beyond reasonable doubt and by the Fifthand Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.No corresponding safeguards against abu-sive public-sector litigation exist in civil cases.By limiting the rule to cases involving gov-ernment plaintiffs, access to the courts is pre-served for less-affluent, private plaintiffsseeking redress of legitimate grievances. Butdefendants in government suits will be ableto resist meritless cases that are brought bythe state solely to ratchet up the pressure fora large financial settlement.“Government pays” becomes ever moreurgent with the recent emergence of an insidi-ous relationship between the plaintiffs’ bar andsome government officials. That relationship—common to tobacco and gun litigation—is asecond major threat to the rule of law.Both rounds of litigation were concoctedby a handful of private attorneys who enteredinto contingency fee contracts with the gov-ernment. In effect, members of the private barwere hired as government subcontractors, butwith a huge financial share in the outcome.That’s not a problem, says Rendell. Heannounced that cities were suing gun makersonly for improved safety features and changesin distribution practices, not monetary dam-ages. Yet one day after Rendell’s disclaimer,Miami and Bridgeport filed their suits, seek-ing hundreds of millions of dollars in dam-ages.
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New Orleans asked for damages
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and sodid Chicago (in fact, $433 million).
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Theclaims include not only medical costs associat-ed with gun violence but also the costs ofpolice protection, emergency services, policeovertime and pensions, courts, prisons, loss ofpopulation, cleaning the streets of blood,lower property values, even lost tax revenuefrom reduced worker productivity
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—pluspunitive damages. And nearly all of the citieshave solicited private lawyers to work for acontingency fee based on those damages.So if money isn’t the primary goal, therewill be a lot of attorneys working for free.Maybe that’s what they deserve. After all, thegun suits aren’t intended to go to trial. Infact, HUD’s threat, on top of the city andcounty claims, was meant to promote a set-tlement, not a trial. No doubt, with a pid-dling $1.5 billion in annual revenues, gunmakers are not going to yield the same trea-sure trove as the tobacco behemoths whoseworldwide sales are $300 billion. But that’snot fatal, because the real goal of the triallawyers is to chalk up one more victory, thusdemonstrating to future wealthy defendantsthat groundless legal theories are goodenough when the coercive power of multiplegovernment entities is arrayed against anunpopular industry.When a private lawyer subcontracts his ser-vices to the government, he bears the sameresponsibility as a government lawyer. He is apublic servant beholden to all citizens, includ-ing the defendant, and his overriding objectiveis to seek justice. Imagine a state attorney paida contingency fee for each indictment that hesecures, or state troopers paid per speedingticket. The potential for corruption is enor-mous. Still, the states in their tobacco suitsdoled out multibillion dollar contracts to pri-vate counsel—not pursuant to per hour feeagreements, which might occasionally be jus-tified to acquire unique outside competenceor experience, but as contingency fees, a sure-fire catalyst for abuse of power. And those con-tracts were awarded without competitive bid-ding to lawyers who often bankrolled statepolitical campaigns.
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Government is the single entity autho-rized, in narrowly defined circumstances, towield coercive power against private citizens.When government functions as prosecutoror plaintiff in a legal proceeding in which italso dispenses punishment, adequate safe-guards against state misbehavior are essen-tial. That is why in civil litigation we rely pri-marily on private remedies with redresssought by, and for the benefit of, the injuredparty and not the state. As the SupremeCourt cautioned more than 60 years ago, anattorney for the state “is the representativenot of an ordinary party to a controversy, butof a sovereignty whose obligation to governimpartially is as compelling as its obligationto govern at all.”
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Put bluntly, contingency fee contracts
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Contracts wereawarded withoutcompetitive bid-ding to lawyerswho oftenbankrolled statepolitical cam-paigns.
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