• Embed Doc
  • Copy Link
  • Readcast
  • Collections
  • CommentGo Back
Download
 
For almost 50 years, proposals by the EuropeanUnion to develop a common foreign and securitypolicy for all member states failed. Since the late1990s, however, the situation has changed. Despite,or perhaps because of, member states’ disagree-ments over Iraq, the EU probably will continue todevelop common foreign and security policies, andthe European Commission may begin to play a rolein developing new European military capabilities.In the military sphere, the EU may well improveits own operational and long-term defense plan-ning and perhaps develop new joint capabilities.On the one hand, that will provide further impetusfor EU military missions independent of NATO.On the other hand, the emergence of a commonEU foreign and security policy will likely lead to aninformal “EU caucus” in NATO, a dynamic thatmay grow with the dual enlargements of bothNATO and the EU. Within 5 to 10 years, the ques-tion may be whether the EU will undertake a roleas guarantor of European defense and how thatwill mesh, if at all, with NATO’s role.If the United States is facing a fundamentalshift in how the Europeans approach security anddefense issues, how should U.S. policymakersreact? In the larger picture, are they likely to per-ceive the EU as a partner, a troublesome obstacle,a potential “counterweight,” or an opponent? Andwhat about our transatlantic security arrange-ments? For example, what impact would the pro-posed EU policies and capabilities have onNATO? What will be the impact of the enlargedmembership of NATO and the EU on NATO’sresponse to those changes? How might EU capa-bilities affect the U.S. role in Europe, or our secu-rity interests elsewhere in the world?NATO will have to change as the EU developsits common foreign and security policy; it willhave to adjust to a growing EU military capabili-ty for conducting operations outside Europe.And, in 5 to 10 years, the EU may decide that itwants to assume responsibility for the defense of Europe. In that case, the United States shouldnegotiate a new security relationship withEurope. Under the new treaty arrangements, theUnited States would be responsible for the terri-torial defense of the United States, and Europefor the territorial defense of Europe. Both couldcooperate on out-of-area operations of commonvital interest, using current NATO politicalstructures and the NATO integrated commandas a foundation for future cooperation.
 European Union Defense Policy
 An American Perspective
by Leslie S. Lebl
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
 Leslie S. Lebl is a former U.S. Foreign Service officer with particular expertise in European political and defenseissues. Among her many assignments during a 24-year career, she served as minister-counselor for political affairsat the U.S. Mission to the European Union in Brussels, and she had two tours as political adviser to the commander of stabilization forces (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Executive Summary
No. 516June 24, 2004
 
European PoliticalIntegration
The European Union is in a constant stateof flux. Although this transitory conditionmakes it hard to measure the degree of European integration accurately, there hasbeen definite progress toward that goal. It’s abit like watching a flock of birds, swirling inapparently aimless movement. An hour later,they’re still swirling—half a mile down theroad. Several years ago the European Unionwas little more than a free-trade area. Now ithas dismantled many of the internal barriersto trade and investment; adopted a single cur-rency for most of its member states; agreed tocommon policies governing external trade,environmental protection, agriculture, andantitrust; and is developing common bordersecurity policies and unprecedented policeand judicial cooperation. With so much con-certed activity, pressure has grown to completethe package by adding a common foreign andsecurity policy, as well as a military force.Last spring’s very public disarray within theEU over Iraq, while usually cited as visible proof that the EU lacks a common foreign policy,may in fact draw the Europeans closer togeth-er. If so, it will be only one in a series of embar-rassments that catapulted the Europeanstoward greater cohesion.In the 1990s, Balkan policy was the sourceof tremendous disarray and humiliation, withthe Dayton Peace Accords and the NATO mis-sion in Bosnia-Herzegovina signaling the keyrole of the United States, not Europe, in stop-ping that conflict. Since then, the EU hasdevised a common approach to regionalissues including eventual EU membership forthe Balkan countries—a remarkable change inpolicy toward a region most Europeans viewedas a remote, primitive backwater that was bestignored.The impact of the later Kosovo air cam-paign was also a strong stimulus for change.It revealed, in humiliating fashion, the yawn-ing gap in military capabilities between theUnited States and its European allies. TheEuropeans disagreed with the Americanapproach yet were unable to alter it. They feltthey had been involved in a campaign thatthey could not control and did not want tofind themselves in that situation again.
1
Solutions to the problem of relative mili-tary weakness could be found becauseFrench, British, and German defense policiesconverged gradually after the end of the ColdWar. The French sought a closer relationshipwith NATO, making it easier for othernations to cooperate with France; theGermans finally began to develop a foreignand defense policy after reunification; andthe British for the first time agreed to partic-ipate in the development of EU military capa-bilities at the French-UK summit in St. Maloin late 1998.
2
The so-called big three (France,Germany, and the UK) and other EU memberstate governments have also come slowly to acommon understanding of the need to reex-amine the threats they face and to reorganizetheir armed forces in the post–Cold War envi-ronment, even if they have yet to implementmany of the changes.
3
Key elements of this common understand-ing have been affirmed at senior political lev-els in the EU, with the stated intent of strengthening and developing EU institu-tions. The two trilateral summits held inSeptember and November 2003 by the bigthree in the wake of the split over Iraq onlyreaffirm the importance they ascribe to work-ing together on defense and foreign policy.This trend has been accompanied by thegrowth of new institutional structures, inwhat could be called the “Brusselization” of EU foreign policy. In October 1999 formerNATO secretary general Javier Solana was thefirst person appointed as EU high represen-tative for the common foreign and securitypolicy.
4
In addition, a new body, the Politicaland Security Committee, was set up inBrussels, staffed by ambassadors from EUmember states who were charged with devel-oping common policies.Solana’s activities and effectiveness havevaried, depending on the issues of the dayand on the latitude afforded him by themember state holding the six-month rotat-
2
EU membershave come to acommonunderstanding of the need toreexamine thethreats they faceand to reorganizetheir armedforces in thepost–Cold Warenvironment.
 
ing presidency of the council, but overall hehas done a remarkable job of establishing theEU as a player in international politics. Forits part, the PSC has created conditions forgreater cooperation among EU memberstates. While key decisions continue to bemade in EU capitals, common policies inmany other areas are increasingly forged byconsensus in Brussels.
European Security andDefense Policy
As an integral part of the development of acommon foreign and security policy, the EUcommitted itself to engage in crisis preventionand management beyond its borders. That ini-tiative was captured under the title ESDP, orEuropean Security and Defense Policy, eventhough for much of the policy’s existence ithas been difficult to define what “European”means. There has been no overarching securi-ty policy, as it was considered too difficult toreach agreement on one among EU memberstates; nor was ESDP designed to “defend”Europe. That task was explicitly left to NATO;ESDP aimed instead at developing capabilitiesfor handling crises outside Europe.After the St. Malo summit in December1998, this process moved ahead quickly, withan initial commitment of 60,000 troops fromthe 15 EU member states, deployable within60 days and able to sustain operations for atleast one year, to handle a range of crisis man-agement tasks from humanitarian interven-tions to peacemaking (war fighting, whilenot specifically prohibited, was not includ-ed). In addition, the EU pledged to establisha similar institutional capability in the formof 5,000 policemen. The EU has subsequent-ly moved toward the goal of developingrapidly deployable battle groups of 1,500men by 2007.
5
As with NATO, these werenational capabilities that could be assignedto the EU as required, not a standing force of the EU central authorities.Establishing new structures, such as a mil-itary committee and a military staff, alongwith a 24-hour situation center and a staff coordinating the civilian functions, was rela-tively easy. The next step, which proved moredifficult, was to work out the terms of aframework agreement with NATO—a stepthat is necessary inasmuch as the EU wouldto a great degree call on the same pool of sol-diers as would NATO. The EU also hoped togain access to NATO and U.S. assets that itlacked, such as heavy transport, intelligence,reconnaissance, logistics, or strike capabili-ties.
6
Those arrangements were finally inplace by March 2003.The EU has mounted three operationssince January 1, 2003: a civilian police mis-sion in Bosnia-Herzegovina, replacing theUN; a military monitoring mission inMacedonia, replacing NATO; and a militarypeacekeeping mission in Bunia in CentralAfrica as part of a larger UN operation. It alsointends to replace the NATO military mis-sion in Bosnia in 2004 (which would mean itwould be in charge of both civilian policingand peacekeeping there).
7
In “EU time,” thatis very rapid progress indeed.
A European SecurityStrategy
The durability and effectiveness of theEU’s resolve was tested last spring by theopen dissension over Iraq. After the relativeeuphoria of reaching agreement with NATOon framework arrangements, and the impor-tant practical step of deploying an EU forceto Macedonia, the open split over Iraq wasparticularly painful and humiliating. For sev-eral months both insiders and outsideobservers speculated that the EU’s commonforeign and security policy was dead.
8
Above all, it was clear that the Europeanswould never be able to act jointly if they dis-agreed on the threats they faced. To solvethat problem, Solana was asked to prepare apaper on a common EU security strategy.The EU had previously avoided that task assiduously, fearing it would be too difficultto bridge the differences between member
3
The EU hasmounted threeoperations sinceJanuary 1, 2003: acivilian policemission inBosnia-Herzegovina,a militarymonitoringmission inMacedonia, and amilitary peace-keeping missionin Bunia inCentral Africa.
of 00

Leave a Comment

You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...
You must be to leave a comment.
Submit
Characters: ...