The Role of Muslim Scholars (‘ulema) and Prayer Leaders (imams)1 in

Formulation of Public Religious Policy towards Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan.

By Syed Akif and Kafeel Ahmed

Abstract

Religion is increasingly an important constituent of public policy discourse in

Pakistan. While numerous factors, most particularly the complicated geo-politics
of the region, have further convoluted the already complex relationships between
the sacred and the secular in Pakistan, it is important to make sense of the thought
processes of leading players in both realms, which come together at least five
times a day when police guards take up positions outside most mosques to protect
worshippers. An important aspect of the religious discourse in Pakistan is sectarian
conflict between the two main Muslim faith streams.

As apparent from the title, the principal objective for undertaking this study was to
determine the public perceptions about the status of and actual role(s) played by
Muslim scholars and prayer leaders (‘ulema and imams) in the formulation of
public policy. While these two groups of public opinion leaders are undoubtedly
important in terms of the influence they exert on the thoughts and actions of
common Pakistanis through their very regular interactions, especially the formal
sermons on Fridays and in special congregations, it is important to determine what
exactly is the extent of their persuasive power. Given the fact that the public
canvas is a very large one, it was felt necessary to limit the scope of this study to a
particular area of focus. For this we chose the sectarian conflict between the two
major faith streams, the Shia and Sunni, in Pakistan which in spite of having
receded after peaking in the early part of this decade is never too far from the
public domain. It is certainly a weighty factor in the national religious and political
discourses, especially in places like Parachinar and the annual Muharram
commemorations.

The study is a primarily a quantitative one and employed a questionnaire to elicit

responses. Keeping in view the theme of the research, the generally perceived
awareness and intellectual level and linguistic skills of ‘ulema and imams, their
division on sectarian lines, a detailed questionnaire was developed in Urdu to
facilitate responses by members of these groups who are generally not well versed
in English.

1
Although the correct Arabic plural of imam is aimma, this study uses the Anglicized plural ‘imams’ as
the word has now come to be incorporated in English and is found in most contemporary English
dictionaries. However, the term ‘ulema - the plural of ‘alim – has been retained on account of its not
being so widely used in English.
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The questionnaire was administered through a random sampling process in
Karachi to 10 ‘ulema and over 50 imams in Karachi; the respondents were
randomly selected from lists of ‘ulema and mosques made available to the authors
by a national security agency in confidence. While no amount of care can ever be
perceived to be totally unbiased when it comes to religious issues in Pakistan
which is highly fragmented between various “sects” and sub-denominations, an
attempt was made to maintain a balance in the representation of various groups and
sub-groups on the basis of what is arguably the best available official list (even
though the same may not conform to “generally held perceptions.”)

From findings of a pre-administration piloting, the form required between 30 and

40 minutes to fill out. As with any research study, there were constraints and
limitations. Some of the respondents were skeptical about the aims and objectives
of the survey and apprehended the involvement of some government security
agency working behind the scene for some hidden agenda under the prevailing
political circumstances. A number of them were hesitant to return the
questionnaire, in all likeliness on account of their perceived apprehensions.
Accordingly, only the voluntarily/freely responded replies have been analyzed for
this study.

Introduction

Historically, the ‘ulema have considered themselves to be the successors of

Prophets2 and by association a group tasked by the Qur’an (3:104) and Prophet
Muhammad to propagate Islam throughout mankind’s stay on this planet. They
have taken on as one of their prime responsibilities, partly self-assumed and partly
socio-culturally mandated, to advise not only common Muslims but more
specifically Muslim rulers and governments on Islamic tenets and issues
demanding contemporary solutions. From the earliest days of Islam, ‘ulema have
held important positions in various governments and tasked with overseeing the
dispensation of justice. For instance Imam Abu Yousuf (d. ), the lead disciple
of Imam Abu Hanifa [Noman ibn Thabit], who provided the foundational
interpretation and documentation of one of the four Sunni schools of religious
jurisprudence, the Hanafi Fiqh, was the Chief Justice of Abbaside government of
Haroon Rashid (786-809 CE).

In South Asia, ‘ulema like Bahauddin Zakaria (d. ) and Qazi Abu Mansoor (d.)
occupied important positions like those of Qadi-al-Quda (Chief Justice), Sheikhul
Islam (Chief Scholar), and Sadar-ul-Sadoor (Chief Court Advisor) during various
Muslim dynasties that ruled parts of South Asia ever since the Muslims first ventured
there under Muhammad Bin Qasim (711-12 CE) and up to the Mughal Empire (1526-
1857). Burhanuddin Balkhi, a well known faqih (expert in Islamic jurisprudence) of
the 13th century C.E. impressed Sultan Ghayauddin Balbun (d. )so much that he
2
This belief is based upon the Islamic tenet that Prophet Muhammad was the last of the Divinely
ordained messengers and owes its origin to a hadith – a saying of the Holy Prophet – appearing in a
chapter of the most widely acclaimed book of the Prophet’s sayings, Sahih Bukhari (Kitabul Islam)
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was made an advisor of the court. As late as the mid-19th century C.E. the Sultan-
ul-’ulema of the Shia state of Awadh (19th century) used to crown the new ruler.

On the other hand, ‘ulema were never wanting of taking principled stands against
kings who naturally displayed extreme arrogance towards all persons and things they
considered to be hindrances in their political ascendancy. Some scholars like Shaikh
Shahabuddin and Chiragh Delhvi (d. 757 Hijra; c. 1350) annoyed Muhammad Bin
Tughlaq and earned his wrath. Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi, who challenged Din-e-Ilahi,
the religious aberration of Mughal emperor Akbar (ruled 1556-1606 CE) was
imprisoned for a very long period. Not shy of intervening in political matters, scholars
like Shah Waliullah ( ) took on a very active role and invited foreign Muslim forces
like those of Ahmed Shah Durrani ( )to help stabilize the enfeebled Muslim rule
quell Hindu Marhatas who were on the verge of over-running the capital at Delhi
( C.E.). Still others took up militant uprising themselves: Syed Ahmed Barelvi (d.
1831 CE) tried to establish an Islamic state in the Pashtun area of the Kaghan Velley
(now in Pakistan) in the early 19th century. Maulvi Liaquat Ali, Maulana Mehmoodul
Hassan and others participated in 1857 War of Independence (a.k.a. as “Indian
Mutiny”) and were sentenced to life imprisonment in the Andaman Islands (called
kala pani or “dark waters”). Mufti Barkatullah tried to seek Afghan and Russian help
against British occupation.

For their part, the British also used “the religious card” by establishing and propping
up pro-government religious personages from amongst the Sufic orders who presided
over as administrators of tombs and shrines as Gaddi Nasheens. These “official
molvis” were used by colonial authorities to condemn the ‘ulema who did not tow the
official line by branding them as ‘Wahabis’ – a very convenient ploy to discredit
anyone by ascribing them a connection with the austere Islamic interpretation of 19th
century religious leader and ideologue of the Saudi Arabian regime. Official reverence
was accorded to the graves of scholars and religious leaders from British times by the
visit of important officials and political leaders.

Owing to their delicate position which has demanded arbitration between

contrasting demands of orthodox religious doctrine and real-politik of rulers, very
often genuine religious scholars (as opposed to the official or “market-players”)
have also faced the wraths of governments for speaking truth or not towing and
supporting the official line.3

The `ulema have also played an important role in knowledge-propagation by

establishing major Islamic educational institutions like Jamia Al-Azhar in Egypt,
Madarsa-e-Nizamia in Baghdad, Houza-e-Ilmia at Najaf, Islamic University in
Madina and India’s great seminary at Deoband.

3
Such examples are many and include the case of execution of Ahmed Bin Naser on the orders of the
Abbaside ruler Wasiq, torture of Imam Ahmed Bin Humbal on the orders of Abbaside ruler Mamoon
and imprisonment of Imam Abu Hanifa on the orders of the Abbaside ruler Mansoor. In recent times
also Muslim religious scholars have faced not just torture and imprisonment (Maulana Mawdudi in
Pakistan) but also death (Sayyid Qutub in Egypt); throughout Muslim lands.
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AIMS & OBJECTIVES

The main aim of this research was to determine the role played by ‘ulema and
imams in the formulation of public policies concerning religious affairs in
Pakistan. This important and sensitive segment of the society plays its role by way
of influencing its major constituency, the Muslim citizens of the country who form
nearly 99 percent of the population. It also addresses the government not only
through their direct participation in the political process but also indirectly by
exercising their social and cultural influence. On the one hand the ‘ulema demand
legislative and administrative actions for promoting the causes of Islam as
perceived by them and on the other they react to policies adopted by the
government, either for their repeal or instituting changes according to their points
of view.

It is a general perception that successive governments have been quite alive to the
issues relating to, if not actually wary and apprehensive of, the influence of ‘ulema
on the Pakistani society and have generally put forth a guarded and defensive
posture, if not offering continuous appeasements. The unprecedented success of
the religious parties led by the ‘ulema in the 2002 national elections, especially in
the two provinces bordering Afghanistan, was an important development, in spite
of the fact that these were almost totally routed in the 2008 elections. The
government was, however, able to get the better of them by obtaining their support
on the issue of 17th Constitutional Amendment in 2003. However, with the
government having reportedly gone back on its commitments made to the ‘ulema,
they felt betrayed and started flexing their muscles and displaying shows of force
which have surfaced many times not just in the insurgency hit Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) but surprisingly even in the national capital
Islamabad where the Lal Majid incident of 2007 became an embarrassing
international headline.

The hypothesis of this study is that there is no consensus among the ‘ulema as to
the nature of an Islamic state and hence on how policy formulation should take
place in a modern Muslim polity like that of Pakistan.4

With the nation being divided on almost every facet on national discourse, religion
is no exception.5 The polarization is Muslim scholarly opinion has become more
pronounced and prevalent in the post 9/11 era and thus warrants a middle course.

4
Justice Munir in his report on 1953 incidents of Punjab had probably correctly observed that “no two
‘ulema agree on the precise definition of a muslim or Islamic sate”. [REFERENCE]
5
. Four different groups, deriving inspiration from different phases of Islamic history, can be easily
identified in present-day Muslim polities: the “conservatives” wanting a return to Khilafa (the
Caliphate), the “traditionalists” accepting malookiat (rule by non-democratic ‘Divine Rightists’),
“progressives” insisting on a re-interpretation of the Qur’an in the light of modern knowledge and the
secularists considering Islam only a social code. The first two categories primarily interpret Islam in
terms of practices and institutions of seventh-century Arabia and are not prepared to follow the Western-
oriented Muslim intelligentsia calling for brotherhood, equality, moderation, toleration and social
justice. They project Islam as merely a static collection of injunctions and prohibitions.
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The ‘ulema and imams have not been able to adjust themselves to the changed
scenario.

The questionnaire devised to seek opinions and perceptions of ‘ulema and imams
on policies having a religious aspect covered the following important themes:

(i) Basic concepts on what comprised ‘a true Muslim’, an Islamic state,

Jihad, blasphemy etc.

(ii) Nature and direction of the “Pakistan Movement”, the Objectives

Resolution, PNA agitation against Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977.
(iii) ‘ulema ’s perception and their role in Islamization.
(iv) Sectarian strife, its characters and effectiveness of government
actions.
(v) Merits and demerits of Zakat system, Haj scheme, Ruet Hilal
Committee.
(vi) Perception about registration of Madarsas, inclusion of modern
subjects in their syllabi, acceptance of government grant etc.
(vii) Response to changes/implementation of Blasphemy Act, Hudood
Ordinance etc.
(viii) Impact of unity of religious parties on one hand and the five boards
of madarsas on the other.
(ix) Overall level of satisfaction with government policies.

METHODOLOGY ADOPTED

For the purpose of primary reach to collect data, a 28-item questionnaire was
developed in Urdu as most of the ‘ulema and imams do not know English. It was
pilot tested on a number of imams who found no difficulty in attempting it. They
generally required 35-40 minutes to fill it. Thereafter, 12 known ‘ulema and 60
madarsa teachers/imams were randomly selected from different sects. Their
regional/ethnic affiliation was not taken into consideration. According to figures
available with a number of civil authorities, there were 1084 Barelvi, 1082
Deobandi, 211 Shia and 62 Ahle Hadith registered mosques in Karachi. They were
mostly approached by trusted persons pretending to be students of higher classes
doing some assignment. Quite a few of them showed reluctance in giving a
response apprehending some hidden motive behind the exercise which was
expected under the prevailing circumstances. Names of respondents, their sect,
place (mosque/Madarsas) etc., were not asked but recorded separately by the
worker. The secondary research was based on a survey of available literature
(newspapers, magazines, books, government records etc.) and has already been
reflected in the introduction. Following is a denomination-wise break-up of the
respondents:

S.No. Sect Ulema imams

i. Barelvi 04 21
ii. Deobandi 03 19
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 iii. Shia 02 07
iv. Ahle Hadith 01 03
TOTAL 10 50

Limitations:

This survey was conducted as an academic requirement for completion of

promotion requirement at the National Institute of Public Administration. With
the duration of the course being about three months and the pressure to perform in
a range of areas the study was limited in terms of the time duration available to the
researchers. Added to this was the fact that the fasting month of Ramadan fell this
period, further burdening the researchers in terms of shorter office hours on the one
hand and extra-occupation of ulema and imams in the heightened religious
activities of the month.

Furthermore, while the survey was done through random sampling, it was felt that
the sample was small and limited to Karachi. The absence of training and past
experience of respondents in engaging with similar surveys was another limiting
factor. This was similar to the poor performance of students on IQ tests to which
they are not accustomed. Yet another stumbling block was the lack of full trust
between the surveyors and the respondents, many of whom remained skeptical
about the whole process.

FINDINGS

Following is a table summarizing the findings extracted from the

questionnaires. The serial numbers refer to the original questions in the form.

S. Question / response options %

No
.
1 What are the minimum beliefs for being a Muslim? [Please mark as
. many as applicable]
1 a) Tauhid (Unity of Godhead) 100.00
b) Risalat (Prophethood) 100.00
c) Qiyamat (Belief in the Hereafter) 93.60
d) Imamat (Belief in an imam - a post-Prophetic guide) 31.91
e) Ibadat (a set of ritual worship) 17.02
12.76
f) Adalat (Justice) 78.72
g) Khatam-e-Nabuwwat (End of Prophethood with
Muhammad) 42.55
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 h) Ikram-e-Sahaba (Reverence of the Companions of the -
Holy Prophet)
i) Any other
j) k) Don’t know.
2 What are the minimum requirements for a state to be called Islamic.
. a) Elected Amir (head of state) 44.68
i b) Just Ruler 65.95
42.55
c) Nizam-e-Salat (a state-run system for ritual prayer) 34.04
d) Nizam-e-Zakat (a state-run system for collection of
alms)
e) Any other
f)
3 If any of country may be considered a model Islamic state, which of
. the following would it be?
i a) Saudi Arabia 48.93
b) Jamhoori Iran 21.27
c) c)Taliban’s Afghanistan 02.12
d) General Zia’s Pakistan -
e) Malaysia -
f) None 14.89
4 How can an “Islamic system” (of governance) be established?
. a) by bringing pressure to bear upon governments 12.76
i b) by preparing / motivating the masses 72.34
c) by having a government of ‘ulema 06.38
d) Any other -
e) Do not know 10.63
5 What was the nature of Pakistan’s independence (Pakistan Movement)
. a) It was an Islamic movement 65.95
v b) It was a political campaign 40.42
02.12
c) It was an economic struggle 06.38
d) Do not know
6 What were the effects of adoption of Qarardad-e-Maqasid (The
. Objectives Resolution – a Statement of Principles that is now part of
the Constitution)
a) It set of the country’s ideological orientation 82.97
b) Created a confrontation between ‘ulema and 04.25
politicians 17.02
c) c) Do not know.
7 What was the outcome of the agitation was the opposition alliance
. (PNA) against the Bhutto government led by religious parties
a) Partial implementation of Islamic way of life. 29.78
b) Imposition of Martial Law. 25.53
c) Damage to religious forces. 14.89
d) d) Do not know 44.68
8 Implications of Zakat System 55.31
. a) Help to poors. 29.78
b) Creation of more beggers.
c) Sectarian divide. 02.12
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 d) Don’t know. 17.02
9 Utility of ‘ulema moved Bills in Islamization 51.06
. a) Shariat Bill 21.27
b) Namoos-e-Sahaba Bill.
c) Husba Bill 08.51
d) None 34.16
1 Results of religious rituals 53.19
0 a) Stability of faith. 23.04
. b) Sectarianism. 25.53
c) Public annoyance.
d) Don’t know. 06.38
1 Effects of declaration of Qadianis as non-Muslim 76.59
1 a) Service to religion
. b) Sectarian conflict --
c) Defamination abroad.
d) Don’t know. 10.83

02.12
1 If any foreign country(s) abetted sectarian extremists 17.02
2 a) Saudi Arabia 25.53
. b) Jamhoori Iran 21.27
c)Taliban’s Afghanistan -
d) Saddam’s Iraq 48.93
e) Israel 31.91
f) India 26.65
g) America 21.27
h) None
1 Who is authorized to initiate Islamic Jihad 06.38
3 a) Every muslim. 04.25
. b) Any Islamic group.
c) Islamic Govt. 72.34
d) Imam 08.51
e) Muslim Army 04.25
f) Don’t know 14.89
1 Who can be held responsible for sectarian terrorism 34.04
4 a) LJ (SSP) 44.68
. b) SMP 65.96
c) Foreign hand 19.14
d) Govt. Agencies 14.89
e) Don’t know.
1 The outcome of imposition of ban on extremists sectarian/Jihadi 51.06
5 groups
. a) Terrorism decreased. 06.38
b) Terrorism increased.
c) No difference. 34.04
d) Don’t know. 10.63
1 Results of ban on misuse of loudspeakers 36.17
6 a) Iblagh-e-Din affected.
. b) Sectarianism curtailed. 27.65
c) Public satisfied.
d) Don’t know. 27.65
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 38.29
1 If Ruet-e-Hilal Committee is abolished 70.21
7 a) More than one Eid’s.
. b) Sectarian divide. 31.91
c) Public disruption. 04.25
d) End of govt. intervention
e) Don’t know 10.63

10.63
1 How sectarian divide/ extremism can be minimized 51.06
8 a) Govt. punitive actions
. b) Reconciliatory role of ‘ulema 40.42
c) Public awareness
d) Something else 29.78
19.14
1 If the formation of religious parties alliance MMA 30.04
9 a) Promoted sectarian harmony.
. b) Created further sectarian divide. 04.25
c) No effect
d) Don’t know 31.93
31.91
2 Effects of alliance of six religious Madarsa Boards 36.17
0 a) Sectarian harmony
. b) Govt. confrontation. 19.14
c) Routine/timely matter.
d) Don’t know. 27.65

21.27
2 Opinion on registration of Deeni Madaris 38.29
1 a) Agree 27.65
. b) Disagree 36.17
c) Not clear
2 Which modern subject may enhance academic and economic 85.10
2 capability of Madarsa students 65.95
. a) Computer 38.29
b) Science 27.78
c) Maths -
d) English
e) Any other subject 10.63
f) None
2 Opinion about acceptance of govt. grant for Deeni Madaris 42.55
3 a) No harm. 36.17
. b) Govt. intervention
c) Neutrality effected 27.65
d) Don’t know.
-
2 What is the source of law of Blasphemy 57.44
4 a) Qura’an 57.44
. b) Hadith 23.40
c) Act of Sahaba 08.51
d) Ruling of Imam 29.78
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 e) Ijma 27.65
f) Fiqah 23.40
g) Don’t know
2 What is needed to make Blasphemy Act more acceptable 82.97
5 a) Equitable application.
. b) No change -
c) Abrogation -
d) Punishment if disproved 14.89
e) Don’t know
04.25
2 How the objection on Hudood Ordinance can be removed 04.25
6 a) Cancellation of law.
. b) Criteria of witness 17.02
c) Transparent application
d) Something else 74.46
e) Don’t know
06.38
10.63
2 Which of the objections on Haj policy are true
7 a) Ballot/Quota 23.40
. b) Increased expenses 76.59
c) Unsatisfactory residences 80.85
d) Long period of stay 02.12
e) Irresponsible Mauallameen 17.02
f) Plunder of tour operators 29.78
g) Something else 02.12
h) Don’t know 06.38

2 In which degree govt.’s religious policies are acceptable

8 a) Fully agreed. 02.12
. b) Generally agreed. 08.51
c) Partially agreed 51.06
d) Slightly agreed 08.51
e) Disagreed 27.65

** Only one respondent (A Shia Aalim) gave detailed replies using extra pages.
An Ahle Hadith Aalim also made some small clarifications.

ANALYSIS OF DATA

(i) Basic Concept

AS could have been expected, In this probe a complete consensus was found on
Tauheed and Risalat as the basic requirement for being a Muslim followed by 93.6
support to ‘Qiamat’ (Qura’anic requirements 2:62 & 3:114 Al-Qura’an). In
addition 73.72% respondents preferred Khatam-e-Nabuwwat and 42.55% (mainly
Sunnis) weight Ikram-e-Sahaba while 31.91% (mostly Shias) described Imamat
also as the minimum requirement. Ibadat were listed by 17.02% and Adal was
mentioned by 12.76%. It indicates that beliefs of Khatam-e-Nabuwwat, Ikram-e-
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Sahaba and Imamat have been given over emphasis in due course of time by
respective sects (Q. 1).

As regards the criteria for an Islamic state, a justice ruler has been preferred
by a majority of 65.95% rulers followed by 44.68% support to an elected Ameer.
42.55% respondents also necessitated Nizam-e-Salat while 34.04% ranked Nizam-
e-Zakat. It indicates that ‘ulema prefer a justice ruler over the elected one. The
opinion about Islamic state of present day remained divided. 48.93% respondents
mostly the Sunnis choose Saudi Arabia while 21.27% mostly Shias took Jamhoori
Iran as an Islamic state. 14.89% respondents replied in negative while only 2.12%
favoured ex-Taliban government. It is probably due to its non-existence now as
most of the Deobandis were in its favour in those days. No one considered General
Zia’s Pakistan as an Islamic state although, he introduced Nizam-e-Salat/Zakat and
Blasphemy Act which have been weighed high in the subsequent questions (Q. 3).

As regards the mode of establishment of an Islamic system, a vast majority

of 72.34% urged for motivation of the masses. Besides 12.76% urged continuing
pressure on the government while only 6.38% desired an ‘ulema ’s government for
the purpose. 10.63% respondents had no opinion on this issue (Q. 4).

Religious rituals have also been favoured by a majority of 53.19% as

contributory to stability of faith while a slightly lesser number has described the
same as the cause of public annoyance (25.53%) and sectarianism (23.04%)
respectively (Q. 10).

The ‘ulema appearing clear on the authority to initiate Islamic Jihad,

overwhelmingly authorized Islamic government by 72.34%. Other options
attracted little support including Imam (8.51%) by Shias. 14.89% respondents were
not certain. (Q. 13).

(ii) Movements led/participated by Ulema

‘ulema having played an active role in the religio-political campaigns, described

the Pakistan Movement as an Islamic movement by a majority of 65.95% followed
by 40.42% who identified it as a political movement as well. Only 2.12%
described it as an economic move. It is obvious because the secular and leftist
lobby used to call it an economic movement. About the outcome of PNA agitation
a majority of 44.68% showed ignorance while 29.78% described the gain of
implementation of some Islamic rules while 25.53% identified it with the
imposition of Martial Law followed by 14.89% who saw damage to the credibility
of religious elements (Q. 7).

As regards the declaration of Qadianis as non-Muslim as a result of a mass

movement led by ‘ulema , a dominant majority of 76.59% described it a service to
the religion while only 10.63% gave weight to the defamation of the country
abroad (Q. 11).

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 On the other hand the formation of MMA, a alliance of six religious parties
which performed well in elections 2002, was not given due importance by the
‘ulema . Only 30.74% respondents saw promotion of sectarian harmony due to its
formation, while a equal number of 31.91% did not see any impact and exactly the
same number remained ignorant of its effect. 4.25% witnessed creation of sectarian
divide. It indicates that vast majority of ‘ulema /imams do not see MMA with a
positive eye atleast now (Q. 19).

The opinion about the impact of alliance of six Madarsa Boards remained
divided. 36.17% i.e a little more than 1/3rd observed a help to sectarian harmony,
while 27.65% described it a routine affairs and 21.27% had no opinion whereas
19.14% apprehended a confrontation with government (Q. 20). These two issues
indicate lack of harmony/enthusiasm at lower level despite unity at higher level
probably effected by compulsion of circumstances.

iii. Steps for Islamization

The adoption of objective resolutions on the pressure and basis of ‘ulema 32-
point, was pre-dominantly described by 82.97% as having set ideological
destination of the country. 17.02% showed ignorance about it (Q. 6).

Some 51.06% i.e a little more than half of the respondents considered
‘ulema moved Shariat Bill important towards Islamization, while 21.27% also
supported Namoos-e-Sahaba Bill and 8.51% also favoured Husba Bill of NWFP. A
little more than 1/3rd i.e 34.6 did not support any of these bills (Q. 9).

The Zakat system in practice was supported by a majority of 55.31%

including Shias as helpful for the poor while 29.78% have seen creation of a new
class of beggars. 17.02% are not clear. They are mostly not satisfied with the
management of the system (Q.8).

Dissolution of Ruet-e-Hilal Committee as demanded by JUI-F, NWFP

recently was opposed by a vast majority of 70.21% who apprehended more than
one Eids otherwise. 31.91% also apprehended a sectarian divide in the absence of
the Committee. Only 10.63% respondents visualized an end of government
intervention into the matter. An equal number was uncertain about the outcome (Q.
17).

Amongst the major objections on the existing Haj policy, a dominant

majority of 80.85% expressed dissatisfaction with the Hajis accommodation while
76.59% respondents took notice of increasing expenses. Other complaints
including plunder of tour operators, ballot/quota system and irresponsible attitude
of guides was listed by 29.78%, 23.40% and 17.02% respondents, respectively (Q.
27). Umrah system is also under criticism and mosque level protest was observed
on November 19, 2004 against mishandling of returning pilgrims by PIA in KSA.

iv. Sectarianism
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 The view point of ‘ulema /imams of the mosques about foreign
involvement in the sectarian extremism in Pakistan was divergent. The largest
proportion i.e 48.93% held Israel responsible followed by 31.91% for India,
26.65% for US, 25.53% for Iran, 21.27% for Taliban and 17.02% for Saudi Arabia.
Sectarian divide was also visible in this ranking. Deobandis were generally found
against Iran while Shias against Taliban and Saudi Arabia. Israel, India and US
were the common foes (Q. 12).

As regards responsibility of sectarian terrorism, a majority of 65.95%

including all sects held foreign hand responsible for it. Amongst local groups
44.68% accused SMP (Shia group) and 34.04% charged LJ/SSP (Deobandi) for the
same. A sizeable 19.14% of the respondents put the blame on government
agencies. 14.89% remained uncertain about the matter (Q. 14).

The recent imposition of ban on use of loudspeakers for other than Arabic
sermons and Azan is yet to show its impact as a majority of 38.29% was not clear
about the outcome followed by 36.17% who considered it an impediment for
preaching. 27.65% saw a check on promotion of sectarianism and an equal number
noticed rid of the public from a nuisance (Q.16).

Regarding checking of sectarianism 51.06% respondent favoured

government steps effective while 44.42% considered reconciliatory role of ‘ulema
effective for the goal. 29.78% favoured creation of public awareness while 19.14%
desired other measures but did not give any suggestions (Q. 18).

v. Madarsa Policy
The opinion of ‘ulema and prayer leaders about compulsory registration of
their Madarsas remained divided. 38.29% agreed in principle with the proposal
while 27.65% did not agree. A little more i.e 36.17% was not clear on the issue (Q.
21).

As regards introduction of modern subjects into the syllabi of Madarsas,

the response remained very encouraging. 85.10% favoured computer, 65.95%
opted for science, 38.29% advocated maths and 29.78% supported teaching of
English in order to improve academic and economic capabilities of Madarsa
students. Only 10.63% opposed inclusion of any such subjects. One Madarsa gave
practical proof of adoption of computer by reproducing the questionnaire on their
computer (Q. 22).

The opinion about acceptance of government aid for Deeni Madaris is

divided. Some less than half i.e 42.55% saw no harm in it while 36.17%
apprehended opening of government intervention into Madarsa affairs while
27.65% feared a damage to the neutrality of the Madarsas (Q. 23).

vi. Blasphemy Act / Hudood Ordinance

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 Although the respondents have overwhelmingly supported declaration of
Qadianis a non-Muslim minority (Q. 11 above), they were not clear about the
source of law of blasphemy. 57.44% each quoted Qura’an and Hadith in this regard
but could not cite the exact verse/saying of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) describing
the guilt and its punishment according to scholars. 29.78% quoted Ijma, 27.65%
quoted Fiqah, 23.40% quoted act of Sahaba in this regard. 8.51% mainly Shias
described ruling of Imam. 23.40% a little less than 1/4 th were uncertain about the
base of legislation (Q. 24).

Despite above 82.97% respondents favoured an equitable implementation

of the act in order to remove any doubts. 14.89% advocated punishment to the
complainant if proved in correct. No one supported abrogation or any change in
the act (Q. 25).

Same applies to the objection on Hudood Ordinance wherein almost 3/4th

i.e 74.46% respondents urged transparent application of the law. 17.02% also urged
soundness of the witnesses. 10.63%, however, remained uncertain while 4.25%
advocated cancellation of the law (Q. 26).

vii. Overall perception

The respondent were tested on a five stage scale ranging from full
agreement to disagreement with regard to religious policies of the government. The
general trend was not very much encouraging as 51.06% i.e just half showed
partial agreement while 27.65% exhibited a disagreement. 8.51% equally showed
general agreement and slight agreement on the right and left flanks respectively
(Q. 28).

CONCLUSION

‘ulema are a sensitive and important segment of our society. Besides performing
religious rites, they are also alive to issues, developments policies having a bearing
or connection with the religion. They appear touchy on some issues like
Blasphemy. Using the easy platform of pulpit and various religious occasions and
bodies, they ventilate their feelings on topical issues of their interest and
channelize the public opinion. They are perturbed with the current scenario but do
not want a confrontation on religious issues. They are trying to adjust themselves
in the new environment and protect their institutions. From above study, the
following conclusions have been draw:

 ‘ulema ’s concept of minimum requirement for being a muslim is

beyond what has been prescribed in Qura’an. Khatam-e-Nabuwwat has
gained undue importance over the years besides rituals. (Deletion of
religious column from computerized passports is being criticized in the
same context).

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  Pakistan movement was Islamic in character and passage of objectives
resolution has set its Islamic destination.

 Religio-political alliances like PNA, MMA etc., have not contributed

much towards Islamization.

 Islamization can be achieved principally by preparing the masses for it

and at the same time keeping the government under pressure. A
government of ‘ulema is least wanted.

 Sectarian violence/terrorism is basically a foreign sponsored

phenomenon and US, Israel and India are to be primarily blamed. A
thin section also put it fingers on government agencies.

 Imposition of ban on militant sectarian/Jihadi organizations has not

yielded sound results but continuing government action in the form of
raids/arrests/trials, confiscation of funds/subversive literature etc., is
bound to achieve the goal.

 Only an Islamic government and its regular army can initiate jihad
against any hostile/infidel/atheist inimical force rather than any
individually or organization.

 A kind/justice ruler is the prime requirement of an Islamic state.

Requirement of his election by people is secondary. Nizam-e-Salat and
Zakat come next.

 ‘ulema are not unanimous about the source of Blasphemy, yet they
consider declaration of Qadianis as non-Muslim minority, a great
service to their faith, oppose any change in Blasphemy Act and
necessitate its transparent application. Same is their view about Hudood
Ordinance.

 Opinion about registration of Madarsas, acceptance of government aid

for improvement and inclusion of modern subjects in their curricula and
ban on loudspeakers is divided but generally soft.

 Existing Hajj policy is not popular on account of over increasing

expenses, uncomfortable residences, irresponsibility of mohtamim,
uncertain return schedule etc. They are also not satisfied with
management of Zakat system.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 Government may tactfully continue with its policy against terrorism but
assure transparency of the process.
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  Blasphemy Act may not be touched for the time being, but its equitable
application be ensured.
 Policy about Madarsas be pursued cautiously in consultation with
‘ulema bodies.
 ‘ulema may be engaged in social activities like primary teaching, first
aid, learns vocational skills for integration into the society learning
from experiences of Bangladesh and other countries.
 Every effort be made to redress grievances about Hajj and Umrah
policy particularly the return schedule.
 Only clean and well reputed persons be engaged in Zakat admin at all
levels for the smooth functioning of this vital system.
***

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 References

(i) Constitution of Pakistan (1956, 62 and 73).

(ii) Political systems of Pakistan by Dr. Varnider Groxer
and Dr. Ranjna Arora (India).
(iii) Pak 50 years of Indpendence by Dr. V.C & Ranjna
Arora (India).
(iv) Aab-e-Kausar/Raud-e-Kausar by S. M. Ikram (2002 &
2003 SBC Edition).
(v) Muslim League Ka Daur-e-Hukoomat (1947-54) by Dr.
Safdar Mehmood, Lahore.
(vi) Pak Tareekh-o-Siasat (47-88) by Dr. Safdar Mehmood,
Jang Publications, Lahore.
(vii) Tehreek-e-Pakistan Uska Siasi Pas Manzar by Asghar
A. Jafri.
(viii) Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas by Prof. Atta and Zafar Umer
Zubairi, Karachi.
(ix) Hukoomat Aur Siasat by M. Mujahid Farooq, Lahore.
(x) Official records.
(xi) Newspapers/Magazines.

References:
1. Pages 158 and 364 – Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas.
2. Pages 144, 145, 154 and 363 – Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas.
3. Page 56, Khilfat-e-Bannu Abbas.
4. Pages 367 and 404 – Ab-e-Kausar.
5. Pages 75-77, 136, 190-93, 278-79 – Raud-e-Kausar.
6. Pages 130-33 – Raud-e-Kausar.
7. Press/Pakistan Ki Nazaryati Tareekh by Mujahid Farooq – Lahore (Page
66).
8. Weekly Takbeer, Karachi (June 1991/Nov. 2004) and Pakistan Ki Nazaryati
Tareekh by Mujahid Farooq – Lahore (Page-401).
9. Printed material of JI/Newspapers/book of G.A. Parvez.
10. Weekly Takbeer, Karachi (June 1991/Nov. 2004)
11. Press.
12. Pages 168, 198, 206 and 232 – Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas.
13. Pages 262-64 – Khilafat-e-Banu Abbas.
14. Pages 288-91 and 332 – Khilfat-e-Banu Abbas.
15. Pages 94 and 115 – Ab-e-Kausar.
16. Pages 16, 25-6 and 207 – Raud-e-Kausar.
17. Page-247 – Raud-e-Kausar.
18. Special Branch Report on Sectarianism – 1997.
19. Raud-e-Kausar (Page-442).
20. Raud-e-Kausar (Page-430-31).

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 The following question was also asked from a few respondents
verbally on personal interaction but they were found divergent rather confused:

What are Pakistan’s main problems in the order of priority:

(a) Islamization
(b) Provision of justice
(c) Democracy
(d) Economic uplift
(e) Crime/law and order/terrorism
(f) Feudalism/Tribalism
(g) Regionalism/sectarianism
(h) Not certain

While the West has long been comfortable with the established boundaries of the
sacred-secular divide, popular forces – driven in no small part by global politics of
“the War on Terror” have seized upon Islamic revivalism not only as an issue to
force through their local political demands for justice and devolution (as in Swat)
but also to bring to the fore a more wide spread dissent against the Pakistani
federation and its Western backers. Thus, it is not just “the anti-Islamic symbols of
decadence” like music and video shops and ski resorts which have been put to the
torch but anything seen to threaten ancient cultural ways like girls’ schools.

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