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American interest in and concerns about Indiarose sharply after that country carried out under-ground nuclear tests in May 1998. Clinton admin-istration officials belatedly acknowledged thatdeveloping a good working relationship with Indiashould be one of America’s top foreign policy pri-orities. President Clinton’s visit to South Asia inMarch 2000 was an important symbolic step.That initiative, however, does not constitute amajor breakthrough in relations between Indiaand the United States. Paying greater attention toIndia, although long overdue, cannot by itself dra-matically improve uneasy U.S.-Indian relationsand turn India into a de facto strategic partner.The fundamental mistake made by U.S. leadershas been to underestimate India and its economicand military potential. How India uses its grow-ing power can either enhance or seriously under-mine U.S. interests. Continued insistence by theUnited States that India liquidate its nucleararsenal will only cause major problems in rela-tions between Washington and New Delhi.Washington’s overemphasis on the prolifera-tion issue illustrates the tendency of U.S. policy-makers to treat India as a potential adversaryrather than a potential friend. U.S. leaders shouldnot insist on improvement in New Delhi’shuman rights record in Kashmir, or set other pre-conditions, for the U.S.-Indian relationship.Pursuing the current course may well extend theimpasse in relations to the point of irrevocably“losing” India.Mistakes in U.S. policy have contributed toIndia’s drifting toward a Russia-India-Chinanexus aimed at preventing U.S. global domina-tion. The likelihood of India’s participation in ananti-U.S. alliance will depend on what New Delhithinks about American geopolitical designstoward India and its national security interests.A long-range strategy needs to be based onWashington’s willingness to accept India’s worldpower status. That means accepting India into theclub of nuclear weapons states and enthusiasticallyendorsing New Delhi’s bid for permanent member-ship in the UN Security Council. The main benefitto the United States of such a breakthrough inU.S.-Indian relations would be to prevent a dra-matic adverse change in the current global geopo-litical situation, which currently favors the UnitedStates. An assertive India could help stabilize thePersian Gulf and Central Asian regions. Even moreimportant, India could become a strategic coun-terweight to China and a crucial part of a stablebalance of power in both East Asia and South Asia.
 India as a World Power 
Changing Washington’s Myopic Policy
by Victor M. Gobarev
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Victor M. Gobarev is an independent security policy analyst based in Washington, D.C. Previously, he was a schol-ar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and George Washington University.
Executive Summary
No. 381September 11, 2000
 
Introduction
President Clinton’s visit to India in lateMarch 2000, the first visit by a U.S. presidentin 22 years, was long overdue. As Clintonhimself admitted, India, the second mostpopulous country in the world, has neverbeen a major focus of U.S. foreign policy.
1
Conventional wisdom attributes Washing-ton’s dismissive attitude to the fact that Indiawas seen as belonging to the opposing campduring the Cold War. That explanationseems insufficient. The United States alwayspaid utmost attention to its relations withthe Soviet Union, the leader of that camp.The main reason for the difference was that,unlike India, the Soviet Union was consid-ered dangerous. Such inattention to thehome of one-sixth of the planet’s populationmay be explained (but not justified) by theferocity of the West-East confrontation thatconsumed nearly all of America’s significantnational security and foreign policy interests.However, it is much more difficult toexplain why the end of the Cold War did notproduce much change in U.S. policy towardIndia. During the Bush administration andthe first Clinton administration, relationswith India were largely ignored. (PresidentClinton took months even to name anambassador to New Delhi.) India was notconsidered a potential threat (or even a seri-ous geopolitical player) as opposed, for exam-ple, to neighboring China. Thus, China wasengaged, whereas India was almost forgotten.The situation finally began to change dur-ing the second Clinton administration. Forthe first time, a comprehensive U.S. strategytoward the South Asian giant, although stilllacking some essential features, was formu-lated. The strategy was based on “A New U.S.Policy toward India and Pakistan,” a reportprepared by a group of independent ana-lysts.
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U.S. strategic goals in the region weredetermined to be the following:
•
to deter a regional nuclear arms race;
•
to restrict exports of nuclear technolo-gy from India and Pakistan to thirdcountries;
•
to assist in resolving Indian-Pakistanidisputes that might provoke a regionalwar;
•
to preclude the nuclear capabilities of either India or Pakistan from fallinginto the hands of anarchists and ideo-logical extremists; and
•
to expand political, economic, and mil-itary ties with India and Pakistan in thepost–Cold War era.A series of steps toward rapprochement withIndia followed. In addition, American inter-est in India grew after it carried out under-ground nuclear tests in May 1998.
The Clinton Visit:A Modest First Step
The visit of President Clinton was animportant move in implementing the admin-istration’s more engaged policy toward India.The Clinton administration acknowledgedthat a good working relationship, perhapseven a strategic partnership, with India shouldbe a U.S. priority. President Clinton proceededcautiously and diplomatically during the visit,carefully choosing his words in a country waryof lectures. Those Americans who argued thathe should have been blunt, for example onhuman rights violations by the Indian armyand security forces in Kashmir, were wrong.
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Such an approach would have worsened U.S.-Indian relations and not helped the humanrights situation in Kashmir.During his visit, Clinton also reaffirmedU.S. support of democracy in South Asia, andhis remarks clearly favored India overWashington’s long-time ally Pakistan. As the
Washington Post 
put it, “The Cold War strategicalliance with the United States is over, andPakistan must move to restore democracy andcontrol terrorism in Kashmir or fend for itself in its mounting confrontation with India.”
4
Although there were important discus-sions on nuclear nonproliferation, the main
2
During the Bushadministrationand the firstClinton adminis-tration, relationswith India werelargely ignored.
 
result of President Clinton’s visit was mostevident in another field. He and Indian primeminister A. B. Vajpayee agreed to start an“institutional dialogue” between their coun-tries, including “regular” summit meetings.
5
Such a dialogue, if taken seriously, couldbegin much-needed changes in U.S. policytoward India.In general, Clinton’s visit to India was astep toward a closer relationship between thetwo countries. However, the visit was not amajor breakthrough. Notably, the principalU.S. goal of the visit—getting concessionsfrom New Delhi on the issue of nuclear prolif-eration—was not achieved. The vast differ-ences on the issue were clearly reflected in the“vision statement,” the main documentsigned during the visit: “The United Statesbelieves India should forgo nuclear weapons.India believes that it needs to maintain a cred-ible minimum nuclear deterrent in keepingwith its own assessment of its security needs.”
6
The failure to persuade India to abolish itsnuclear weapons program drew attentionand some criticism from Congress, includingthe Senate Republican leadership, and fromsuch politically diverse newspapers as the
Washington Times
and the
Washington Post 
. The
Times
stated that “Mr. Clinton failed toachieve the major goal of his trip to India—convincing the world’s most populousdemocracy to forgo nuclear weapons. . . . Thepresident fell short on each of the specificobjectives he laid out—persuading India toban the production of fissile materials, tight-en export control, and embrace theComprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.”
7
The
Post 
was less critical, while noting thatClinton had moderated his plea on thenuclear arms issue with praise for India. The
Post 
admitted that Prime Minister Vajpayee“was unmoved” by Clinton’s call for nucleararms cutbacks.
8
The
 New York Times
tendedto see only positive results of the visit, stating,“If Mr. Clinton can coax India and Pakistanto consider reciprocal steps to ease tensions—a reduction in Indian forces in Kashmir inreturn for a cutoff of Pakistani aid to therebels—the visit this week will have been valu-able indeed.”
9
That wishful thinking has notmaterialized: India refused even to discussthe Kashmir matter, not to mention toreduce its forces there.
The Need for Bolder Steps
Both critics and supporters of PresidentClinton’s performance in India have failed tosee the main point: even paying greater atten-tion to India cannot dramatically improveuneasy U.S.-Indian relations and turn Indiainto a de facto strategic partner. The princi-pal reason is that American policy is stillbased on fundamentally wrong assessmentsof India and its place in the world and of what India can contribute to stabilizingAsia’s security environment. U.S. leaders nei-ther appreciate the importance of the inter-ests at stake in relations with India norunderstand how to set priorities for U.S.interests and goals. The United States stillsees India as a Third World, poverty-strickengiant that would profit from closer coopera-tion with America but would be unlikely togive something valuable in return. More per-ceptive policy experts understand that Indiais already a heavyweight in South Asia andcan help guarantee stability and prosperity inAsia as a whole. But even most of thoseexperts fail to see that India is an emergingworld power with an influence felt far fromAsian shores.Current American national security inter-ests with India, such as deterring a nucleararms race in South Asia and restrictingexports of nuclear technology, are no doubtnoble. But is it productive to treat the deci-sion by the world’s largest democracy todevelop nuclear weapons the same way wetreat pariah states’ nuclear ambitions? Ispressuring India to forgo nuclear weaponsour best option?The United States considers India neithera serious adversary (despite its nuclearweapons) nor a serious ally. The mountingevidence of India’s rapid growth in virtuallyevery major field has not yet been properly
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American policyis based onfundamentallywrong assess-ments of India’splace in the worldand of what Indiacan contributeto stabilizingAsia’s securityenvironment.
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