White the New York City attack sas ter- vifying, the attack ‘on the Pentagon seas particularly upsetting to mili- tary personnel, striking the nerve center of the US armed forces. But it could have been worse. The impact occurred at a part of the Pentagon that was not fully staffed, since it was the second wedge of the building sched- led to undergo ren ‘ovations. 8 Deadly Void Looking for Leadership In The DOD Chemical- Biological Defense Program ne gc events of 11 September ied thousands eis etic ante tons ec td an ccoomi ecesnon and sated macy citizens ath in domestic secu Th aion Scaring he peyhe ofthe american pb faves profound pat te US armed forces nd De- fen pees ore to come It has been said that,on 12 September ll the servic es stared ripping up their force modernization plans. This should also be true of the DoD Chemical-Biotog- ical Defense Program (CBDP),a jointy-funded and service-executed effort aimed at modernizing the armed forces’ CB defense capability. Observers are al: ready asking tough questions about how the Defense Department plans to reshape the CBDP to accommo late not just passive defense, but military CB defense ‘requirements in consequence management and force protection Those who are directly involved in the CBDP are wondering which agency (or agencies) will lead the effore While the New York City attack was terrifying. the ‘ack on the Pentagon was particular upsetting to malitary personnel, striking the nerve center ofthe US armed forces. But it could have been worse. The Impact occurred ata part of the Pentagon that was not fully staffed, since it was the second wedge of the building scheduled to undergo renovations. While this wasn't exactly a conventional attack, st wasn’t chemical or biological warfice agent attack either, ‘The Pentagon has strong bones, and most ofthe per Sonne] working in the building When the atack oc ccurted were back the very next day There had been speculation thatthe terrorists might attack a second time with chemical o biological war: fare agents targeting the emergency responders and relief workers, Indeed, on Tuesday morning, some hospital workers treated patients who complained about being short of breath, and began asking if this ‘was a symptom of chemical warfare agent exposure ‘cudos tothe DoD Domestic Preparedness Program city training effor) (One of the few good news stories that day was the ‘quick response of local emergency responders t0 the Incident sites. This was due, in par, to the previous ‘coordination and training exercises between Pents- {gon and county emergency responders that had been Conducted prior ro the attack. In those exercises, participants had practiced responding toa potential CCB terrorist incident at the Pentagon. Of course, no ‘chemical or biological atack took place that time, ‘nut the open lines of communication between key DoD and local responder personnel, and their fami larity with procedures for responding toa potential terrorist incident at the Pentagon, were probably key factors in saving lies and minimizing damage. Major newspapers across the nation immediately ran articles discussing when (not whether) terrorists will use CB warfare agents against US military and civilian targets—a question that was answered in short order by the mailed anthrax campaign. The terrorist groups’ demonstrated resolve to creat mass casualties is no longer in question. As one pundit pointed out, ifone had asked what the odds were that four com 4 ‘mercial urplanes would be hijacked simukeaneoush the answer probably would have been infinitesimal to none. Yet it happened, So,to0, could much broad (CB terrorist incidents with the potential of inflict ing thousands of related casualties. Knowledgeable authorities have state ime and again since the Aum Shinsikvo incident in 1995, thae it was a matter of not if but when” the United States willbe hit by CB terrorism. Well appears that giob- al terrorism now prefers mixing simple and conven tional tools of attack with complex ones. This leads {to many unanswered questions about how DoD should prepare for CB terrorist attacks Armed Forces Journal rrexxsniosat / December 2001Regardless of the real odd of future CB terrorist at lacks, chere has been a flurry of activity to increase (CB defense preparedness and consequence-manage ment capabilites at DoD installations. Both of these mission areas Would require CB defense capabilites, 2s long a8 people perceive CB threats in both active ‘ies, Up to this time, however the services have not addressed CB threats with the sime intensity as exe ‘curing DoD evil support to federal and state agen: Ges in natura disaster scenarios or hardening mil Cary sites against terrorists using high-explosive, con: ventional munitions ‘Some suggest that the concept in responding to « CB incident in consequence management or force pro- tection missions is the same as the current concept for passive defense requirements—one uses the sime principles of contaminstion-avoidance, protection, and decontamination. This i disingenuous and oversimplified generalization, with litte or no critical analysis to support it. Consequence-management and force-protection ae: tivities are generally oriented toward operations oth: cr than war, with 2 greater emphasis on protecting personnel than on maiitary warfighting, This means that the concept must be different for executing 2 lary response. The important differences in these responses are rooted in three mission areas 1m Possive defense, which provides protection for mil tary forces during operations against a hostile (or po- tentially hostile) force. US forces plan and prepare for the adversarial employment of large quantities of (CB warfare agents prior to, during and following an ‘enemy attack. Acceptable risk to individuals is high be prepared to operate while contaminated). Ma feriel solutions are funded through an OSD-managed joint budget Consequence management, which provides DoD re sources toa lead agency (domestic or overseas) to ‘manage or mitigate damages or other consequences resulting from the employment of CB weapons. This includes responses solety to acts of terrorism, along, ‘with activities following hostile military actions. Ac ceptable tsk is very low, given that the unprotected public is often the main target. Materiel solutions are funded atthe DoD level but executed by the Army. (argely for its Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams) 1 Force protection, which aims to protect service mem bers, civilian employees family members, facilities, in formation. and equipment in all locations and situa ‘ons from terrorist incidents (mostly during peace time), Most of these personnel will be unprotected and not expecting CB hazards. Acceptable risk is Jw, bounded by budgets and expected threat. Mi terie! solutions are unded and executed by the ind vidual services, The DoD CBDP can claim that passive defense re (quirements are largely not entire: within theie realm of expertise. Not so for consequence manage ment and force protection. While there are CB de: fense tasks within those mission areas. they do not constitute a major portion of those activities, These two areas encompass service-specific efforts focused ‘Counterterroristt or responses to terrorism 48 op- posed to a joint program focused on military opers tions. Consider that in 2001, by General Accounting Oflice (GAO) estimates. the federal government spent five mes as much money on countersereor ism efforts not related to CB response than on efforts directed at responding to CB terrorist incident ‘The catch is thar the same technical development of materiel solutions for passive Ch defense require ments is applicable ta the two other mission areas. This is both a blessing and a curse. On a positive note,the same DoD laborwories an! same industria! firms ean develop similar CB detense equipment for al three areas, which means we are leveraging the same resources and expertise o ensure thatthe equipment is sate-oFthe-art and consistent in cap bility: On the down side, however the current and projected DoD budget for CB defense research. devel ‘opment, and acquisition does not adequately cover al passive defense requirements of the Defense Plan hing Guidance, le alone address consequence man agement and force-protection requirements. This is ‘widely acknowledged. as evidenced by all of the re cent DoD CB Defense Program Annual Reports that have made their way to Congress Some observers have suggested that the DoD CBDP (and, specifically, not the services’ budgets) should procure all CB defense equipment for peacetime DIFFERENCES IN CONOPS AND POLICY 3 Consequence Management (Het hs aoe) (© Protects Do pnd Ay exe, 50 oi hyde (lisa Rinses odor oi, movies run fl save 1 Force Protection (Not st CB Deise) (© Frets military personne win the gote @ Service exected Service fnded (© imal Kk - hardens ogo tetris throat (consequence management and force protection).as well as lor military passive defense operations. This i not realistic expectation. It i wishful thinking to suggest that OSD and service leaders will be amend: able to giving up portions oftheir budgets to the jointly funded DoD CBDP to cover these new costs, ‘once they grasp the real extent of cufrent shortlls in our ability to respond to CB terrorism, ‘Some might turn to the terrible September attacks and point out that there was no CB warfare threat in the opening battle of the new war. Others will argue iat there are other DoD shortcomings that deserve higher prionity—such as intelhigence-colleetion. infor: mation security and force-protection measures Armed Forces Journal srerssniosat / December 200% a, Caer i Consequence: management and forceprotection activities are generally oriented toward operations other than war, with a greater emphasis on Protecting Personnel than ‘on military warfighting. Examples (O Sivan arn: of NBC Honorés Fate of (O Nein Hone: OFTEMP (O Susan Operations tied ‘Ses © len Unknown Haars to Saloqard Gs © Potion of ist ers > ResoreGovaent Serves Restore ond Prete Gd Instructs © Sorvey ond Wontar Prot Bren for Honards 2 Pree of Ste Ocapats 5 Poet Sie lahat< Each service other than the Army bas principals and action officers that ‘execute CB defense 40 officers develop their issues, despite their lesser involve. mont, they know they have general officer support when they need it, auainst conventional munitions. Even the national missile defense program, despite its lack of utility ‘agains this particular form of tereoris, will be Fight Ing to retain sts planned funding profit U the DoD CBDP is eaxed to provide for these new mission areas the armed forces passive defense cap biliues will suffer The costs of procuring additional procective ensembles and mesial pre-and posttreat »ments for bundreds of thousinds of DoD personnel (and, pethaps. other nations forces). not to mention thousands of additional CB agent detectors and cot lective-proteetion shelters for every military base that perceives a CB threat, will be immense The operations and maintenance costs of procuring rmilions of protective ensembles and warehouses of medical CB detense material, tons of decontaminates, and thousands of collective-protection filters are stag: zgering and, to date. are not the top priority of most Commanders. It may be wiser to dict the services {o provide their own funds to pracure equipment for force-protection and consequence management 1 ‘quirements, while the DoD CBDP pays forthe re search and development required in all three areas, plus the acquisition cost of much of the pussivede- fense equipment The DoD CBDP may be the appropriate Vehicle for funding all these new eequirements, but that is not to say that DoD has developed the necessary policies or hasan institutionalized process to adress them, A longcerm DoD CB Defense Strategic Plan has not been developed and is not in place, The military leadership needs to iatiate a serious, top down ex mination of the DoD Counterproliferaion Strategy, including how the counterprolferation pillars of counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management work together, and then ‘decide who should be in charge of developing and Implementing these capabilities. DoD leaders need to clearly articulate how the CBDP should support counterproliferation and force-protection arcas, Ideally, OSD should transition the DoD CRDP from a passive-defense-only effort to a program that coord nates the requirements and funding for service and DoD requirements in passive defense, consequence ‘management, and force protection. Considering all that has occurred since Public Law 103-160 made this a joint program area in 1994 (the Defense Re form Initiative, DoD Counterproliferation Strategy the ‘wo Quadrennial Defense Reviews) its time t0 de velop a new DoD CB defense strategy and revise its ‘management structure accordingly (Clears in the wake of the 9-11 stacks. a new direc lion is needed. But many peuple want to simply ‘charge forward and just stat buying CB defense {equipment for their installations. however. they to siow-down and focus on what the institutional fis willbe for the DoD CHDP. DoD is no longer operating under the old 2Major Theater War scenario. This presents an opportuni to define a clear tresh was forward one thats untet «red from the constraints of former operational con cepts. This wil require strong leadership and a Will ingness 10 explore new options. Iealso requires de veloping a concepe tha realistic rom a budgetary standpoint and can be supported by the DoD Coun: {exproliferauon Steateg The question now is whether the Army leadership is prepared to launch the paridign change. The Army: Changed as the DoD Executive Agent for Cl defense has the majority of the armed forces CB infrastruc ture in cerms of military and civilian specialists and dedicated laboratory space. This is che result of more ‘than 80 years of experience in this eealm—exper lence unmatched by any other service. The Joint Ser. vice Materiel Group QJSMG) and foint Service Integra tion Group (SIG) both have Armiy Chemie! Corps ener officers as their heads, Army Chemical Corps Colonels serve within the OSD policy-ormuation of fice, and on the Joint Staff and Army Stal Ironically, though, there area number of incidents thar have muted these Army Chemical Corps leaders, ‘One isthe multiservice nature of the JSMG and JSIG In the 1970s and 1980s, the Army controlled spend ing for more than 70 percent of the DoD CBD budget and had (and stil has) the only dedicated force struc ture addressing weapons of mass destruction. In 1994, Public Law 103-160 directed the formation of the DoD CBDP and successfully eliminated duplia- tion of effort among the four services’ CBD progrims. The services’ implementation ofthat law, through a Joint Service Agreement, waintentionaly diluted the Army's leadership. The" one service, one vote" con ‘cept shrank the Army's "control" to a 25 percent share. Control over research and development pro: grams shrank accordingly since every’ service had to have its quarter share of program management Each service other than the Army has principals and action officers who execute CH defense as a part- time duty. When these action officers develop their issues, despite their lesser involvement, they know they have general officer support when they need it Not so with the Army When the Army Chemical Corps moved to Fort Leonard Wood, MO, the chreestar Engineer command and its issues overshadowed the Chemical Corps dt ties, The expected synergy in doctrine, traning, and materiel development has not yet materialized, in part because the TRADOC schoolhouses are chron cally undermanned and overworked. Asa result, while the other services’ action officers are paretime advocates for CB defense. they are often more intl ‘ental than their Army colleagues because oftheir ‘general officer bucking. AS a result. the DoD mul: service CB defense effort funcrions more like a play pus than a mongoose in its delivered capability In the Pentagon. there used to be an Army Chemical Coxps general officer in the Office of the Deputy (Chief of Staff for Operations. With the abandonment of an offensive Cs Weapons programy, the Army ywngraded that position to a colonel and. recently nearly toa lieutenant colonel sit. It seems hard 16 Jmagine thatthe highest ranking Chemical Corps off ‘cer on the Army staff might have been a lieutenant colone! who would have been charged with leading the other services issues in the DoD CBDP. While there are a few Chemical Carps colonels and 4 num ber of lieutenant colonels scattered theough the Pen: ‘Armed Force's Journal mraxxsmosut / December 2001