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Fat Cats and Thin Kittens
 Are People Who Make Large CampaignContributions Different?
by John McAdams and John C. Green
 John McAdams is an associate professor of political science at Marquette University. John C. Green is a professor of politi-cal science and director of the Ray Bliss Institute of Politics at the University of Akron.
No. 76
Critics of campaign finance in the United Statesoften direct their fire toward contributors who makelarge donations. Critics charge that large contribu-tions are unfair, unrepresentative, and undemocrat-ic. Accordingly, they push for “reforms” that wouldfavor small contributions over large, and publicmoney over private donations.Survey data on contributors contradict thatstereotype of contributors of large amounts andtheir effects on American politics. Overall, “fatcats” differ less from contributors of smalleramounts than critics have alleged. The differ-ences that do exist are mostly unsurprising andgenerally small in magnitude. Survey resultsshow that both policy liberalism andDemocratic partisanship are well representedamong contributors of large sums.The supporters of McCain-Feingold arguethat new restrictions on large contributions willprofoundly alter American politics for the bet-ter. Their claims have no basis in fact. New lawsaimed at restricting large donations in favor of smaller ones will have little effect on practicalpolitics.
September 25, 2002
 
Introduction
One of the most enduring stereotypes inAmerican politics is the “fat cat,” the wealthycampaign contributor. From the robberbarons of the gilded age to the corporate richof the mid-20th century to the purveyors of soft money in the 1990s, those who donatelarge sums have a firm place in the mytholo-gy, if not the reality, of American elections.Fat cats are prime suspects in the conspiracytheories of the left and right, potent propsfor cynics of every persuasion, and the greatbane of all reformers. Political scientists fre-quently focus on fat cats as well, assigninglarge contributions a prominent place inexplanations of political power and partycoalitions. Such assertions are rarely basedon more than anecdote and conjecture.
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This paper juxtaposes the fat-cat stereo-type with an empirical picture based on sur-vey data. We have collected a national sampleof donors to competitive congressional racesand public records of their subsequent feder-al donations. We use those data to describethe political and social correlates of donorsacross the gamut of contributions.We conclude that new laws aimed at restrict-ing large donations in favor of smaller ones willhave only modest effect on practical politics.
Criticisms of Contributorsof Large Sums
Critics of fat cats in American politicsargue that contributions influence cam-paigns and the policies proposed and passedby elected officials. Money in politics, theysay, has the same effect it has in the market-place: the more money people spend, themore influence they can “buy.” If that is so,contributors of large amounts are especiallyinfluential in politics by virtue of their finan-cial largesse.Critics decry this influence because theybelieve democracy and fairness require all citi-zens to have an equal opportunity to influencepolicymaking.
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In this view, large donationsare unfair and undemocratic because personalwealth is distributed unequally among citi-zens, which gives the wealthy more opportu-nity to affect the political process.
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Critics alsobelieve that money has relatively more influ-ence on politics than other resources, whichare more evenly distributed, such as votes,time, energy, or wisdom.
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When push comesto shove, the critics say, the special potency of large donations can overcome other efforts byless affluent citizens.Critics also believe that fat cats give inpursuit of private, selfish interests. “Bigmoney” pursues material concerns, allowingdonors to seek to maximize personal returnsfrom their political “investments” ratherthan pursue a more public-spirited agenda.
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Moreover, large donations make the politicalsystem less representative of the public as awhole, even if they are made with a broaderagenda in mind. The wealthy are differentfrom you and me, the critics claim, and not just because they have more money. Theyhave different class interests, are more con-servative, and are likely to support theRepublican Party.
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Because large contributions are unfair,undemocratic, corrupt, and unrepresenta-tive, critics have sought and obtained limitson the size and level of individual contribu-tions. They believe that smaller donations aremore fair, democratic, public spirited, andrepresentative. Government financing of campaigns supported by voluntary incometax check-offs represents the logical exten-sion of such thinking: individual contribu-tions in such systems are nearly equal andtoo small to threaten other forms of partici-pation, garner special favors, or overrepresentspecial interests. Those who give small dona-tions, “thin kittens,” are thus seen as muchbetter for the functioning of the political sys-tem than fat cats.What does the scholarly literature have tosay about these assumptions, conclusions, andcorollaries regarding fat cats? First, scholarsoffer a series of qualifications to the critics’broad assertions about the power of money in
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Fat cats are primesuspects in theconspiracy theo-ries of the left andright, potentprops for cynicsof every persua-sion, and thegreat bane of allreformers.
 
politics. For example, studies reveal that moneyaffects electoral outcomes ambiguously andindirectly; campaign spending often mattersless for well-financed candidates than for thosewho are less well funded.
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Similarly, studiesshow that money affects legislative behavior incomplex ways; one of many influences, moneyis rarely the most important and is often incon-sequential.
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Second, research on campaign contribu-tors reveals a more complex picture. On theone hand, donors as a group differ substan-tially from the general public; they are farmore affluent and politically active.
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Indeed,giving even a small amount puts an individ-ual in the activist corps, and other kinds of activists also differ from the general public ina similar fashion.
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On the other hand,donors are quite diverse politically, represent-ing a wide variety of attitudes, motivations,and forms of activism.
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This analysis looks at the criticisms of largecontributors by testing three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Givers of large donationsshould be much wealthier than contrib-utors of smaller amounts (and thustheir participation is potentially unfairand undemocratic).
Hypothesis 2: Givers of large donationsshould be motivated more by materialand instrumental concerns than con-tributors of smaller amounts (and thustheir participation is potentially venal).
Hypothesis 3: Givers of large donationsshould have different attitudes thancontributors of smaller amounts.Specifically, we would expect givers of large donations to espouse conservativeeconomic views and be Republican par-tisans (and thus their participation ispotentially unrepresentative of the pub-lic as a whole).
Findings
We sampled campaign contributors frompast elections and surveyed them to testthose conjectures. The Appendix describesour sampling approach and the subsequentsurvey of contributors that underpins thisstudy. We turn now to assessing each hypoth-esis in light of our data.
Hypothesis 1: Givers of Large DonationsAre Wealthier Than Contributors of Smaller Amounts
Table 1 presents demographic differencesbetween contributors of small, moderate, andlarge amounts. Small contributions were lessthan $500, moderate contributions were from$501 to $5,000, and large contributions were$5,001 or more. The contributors of largeamounts are more likely to be male, less likelyto belong to a labor union (although very fewcontributors in any category do), and morelikely to be over 60 years of age. The occupa-tional data are interesting. Contributors of large amounts are a bit more likely to beemployed in private-sector businesses and abit less likely to be employed in government.They are also a little more likely to be lawyers.One variable, however, overwhelms all theothers: income. Ninety-four percent of con-tributors of large amounts make more than$100,000 annually. Campaign contributionsare, in other words, what economists call a“normal good”: you consume more of themas your income increases. As the termimplies, this finding is about the most unsur-prising one imaginable.
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As might be expect-ed, contributors of large sums are wealthierthan donors of smaller amounts and thepublic at large.
Hypothesis 2: Givers of Large DonationsShould Be Motivated More by Materialand Instrumental Concerns ThanContributors of Smaller Amounts
Table 2 explores the motivations of contrib-utors by looking at what respondents saidprompted their contributions to political cam-paigns. We asked whether various factors were“very important,” “important,” “somewhatimportant,” or “not important” to their deci-sion to contribute. Not all the alternativesoffered are very interesting or theoretically
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Studies show thatmoney affects leg-islative behaviorin complex ways;one of manyinfluences,money is rarelythe most impor-tant and is ofteninconsequential.
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