MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Page 1 of 5
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event:
Staff
visit
to the
Boston Center,
New
England Region,
FAA
Type
of
Event: Briefing
and
Scheduled Interviews
Date:
September 22-24, 2003
Special
Access Issues: NATCA (National Air
Traffic
Control Association) representatives sat in on
some
interviews. A FAA legal representative
from
the New England Region attended all staff contacts
with
FAApersonnel
Prepared
by: Miles Kara
Team
Number: 8Location: Nashua,
NH
(Boston Center) and Burlington, MA (New England Region)Participants- Non-Commission: See individual interview reports
Participants
- Commission: Miles Kara, John Azzarello, Geoff Brown
Background
Summary
Commission
staff
were able
to
efficiently
and
effectively
formally interview
18
people, tour
facilities
at
both the Boston Center and the New England Region, and accomplish discovery of
four
additional
relevant
document sources, thanks
to a
forthcoming,
responsive
reception
by the
Operations-Manager-in-Charge, Terry Biggio. Mr. Biggio fine-tuned the visit schedule on-site to ensure that we talked to thepeoplethat would do
Staff
the most good in the time allotted. That required dropping some potentialinterviewees and adding others and making several schedule changes that impacted the FAA work
force.
The
work
force
accommodated those changes and the representatives of FAA Counsel appointed to
attend
Staffs
presence pitched in and helped out. NATCA representatives, when requested by
interviewees
to be present were also
helpful
in the overall process. The Staff
left
with the impressionthat Boston Center, Mr. Biggio in particular, wanted us to gain a complete and accurate view of their
collective
work under near-unprecedented pressure on September
11,
2001. The Regional Administrator
took
a brief exit brief
from
the team at which time she was advised of the support provided by Mr
Biggioand
staff
and of the
document discoveries made
by the
Commission
staff.
Major
Points
Discovery.
Staff
learnedofadditional responsive information thathad notbeen provided throughthe
document
request process.
Accident
File.
Staff
learned
from
Mr. Bob
Jones, Quality Assurance
Office,
of the
existence of an accident file,
different
from
the "accident
package"
provided by FAA to both the
FBI
and NTSB, and subsequently provided to the Commission in response to a document request
to
DoT. Among other items in the package is a reconstructed time-line based on telephonecompany records.
Mr
Jones, locally considered
a
hero because
of his
quick work
in
replaying
the
tapes of cockpit conversations that day was insistently steered our way by Mr. Biggio.
After
Action Review.
Staff
learned that the New England Region convened a round table two
weeks after
Ssentemrier
1
1
"•
tn
r.nnHnr.t
a
HetaileH
review
of
events
of
the Hav
Staff
is
not aware
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1ORANDUM FOR THE
RECORD Page
2 of 5
of
any
formal
product that ensured, but asked that associated
files
and records of that event bemadeavailable to the Commission. A member of the Region's 24-hour operations center, duringinterview, produced a region log, a document previously not provided
staff,
but one that
staff
wascertain must exist since a similar document was produced by the Eastern Region in New York.
Staff
has a
copy
of
that log.
Additional
Transcripts.
During one interview
Staff
became aware of a radar controller positionthat
controlled
the
scrambled
Otis
fighters. Staff
asked
for information
from
that position.
It is
Staffs
understanding that the only information that went into the
"accident package"
was datapertaining
to
FAA's actually contact with
or
handling
of the
four
hijacked
aircraft,
possiblybecause that
was the
FBI/NTSB
focus.
That excluded
any
accident
file
information that pertained
strictly
to the Otis
fighters
themselves. The FAA legal representative said he would make sure
we
got the information we needed. Separately, and previously, Staff had brought to Headquarters
FAA
attention
the
lack
of
transcripts pertaining
to the
Otis fighters,
aircraft
that
we
know
from
other
sources
had
been controlled
by
FAA,
at
least
in
part.
FAA
provided
the
tapes
of
BostonCenter radar
control
positions
17R
and
18R
to
Staff
onSeptember25,
2003.
PersonalNotes.
Two persons interviewed brought with them personal notes at least one set ofwhich
had
been constructed
a few
days
after
9/11.
Staff asked
for and
voluntarily
got
both sets
ofnotes.
Those notes are important because both individuals worked in the
Traffic
Management
Unit
that day,
the
focal point
for
decisions made
by and
information flowing
to the OMIC, Mr.Biggio.
Boston Center Performance.
To a person, Boston Center is proud of its performance that day
and
the Center has internalized that it did all that it could do, given the events of the day. The Senior
Traffic
Management Controller, Mr. Bueno,
carefully
and repetitively described to Staff "the box," hisdescriptionof how the Center perceived thathijackingswould proceed. No one seriously considered any
outcome
other than an airplane proceeding to an airport somewhere and landing, perhaps Cuba. The
view
prevailed even
after
the content of the cockpit communications was learned. Therefore, Boston
Center
controllers proceeded to do what they were trained to do; they notified supervisors as events
proceeded,
and then continued to try and ensure safety in the sky by keeping planes separated,
from
each
other
and
from
AA11,and notifying adjoining sectors within the
Center
and other Centers, as necessary.
Determining
a hijack.
No one
factor
or combination of
factors
that day, other than the cockpitcommunications, definitely led Center personnel to a hijacking awareness. There are three such factors.
Loss of Radio Contact.
This phenomenon was common, to the point of being notorious.
Pilots
and crews were simply lax in maintaining contact. One interviewee made sure weunderstood
the
commonly
misunderstood
acronym
"NORDO."
That
means "no
radio"
in the
literal
sense that the
aircraft's
radio(s) are not working. It is in that
sense
that controller
38R
is
captured
on tape early in the AA11 story designating
AA11
"nordo,"
implying that the pilot is incontrol
and
unable
to
communicate. That
is
different from
an
aircraft
with
a
working radio,
but
deliberately not communicating. The term for that,
Staff
was told, is
"NORAK,"
(ph)
Lossof Transponder.
This phenomenon is much rarer, but not
in-and-of-itself,
alarming.Controllers routinely ask the
affected
plane to
"recycle
your
transponder."
[That is the protocolused with
UA175
by NewYork
Center
controllers.]
Controllers generallyagreed
that
transponder
loss would be reported to the supervisor. The combination of
"nordo"
and
transponder
loss is highly unusual and many controllers had never experienced that combination.
According to Mr.
Biggio that combination
is a
sign
of
major
equipment malfunction
and at
that
pointin the
flight
of AA11
would
not
have triggered
any
notion
of a
hijack.
CourseDeviation.
One controller, a supervisor on duty that day as a radar associate tocomplete monthly qualification requirements, citied minor course deviation—AA11
failure
toclimb
to
35000 feet—as
anadditional
warning
sign.
There
was no
consensus
on
that point,
but all
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,£MORANDUM
FOR THE RECORD Page 3 of 5controllers agreed that the combination of
"nordo,"
transponder loss, and significantcourse deviation—the AA11 turn to the south—was serious. However, Mr. Biggio on that point
said
that given a
major
equipment malfunction what might be happening was a pilot turning to
land
at a
"heavy"
capable airport. One controller supported that thesis, describing a
"heavy"
pilotas one who would try to land at Kennedy, vice elsewhere. A
"heavy"
aircraft is a term used byFAA
controllers to
describe
a
large aircraft
such as a 747/757/767.
Center
personnel
who
observed the turn south also observed a unusually rapid rate of progress, indicatively of a pilot
who
wanted to get somewhere in a hurry.
TheIntervening Variable, Unusual Cockpit Communications.
After
AA11lost its
transponder
and just before it made a significant course deviation to the south, unusual communications
of
unknown source were heard on the AA11 assigned frequency of controller 46R. It was quite clear to
the
controller that he had a problem and he immediately and loudly made that
fact
known. In a rapid
sequence
of events a quality assurance
staff
member, Bob
Jones,
personally went to the basement and
reran
the tapes and made the call that the voice said "we have some
planes."
Mr.Jones'accident file
timeline will
providetheexact timehecommunicated that
fact
to thewatch deskand to Mr.Biggio.The
OMIC
log shows that Biggio declared a hijack, based on cockpit communications at 0825 EDT. That
time
appears to
staff
to be the time of the original communication itself and not the time that Biggio was
notified
by
Jones.
The
accident
file log
will
be
determining
factor.
First
Aircraft
Impact into WTC and
AA11.
TheBoston Center learnedofdeveloping
problems
in New York one of two ways. First, a CNN
feed
is maintained in a
office
contiguous to thewatch deskin thecenter proper. Second, controllersonbreak typically wentto thecafeteria wherea
CNN
feed
was
also available. Intuitively
and
instinctively, Center personnel
who
were aware
of and
followed
AA11
on its
flight
south knew that
it was
AA11 that impacted
the
north tower, irrespectively
of
differing
information
available
from
CNN.
At least at the supervisory
level,
if not at the individual
controller
level, Boston Center personnel also understood AA11 to be slowing and descending.
Staff
tentatively
concludes that Boston Center itself was not the initial source of
confusion
aboutAA11
after
the
impact of the first plane into the WTC. Nevertheless, Center personnel aware of the altitude search
for
AA11, southbound, were also aware
of two
other factors. First
the
last know accurate altitude
for
AA11 was 29,000
feet.
Second, UA175, under direct query by a Boston Center controller sited AA11 at
about
0837EDT andestablisheditsaltitudeto be27-29,000
feet.
The Altitude Problem.
FAA controllers cannot determine altitude on a
non-transponding,
primary-only,
aircraft.
Center personnel
confirmed
that to
Staff
several times over. On the other hand,
air
defense scope operators at the Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) can determine altitude in that
circumstance.
According
to the Deputy Commander at the 84 Radar Evaluation
Squadron,
FAA did
not
purchase that altitude-determining capability and,
further,
was
considering
the
elimination
of all
primary radar returns
from
its
en-route radar system. Most Center personnel were
not
aware that
theSector
Area Operations Center (SAOC) at NEADS could read altitude and that might have been a reason
to
contact NEADS. One key person did, Colin Scoggins, a member of the TMU and the person most
often
in contact with NEADS. He arrived at the Sector about 0825 EDT and immediately became aware
of
a developing situation. His initial instinct was to stay out of the
road—too
many onlookers impeded
the
task
at
hand.
As he
became aware
of a
primary-only possible hijacked
aircraft
his
immediate
response was
that NEADS needed
to be
notified
so
they could
get
altitude
on the
airplane.
He
headed
for
the
TMU and by thetimehearrivedJoeCooperwas incontact with
NEADS.
Mr.Scoggins spendthe
majority
of his
time thereafter
in
intermittent direct phone contact with NEADS, primarily
Major
Deskins,
tryingtoassist NEADSingaining scope contact with AA11.Hiscalls, however, werenot on a
taped
line. He believes those calls were taped at NEADS. The
difficulty
was that NEADS wanted
"lats
and
longs" and he was trying to give them position
from
a knownVOR,e. g.
"x"
miles south of Albany.
He
recalled that he passed two distinct sets of lat-long coordinates to NEADS.
Military
Notification.
No
person
Staff
interviewed seriously considered contacting NEADS
through
the process on paper—FAA-NMCC-NORAD, if they were even aware of it. Dan Bueno gets
high
marks
from
Center personnel
for
instinctively calling
FAA
traffic
approach personnel
at thelocation
where he knew the fighters to be—Otis AFB. Bueno called Otis
because
he knew "from thehttp://kinesis.swishmail.com./webmail/imp/view.php?Horde=a5c6a09aa8293d831d4502cd...9/29/2003
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