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T5 B25 Articles on VISAs 3 of 3 Fdr- Letters From Thomas Pabst Re Illegal Activities of John Heimann at US Consulate 301

T5 B25 Articles on VISAs 3 of 3 Fdr- Letters From Thomas Pabst Re Illegal Activities of John Heimann at US Consulate 301

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10/24/2009

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Joanne Accolla
«
TI:
Dan
Leopold
on
behalf
of
Info
t:
Monday, February
02,
2004 3:42
PM
Team 5
Cc:
Chris
Kojm
Subject:
FW: Atten:
Chris
Kojm/National Commission,
Terrorist Attacks
on the
U.S.
VisaMisuse.doc
(29HeimannFullReport.
KB)
doc (46 KB)
-Original
From:
Tom
Pabst
|
9/11
Personal Privacy
|
Sent:
Friday, January
30,
2004
11:
16
AMTo:
Info
Cc:
Thomas
Philip PabstSubject: Atten: Chris
Kojm/National
Commission,
Terrorist
Attacks
on the
U.S.
Hon. Chris Kojm, Deputy Executive Director
For the
information
of the
Commission. Please
see
attachments. Attached Document
"VisaMisuse"
describes,
at
U.S.
Department
of
State Consular post
in
late 1980s,
the
illegal
and
unapproved diversion
and
misuse
of
Visa
(Consular) resources
away
from visa processing
to
other, non-consular activities,
by
John
Paul
Heimann
and
Judith Margaret
Heimann, thePrincipal
Officer
at
post. This diversion,
in an
admittedly very small
way,
and
long
before the
9-11
attacks,weakened
the
ability
of the
Bureau
of
Consular Affairs
at theState
Department to detect potential terrorist visa applicants. This diversion alsorived
the
Bureau
of
Consular
Affairs
of the
knowledge
that
a
Visa Officer (position)
rseas
was wholly dedicated to
100%
non-consular (non-visa) work, resources that might
e
been transferred to and employed at a different overseas post for their intendedpurpose, visa processing. The also reflected
(s)lack
of structural procedures andoversight
by
Department
of
State
to
ensure Consular resources
in the
field
are in
fact
used
forconsular (visa) processing purposes.I
note that this
is a
separate issue frominadequateresources formally programmed
by
Congress
to the
Visa function
at the
State
Department.
Attached,Ialso provide information about allegedly criminal activitiesbyJohn
Paul
Heimann, spouse of the Principal Officer, at the
post.
These latter activities
did
notdirectly involve visa processing,butthis informationisgivenforbackground.Istand ready
to
provide
any
additional
information you
might require.
I
believe
the
9-11
attacks were preventable
at
least
in
part.
The
Honorable Mary Ryan
is
correct
that
Consular Officers handleup to 200visa casesper
day,
as did I atTijuana,
Lisbon,
and Bordeaux. With about a minute per interview, how can a Visa Officer beexpected
to
fully review
an applicant's
information
and be
sure
he/she
is not an
intending
terrorist,
or not otherwise unqualified for the visa they seek? Further, because most
Visa
Officers are performing their visa work as an entryway or way station to mainstream(non-Consular/Visa) diplomatic and foreign relations work, they are transferred out of
visa
processing once they develop expertise. And visa supervisors cannot possibly review
any but a
small fraction
of
cases.
The
institutional visa knowledge
of the
Bureau
of
Consular Affairs is perpetually handicapped, because most visas are processed by officerswho arealwaysin a defacto trainee
status.
Superbastheir efforts
are,
probably75% of
the
visa officers are marking time until they move into Political, Economic, or
Administrative
workat theStateDepartment. AVisa Function transferredto theDepartment
of
Homeland Security
(DHS)
would
not
suffer such
a
handicap.
All
visas,
all
the
time,
for the
duration
of the
career. Because handling visa processing
for an
Officer
is
by
nature challenging, complex, difficult,
and
exhausting,
the
conditions
of
employment
could
reflect a
maximum
number of hours per day of face-to-face interviews, frequent
,
maximum use of technology, and good pre-screening by local nationals where
Respectfully, and
with great hope your Commission recommends
that
the
visa
function
is
moved to the
DHS,
or
alternatively,
that
criminal penalties
are
imposed
on
State
 
Department
Officers
who
divert
Visa
resources
away
from
the Consular
function,
as did the
Service
Officer, 1980-19951 9/11
Personal Privacy
|
9/11 Personal Privacy
 
[senate
Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations SubcommitteeUnited States SenateRoom S
14
6A Capitol
Bldg.
Washington,
DC
20510
fax
number
:
(202)
224-2698
Thnmaa
H.
Pah.gf-
March
27,
2003
9/11
Personal Privacy
Honorable Membersof the Subcommittee,This letter is intended for members of the
above-referenced
Subcommittees, or their staff assistants or aides who help to setandallocatetheBudgetfor the
U.S.
DepartmentofState,specifically the Consular overseas portion of the State Department
budget.
The basic thrust of my message is that the StateDepartment does
not
spend
on
Consular
functions,
those fundsallocated by Congress to the State Department "Consular Account".Rather,the overseas
Consular
funds in
effect
have been andpresumably could
be
again unofficially shifted
to
non-Consular
activities overseas,
and
Congress,
OMB, 0PM,
and
other regulatory
and
oversight bodies
are not
likely
to
learn
of it, or to
learn
of
it
in a timely manner. My conclusion is based upon direct personalexperience in the Foreign Service, briefly summarized below.I was a Foreign Service Officer with the
U.S.
Department of StatefromNovember
1980
to June
1995,
almost 15
years.
For my
last
ofthreeoverseas tours,
I was
assigned
in
1988
as a
Consular
Officer
to
a
Consular
Position at the
U.S.
Consulate in Bordeaux, France,from September
1988
to September 1990. (That Consulate was closed.)
The
position
to
which
I was
assigned
was
programmed
as
Consular,and that never changed.Uponmyarrivalat theConsulateinSeptember,
1988
tobeginmytour of duty in this
Consular
position, my supervisor
(the
Principal Officer) assigned to me 100 percent NON-CONSULAR DUTIES.Thatis, all of theduties thatsheassignedto mewereadministrative
and
reporting(journalistic),with absolutely
no
consular element
or
component
to the
duties.
On the
books
inWashington,
however, the position was never
reprogrammed
out ofConsular with the concomitant shift in funds in the accounts, and
was
always
a
designated, funded
Consular
position.
To
reiterate,
the
positionwasfundedfor theperformanceofConsular duties,andnotreportingoradministrative duties thatit wasimproperlyandillegally (?)used
for.
I wasrequiredby thePrincipal Officer(mysupervisor)
to
perform wholly non-Consular services
in a
Consular
position. This
is not
what
the
Congress
and the
taxpayers
"contractedfor".

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