cent, nearly twice as much as the rest of theworld.
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Or put another way, U.S. defensespending went from 38 percent of the world’sdefense spending in 2001 to 41 percent in2003. If those growth rates (approximately 4.5percent annually for the rest of the world and8.5 percent annually for the United States)were sustained, in 10 years U.S. defense expen-ditures would nearly equal what the rest of theworld combined spends.The six-year trend shows that U.S. defenseexpenditures grew from $338.1 billion in 1997to $422.5 billion in 2003, while the rest of theworld’s defense expenditures fell from $656.0billion to $617.9 billion (in constant 2005 dol-lars) during the same period.
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In other words,U.S. defense expenditures grew at about 4 per-cent per year while the rest of the world’sexpenditures declined about 1 percent annual-ly. If the six-year trend is used, U.S. defenseexpenditures will exceed those of the rest of the world combined in eight years. Although itis impossible to accurately predict futuredefense expenditures, it is probably safe to say that the United States is on track to outspendthe rest of the world combined sometime dur-ing the next 10–20 years, especially if thelonger-term trend is declining defense expen-ditures for the rest of the world.Is such a large defense budget necessary toprovide security against the threats theUnited States faces? Is such spending neces-sary to fight the war on terrorism?
The 21st-Century ThreatEnvironment
U.S. defense spending should be put in per-spective relative to the 21st-century threat envi-ronment. Since the demise of the Soviet Union,the United States no longer faces a serious mil-itary challenger or global hegemonic threat.President Vladimir Putin has charted a coursefor Russia to move closer to the United Statesand the West, both politically and economical-ly, so Russia is not the threat that the formerSoviet Union was. Indeed, Russia now hasobserver status with NATO—a dramaticchange, given that the NATO alliance was cre-ated to contain the former Soviet Union. Andin May 2002 Russia and the United Statessigned the Strategic Offensive ReductionsTreaty (SORT) to reduce their strategic nucleararsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheadseach by December 2012. According to IISS,“despite disagreement over the U.S.-led actionin Iraq, the bilateral relationship betweenWashington and Moscow remains firm.”
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And even if Russia were to change courseand adopt a more hostile posture, it is not ina position to challenge the United Stateseither economically or militarily. In 2003Russia’s gross domestic product was a littlemore than a tenth of U.S. GDP ($1.3 trillion vs. $10.9 trillion).
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And although a largershare of Russia’s GDP went for defenseexpenditures (4.9 percent vs. 3.7 percent),
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inabsolute terms the United States outspentRussia by more than six to one. So Russia would have to devote more than 20 percentof its GDP to defense—which would exceedwhat the Soviet Union spent during theheight of the Cold War during the 1980s
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—to equal the United States.Certainly, Chinese military developmentsbear watching. Although many observers seeChina as the next great threat,
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even if China modernizes and expands its strategic nuclearforce (as many military experts predict it will),the United States will retain a credible nucleardeterrent with an overwhelming advantage inwarheads, launchers, and variety of delivery vehicles. According to a Council on ForeignRelations task force chaired by former secre-tary of defense Harold Brown:[T]he People’s Republic of China is pur-suing a deliberate and focused course of military modernization but . . . it is atleast two decades behind the UnitedStates in terms of military technology and capability. Moreover, if the UnitedStates continues to dedicate significantresources to improving its military forces, as expected, the balance betweenthe United States and China, both glob-ally and in Asia, is likely to remain deci-
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Russia wouldhave to devotemore than 20percent of itsGDP to defenseto equal theUnited States.
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