T8 B3 Boston Center Colin Scoggins Fdr- Chronology of Events and FAA Personnel Statement- Wasnt in a Rush- Went to the Credit Union First

Chronology of Events at Mission Coordinator Position

My

name is Colin Scoggins, I specialize in airspace and procedures, and militaryoperations. My intent was to check with TMU to make sure that

fighters

were requested

for

AAL11 a

Hijacked

aircraft.

Once

at TMU the

call

to

NEADS

for

Fighter escort

had

just been made. I volunteered to help and man the mission coordinator (MC) position.Belowis arecollectionofsomeof thetelephone

calls,

andcommunications that occurredin the TMU unit. Unfortunately, most of these calls were made on the DSN telephone atthe MC position. This is an unrecorded line at Boston Center, but is recorded at NEADS.

Without

arecordingI amunabletoprovideatimeline,I did mybesttokeep thingsin

order.

I actually came in late that morning, at about 8:25 AM. As I entered the doorwaysomeone advised me that a Hijacking was going on, an

AAL11.)

I

wasn't in a rush because when Hijacks do occur sometimes to many people try to get

involved

but instead they just get in the way. I went to the credit union

first.

I thenthought Ishould probablygo to the TMUunittomake surethe

fighters

got offbecauseofthe

Hijack.

I commented to the Credit Union employee, that I needed to go to the TMU

unit

to make sure that the fighters got

off,

just in case they needed to take action againstthe hijack. Commenting that if it really came to it and if they had to stop the highjack

from

hitting a building or something, there

wasn't

much they could do.

Entered

TMU Unit to

verify

that NEADS was called to scramble

fighters.

Joe

Cooper was talking to NEADS requesting

fighter

escort asking them when they weregoing

to get

off.ConversedwithDanBuenotheSTMCto

verify

that NEADShadbeen called.Headvised they had, and

briefed

me on the

Hijack.

(There was a delay here

because

Bueno

called

the

102

nd

first

and asked them to scramble, they advised they needed a scramble

order

over the scramble circuit.) (Bueno had also advised me that the Hijack seemed to be

more

real, that there may have possibly been a Mid-eastern or Arabic voice heard on the

hijack.)

(He also advised me that they had turned

off

the transponders to prevent the

Hijack

code

from

appearing.) (Thiswas notsomeone pissedoff ormentally deranged,

you

could tell that our awareness was higher than normal.)Contacted NEADS to see if they could

identify

AAL11 primary target only, attempting to

get

analtitude

from

their radar. (Height

finding

equipment) NEADS unableto

identify

target.

Called NEADs several times to

identify

target, 50 South of ALB, then 30 North of JFK,

16

N of JFK, and again when we lost radar 8 NE of JFK.

Conversed

with Dan Bueno onAAL11target, target seemed to be slowing down entering

ZNY's airspace, possibly descending.

(400

+ knots to 320

knots)

Contacted NEADS requesting them to

identify

AAL11

primary target, to receive analtitude read out

from

their radar system. NEADS unable to identify target. AdvisedNEADS that they

should consider

launching

fighters

from ACY, that

Otis

ANGB might

not

be

able

to

catch

up to the

AAL11.

Primary

Radar target lost, conversed with Dan Bueno about radar coverage, aircraft

possibly

descended belowourcoverage.Conversed with

Dan

Bueno about whether

the

fighters

had

scrambled

or

not,

Dan

advisedthat Cape Sector had issued the clearance but didn't believe they were off yet.

Call

from

HUNTRESS (Same as NEADS), Sgt. Powell advising us about the fighters

from

Otis ANGB. Advising

ZBW

that the fighters should be airborne. AdvisedHUNTRESS that radar was lost.Began numerous discussions with

a

female

Major

at

NEADS believe

to be

Major

Deskins

on

DSIs]

|

We

needed

to

identify

radar target, gave last knownpositions 8 NM northeast of JFK, also gave

L/L

of last known position.TMU Unit notified of an ELT and an

aircraft

had hit the WTC.Discussions in TMU on what aircraft hit the WTC. I believe a call was made to AALoperations to confirm. It was apparent it was AAL11.

Open TELCON

at TMU desk discussion

about

a

UAL

175 Hijack or NORDO.

Bo

Dean had entered TMU area. I requested Bo Dean to call UAL operations to find out

the

status.

I

don't believe

UAL new the

status.

ASD

indicated that UAL175

was

over

NJ.

/

Terry Biggio, the

OMIC,

issued a ground stop.Catted NEADS on DSN]

[requested

to speak with Bill Ayers ADLO. Receivedseveral

different

numbers

to

use.

OMIC

advises that there

may be

more

aircraft

involved.Bob Jones

had

entered

the TMU

Unit

and

advised

Biggio

that

the

tapes

indicated

and

clearly

stated that they

an

Arabic voice

was

heard

and

stated that they

"

we

have planes,

we

have more

planes",

he

states

again"we arereturningto theairport everyone stay

calm,

we are returning to the airport calm down and no one will be injured."

(I

heard this tape several days later, it is very chilling to hear based on the knowledge ofthe entire ordeal.)

(My

good

friend

Pete Zyleski

was the

radar controller working

AAL11.)

9/11 Law Enforcement

Sensitive

I

believe

I

called NEADS

and

asked them

if

they knew

of

information

on

UAL

175 or ifthey

were tracking

UAL

175.

The

fighters

had got off

from

FMH,

but by the

time they broke ground

the WTC had

already been hit. (I did not hear this directly but was repeated to me that when they got

off

on initial contact with the center they were advised they were too late. They werecleared into W-105 to delay until they received other orders.) (We did not know that

UAL

175 had been hijacked yet. On several calls to New York Center we were advisedthatthey were working a hijack, and we assumed it wasAAL11not UAL175.)

AF

personnel advise that a 2

nd

aircraft

had impacted the

WTC.

They have CNN on a TV

at

their position.Open TELCON rumor that AAL11 may not have impacted the WTC, that it might havebeen another

aircraft,