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The U.S.-Japan strategic relationship, formal-ized during the depths of the Cold War and refinedduring the 1980s and 1990s, continues to undergodramatic changes. Although Japan is economically capable and now seems politically motivated toassume full responsibility for defending itself fromthreats, it is legally constrained from doing sounder the terms of the Japanese constitution, par-ticularly Article 9. The path to defensive self-suffi-ciency is also impeded by Japan’s continuingdependence on the United States embodied in theU.S.-Japan security alliance.With the United States struggling to meet mili-tary commitments abroad, and with Japan increas-ingly asserting military autonomy, American poli-cymakers must shape a new policy that will moreequitably distribute security burdens between thetwo countries. Three recent instances in which theUnited States and Japan have worked together onmatters of mutual interest—Iraq, Taiwan, andNorth Korea—offer useful clues as to how a coop-erative strategic relationship might operate in thefuture. A new U.S.-Japan strategic relationship will becrafted over a period of several years, but the processshould begin immediately. As a first step, theUnited States should refrain from interfering in thedecisions that the Japanese people may make withrespect to their own defense. Washington shouldremain agnostic on the question of revisions to the Japanese constitution, including the crucial Article9. Further, while U.S. policymakers might advisethe Japanese of the uncertain benefits of acquiringtheir own nuclear weapons relative to the highcosts, the United States should not expect to be ableto prevent the Japanese from developing suchweapons—nor should it try. Finally, the new strate-gic partnership should culminate with the removalof U.S forces from Japanese soil. The two countriescould negotiate basing agreements for U.S. naval vessels and aircraft, and possibly also some pre-positioning of heavy equipment in depots for rapiddeployment in the region, but such agreementsneed not depend on the continuation of a large-scale, and effectively permanent, U.S. troop pres-ence. The new alliance between two normal coun-tries—as opposed to one between a patron and a defacto client—will provide a more durable founda-tion for addressing the most pressing security chal-lenges in East Asia and beyond.
Two Normal Countries
 Rethinking the U.S.-Japan Strategic Relationship
by Christopher Preble
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Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.
Executive Summary 
No. 566April 18, 2006
Routing 
 
Introduction
The Americans and Japanese have cooper-ated to address East Asian security issues formany years. The United States has retained a formal leadership role in the region throughits maintenance of a sizable military garrisonon Japanese territory. For their part, Japanesepolicymakers have grown more confident andassertive. They have increasingly pushed theenvelope on the definition of “self-defense,”progressively expanding, in both philosophi-cal and practical terms, the uses of military force that are considered legitimate under Japan’s officially pacifist constitution. The Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) today isone of the most capable militaries on the plan-et, and that will continue to be the case, even if total Japanese defense spending remains rela-tively modest.Meanwhile, U.S. military power, still un-matched in absolute terms, is insufficient formaintaining a dominant position in all cornersof the globe. If the United States is to focus ona few areas of particular concern related to theglobal war on terrorism, especially the MiddleEast, then U.S. policymakers must seek ways toquietly devolve security responsibilities towealthy, stable, democratic allies in otherregions of the world. That reorientationapplies to Europe, where long-time NATOallies should be expected to play a much largerrole in the defense of a continent that hasenjoyed relative peace and security for morethan 50 years. U.S. policymakers should apply the same reasoning to East Asia, a region con-fronting several urgent security challenges.Chief among those challenges has been theClinton and George W. Bush administrations’inability to prevent the dictator of theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim Jong-il, from developing nuclear weapons.Despite some progress in the Six-Party Talks,the future of the North Korean nuclear pro-gram remains very much in doubt. Kim’snuclear ambitions today pose no immediateand direct threat to U.S. security. If the Six-Party Talks fail to achieve the complete, verifi-able, and irreversible dismantlement of theNorth’s nuclear weapons program, suchweapons will pose only a limited threat to theU.S. homeland because of the relatively limit-ed range and poor accuracy of North Koreanballistic missiles, the absence of any other reli-able long-range delivery vehicles, and theUnited States’ overwhelming deterrent capa-bility. Nonetheless, with more than 30,000U.S. troops stationed in South Korea andalong the demilitarized zone, and with anoth-er 35,000 U.S. troops residing in Japan,
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Kim’sweapons clearly pose a threat to U.S. interestsand Americans in East Asia.They pose an even greater threat to Kim’sneighbors. That fact, combined with Kim’serratic behavior, has led the Japanese, in par-ticular, to take a hard look at their defenses.
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Even if the nuclear stand-off is resolved, rela-tions between Tokyo and Pyongyang will like-ly remain frosty so long as the DPRK refusesto account fully for the abduction of Japanesecitizens in the 1970s and 1980s.But lingering hostility toward and suspi-cion of North Korea in the near term pale incomparison with Japanese concerns over themedium to long term with respect to a risingChina. Beijing is exerting greater influence inthe political, economic, and diplomaticrealms and simultaneously threatening touse force against Taiwan if the island pro-ceeds on its current path toward greater inde-pendence. Japan would look upon Chineseannexation of Taiwan as a national security threat, but it is less clear how it wouldrespond to more subtle Chinese challenges to Japanese economic and security interests inand around Taiwan.The trajectory of China’s rise to regionalprominence threatens to collide with both Japanese and American interests. The openquestion is whether all three countries will beable to establish a new strategic balance orwhether competition for influence in East Asia will lead to a clash that could threatenthe lives of hundreds of millions of people onboth sides of the Pacific. According to Eugene Matthews, a formersenior fellow at the Council on ForeignRelations and now president of the interna-
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U.S. policymakersmust seek ways todevolve security responsibilities towealthy, stable,democratic allies.
 
tional educational firm Nintai, Japan’s grow-ing self-reliance is indicative of resurgentnationalism. Matthews urges that U.S. policy be directed at blocking such sentiments, or atleast attempting to channel them in a particu-lar direction.
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But it is hardly unreasonable for Japan to seek some measure of independencefrom the United States.
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 A desire that one’scountry be capable of defending itself mightbe a sign of nationalism, but if it is, it is no dif-ferent from the nationalism expressed by theUnited Kingdom and dozens of other coun-tries that have maintained a robust defensivecapability in spite of security assurances fromthe United States.Fortunately, the Bush administration hasencouraged a more assertive stance on thepart of the Japanese government, even at therisk of arousing regional fears of a resurgent Japan. Although such fears cannot be dis-missed entirely, both the United States and Japan should continue their efforts to estab-lish Japan as an independent pole of power inEast Asia, a “normal country” that is nolonger dependent on a distant patron for itsdefense.
The Evolution of the U.S- Japan Strategic Relationship
The United States has maintained a sizabletroop presence in Japan since the end of WorldWar II. For most of that time the strategic rela-tionship has been shaped by an underlyingbut pervasive lack of trust on the part of theUnited States. Although the military occupa-tion officially ended with the signing of theMutual Security Treaty of September 8, 1951,that treaty formalized a security bargain inwhich Japan—explicitly proscribed from pos-sessing a military under the language of  Article 9 of the Japanese constitution—wasguaranteed U.S. protection and the UnitedStates was allowed to maintain permanentbases on Japanese soil. Less than 10 years later,the two countries reaffirmed that strategicbargain with the 1960 Treaty of MutualCooperation and Security.
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The need for an American military presencein Japan has been a foregone conclusion in bothcountries’ military planning ever since, althoughthe troops themselves have often been a sourceof controversy and have at times engenderedstrong Japanese resentment. There were morethan 172,000 American military personnel sta-tioned in Japan in April 1952. The numbers havecome down over the years, but the presence wasmaintained throughout the Cold War inresponse to the Soviet and Chinese threat inEast Asia.
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In 1989, at the end of the Cold War,more than 49,000 Americans were stationed onbases in Japan, plus another 24,000 sailors withthe Seventh Fleet.
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But, even though the ration-ale for keeping U.S. forces in Japan changed inthe 1990s, the numbers remained quite high,particularly relative to the overall reduction of uniformed military personnel that has occurredsince the end of the Cold War. As of December31, 2005, there were 35,050 U.S. troops in Japan.The Navy maintains bases in Sasebo and Yokosuka, the headquarters of the U.S. SeventhFleet, and the Yokota Air Base is the headquar-ters of the U.S. Fifth Air Force. The more than15,000 Marines stationed in Japan are concen-trated on the island of Okinawa.
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The security guarantee afforded by thosetroops, and enshrined in the 1960 treaty, doesnot constitute an alliance in the traditionalsense, in that there is no presumption of reci-procity on the part of the Japanese. From theearliest days, many Japanese have contendedthat Article 9 of their constitution bars themfrom becoming involved militarily in regionalcrises. The language of Article 9, which wasessentially imposed by U.S. occupation author-ities, is quite explicit on that score: “Aspiringsincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people foreverrenounce war as a sovereign right of the nationand the threat or use of force as means of set-tling international disputes.” Less clear is theextent to which Article 9 prevents Japan fromdefending itself when attacked. Part 2 of Article9 stipulates that “land, sea, and air forces, aswell as other war potential, will never be main-tained” and that “[t]he right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized,” but that lan-
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The UnitedStates and Japanshould continuetheir efforts toestablish Japan asan independentpole of power inEast Asia.
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