external vantage point the accuracy of our view s and the validity of our procedures
for assessing them . Instead, both
c h a lle n g e th e s e n s e o f t h e p r o b le m , u ltim a te ly
suggesting that the project of grounding
t h e 'w e '
begins from
a p o s itio n
w here
w o rld a n d w e h a v e b e e n a rtific ia lly a n d a s it w e re p re m a tu re ly s e p a ra te d . I t is as if
the w orld had first to be stripped of the taint of m eaning before it could again be
r e n d e r e d
a n h o s p ita b le
e n v iro n m e n t fo r th e d w e llin g o f m o rta ls . W h a t, ask
H e id e g g e r a n d W ittg e n s te in , m o tiv a te s th e p h ilo so p h ic a l p ic tu re th a t re n d e rs su c h
prior alienation of us from
th e w o rld , o f th e w o rld fro m
u s, in e v ita b le o r m a n d a to -
ry ?
Let us look first at W ittgenstein. H is stance on the problem
o f t h e 'w e '
e m e rg e s in h is tre a tm e n t o f ru le -fo llo w in g
i n
P h ilo so p h ic a l In v e s tig a tio n sa n d
R e m a r k s o n th e F o u n d a tio n s o f M a th e m a tic s .T h e re , h e sh o w s th a t n o th in g in th e
m in d fix es th e p ro p e r in te rp re ta tio n
of w hat a rule dictates, because every interpre-
tation hangs in the air and seem s itself subject to interpretation; there m ust (if a rule
is genuinely to determ ineap a rtic u la r w ay o f g o in g o n ) b e a w ay o f u n d e rs ta n d in g
the rule that isn o t a n in te rp re ta tio n
(v .P I @ 198, 2 0 1 ) . W ittg e n s te in lin k s th is
understanding to our com m on agreem ent in judgm ent (P I$ 2 4 2 ) . P in k a rd fin d s in
th is a g r e e m e n t a k in d o f g r o u n d in g of o u r linguistic practices: "W e orient our par-
tic u la r ju d g m e n ts
about w hat the
ru le
m eans and
requires of us
.
.
.
b y
w hat
W ittg e n s te in c a lls 'th e c o m m o n h u m a n m o d e o f a c tio n ' o r 'fo rm
o f life',"
in w hich
th e p ra c tic e o f fo llo w in g th e ru le is e m b e d d e d ; b e h in d
th is c o m m o n a lity , P in k a rd
continues, "there is nothing else m ore norm atively fundamental."Thus, he has it:
" T h e 'c o m m o n
h u m a n m o d e o f a c tio n ', th e h u m a n 'fo rm
o f life' is th e 'w hole' in
te rm s o f w h ic h w e lo c a te o u r in d iv id u a l ju d g m e n ts
in order to secure them
a s
m e a n in g fu l a n d as rig h t. T h e h u m a n fo rm
o f life is n o rm a tiv e ly a u th o rita tiv e fo r u s
although in a groundless fashion; w e cannot give any further norm ative account of
th a t fo rm o f n o rm a tiv ea u th o rity ." '
T h is m o re
or less standard reading yields a picture
o n
w h ic h , w h ile
W ittgenstein sees o u r form
o f life asagroundless ground for w hat we do and refus-
es to countenance any dem and for som ething deeper, the skeptic's
c o n c e p tio n o f
g r o u n d in g re m a in s in ta c t. W ittg e n s te in 's
refusal hardly seem s to yield a satisfying
response to skepticism . True, our eyes are shut to the skeptic's
d o u b ts (v .P Ip .
2 2 4 ) ; h o w e v e r, in th e s k e p tic 's e y e s , w e h a v e d e lib e ra te ly a v o id e d a p e rfe c tly le g iti-
m ate effo rtt o question the credentials of our taken-for-granted w ays of proceeding.
All w e have provided
is a less than reassuring rem inder that, as a contingent m atter
of fact, w e are absorbed in o u r form
o f life;w e h a v e g iv e n n o in d ic a tio n as t o w h y
w e s h o u ld n o t b e c o n c e rn e d w ith w h e th e r th e re s u lta n t 'o rie n ta tio n ' is, o n a c c o u n t
o f its 'p a ro c h ia lity ',
radically o u t of tune w ith
th in g s . S k e p tic is m , in o th e r w o rd s ,
harbors a fear th at 'form
o f life ' p ro v id e s a m e re ly c o n v e n tio n a l o r fo r th a t m a tte r a
m erely natural basis of our w ays of going on, neither of w hich can account for its
p u ta tiv e n o rm a tiv e
force. At bottom , appealing to an
" u n d e r iv e d
b u t n o t se lf-
g ro u n d in g " fo rm
of life7 does nothing in the skeptic's eyes to banish the specter of
arbitrariness that haunts grounds such as these. Pinkard's
W ittg e n s te in s e e m s t o
represent a W ittgenstein viewed through skepticallenses.
A n
alternative interpretation is available, on w hich W ittgenstein
in v ite s
s o m e th in g lik e th e s ta n d a rd in te rp re ta tio n
but contests its term s. H e w rites, "W hat
h a s t o b e a c c e p t e d , t h e g iv e n , is-so
o n e could say-form s
o f life"(P Ip . 2 2 6 ) . T h is
p r o n o u n c e m e n t d o e s n o t d ic ta te a c o m p la c e n t a c c e p ta n c e o f a c o n v e n tio n a l o r n a t-
ural basis for our practices; rather, our hum an form s of lifecom prise our practices,
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