and the Iranian government would react by defending itself. As will be discussed below,Iran’s strategy of defense against a U.S. attackcould involve further destabilizing Iraq, in par-ticular the southern Shi’a region; convention-al or possibly chemical or biological attacksagainst either U.S. personnel in the region oragainst Israel; the use of mines or civilianboats to covertly attack oil tankers in the Straitof Hormuz, similar to the attack against theUSS
Cole
; and a long, protracted guerrilla warshould the conflict escalate to regime changeand involve U.S. personnel on the ground inIran. These possibilities must be factored intoany decision about whether to start a war withIran. It is worth, then, looking systematically at the possible results of the military option.
Problem #1: Worse Intelligence Than Iraq?
The U.S. government appears to know very little about Iran’s nuclear program. It is quitedifficult to gather effective intelligence on a country with which America has not had com-mercial or diplomatic relations for more thantwo decades, and a successful attack against a nuclear program as dispersed and effectively hidden as Iran’s apparently is would require very good intelligence. In 2002 the UnitedStates learned of startling advances in Iran’snuclear program after revelations regardingthe Natanz enrichment facility and the Arakheavy water reactor were made very publicly by the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq’s (MEK’s) politicalarm, the National Council of Resistance inIran (NCRI).
6
Given that these facilities wouldrank high on any list of potential targets inIran, we must understand that the Iranianleadership knows that we know about them. Are Natanz and Arak still the key sites tostrike in order to damage Iran’s nuclear pro-gram? If so, the Iranians would be leavingthemselves vulnerable to just the sort of U.S.air strikes that they fear. It is far more likely that the leadership in Tehran has taken intoaccount that those locations would be firston a list of U.S. aim points and has adjustedtheir programs accordingly, by either diversi-fying the locations even further than they were or by relocating nuclear activity.
7
In addition to the inherent difficulty of gathering information about a country withwhich we have had nearly no diplomatic oreconomic engagement for 27 years, there is rea-son to fear that what little intelligence we dohave is of poor quality. According to JamesRisen of the
New York Times
, the entire CentralIntelligence Agency network inside Iran was“rolled up” in 2004 when a CIA operative acci-dentally sent a full roster of U.S. assets insideIran to an Iranian double agent. This, accord-ing to Risen, left the CIA “virtually blind inIran.”
8
Even before the “roll-up,” a presidentialcommission concluded in 2004 that the U.S.intelligence community had “disturbingly lit-tle” information on Iran’s nuclear activities.
9
That assessment was echoed in August2006 in a report for the House PermanentSelect Committee on Intelligence. Thatreport noted that “American intelligenceagencies do not know nearly enough aboutIran’s nuclear weapons program.”
10
Further,the report argued:Improving intelligence collection andanalysis to better understand andcounter Iranian influence and inten-tions is vital to our national security.The Intelligence Community lacks theability to acquire essential informationnecessary to make judgments on theseessential topics, which have been recog-nized as essential to U.S. national secu-rity for many, many years.
11
Some neoconservatives loudly criticize theCIA for its pre–Iraq war failings, and disdainits capability to assess the Iranian program. Atthe same time, though, they seem to assumethat the intelligence we—or they—possess onthe Iranian nuclear program is good enoughto make striking Iran’s nuclear programsremarkably easy. On March 5, 2006, during a presentation to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Pentagon adviser RichardPerle presented the option thus:I trust we know where [the Iraniannuclear facilities] are. If we don’t know
3
A presidentialcommissionconcluded in2004 that theU.S. intelligencecommunity had“disturbingly little” informa-tion on Iran’snuclear activities.
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