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A
BDISALAM
M.
 
I
SSA
-S
ALWE
 
S
OMALIA
S
D
EGENERATED
A
UTHORITY
:
 
W
HICH
W
AY
O
UT
?
 
M
ARCH
2000
 
 
 
1. Introduction
Since the breakdown of the Somali state in early 1991, there have been many efforts by theinternational community to revitalise the Somali state. Instead they were unsuccessful and,generally, counter-productive. The failure lies, first, in the approach as it aimed at theresuscitation of an externally driven state structure where the local peoples say, contributionand involvement were rarely sought. Second, the memories of the dreadful fratricidal war stilllinger on in the minds of the Somalis, thus, creating major obstacles to peace. Third, none of previous peace processes were based on the reality of today's Somalia and the background of the tragedy. They were all relying on collaboration with the warlords in the attempt to form agovernment based on power sharing between/among the power-thirsty warlords, rather thanon confidence building among the people concerned. Fourth, none of these conferences wasbased on any well-though-of programme or any clear vision for rebuilding from the rubble of the shattered statehood and country.Is there a way out from the current Somalias nightmare? What is the basis for therehabilitation of a central authority in Somalia?
2. Undermining the Traditional Authority
In spite of the fact, that Somalias nightmare came in focus in this decade, it is believed that ithad begun in the closing decade of the nineteenth century. This had not only resulted in thepartition of Somali territory, but also had left behind a centralised system of government aliento the Somalis.Traditionally, Somali political authority was spread throughout the community, as therewas no centre for political control. Clan leaders dealt with people politically on a face-to-facebasis, and were responsible for all affairs concerning the clan and its relations with otherclans. They claimed no rights as rulers over their people. The clan-leader had a littleexecutive power. "He presided over the assembly of elders (
 shir 
), but did not himself makethe decisions" (
Ugaaska wuu guddoonshaaye, ma gooyo
) (Kapteijns, 1993). Somaliegalitarianism is encapsulated in the right of every man to have a say in the communal affairs.After lengthy discussion and analysis of the matter concerned, a decision in the
 shir 
isdecided by consensus.During the late 1930s to 1960s lineage politics were manipulated to serve the politicalneeds of the colonisers. A new form of hierarchy was introduced, and chiefs, called
caaqils
,were appointed by the colonial administration to represent and speak for the clan lineages.This process was to undermine the local authority (Sadia, 1994).These subordinate
caaqils
were used as political representatives of colonial authorities asthey were paid a stipend by the colonial administration, and given other concessions. Thesespokesmen were generally, for obvious reasons of convenience and availability, drawn fromthe urban areas. Although they were in theory representative of clan local interests, they werenot necessarily in touch with grass roots issues; they were 'townies', and more concerned withpersonal interest (ibid.). As they were paid by the colonial masters, this undermined thetraditional source of authority (Lewis, 1980). It weakened the integrity of the clan, anddiminished the
caaqil 
's accountability to the clan. Moreover, groups whose
caaqils
collaborated with the colonial government were favoured, in order to tempt other groups toacquiesce under the colonial authority (Sadia, 1994). Thus, the lineages were politicised bythe colonisers for 'divide and rule' purposes, and the system was successful in corroding thelocal institution of 
 shir 
(assembly) and traditional leadership (Samatar, 1988). Traditionalchiefs thus became marginalized. Such social changes, which saw the shifting of influencefrom traditional (rural) leaders to a new urban leadership was to have an impact on themodern Somali leadership.
 
Here we see the beginnings of the influence of hitherto unfamiliar modern westernisedpolitics - which was to have far reaching consequences on the later-to-be-constituted Somalistate. This imposed an alien system and eroded the power of grassroots communalassociations. Harmonising relations and enforcement of peace for the common good amonglocal groups was replaced by a high public political profile of a socio-economic nature(Sadia, 1994).The civilian government, which ruled Somalia in 1960s, did not change much of whatthey had inherited from their colonial predecessors. They gave priority and sometimes paidsalaries to the townie clan representatives.The centralisation of the system of government following independence brought a newtype of leadership. The ability of the traditional assemblies to influence decisions grewsteadily weaker and power shifted to leaders who were elected to parliament. These newleaders, living away from the communities who had elected them, were free of the traditionalpattern of constraints, and became less and less accountable for their actions.This new political culture created a type of leader who was more concerned with personalpower and aggrandisement. Such a person, physically and socially removed from thetraditional power base, felt free to operate unchecked by the clan, and this lack of responsibility to his constituents was not compensated for by a more general, though essential,sense of responsibility to society that should accompany public service. This degeneration instandards of responsibility would help pave the way for the subsequent leadership crisesduring the military era, and in the period of disintegration of the Somali nation state.The military regime, which came to power in 1969, followed a similar policy. In additionto that, it created their clan representatives called
nabaddoon
and
samadoon
(peace-seekers)
.
 Clan manipulation was also a mark of the regime; the policy became a political instrumentwhose effect on the Somali public was to build up resentment among other clan groupings.The regime set a two-tier system, one which rewarded some sub-clans for their loyalty to the
 Kacaanka Barakaysan
(the Blessed Revolution), and the other to persecute and repress thosesub-clans "for their recalcitrance or reluctance to be enthusiastic about the new order imposedupon them." (Siciid, 1993). To create fear among the social groupings, family members andneighbours were encouraged to spy on each other and report to the
Guulwadayaal 
, the Para-military force established which acted as the regime's watchdog at neighbourhood level (Issa-Salwe, 1996). The song
harkaaga laguu diray
 
(your shadow is watching you)
 
was meant tointimidate people from drifting from the revolutionary path.After the power vacuum created by the downfall of the military regime, the leadership of so called "warlords" which emerged, changed the course of events into widespread clan-based factional warfare of a primitive feudal nature.
2.1 The Breakdown of the Sense of Authority
After over a century of colonial defamation of Somali traditional authority and culture,followed by a decade of feeble governing by the civilian government, two decades of repressive centralised state control involving the manipulation of clan mentality, theexploitation of traditional rivalry and suppression and collective punishment of any form of rebellion, a destructive instinct was created in society against the fabric of the Somalinationhood.Not only has the Somali state failed to replace the clan with a feeling of security for theindividual Somali, but it has also become a threat to his/her being. It was a natural regressiontherefore for the Somali to go to his/her roots, i.e. the clan, which was eroded by the tides of social change and political exploitation. These phenomena created resentment amongst theSomalis, which turned into an instinct for destruction towards the state and its institutions.The destructiveness was assumed to be derived from "the unbearable feeling of 
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