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In the midterm elections on November 5, 2002,there exists the real possibility of change in the par-tisan control of either or both houses of Congress,which makes each potentially competitive raceimportant to national policy and politics. This situ-ation lends itself to looking at the election as a seriesof horse races and the overall outcome as the TripleCrown of politics. As a result, respective partisanfortunes are expected to dominate political discus-sion during the next 60 days. This is unfortunate.Our analysis offers a different perspective.Although the horse race aspect of this year’s elec-toral contest is interesting, the preoccupation withpartisan details obscures broader, more importantaspects of the national policy mood and the healthof our political system. In this study, we examinethe attitude of Americans toward big government,the declining competitiveness of our elections, andsome mistaken conventional wisdom aboutAmerican democracy.Contrary to conventional wisdom, acrossAmerica there exists a measurable popular prefer-ence for less, rather than more, government inter-vention. Therefore, in the fall of 2002, the electoratewill favor candidates who support defense spend-ing, civil liberties, and smaller government outsideof defense. At the same time, the political system’shealth is seriously weakened by a lack of competi-tion. Unfortunately, the mismeasurement of, andpreoccupation with, voter participation serves onlyto divert attention away from the pressing problemof an uncompetitive political system.An election that either ushers in a new era of expanded government or further cements the advan-tages of incumbency will serve neither the representa-tive nor democratic functions of our political system.
 Election 2002 and the Problems of  American Democracy
by John Samples and Patrick Basham
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
 John Samples is director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Representative Government. Patrick Basham is a senior  fellow at the center.
Executive Summary
No. 451September 5, 2002
 
Introduction
The midterm elections of 2002 promise tobe exciting. Partisan control of the Senateand the House of Representatives could easi-ly change hands, which makes each poten-tially competitive race important to nationalpolicy and politics. This situation lends itself to looking at the election as a series of horseraces and the overall outcome as the TripleCrown of politics. This analysis offers a dif-ferent perspective. We examine the attitudeof Americans toward big government, thedeclining competitiveness of our elections,and some mistaken conventional wisdomabout American democracy.
The Policy Mood
Political scientists believe that the policymood of the public affects the election out-comes and also what elected officials dowhile anticipating election outcomes. Whatis a policy mood? The political scientistJames Stimson defines a policy mood as thepublic’s general disposition toward publicissues and policies.
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The policy mood of thenation going into an election affects policyoutcomes because voters favor candidateswho reflect their views, and they force othersto accommodate their positions to publicsentiment. Stimson’s measure of the policymood focuses on the public’s dispositiontoward government activity. Do Americanswant more or less government?Stimson’s notion of the public moodassembles the public’s responses to thou-sands of poll questions about policy issues.Figure 1 charts Stimson’s measure of the pol-icy mood over the past 50 years.The 1960s and 1970s saw a continualdecline in public support for more govern-ment activism, a trend that bottomed out in1980. Support for activism then climbedthroughout the 1980s. Since 1990, however,the overall trend has been away from sup-porting government activism; in recent years,the policy mood measure has declined steadi-ly and about as steeply as it did during the1970s. As the Bush administration began,Americans might not have been looking for asecond Reagan revolution, but they were
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Since 1990 theoverall trend hasbeen away fromsupporting gov-ernment activism.
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   1   9   5   2   1   9   5  4   1   9   5  6   1   9   5   8   1   9  6   0   1   9  6   2   1   9  6  4   1   9  6  6   1   9  6   8   1   9   7   0   1   9   7   2   1   9   7  4   1   9   7  6   1   9   7   8   1   9   8   0   1   9   8   2   1   9   8  4   1   9   8  6   1   9   8   8   1   9   9   0   1   9   9   2   1   9   9  4   1   9   9  6   1   9   9   8   2   0   0   0   2   0   0   2
Figure 1Stimson’s Policy Mood Measure (1952–2002)
Source: Updated from James A. Stimson,
Public Opinion in America: Mood Cycles and Swings
, 2d ed. (Boulder:Westview, 1999); personal communication, June 18, 2002.
   L   i   b  e  r  a   l   T  e  n   d  e  n  c  y
 
moving strongly away from increased gov-ernment activism.Did September 11, 2001, change all that?Stimson’s latest data come from the middleof 2002 and show a continued move awayfrom supporting expansive government.Stimson remarks that his data show “no 9-11effect at all. Liberal-conservative self-identifi-cation, in contrast, does show a small bouncein the conservative direction after 9-11.”
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The evidence also indicates a reneweddecline in public trust in the federal govern-ment. For many years survey researchers haveasked citizens how much they trusted the fed-eral government to do the right thing. Theproportion that answered “just about always”or “most of the time” provides a rough mea-sure of public trust in the federal government.Trust has declined most of the time since itshistoric high point in the 1960s.About a month after September 11, theBrookings Institution asked the PrincetonSurvey Research Associates to pose the trustquestion to a sample of Americans. Theyfound 57 percent of those polled trusted thefederal government to do the right thing“just about always” or “most of the time”—strikingly higher than the recent trend. Thistrust faded. The same question posed in May2002 showed that 40 percent of the respon-dents trusted the federal government.
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Oncewe eliminate the immediate post–September11 reactions, we find that the trust measuremay have turned downward beginning in2000 (see Figure 2). This fits well with a pub-lic mood skeptical of expanded government.After all, a public that trusts government lessand less will hardly demand that the federalgovernment do more and more.
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As the public becomes more concernedabout terrorism, it might support additionalpublic spending or greater powers for thegovernment. For the past seven years, Galluphas tracked the public’s concern about itsbecoming a victim of terrorism. National lev-els of concern about the risk of terrorism aresimilar to those found before September 11(with the exception of the 1995 Oklahoma
3
A public thattrusts govern-ment less and lesswill hardlydemand that thefederal govern-ment do moreand more.
01020304050607080'64 '66 '68 '70 '72 '74 '76 '78 '80 '82 '84 '86 '88 '90 '92 '94 '96 '98 '00 '01 '02
 
Figure 2Trust in Government (1964–2002)
Sources: for 1995–2000, National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan.
The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior,
www.umich.edu/~nes/nesguide/nesguide.htm; for 2001and 2002, G. Calvin Mackenzie and Judith M. Labiner, “Opportunity Lost: The Rise and Fall of Trust andConfidence in Government after September 11,” Brookings Institution, May 30, 2002, Table 1, p. 3.
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