowledge & competence of a judge. Testimony of instrumental witnesses will suffice w/o the court being bound even by real experts. 5. Albano is not a poor man. Through her efforts, he was richer by about P100k (P85k in realty + P15k in cash as damages).

She was not using her influence as a board member. She was not yet part of the board when she became complainants lawyer. 7. She has been a lawyer for more than 20 yrs & she strictly adhered to the ethics of the profession & has been guided by the principles of justice, fairness & respect for individual rights. 8. People of Ilocos Norte well know that Albano has no sense of justice, no integrity to preserve, no honor to treasure & no future to build while they (people) have supported Coloma in her aspirations. 9. Cause of action barred by prior judgment & by the statute of limitations. Sol Gen: case be dismissed. Issue: WON Coloma was remiss in her duties as Albanos lawyer & thus not entitled to the contingent fee. NO. Ratio: (mostly based on Sol Gens report) 1. Sol Gens findings reveal Colomas utmost diligence & conscientiousness. 2. Genuiness of the contract was affirmed by the trial court & CA and strengthened by the ff: a. Sergio Manuel, witness to that document, testified that Albano & his mom indeed signed the document. Negative testimonies of Albano & Aquino will not prevail over the positive testimony of Manuel & Coloma. b. Verbal agreement re attorneys fees witnessed by Rosario Lagasca, related to the plaintiffs, and Silvina Guillermo. c. Plaintiffs claim that Coloma agreed to a P2k contingent fee. Court however finds that no lawyer in his right mind would accept such a miserable fee. d. Testimony of Felicidad Albano, petitioners sister, who testified that she authorized her brother & mother to give 1/3 contingent fee to Coloma. 3. CA ruling is now res judicata & bars Albano from raising the question anew in these disbarment proceedings. Party cant escape the bar of a previous judgment against him in a new suit on the same cause of action by varying the form of his action/adopting a different method of presenting his case. 4. NBIs findings lacks persuasive force there being no reason or basis for its conclusion. 5. Contingent fee was reasonable. 6. If theres anyone guilty of bad faith, its Albano & his mom who tried to deny their agreement. Even if the case was not barred by res judicata, evidence would still exonerate Coloma from liability. 7. RELEVANT PART: Counsel, any counsel, whos worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. A lawyers only capital is his brains & skill acquired at a tremendous cost not only in money but also in the expenditure of time & energy. Thus, hes entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. Such acts of a client must be avoided & condemned. Reputation in the legal profession is a plant of tender growth & its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored. Colomas good name was marred by petitioners reckless disregard of the truth & this calls for the severest censure. Had there been any showing of nonfeasance/malfeasance on the

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part of the lawyer, Court will not hesitate to take the appropriate disciplinary action. Holding: Charges against Coloma dismissed. QUIRANTE vs. IAC [1989[ APPEAL by certiorari to review the judgment of the then IAC Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a contract with a building contractor named Norman Guerrero. The Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN) acted as bondsman for Guerrero. In view of Guerrero's failure to perform his part of the contract w/in the period specified, Dr. Casasola, thru his counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued both Guerrero & PHILAMGEN before the CFI Manila, now the RTC of Manila for damages, w/ PHILAMGEN filing a cross-claim against Guerrero for indemnification. RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff by rescinding the contract; ordering Guerrero & PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages & attorney's fees; ordering Guerrero alone to pay liquidated damages; and ordering PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff the amount of the surety bond. PHILAMGENs MFR was denied by the TC. PHILAMGEN filed a notice of appeal but the same was not given due course having been filed out of time. TC thereafter issued a writ of execution A petition to quash the writ of execution & to compel the TC to give due course to the appeal was filed with the IAC. But the petition was dismissed, so the case was elevated to this Court Meanwhile, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow & several children as survivors. On June 18, 1983, herein Quirante filed a motion in the TC for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. He claims, the oral agreement regarding the fees between him and the late Dr. Casasola was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow and the 2 daughters of the deceased. He avers that pursuant to said agreement, the attorney's fees would be computed as follows: o In case of recovery of the P120K surety bond, the attorney's fees shall be P30K. o In case damages are awarded in excess of the bond, it shall be divided equally bet Casasolas Heirs, Atty. Quirante & Cruz TC granted motion for confirmation & denied the MFR of the order of confirmation. These are the 2 orders w/c are assailed in this case

jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in w/c the services of counsel have been rendered." What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however, different from attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution. Petitioner's claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors. However, the confirmation of attorney's fees is premature. The petition for review on certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN "may or may not ultimately result in the granting to the Isasola (sic) family of the total amount of damages" awarded by the TC. Since the main case from w/c the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise hasnt become final yet, determination of the propriety of said fees & the amt thereof should be held in abeyance. The remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client An attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been recovered from w/c the fee is to be paid Besides, the supposed contract is subject to certain contingencies Moreover, the issue on the alleged confirmation of the attorney's fees by some of the heirs of the deceased should be likewise determined by the court a quo inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the same contingencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of attorney's fees by both petitioners herein. The Court thus takes exception to and reject that portion of the decision of the respondent court which holds that the alleged confirmation to attorney's fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto, since it is also premised on the eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family, hence the same objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding may be preemptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented for consideration by the trial court.

WON counsel may already claim his attorneys fees Counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the 1st alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the min. prescribed by law for the

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Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc. [January 8, 1973] Mr. Zulueta, Mrs. Zulueta and Ms. Zulueta were passengers of Pan Am. Mr. Zulueta left the terminal and went to the beach in search for a place that would be suitable for his purpose (where it would not be visible for the people in the plane and in the terminal). He came to a place abound 400 yards away from the terminal. Mr Zulueta was gone for almost one hour (but before the plain left) and Pan Am was contending that it could have not taken him that long relieve himself and that there were 8 commodes at the terminal toilet for men. (his search for a place to answer the call of nature) Capt. Zentner claims that Mr. Zulueta has been off-loaded due to drinking and belligerent attitude but according to plaintiff (Zulueta) the order to offload all Zuluetas, their luggage and overcoats and other effects handcarried by them came as a result of the altercation that happened between Capt. Zentner and Mr. Zulueta when the latter was not cowed by the arrogant tone of Capt. Zentner. After Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded, Capt. Zentner had the intention of keeping him stranded for a minimum period of one week at a cost of $13.30 per day. Mrs. Zulueta filed for the dismissal of the case as far as she is concerned because she settled all her differences with Pan Am for P50,000 Lower Court awarded P75,000 as attorneys fees. PANAM impugns the award of attorneys fees upon the ground that no penalty should be imposed upon the right to litigate; that, by law, it may be awarded only in exceptional cases; that the claim for attorneys fees has not been proven; and that it is patently exorbitant. Issues 1. WON the amount of damages awarded were excessive 2. WON Mr. Zulueta has the right to recover moral or exemplary damages 3. WON the award of attorneys fees are proper? 4. WON the non-enforce of the compromise agreement between the defendant and Mrs. Zulueta was valid. NO Ratio: 1. NO Award for damages is purely academic value. Zuluetas had a contact of carriage with Pan Am which binds the latter, for a substantial monetary consideration paid by the Zuluetas, to transport them to Manila with utmost diligence. Pan Am did not only fail to comply with its obligation but they also acted in a manner calculated to humiliate Mr. Zulueta, chastise him, make him suffer, and cause him the greatest possible inconvenience, by leaving him in a desolate island. 2. YES Exemplary damages are not recoverable in quasi-delicts except when the defendant has acted with gross negligence. In the present case, the agent of Pan Am has acted with malice and evident bad faith. If gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason it is imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith.

3.

4.

YES Article 2208 of the CC expressly authorizes the award of attorneys fees when exemplary damages are awarded as well as in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees be recovered. The court deems it equitable to award attorneys fees considering the exceptional circumstances, particularly the bad faith with which the defendants agent acted, the place where and the conditions under which Zulueta was left at Wake Island, the absolute refusal of the defendants manager in Manila to take any step whatsoever to alleviate Mr. Zuluetas predicament and the racial factor that had tainted the decision of the defendants agent. Factors that were considered by the court in awarding attorneys fees: o Quantity and quality of the services rendered by the counsel appearing on record o Nature of the case and the amount involved therein o Prestige as one of the most distinguished members of the legal profession NO The payment that was made to Mrs. Zulueta is effective insofar as it is deductible from the award, and, because it is due (or part of the amount due) from the defendant with or without its compromise agreement with Mrs. Zulueta. It is ineffective insofar as the conjugal partnership is concerned. Article 113 of the Civil Code provides that the husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife except (2) if they have in fact been separated for at least one year. This provision refers to suits in which the wife is the principal or real party in interest. In this case it is the husband that us the main party in interest, both as the person principally aggrieved and as administrator of the conjugal partnership he having acted in this capacity when he entered into the contract of carriage with Pan Am and paid the amount due with funds from the conjugal partnership to which the amount recoverable for breach of the contract belong. She is not allowed by law to waive her share in the conjugal partnership, before the dissolution thereof. She cannot even acquire any property by gratuitous title, without the husbands consent, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree. The law does not favour a settlement with one of the spouses, both of whom are plaintiffs or defendants in a common cause, such as the defense of the rights of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of the compromise is to jeopardize the solidarity of the family. The award was made in their favour collectively. Presumption is that the purpose of the trip was for the common benefit of the spouses and that the money had come from the conjugal funds, for, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

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Pan Am claims that the damages are not among those forming part of the conjugal partnership pursuant to art. 153 of the CC. Sison v Suntay On May 14, 1934. Jose Suntay a Fil cit died in Amoy, Fookien China, leaving properties in the Phils and China and children of the 1st marriage with deceased Manuela Cruz, namely Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana Aurora, Emiliano and Jose, Jr. and a child by 2 nd marriage to Ma. Natividad Lim Billian(alive), named Silvano. And intestate estate proceeding was instituted and letters of administration issues to Apolonio, and when the latter died, to Federico. Oct. 31, 1934. The surviving widow filed a petition for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed by the late Jose Suntay. The petition was denied because of the loss of the said will and insufficiency of evidence to establish its loss. Appeal was taken from this order and it was held by the SC that there was sufficient evidence to prove the loss of the will and the case was remnded for further proceedings. The petition for probate was subsequently dismissed by this Court because an attesting witness who was in China couldnt come to the Phils. War broke out, After liberation, Silvano filed an alyternative petition praying for the probate of the will which was allegedly executed by Jose B. Suntay in the Phils. In Nov 1929 or of the will allegedly executed by said deceased in Amoy , Fokien China on Jan 4, 1931. Administrator Federico filed a motion thru his lawyers Roxas, Picazo, and Mejia asking for dismissal of the petition. The alternative petition for probate filed was heard before the court, and in all the hearings, Federico was represented by his lawyers. After the hearing was terminated, the parties filed their respective memorandum. Federicos by his lawyers. The lower court Judge Pecson issued an order(1st) granting trhe petition of Silvano. Federico filed thru his attys a MFR and new trial. Written opposition to this petition was filed by Atty. Claro m Recto for Silvano. While Federicos MFR and new trial was pending resolution, Atty. Sison was engaged as counsel by Federico in substitution of his former attys without any contract as to the amount of his services, the agreement being that claimant would be given a reasonable compensation. Atty. Sison filed a reply to the opposition of Atty. Recto and appeared and argued orally at the hearing of the mfr and new trial. The lower court issued an order(2nd) granting the MFR and denying the alternative petition of Silvino. Atty. Recto filed an MFR of the 2nd order of Judge Pecson and Stty. Sicon filed a simple opposition to this moption. The MFR of Mr. Recto was denied and appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. The SC finally rendered a decision affirming the validity of the order of the lower court. The MFR of the decision having been denied, the decision became final. Sison had also acted as counsel for the resp-administartor in

the motion filed by Recto on behalf of Silvino, asking for the removal of Federico as administrator. Denied. Sison had further rendered service as counsel for the Federico in the approval of the latters accounting, in the motion to fix the fees of the administrator and in the motion asking that the administrator be authorized to mnortgage this estate in the sum of 150,000 various times during the period that claimant was respondent-administrators coun sel, he secured from the latter sums amounting to P67,000 on account of his services. After the termination of the case in the SC, Sison, made demands on Federico for the payment of his professional fees in the sum of 400k, but the latter refused to pay this amount alleging that the amount of 67k which had already received from Federico as fees is sufficient compensation for claimants services. In view of the refusal of Federico to pay the remaining claim of 333k as attys fees, Sison filed a petition in this case asking for the annotation of the charging lien and for the allowance and payment of his attys fees of 400k. The lower court reached the conclusion that the professional services rendered were not chargeable to the estate and that even if chargeable, the amount of 67k already received by Sison constituted sufficient compensation for his professional services. Consequently claim was denied. Accdg. To lower court, Sicons work in connection with the alleged will did not redound to the protection or benefit of the estate of the Suntays, because will or no will the estate continued to be the same. It appears however, that the parties agreed in the pre-trial conference, that claimant Atty. Sison was engaged as counsel for resp-administrator in the latters capacity as such in the motion of said claimant, under the circumstances alleged in said motion Issue: WON Sison is entitled to compensation. YES Sison rendered legal services for the benfit of the intestate proceedings, and pursuant to his understanding with the administrator should be paid a reasonable compensation. Courtys agreed that the fixing of such compensation is a difficult and delicate task. 22 of Rule 127 of the RoC provides that an atty shall be entitlked to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation foe his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the atty. The SC has held the ff. circumstances to be considered in determnining the compensation of an atty.: a.) mount and char of services rendered; b) labor, time and trouble involved; c) nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; d.) the responsibility imposed; e.) amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy, or involved in the employment; f.) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; g.) the professional character and social standing of the atty; h.) the results secured; i.) WON the fee is absolute or contingent, it being a recognized rule that an atty may properly charge a much larger fee when it is to be a contingent than when it is not.

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The claim of Sicson is principally based on his services in connection with the reconsideration and setting aside of the order of the lower court admitting to probate the last will and the recording of the Chinese will of the deceased Jose Suntay and for his services in connection with the appeal taken from the order of the lower court, reconsidering its order denying the alternative petition of Silvino Suntay. Sison lays stress in having secured the reversal of the 1 st order of the lower court, because he alleges that if this order were not reversed 2/3 of the estate of the deceased Jose Suntay would have gone to Silvino and the latters mother, whereas, with the deceased being declared as having died intestate. The heirs participated equally in the distribution of this estate which would be 1/10 share for each one of the ten children. The SC does not agree that the credit for such reversal should go to the former counsel of Federico since the 2nd order setting aside the previous order is principally based on the arguments embodied in the MFR by Sison. Sison had been a successful practitioner before he became a Governor, a Senator, Sec. Of the Interior, Justice of CA, not to mention other high positions he now held. Precisely because of those qualifications that the Federico sought his services to convince Judge Pecson to reverse himself - a task very difficult indeed, partly because judges render their verdicts only after mature deliberations, and partly because of the natural human reluctance to admit ones error. It may be added that such a task appeared to be doubly difficult by the opposition of the winning side, represented by the brilliant and successful lawyer Recto among whose qualifications may be mentioned his having worthily occupied a seat in this SC. The case for the Federico in opposition to the will had been competently handled by Sison. That he has been helped by anassistant in his office, cannot in any way reduce the compensation he is entitled to receive; he has paid such assistant. He was not expected to do everything personally; he could employ his assistants to do research for him, under his supervision and responsibility. The general does not fo the fighting; he directs and supervises. YET nobosy denies him credit for the victory won in battle. What is the reasonable compensation for the services rendered by Sison.? In determining what would be a reasonable compensation for the atty for an admninistartor or executor, the size and value of the decedents estate should be taken in consideration. But the services performed should be considered. Accdg. To Sison the value of the property involved in the estate is P4m. Therefore, Sison concludes at 10% my attys fee should be 400k from which 67k may be deducted; and that entitles me to demand as I demand 333k as additional fees. He introduced the testimony of Marcelo Balatbat, a real estate expert native of Hagonoy , Bulacan. After examination submitted by Balatbatr, court concludes that the estate should be assessed roughly at P3,695,000. The price at which some heirs disposed of their shares may not be taken as the basis of computation, because the sales had taken place during the war emergency in 1942 or

were affected by the uncertainties resulting from the pending contest of the wills. Henjce the purpose of computing the claimants compensation, we could say that the litigation or the intestate involved over 3 i/2 million pesos or that his services to the intestate prevented the loss to it of 2/3 of such amount (2,462,000) Sison insists on 10% of the value of the estate, relying principally on Quintillan v Degala, wherein this Court approved payment of P50k for professional services in opposing two wills concerning an estate or half a million pesos. But there was a contract for contingent fees: 30% if successful, none if unsuccessful. HERE no such contract! Although it is usual to insert in promissory notes or mortgage deeds, a stipulation for payment of 10% attys fees in case of litigation, still we doubt if the same rate would be fixed where the amount involved ran into hundreds of thousands or millions. Jurisprudence have resulted to many rates , howevere none of these involved more than half a million. Federico brings to the attention of the court an instance where the atty got P15k only after handling 2 cases involving P1,182,952(Delgado v Rama) This precedent could certainly clinch this debate for the appelle; but the court finds three telling circumstances which need no comment: a. the atty withdrew from the case before its termination b. the client lost and c. the atty before filing a suit, had sent to this client a bill for services in the amount of P10k A fairly diligent search has uncovered several representative cases in the US fixing reasonable professional fees for litigations of the million or halfmillion class. In Columbia Law Review the result of an investigation showed that attys fees allowed inm stockholders derivative suits ranged between 20% annd 33-1/3 per cent of the benefit to the corporation. Bearing in mind all these precedents and variables, in the light of the difficult situation of the intestate when it engaged the professional skill and prestige of the claimant, together with resultant benefits accruing to said intestate. The Court arrives at the conclusion THAT AN ADDITIONAL 75K TO THE CLAIMANT WOULD BE ABOUT AS FAIR AS AN AWARD AS THE FACTS OF THE LITIGATION COULD WARRANT. That gives trhe lawyer a lump sum of P142k which represents 3.8% of the P3,695,000 total value of the estate. Or 5.7% of P2,462.000 the amount preserved or won for the intestate through his services. Silvino Lim and Natividad LIM Billian should not be made to contribute to the addtl fee; they had pleaded for approval of the wills therefore were not benefited by appellants main accomplishment. Judgment: the appealed order is revoked and one is hereby entered allowing appellant the above addtl fees in the amount of 75k with legal interest starting from the finality of decision .

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METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO ALAFRIZ & ASSOCIATES, respondents [1990] Background: 1. Javier brought 7 parcels of land (about 10 hec) owned by Alejandro, et al. 2. Javier mortgaged properties w/Metrobank (MB) to secure a loan obligation of Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. Obligors defaulted, thus MB foreclosed the mortgages. Certificates of sale were issued in favor of MB. 3. Alejandro alleging deceit, fraud & misrepresentation by Javier in the sale of the properties, brought suits against Javier, et al., including MB. 4. MB sold land to Service Leasing Corp. (SLC), a sister corp. SLC sold such to Herby Commercial & Construction Corp. (Herby) for P2.5M. Herby mortgaged property w/Banco de Oro for P9.2M. Transfers & transactions were unknown to Alafriz & Associates (Alafriz), then counsel of MB. 5. MB filed an urgent motion for substitution of party since land has been transferred to SLC. Aug. 16, 1983: Alafriz filed a verified motion to enter its charging lien pursuant to S37, Rule 138 of the ROC, equivalent to 25% of the actual & current market values litigated properties as its attorneys fees. Lower court granted such & ordered the annotation of such on the certificates of title of the parcels of land. Alejandro subsequently filed a motion to dismiss complaints w/c was also granted. May 28, 1984: Alafriz filed a motion to fix the attorneys fees . MB manifested that it had fully paid Alafriz amounting P50k. However, latter claims that such cannot be considered as full payment since it was merely a cash advance. Alafriz tried to offer a compromise amount of P600k but negotiations were unsuccessful. Lower court & CA: MB & Herby ordered to pay Alafriz amount of P936k as its proper, just & reasonable attorneys fees. Issues & Ratio: 1. WON Alafriz is entitled to an enforceable charging lien for payment of its attorneys fees. NO.

No actual damage was suffered, thus damages cant be awarded. And there being no amount awarded to the defendant, Alafriz lien could not be enforced. But he could by appropriate action collect his attorneys fees. Alafriz claim that the lien attaches to the proceeds of a judgment of whatever nature is erroneous. Both American & Phil jurisprudence (including those cited by Alafriz) support SCs interpretation of Rule 138. The lien does not attach to the property in litigation. Court has no power to fix the fee of an attorney defending the clients title to property already in the clients possession. While a client cant defeat an attorneys rt to his charging lien by dismissing the case, terminating the services of his counsel, waiving his cause/interest in favor of the adverse party, or compromising his action, rule is not applicable when the termination of the case was not at the instance of the private respondents client but of the opposing party such as in this case.

2.

WON a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of the lien. NO, only if its valid & enforceable. An enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is w/in the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case & such subsists until the lien is settled. WON Alafriz is entitled to 25% of the actual & current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit (as much as he deserved) basis. SC refrains from resolving this issue. So as not to preempt the proper court in hearing & deciding the controversy in a proper proceeding. Petition for recovery of attorneys fees must prosecuted & allegations must be established as any other money claim. Guidelines for fixing a reasonable compensation: a. importance of the subject matter in controversy b. Extent of the services rendered c. Professional standing of the lawyer *plus other factors. These require nothing less than a full-blown trial so that both parties may be heard. SC however, does not wish to impose an unnecessary burden on Alafriz in collecting fees to w/c it may rightfully be entitled. SCs merely saying that proper legal remedy should be availed of & the procedural rules be duly observed to avoid abuse & prejudice. Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits, its returns are simple rewards for a job done/service rendered. Its imposed w/public interest thus, subject to State regulation.

3.

Sec. 37, Rule 138 provides a lien shall only apply to judgments for the payment of money & executions issued in pursuance of such judgments w/c he has secured in a litigation of his client . Such must be entered upon the records of the court & the client must be notified. The dismissal of the complaints in the aforementioned cases was not the judgment for the payment of money or executions issued in pursuance of such judgments contemplated by Rule 138. Charging lien therefore was w/o any legal basis. Theres nothing to generate it & to w/c it can attach in the same manner as an ordinary lien arises & attaches to a real/personal property.

Holding: Petition granted & CA decision reversed & set aside w/o prejudice to appropriate proceedings as may be brought by Alafriz to establish its rights to attorneys fees & amount thereof.

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