Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Save to My Library
Look up keyword
Like this
1Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
Does CITES work?

Does CITES work?

Ratings: (0)|Views: 3 |Likes:
Published by Mises Fan
Four case studies.
Four case studies.

More info:

Categories:Types, Research
Published by: Mises Fan on May 10, 2013
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

07/31/2013

pdf

text

original

 
The Institute of Economic Affairs
2 Lord North StreetLondon SW1P 3LB
Telephone: 0171 799 3745Facsimile: 0171 799 2137E-mail: enviro@iea.org,ukInternet: http://www.iea.org.uk
The IEA is a Registered Charity No. 235 251Limited by guarantee, registered no. 755502
EnvironmentBriefing Paper 
Does CITES work?
Four case studies
Michael ’t Sas Rolfes
IEA Environment Briefing No.4
ISBN 0-255 36445-8
Price £3.00 inc. P&P
A Publication of the IEA Environment Unit
 
©
 AfricaResources Trust1997
Introduction
The objective of the Convention on International Tradein Endangered Species (CITES) is to regulateinternational trade in specimens of species of wild faunaand flora. To achieve this, CITES relies on specificmanagement authorities from signatory nations to issue permits and certificates for import and export.Particular animal and plant species (or parts thereof)may be subject to one of three different levels of regulation, corresponding to the particular ‘appendix’upon which they are listed:
 
Appendix I
includes species threatened withextinction and for which trade must be subject to particularly strict regulations and only authorised inexceptional circumstances.
 
Appendix II
species are not necessarily currentlythreatened with extinction but may become sounless trade is strictly regulated. Appendix II alsocontains so called ‘look-alike’ species which arecontrolled because of their similarity in appearanceto the other regulated species, thereby facilitating amore effective control.
 
Appendix III
includes species that are subject toregulation within the jurisdiction of a party and for which the co-operation of the parties is needed inorder to prevent or restrict their exploitation.Various factors threaten the conservation status of wildspecies of fauna and flora; of these, habitat conversion,fragmentation and destruction account for the greatestnumber of species losses. Excessive commercialexploitation accounts for a much smaller, but stillsignificant, proportion of losses. CITES is intended to protect those species that are threatened by excessivecommercial exploitation. To do this, it focuses on avery narrow aspect of commercial exploitation, namelytransactions that take place across international borders(i.e. ‘international trade’). CITES is not designed toaddress issues such as supply mechanisms, domestictrading regimes or consumer demand.CITES is therefore very limited in its potentialeffectiveness as a conservation tool. Not only does itfail to address issues of habitat loss, but it also fails tocreate mechanisms to control the supply of wildlife products or any direct means to influence consumer demand. As it is currently structured, CITES operates primarily as a restrictive mechanism, rather than anenabling one. Implicit in its existing structure is anassumption that all trade is somehow bad for conservation unless proven otherwise. Measures takenunder CITES therefore tend to emphasize limitations ontrade rather than ways to facilitate trade that mayultimately enhance the status of wild species.In theory, CITES is supposed to supplement, notreplace, effective control of the supply of wild species(field protection). In practice, however, there are manycases where field protection is completely lacking andCITES provides the only readily available mechanismfor controlling commercial exploitation.Can CITES trade measures replace the need for effective field protection? The following four casestudies suggest that it cannot. Each of these caseshighlights serious shortcomings of the existing CITESmechanism. Perhaps we can gain some insights fromthese case studies, and use them to design moreeffective wildlife trade regulation policies andmechanisms.
1Rhinos
Background
There are five extant rhino species, two in Africa andthree in Asia.The African species are the black rhino and thewhite rhino. Black rhino numbers have dropped froman estimated 65,000 in 1970 to about 2,400 in 1995.In the last five years numbers have increased in threerange states: South Africa, Namibia and Kenya.Elsewhere they continue to decline. There are twoseparate populations of white rhino. The northern population declined from some 2,000 in 1970 to asingle population in Zaire of 17 in 1984. Since then this population has increased to about 30 but remains highlyendangered. The southern white rhino was almost
 
2
extinct at the turn of the century, and reduced to asingle population of perhaps 20 animals in theHluhluwe-Umfolozi district in South Africa. However,with careful management numbers have grown to over 7,500 today, and continue to increase.The Asian species are the Indian, Javan andSumatran rhinos. Indian rhino numbers have fluctuated;there was an increase in the early 1980s, followed by adecline in the late 1980s and another recovery in the1990s; estimates put the population at 2,100 animals in1995. Javan rhino numbers appear to have remainedfairly stable over the last decade or two, at some 75animals. Sumatran rhino numbers have droppedconsiderably during the 1990s from an estimated 600-1,000 to the existing level of about 270.In Africa, black and white rhinos were widelyexterminated by hunting until conservation measureswere implemented. Subsequently rhinos have beeneliminated by poaching for their horn. In Asia, theforest-dwelling Javan and Sumatran rhinos have beenlargely eliminated through habitat loss, although poaching for rhino products has also played a role.Indian rhinos have been affected by habitat loss,hunting and poaching for horn.Rhino horn is a highly sought-after commodity. Hornof both Asian and African species is used as aningredient in traditional Chinese medicines, to treatserious fevers and various other ailments. African hornis also used in Yemen to carve traditional dagger handles. Other rhino body parts are also used intraditional medicines, especially in Southeast Asia;virtually every single body part has some use.Ironically, the southern white rhino was probably therarest of all rhino species and subspecies at the turn of the century, whereas today it is more numerous than allother rhino species put together. The southern whiterhino is the only true rhino conservation success story,and it is worth examining the factors that havecontributed to this success and contrasting these withthe factors that led to the demise of all other rhinos.
Round One/First measures
The white rhino and three Asian species were listed onCITES Appendix I at the Convention’s inception in1975. The black rhino was moved to Appendix I in1977. After the Appendix I listings, the price of rhinohorn rose dramatically in all consumer markets. For example, in Japan recorded import prices per kgincreased from US$75 in 1976 to US$308 in 1978; inSouth Korea prices increased from US$49 in 1976 toUS$355 in 1979 and US$530 in 1981; and in Taiwanthey rose from US$17 in 1977 to US$477 in 1980. InYemen, the wholesale price of horn increased fromUS$764 in 1980 to US$1,159 in 1985. Tradecontinued despite the ban and demand was further fuelled by speculative stockpiling.The Appendix I listings of all rhino species has nothad a discernible positive effect on rhino numbers anddoes not seem to have stopped the trade in rhino horn.If anything, the Appendix I listings led to a sharpincrease in the black market price of rhino horn, whichsimply fuelled further poaching and encouragedspeculative stockpiling of horn.
Round Two/Subsequent measures
Recognising the failure of the Appendix I listing, thedelegates at the third CITES Conference of the Parties(COP) in 1981 passed an additional resolution(Resolution Conf. 3.11) on rhino horn trade. Thisresolution called on nations that were not parties toCITES also to take measures to prevent theinternational trade in rhino products and it called for amoratorium on the sale of all government and parastatalstocks of rhino products.Subsequent to this resolution, rhino poaching andtrade continued unabated in most African countries: for example, between 1981 and 1987 Tanzania’s black rhino population dropped from 3,795 to about 275 andZambia’s dropped from 3,000 to just over 100.The obvious failure of Resolution Conf. 3.11 prompted a further resolution to be passed at the sixthCITES COP in 1987. This resolution called for evenstricter measures, including the complete prohibition of trade in all rhino products both internationally anddomestically. It also called for the destruction of government stocks of rhino horn, and suggested thataffected countries should be financially compensatedfor destroying their stockpiles.Since the 1981 resolution was also being ignored bygovernments of several countries, the new resolutionrecommended that parties should exert political,economic and diplomatic pressure on any countries that‘continued to allow the trade in rhino horn’. This later resolution (Conf. 6.10) was again ignored by severalconsumer countries and range states. Most range statesrefused to destroy their stockpiles of rhino horn andseveral key consumer countries failed to implementdomestic legislation. Rhino horn trade and poaching

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->