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The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 says, “Itshould be the policy of the United States to sup-port efforts to remove the regime headed bySaddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to pro-mote the emergence of a democratic governmentto replace that regime.” But a U.S. policy of attempting to remove Saddam from power isflawed in several respects.Although the Clinton administrationclaimed to support the congressionally inspiredlegislation, it has fortunately been unenthusias-tic in its implementation of the law. The ILA con-tinues a record of U.S. attempts to unseatSaddam that is unblemished by success. Forexample, during the Persian Gulf War PresidentBush urged the Iraqi people to rise up againstSaddam—building expectations that the UnitedStates would support them—only to abandonthem when they did.Overthrowing Saddam will be difficult andmay even be counterproductive. Saddam relent-lessly suppresses opposition with an extensivesecurity apparatus. In addition, the elite Sunnisin Iraq apparently believe that Saddam servestheir interests and can best keep the countryfrom breaking apart. Saddam and the elite faceopposition groups that are weak, have differentgoals, and do not cooperate with each other.Furthermore, the opposition cannot get any of Iraq’s neighbors to provide a sanctuary fromwhich to launch an insurgency.The successful overthrow of Saddam couldmake things worse. Iraq could be thrown intocivil war and break up, or a more radical Iraqiregime could arise. Either outcome could causeinstability in the entire region. Given the hard-ships the Iraqi population has suffered since the1991 war, a post-Saddam regime could be evenmore virulently anti–United States than he is.Since his military was decimated by war andsanctions, Saddam’s threat to the region hasbeen overblown. Moreover, Iraq lives in a roughneighborhood and has an incentive—like manynations in the region—to develop nuclear, chem-ical, and biological weapons, regardless of who isin power. The West needs to take only limitedactions to monitor and constrain Saddam’s mil-itary capabilities. Economic sanctions should belifted in exchange for international inspectionsof Iraq’s weapons programs. A more narrowlyfocused Western embargo on arms shipmentsshould be retained. Surely, if the United Statescould outwait a superpower adversary through-out the long decades of the Cold War, it can dothe same with a small, weak nation such asIraq—waiting until that inevitable day whenSaddam’s tyranny falls because of its heavy-handed repression.
 Imperial Overreach
Washington’s Dubious Strategy to OverthrowSaddam Hussein
by David Isenberg
___________________________________________________________________________________________
 David Isenberg is an analyst at DynMeridian, a private firm that advises the U.S. government on national securi-ty issues. The views expressed here are his own.
Executive Summary
No. 360November 17, 1999
 
Introduction
Winston Churchill once said that Russiawas a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside anenigma. A similar, albeit less charitable, senti-ment might be voiced about the Clintonadministration’s foreign policy toward Iraq.Nearly nine years after U.S. military forcesreversed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraq’sresilient and resourceful leader SaddamHussein remains in power—a fact that hascaused the Clinton administration no smallamount of vexation. Economic sanctions,containment, no-fly zones, sporadic attemptsto organize opposition groups, and abortiveattempts to foment coups have all failed toloosen Saddam’s grip on power. And his con-tinuing reign has brought about numerousconfrontations with the United States byobstructing UN weapons inspection teams,perpetrating terrorist acts, failing to abide byair exclusion zones imposed by the allies overnorthern and southern Iraq, moving troopsto threaten Kuwait, and repressing groupsinternally.
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But on the premise that the appearance of doing something—no matter how foolish—isbetter than doing nothing at all, the UnitedStates has decided to reembrace a failed poli-cy. Instead of merely trying to preventSaddam from committing future militaryaggression or revitalizing his nuclear, biolog-ical, and chemical weapons programs—a lim-ited objective that has resulted in limited suc-cess—the United States has decided on themore ambitious goal of attempting to over-throw Saddam.
Iraq Liberation Act of 1998
The operative section (Section 3) of theIraq Liberation Act of 1998 says, “It should bethe policy of the United States to supportefforts to remove the regime headed bySaddam Hussein from power in Iraq and topromote the emergence of a democratic gov-ernment to replace that regime.”
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To that end, the ILA provides assistancevalued at $97 million, including money forgrants to Iraqi opposition groups doingradio and television broadcasting to Iraq,military education and training for suchorganizations, and the drawdown of defensearticles from Defense Department stocks forthose groups. The executive branch may pro-vide military equipment and training ser-vices of the Department of Defense andassets of the Departments of State, theTreasury, and Justice on a grant basis to meetemergencies that it cannot meet throughother aid channels. The Foreign AssistanceAct authorizes the president to draw downup to $100 million of defense articles or ser-vices from the Pentagon for “unforeseenemergencies.” The ILA requires the presidentto designate one or more Iraqi democraticopposition groups that satisfy the criteria forreceiving assistance.The president is required to (1) include abroad spectrum of Iraqi individuals andgroups opposed to Saddam’s regime and (2)ensure that those individuals and groups arecommitted to democratic values, respect forhuman rights, peaceful relations with Iraq’sneighbors, maintenance of Iraq’s territorialintegrity, and cooperation with other democ-ratic opponents of Saddam’s regime.The ILA may go down in history as thesingle most ill-conceived attempt at covertaction during the Clinton administration.Both the act’s conception and its executionare fatally flawed. For starters, the scheme isthe most overt covert action ever initiated.The United States is attempting to organizeinternal Iraqi opposition groups whosestrategies and policies can be found detailedon their own Web sites.
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Furthermore,Washington has designated oppositiongroups that have doubtful allegiance to thespecified criteria and minimal ability tocooperate with each other. The groups do nothave a viable plan to overthrow Saddam.None of Iraq’s neighbors are inclined to sup-port those groups—certainly not to theextent of providing reliable sanctuary. And,most important, the United States has
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Economic sanc-tions, contain-ment, no-flyzones, sporadicattempts to orga-nize oppositiongroups, andabortive attemptsto foment coupshave all failed toloosen Saddam’sgrip on power.
 
shown a reluctance to back the groups whenthey get into trouble.
The Clinton Administration ExhibitsOnly Lukewarm Support for the ILA
President Clinton claims to support theILA:Over the long term, the best way toaddress that threat is through a gov-ernment in Baghdad—a new govern-ment—that is committed to repre-sent and respect its people, notrepress them; that is committed topeace in the region. Over the pastyear, we have deepened our engage-ment with the forces of change inIraq. . . . We will intensify that effort,working with Congress to imple-ment the Iraq Liberation Act . . . to dowhat we can to make the oppositiona more effective voice for the aspira-tions of the people.
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In reality, the administration’s support forthe ILA is tepid. The administration, to itscredit, is reluctant to implement the ILA, andadministration officials warn of the difficul-ty of the task. Under Secretary of Defense forPolicy Walter Slocombe testified beforeCongress: “No one should underestimate thedifficulties of the task of bringing about achange in this regime or the time it may take.It cannot be done by imposing a new regimeby military force from without, even assum-ing that such would be possible, which is verydoubtful. Nor, in our judgment, can it bedone by encouraging an internal insurrectionbefore the conditions exist that would makeit possible for such an uprising to succeed.”
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In 1999 the administration infuriated ILAsupporters by naming Kenneth Pollack tothe National Security Council staff as direc-tor for Near East and South Asian affairs.
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Pollack was a coauthor of an article in
Foreign Affairs
that derided a U.S.-sponsored insur-gency in Iraq as a fantasy that could lead to anew Bay of Pigs.
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ILA supporters correctly sawhis appointment as a sign of the administra-tion’s reluctance to militarily support theIraqi opposition groups.National Security Adviser Sandy Bergermet in May 1999 with seven Iraqi oppositiongroups at the White House and declared adetermination to get rid of Saddam’s regimeby the end of Clinton’s second term. But theadministration’s action did not match itsrhetoric. The White House meeting spurredthe opposition groups to propose holding asession of their legislature in northern Iraq’sKurdistan region—across a de facto borderfrom Saddam’s forces. They also requestedU.S. protection to deter Saddam from attack-ing and ensure that key opposition leaderswould participate. The administrationdeclined to protect the legislative meeting.
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A Manifestation of U.S. Arrogance
One might say that the ILA is a testamentto continuing American arrogance about itsability to dictate political outcomes in othercountries. As syndicated columnist RichardReeves observed, “Since World War II,Americans have periodically deluded them-selves into believing that because we have thepower to disrupt normal life in most any partof the world, we therefore must have thepower to stop or start ancient enmities weknow little about—and that little is oftenwrong.”
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Dennis Halliday, who served as UNhumanitarian coordinator for Iraq beforequitting in frustration in 1998, noted, “Thethinking seems to be, ‘We’ve tried everythingelse, so why not promote an invasion and seewhat happens? Who knows, maybe we’ll getsomebody out of this who can keep thingsquiet for the next twenty years.’”
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U.S. Efforts to UnseatSaddam So Far Have Failed
The ILA continues a record of U.S.attempts to unseat Saddam that is unblem-ished by success. Such attempts startedabout a month after the beginning of Operation Desert Storm. On February 15,1991, President Bush spoke directly to ordi-
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The administra-tion, to its credit,is reluctant toimplement theILA, and adminis-tration officialswarn of the diffi-culty of the task.
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