T8 B22 Filson Materials Fdr- Interview of Col Cromwell- Leslie Filson

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Tape

Side

A

Interview

with Leslie Filson

and

Colonel Cromwell, Commander

of the

Western

Air

Defense

Sector

F:

This

is an

interview with Colonel Cromwell. Commander

of the

Western

Air

DefenseSector. Okay, what I want to start out with Col Cromwell is where you on September

11,

probably

in theBattle Cab.Cromwell:

Nope

I was

right here

in

this office when

I got a

call from

the

Battle

Cab

because

we

were

in the

middle

of an

exercise.

There

was a

NORAD

exercise

going

on

and

we had had an

early morning

VTC

with CONAR

and the

other

sectors.

I had

come

backdown

to my

office

to

review

and

early bird

and

what

I

normally

do

before

the

morning

brief which

was

normally

at 6

o'clock.

So I was in my

office when

I got the

call

that

the

Northeast

had a

highjack

and it

didn't

fit the

exercise

scenario,

so I

asked

if it

wasreal world

or

exercise. They said "it's

a

real

world."

So I did

head

up to the

battlecab

than

and as I was in the battle, someone said the

CNN's reporting

that something hit

the

World

Trade

Center, they

think

it may have been the

highjacked

plane.

So we turned

on

the TV and

shortly thereafter,

we saw the

second plane

fly

into World

Trade

Center.

At

that time I said "exercise is on hold" we are in a

combat

situation.

Don't

do anythingelse

on the

exercise.

At

this time

we are

having

our

flight change

over,

a new

crew

was

coming in and I

went

in at

6:30

and

briefed them that

we

were

in a

state

of

war.

I was

concerned that there

was

going

to be

rolling attacks coming

across

the

United States,

basically

around

the 9

o'clock

time frame

in

each time zone.

I

told

people,

we

havemaybe

1 or 2

hours

to

defend

the

Western

United

States

and at

that time

we

forgot about

the

exerciseandGeneral Arnold,Idon't know exactly whenit was but hepretty much

called

it off

himself.

The Director of Operations, Lt Col Bell (?) my scheduler Pat

Malone

to

call every

unitthat

we had

West

of our - you

know

right

in the

center part

of

the

US and that we worked

with.

Because at

that

time I had

four

jets

on

alert,

two in

Portland,

two in Riverside and that afternoon, we had over 100 jets on alert. That was

through

phone calls to schedulers, to wing commanders, to ops officers and the units hadgreat

initiative

and they did a lot of

things.

The other

fortunate

situation, we were goingto be

briefing

a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

that

morning and Major GeneralScoggin(?) came over to our

building

about 7 o'clock, he was calling General Weaver at

the

Guard Bureau, General

Kemmel(?) at the

Guard Bureau

and

verifying that

the

authority

was there to work toward

bringing

up as many jets as possible.F:

(inaudible)

C:

So 1 had

General Scoggin

(?)

helping

to get the

higher headquarters along

with

what

we

got

from

Col Clark at the time was the

1AF/CONR

DO as well as from Gen Arnold

about

standing things

up.Again,thefocuswas on theEast coast becausethesituationin

Washington

DC and

then

the high jacked airplane that went down in Pennsylvania. But

there

was also reported

that

as many as

11

other jets that they weren't certain of. Many f

the

hadtakenoff in theEastandwere heading towardtheWest.Soagainmyconcernof

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the

rolling attacks,

we

were working with

the FAA to

track

any

unusual aircraft. Then

on

top of

that

the President's

movement,

where all three

sectors

worked

when

and

again

it's

been out that he traveled from Florida to Louisiana to Nebraska before going back to DC.

All

three sectors worked togethertoensure

that

thePresidenthad

escort

and was

protected

while

he

traveled

across

the US

before

he got

back

to Washington DC.

Thatkindofcoversthe first two

areas.

F:

(inaudible)

C: I had

come

in at

2:30 that morning

and I had

stayed

on

that schedule

for

about

thefirst

three

weeks.

We were

doing either

3 or 4

o'clock

VTC,

I

can't

remember.

Because

we moved it back to where it's now 6

o'clock

and General McKinley asked me why Iwasn't

trying

to get it

moved later.

I

said "Sir,

it is so

much better that

it use to

be."

Ithink

they were

4

o'clock

for

about

the first 3 or 4

months,

but I

live

on

base

and in

fact

that

is something

that

I'm going to share with you later, cause going out at 2:30 in the

morning, I

could hear

the

airplanes CAPping over head cause that

was the

only

thing

in

the air. That

was the

sound

of

freedom right over

the

base.

I

knew

the

pilots that would

be

flying

up

there from Portland

and I

knew

it was

going

on

above other cities

in the USand it was an

awesome

feeling

to

know that

we

were doing what

we've

always done.

But

America

was

really desiring

us to do it

more

so

that what they had.

Because

of the

unfortunate

tragedy

of the 11

th

of

September.(silence on tape)

C: The

flexibility

is

another thing, guard, reserve

as

well

as

active duty

units

all

came

up

there was no difference between any of them. The vast majority have never sat alert,

especially at

home

station

but

they

all

responded

and the

maintenance maintainers,

the

weapons

troops,

all the

support personnel

to

make

it

happen,

did a

great job.

The

response

from all of the commanders was "what else can I do", it wasn't "that's to much"

but

they were always looking

to do

more.F: Now yousaid,you hadover100 onalertbythat afternoon.

C: Yea

F: On alert, loaded, ready to go?

C: Yea

F:

That's

significant,

real quick

C:

Yes, CONR wide

it was

over 300,

so

again

it was

over

100 in the

West.

F:

Without being classified obviously,

I

guess your concern that

day was

some

of the big

cities

and...?

NCT0067619

C: We

were

trying

to get

connectivity

and

make sure that

we had

response

capabilities.We were given directions to provide combat air patrol over certain cities, main area, and

critical

infrastructure. So we worked with different units, so they

were

ready to respond

within

their metropolitan

areas,

close to their

bases,

but they were

also

flying

combat air

patrols

over numerous cities and key infrastructure within the

Western

United States.

Again,

there was an equivalent amount if not more on the Eastern two

sectors.

But my

plate was

full

in the

West

and I did not

even think about what they were doing.

F:

In the sectors, with all the rumors about the high jackings, and from what I under

stand

talking to other people earlier, at this point you guys couldn't really see the air

picture.

C: No, we were responding when FAA asked for assistance, we would coordinate thescramble. Fighters from

the

closest

base

and

they would talk

to the FAA

controllers

to

get...

F: The

fighters?C: yea, the fighters would

talk with

them because we had no picture or radios. No way to

control

or we

wouldn't even

see

where

to

control them

to. So the FAA did a

great

job

also

of being

flexible

enough to not direct or control them but to at least point out where

the situations

were.

We had

several intercepts

on

different

tracks that

were

not

following

normal

procedures or that the FAA was concerned about that were uneventful. But the

FAA,

again

the

flexibility

of the

pilots

in

each

of the

situations allowed them

to

successfully

intercept

and

escort these planes

to an

uneventful

landing, after

the

first

situation.

F:

Somebody mentioned

to me

that

the

other sectors

had a

little

bit of a

better picture

than

you

guys did.

C: We had so

much more

of a

area

that

I

would

say

that

the

inner picture

to

them

it

wenta

little

bit

closer inward than

-

because

we had 63

percent

of the air

space,

but we

have

fewer overall

numbers

of

radars

than

they

do.

So

just

the

geography

of

covering

it

wouldhave

allowed them

to see a

little

bit

more

in a lot of

areas. Again,

the

radios were

as big

of

limitation

as the

picture. Because even

if we

could

see it, we

couldn't talk

to

them.

F: As we get to

talking

more,

I'd

like

to

hear more about

how

that

has

changed.

How

would

you

describe that day? Would

you say it was

controlled, chaotic, hectic

or?

C: It was

very

interesting

to see how

people transitioned

to a new

scenario. They used

the

training

that

they

have always

hadfroma

cold

war

scenario.

It was a

brand

new

scenario,but the

training that

they

had

done provided them

a

foundation

to be

creative

and

innovative

and yet be

under control.

It was

chaotic because

of the

tragedy

on TV, itwas

almost like

seeing

a

horror movie

but it wasrealityTV

unfortunately.

But the

training,

people knew what

to do,

they

did

their

job, they focused

on

their job.

We had

some people going around

in

case people

got

emotional

or had

people

who had

lost

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