Description

American representative government suffers
from the handicap of a largely uncompetitive political
system. American politics has fewer and fewer
competitive elections. In arguing that political competition
matters a great deal, this paper traces the
increasing trend toward uncompetitiveness and
details the role and nature of incumbency advantage
in fostering an uncompetitive political system.

Current redistricting practices and campaign
finance regulations, in tandem with publicly
financed careerism, have significantly negative
consequences for the health of the political system.
This study analyzes several of the major
instruments of campaign finance regulation,
such as contribution limits, public financing,
and the ban on soft money, in terms of their relationship
to political competition. Simply put,
campaign finance regulation and public financing
have not improved political competition.

In the past, campaign finance restrictions and
taxpayer-subsidized elections have generated
unintended consequences. The most recent regulatory
round is no exception to that rule. This
study also looks at other reforms, namely, term
limits and improvements to the redistricting
process, in light of their comparatively successful
record regarding political competition.

Changes in the manner in which districts are
designed, campaigns are funded, and politicians
are tenured require immediate implementation.
In short, elected officials should be disconnected
from campaign and election rule making and
regulation. There will not be an improvement in
political competition until the incumbent fox
ends his tenure as guardian of the democratic
henhouse.