T8 B2 FAA NY Center Bob Jones Fdr- Handwritten Notes- Jones MFR and Alt MFR Re Boston Visit

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UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM

FOR

THE

RECORD

Event:

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Center Field Site Interview withRobert Jones, Quality Assurance

Officer,

ZBW.Type of event: InterviewDate: Monday, September

22,

2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by:

Geoffrey

BrownTeam Number:

8

Location:

FAABostonAir

Route Center, Nashua,

New

HampshireParticipants

-

Non-Commission:

John

R. Donnelly, FAA Senior

Attorney

[(781) 238

7045]Participants

-

Commission:

John

Azzarello,

Miles

Kara,

Geoffrey

BrownNOTE: Please

refer

to the recorded interview for a complete account.Jones has been with the FAA for the last

14

years,

13

of which he has spent with ZBW.He is a

full

performance level controller, and a

TMU

supervisor. On

9/11

Jones was a

Quality

Assurance Specialist charged with

processing

the

accident information

for

flight

UAL175.Jones identified the threatening communications

from

UAL175 on the

flight

recording.Jones explained to Commission

staff

the

difference

between an "accident

package"

and

an

"accident file".

The

package

is

developed

and

published

by the FAA and has a

defined

scope and purpose. The

file

is all the information collected regarding an accident, and inthis

case

containsatimeline createdbyJonesand hiscolleague.Thetimeline, which willbe provided to the Commission through a request to FAA headquarters, was piecedtogether through

the

call

toll

records.Based off his notes, Jones stated that at 1224UTC

Area

C reported a possible

hijack.

Jones went to 46R (Pete Zilowski). Jones then went to review the recording. He relayedthe recording information to the Watchdesk. He confirmed that an

"Arab"

voice stated"we have some

planes".

Jones relayed this to Biggio immediately.

At

122456UTC Jones relayed another communication.

At

1233359UTC Jones relayed

the

final

communication. Jones estimates

all

three communications were told

to

Biggio

at

some point between 1233-1237 UTC. (CHECK TIMES).

At

122750UTC the

supervisor

at

TMUY called Herndon

to

relay

information

on the

COMMISSION

SENSITIVE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMISSION

SENSITIVE

likely

hijacking.At

1240UTC

Dan

Bueno requests

to be put on a

conference call withHerndon,

and

relays

the

information that AA1 1 had dropped speed, which he guessed might be a descent intoNYTracon airspace.

At

130355UTC

Boston Center

TMU

tells internal facilities to ground stop all ZBW

traffic.

At

1

3

1 1

02UTC

an order was issued to increase cockpit security.

At

1

342 UTC

all aircraft were ordered to return to airports, and a national ground stopwas instituted.Jones noted that at the time of the

9/1

1 attacks ZBW used reel to reel tapes for recording.Now they have digital audio.Henoticed that thereis adifferenceinterminology whenBoston

ATCs

tried

to

relay information

to

MEADS.

He

thinks this lack

of

common

terminology

should be dealt with.Jones explained that he understands Giant Killer as based out of Norfolk, Virginia and iscontrol of Navy training exercises, and all warning

areas

off the

east

coast.

Jones stated that

AAl

1

first

became

a

primary target

at 1221

12UTC.

He

noted thatbecause they only had a primary Collin Scoggins attempted to contact

NEAPS

tocoordinate with their height

finding

capability (check

on

that).|

|

1

I

Jones also statedthe pre

9/1

1theWOC's prime rolewas to

notify

theother

ATC

centers

of

the

ongoing information

and

operations.

Jones

took

Commission

staff

on a

tour through

the

reel system

of ZBW, and

Commission

staff

has

requested

the

complete accident

file

through

FAA

headquarters.

It was

during

this

tour that Jones explained

to

Commission staff

that

the

communication

from

AAl 1

did not

come

from the

American Airlines

pilot

keying

the

microphone covertly

to

inform

authorities

of the

hijack.

After

the

9/1

1

attacks Jones

assisted

an FBI

audio analyst

incopying

the recordings. The FBI analyst

informed

Jones that in analysis of the recording

he

could pick

up

spit

in the

speech patterns

of the

hijackers being recorded smacking

themicrophone. It was the FBI

analyst's

definitive

conclusion

that

the

hijackers were

in

position

of the

cockpit,

and

speaking directly into

the

microphone,

at the

time

of therecording.

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

COMMISSION

SENSITIVE

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUMFOR THERECORD

Page

1 of 5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Staff visit to the Boston Center, New England Region, FAA

Type of

Event: Briefing

and

Scheduled Interviews

Date:

September 22-24, 2003Special Access

Issues:

NATCA (National Air Traffic Control

Association) representatives

sat in on

some

interviews.

A FAA

legal representative

from

the New

England Region attended

all

staff contacts

with

FAA

personnel

Prepared

by: Miles Kara

Team

Number:

8

Location:

Nashua, NH (Boston Center) and Burlington, MA (New England Region)

Participants

- Non-Commission: See individual interview reports

Participants -

Commission: Miles Kara, John Azzarello, Geoff Brown

Background

Summary

Commission

staff

were able

to

efficiently

and

effectively

formally interview

18

people, tour facilities

at

both the

Boston Center

and the New

England Region,

and

accomplish discovery

of

four

additional

relevant

document sources, thanks to a forthcoming, responsive reception by the Operations-Manager-in-Charge, Terry Biggio. Mr. Biggio fine-tuned the visit schedule on-site to ensure that we talked to the

people

that would

do

Staff

the

most good

in the

time allotted. That required dropping some potential

interviewees

and adding others and making several schedule changes that impacted the FAA work

force.

The work force accommodated

those

changes and the

representatives

of FAA

Counsel appointed

to

attend

Staffs

presence pitched

in and

helped out. NATCA representatives, when requested

byinterviewees to be

present were also

helpful

in the

overall process.

The

Staff

left

with

the

impression

that

Boston Center,Mr.Biggioinparticular, wantedus togainacompleteandaccurate viewoftheir

collective

work under near-unprecedented pressure

on

September

1 1

,

2001

.

The

Regional Administrator

took a

brief exit brief

from

the

team

at

which time

she was

advised

of the

support provided

by Mr

Biggio

and

staff

and of the

document discoveries made

by the

Commission

staff.

Major

Points

Discovery.

Staff learned of additional responsive information that had not been provided through the

document

request process.

Accident File.

Staff learned

from

Mr. Bob

Jones,

Quality

Assurance

Office,

of the

existence

of an

accident

file,

different

from

the

"accident

package"

provided

by FAA to

both

theFBI

and

NTSB,

and

subsequently provided

to the

Commission

in

response

to a

document request

to

DoT. Among other items in the package is a reconstructed time-line based on telephone

company

records.

Mr

Jones, locally considered

a

hero because

of his

quick work

in

replaying

the

tapes

of

cockpit conversations that

day was

insistently steered

our way by Mr.

Biggio.

After

Action Review.

Staff

learned that

the New

England Region convened

a

round table

two

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9/29/2003

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