President Bush’s Muddled Policy on Taiwan
by Ted Galen Carpenter
Ted Galen Carpenter is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and theauthor or editor of 15 books, including
Peace & Freedom: Foreign Policy for a ConstitutionalRepublic.
No. 82
The Bush administration has gone fromone extreme to the other with regard to U.S.policy on Taiwan. During the early monthsof his administration, the president gave aseemingly unconditional pledge to defendTaiwan from attack by mainland China—going significantly further than his prede-cessors had. He followed that assurance byapproving the largest arms sales package toTaiwan in nearly a decade. In marked con-trast to the Clinton years, high-profile visitsby Taiwanese leaders to the United Stateshave been encouraged, despite Beijing’sprotests.That pro-Taiwan stance appeared tochange dramatically in December 2003during a visit by Chinese premier WenJiabao. President Bush publicly admon-ished Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bianfor seeking to change the political status of the island unilaterally and emphasizedWashington’s opposition to any unilateralactions. At issue is the Taiwanese govern-ment’s intent to hold referenda on sensitiveissues, which Beijing believes is the latestinstallment in an ongoing campaign toachieve independence.Neither the earlier pro-Taiwan policynor the latest pro-Beijing posture serves thebest interests of the United States. It is notAmerica’s proper role to take a position onTaiwan’s independence or other issuesinvolving relations between Taipei andBeijing. Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, andthe United States should respect that soci-ety’s democratic prerogatives. At the sametime, U.S. leaders should make it clear thatTaiwan must bear all of the risks entailed inwhatever policies it adopts. In particular,Washington should state that it will notintervene if an armed conflict breaks outbetween Taiwan and mainland China.
March 15, 2004
Executive Summary
Introduction
President Bush made a startling change inWashington’s Taiwan policy during a visit byPremier Wen Jiabao of the People’s Republicof China in December 2003. With Wen at hisside, Bush stated that the United Statesopposed “any unilateral decision by eitherChina or Taiwan to change the status quo.”Making it clear that his warning was directedprimarily to Taipei rather than Beijing, headded that “the comments and actions madeby the leader of Taiwan indicate that he maybe willing to make decisions unilaterally, tochange the status quo, which we oppose.”
1
If that were not enough, the president stoodmute when Wen characterized U.S. policy asone of “opposition to Taiwan independence”and expressed China’s appreciation for thatstance.
2
Whether Bush intended it or not, thatcharacterization suggested that Washington’spolicy was now closer to Beijing’s position thanit was even during the last years of the Clintonadministration. The furthest Clinton had beenwilling to go was to state that the United States“does not support” Taiwanese independence.
3
The difference between “does not support” and“oppose” may be subtle, but it is quite impor-tant. Beijing had unsuccessfully pressed a suc-cession of U.S. administrations for an expres-sion of explicit opposition to an independentTaiwan; now, China seems to have achievedthat goal.Bush’s undercutting of Taiwan drew immedi-ate and sharp rebukes from his political allies.Neoconservatives William Kristol, Robert Kagan,and Gary Schmitt immediately issued a state-ment criticizing the president for rewarding“Beijing’s bullying” but saying “not a word” aboutChina’s missile buildup across the Taiwan Straitand the PRC’s repeated threats of war againstTaiwan. They added, “Appeasement of a dictator-ship simply invites further attempts at intimida-tion.”
4
John Tkacik, who studies East Asian secu-rity issues at the Heritage Foundation, was evenmore caustic. Accusing the president of “losinghis bearings” on the Taiwan issue, Tkacik did notattempt to conceal his dismay. “It just boggles themind,” he said. “I’m just appalled. Clinton neverwould have gone this far.”
5
The president’s political allies were notthe only people who believed that Bush wentmuch too far in placating Beijing. The
Washington Post
weighed in with a scathingeditorial criticizing President Bush for essen-tially placing “the United States on the sideof the dictators who promise war, rather thanthe democrats whose threat is a ballot box.”Such action suggested “how malleable is hiscommitment to the defense of freedom as aguiding principle of U.S. policy.”
6
Administration officials sought to mollifycritics by reaffirming that the United Stateswas still committed to Taiwan’s security. Butboth Taiwan and its friends in the UnitedStates remain deeply concerned about Wash-ington’s new apparently pro-Beijing tilt.
A Stark Reversal of Policy
What made Bush’s comments especiallysurprising is that they were such a sharpreversal of the course he had adopted duringthe initial months of his presidency. In a tele-vision interview on April 25, 2001, Bushappeared to discard all nuances and caveatsabout protecting Taiwan. When asked byABC News reporter Charles Gibson if theUnited States had an obligation to defendTaiwan, the president replied, “Yes, we do,and the Chinese must understand that.”Would the United States respond “with thefull force of the American military?” Gibsonpressed. “Whatever it took to help Taiwandefend herself,” Bush replied.
7
That state-ment was far more categorical than the assur-ances offered by previous administrations,both Republican and Democratic. Bush’spredecessors had implicitly embraced a doc-trine of “strategic ambiguity,” implying thatthe United States would defend Taiwanunless the Taiwanese provoked the attack bytoo vigorously asserting the island’s de factopolitical independence.Although Bush’s aides rushed to give assur-ances that there had been no change in
2
The president’spolitical allieswere not the onlypeople whobelieved thatBush went muchtoo far inplacating Beijing.
Washington’s policy on Taiwan, that is not howthe episode was interpreted in either Taipei orBeijing. Moreover, later that month, the admin-istration made a decision that confirmed thatU.S. policy was tilting noticeably in favor of Taiwan. President Bush approved the largestarms sales package to Taiwan since his father’scontroversial sale of F-16 fighters in 1992.
8
It wasn’t just the firmness of the commitmentto defend Taiwan against attack that marked theadministration’s policy. During the Clinton years,the U.S. government was so committed to a “one-China” policy that it barely tolerated “stopovers”in the United States by Taiwanese officials ontheir way to destinations elsewhere in the world.When Taiwan’s president, Chen Shui-bian, madesuch a stopover in 2000, the State Departmentstrongly discouraged him from making any pub-lic appearances or even meeting privately withmembers of Congress. He was kept virtuallyincommunicado in his hotel.
9
The attitude of theBush administration was dramatically different.Subsequent visits by Chen and other officialsincluded public appearances and meetings withWashington’s apparent blessing—even as Beijingseethed.
10
At one point in 2002, Taiwan’s defenseminister met “informally” with Deputy Secretaryof Defense Paul Wolfowitz during a security con-ference sponsored by a think tank in Florida.
11
That was the highest-level meeting between U.S.and Taiwanese officials since the United Statesswitched its diplomatic recognition from theRepublic of China (the government on Taiwan)to the People’s Republic of China in 1979.In short, the Bush administration gaveevery indication of sympathy for Taiwan’squest for international recognition of its defacto independence. What then accountedfor the policy reversal in late 2003?
Reasons for Washington’sPolicy Reversal
The most obvious answer is that Chen’sgovernment has been pushing the envelopeon the issue of independence to the pointthat Beijing has responded with rather bluntwarnings that such provocations could leadto war. The most controversial action was adecision by Chen’s administration to pushfor a new statute that would allow the hold-ing of referenda on various issues. The firstreferendum, scheduled for March 20, wasoriginally quite bold. One proposition wouldhave condemned China’s growing deploy-ment of missiles across the Taiwan Strait anddemanded that this threat to Taiwan’s secu-rity be removed. Under pressure fromWashington, Chen softened the wordingsomewhat. The new version will ask voterswhether Taiwan should purchase moreadvanced anti-missile systems if China doesnot remove the offending missiles andrenounce the use of force. Another questionwill be whether the government shouldengage in negotiations with the PRC on theestablishment of a “peace and stability”framework for cross-strait interactions.
12
To the authorities in Beijing, even thewatered-down versions are unacceptable,since the Chinese government regardsTaiwan as nothing more than a renegadeprovince. The very act of holding a referen-dum on such issues implies that Taiwan is anindependent state. PRC officials have been inno mood for compromise. The government’sTaiwan Affairs Office condemned the pro-posed referendum as “a one-sided provoca-tion to the peace and stability of the TaiwanStrait.”
13
Beijing also fears that the March referen-dum is just the thin end of the wedge.Chinese leaders suspect that sooner or laterthere will be a referendum on changingTaiwan’s official name from the Republic of China to the Republic of Taiwan or perhapseven a referendum on declaring indepen-dence. A statement from the Taiwan AffairsOffice reflects that worry, accusing Chen’sadministration of seeking “to use the referen-dum to realize Taiwan [sic] independence inthe future.” The PRC is “resolutely opposedto this move on the separatist road to‘Taiwan independence.’”
14
China’s warnings that such provocationscould lead to a war in the Taiwan Strait aretaken seriously in Washington, and they have
3
Chinese leaderssuspect thatsooner or laterthere will be areferendum onchangingTaiwan’s officialname from theRepublic of Chito the RepublicTaiwan.
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President Bush's Muddled Policy on Taiwan, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 82
Executive Summary
The Bush administration has gone from
one extreme to the other with regard to U.S.
policy on Taiwan. During the early months
of his administration, the president gave a
seemingly unconditional pledge to defend… (More)
The Bush administration has gone from
one extreme to the other with regard to U.S.
policy on Taiwan. During the early months
of his administration, the president gave a
seemingly unconditional pledge to defend… (More)
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